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A significant part of global trade, value creation, energy security and interna-
tional peace and security depends on the seas and oceans, which cover around 
71% of the planet’s surface.1 The same applies to the bulk of internet commu-
nications, which rely heavily on submarine cables, and, no less so, to most of 
the world’s unknown biological resources and biodiversity. A number of chal-
lenges and possibilities related to the oceans are highlighted in governmental 
strategies, including notably the Norwegian Government’s White Paper sub-
mitted to the Norwegian parliament in 2017 and the Government’s Updated 
Ocean Strategy published in 2019.2
There is, in fact, good news as regards the toolbox provided by interna-
tional law for policy- makers. A comprehensive, unified and universal legal 
framework exists for ocean and maritime spaces. This framework establishes 
a system of competencies and possibilities of proactive coordination, further 
regulation where necessary, and dispute settlement, together with a number 
of key principles and rules. It successfully promotes and integrates a variety of 
important goals, which previously could seem irreconcilable. Moreover, any 
further regulations must be fully consistent with this legal framework and not 
undermine the existing architecture.3 Instead of lawless black holes, issues of 
lack of compliance or implementation are unfortunately frequent.
This framework did not appear overnight. It builds on a monumental series 
of building- blocks, imagine layer upon layer of legal mortar, stemming mainly 
from State practice and legislation, treaty- making and case- law. The result-
ing masonry is solid. Its most sophisticated expression is found in the United 
1   The author is solely responsible for this contribution, which was written before the author 
assumed his current position.
2   ‘The place of the oceans in Norway’s foreign and development policy’ – Meld. St. 22 (2016–2017) 
Report to the Storting, <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/1b21c0734b5042e489c242
34e9927b73/en- gb/sved/stm201620170022000engpdfs.pdf>; and ‘Blue opportunities – The 
Norwegian Government’s Updated Ocean Strategy’, 3 June 2019, <https://www.regjeringen 
.no/globalassets/departementene/nfd/dokumenter/strategier/nfd_havstrategi_20 
19_engelsk.pdf>.
3   See article 311 (2) and (3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 396 (UNCLOS). See 
also, for example, paras. 6–7 of resolution 72/249 adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 24 December 2017 on an ‘International legally binding instrument under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’, UN Doc. A/RES/72/249.
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 Among its stated aims 
is to make “an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice 
and progress for all peoples of the world,” The number of parties bound by this 
convention has reached 168 at the time of writing.
Even the relatively few States that have not ratified or acceded to the con-
vention recognize that a number of its provisions reflect international custom-
ary law, and thus universally binding norms. This significantly includes the 
United States of America, which is the State that set in motion modern law- 
making relating to the continental shelf. This happened on 28 September 1945 
with the seminal adoption of what has later consistently been referred to as 
the Truman Proclamation.5 Subsequently, the United States continued to be 
at the forefront in spearheading more predictable rules in this domain, in 
line with momentous technological and economic developments. Key steps 
included the adoption in 1958 of the Geneva Convention on the continental 
shelf and, thereafter, the negotiations on the definition and the extent of the 
continental shelf in UNCLOS article 76 and Annex II. The latter consecrates a 
method originally suggested by the American geologist Hollis Dow Hedberg, 
with other additions. Today, the Hedberg formula is most frequently used for 
defining the outer limits of the continental shelf. The existence of an extensive 
legal framework applicable to all Arctic waters was confirmed in the Ilulissat 
Declaration on 28 May 2008 by the coastal States surrounding the central part 
of the Arctic Ocean, who confirmed their commitment to this extensive legal 
framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims in 
the Arctic.
Indeed, there is good news. The broad normative unity and coherence of the 
international law of the sea is striking. In many areas and on subjects which 
could be described as potential hotspots of contention or colliding interests, 
the universal and unified nature of this body of law is regularly demonstrated. 
This fact is actually often overlooked or, wrongly, just taken for granted. The 
yearly resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on the topic of 
“Oceans and the Law of the Sea” are incidentally the longest of all resolutions 
adopted by the plenary of the General Assembly. They arguably contain some 
of the most concrete operative paragraphs for timely adoption of national 
4   Ibid.
5   Proclamation No. 2667, ‘Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of 
the Subsoil and Sea- Bed of the Continental Shelf ’, 28 September 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303; XIII 
Bulletin, Dept. of State, No. 327, 30 September 1945, p. 485.
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measures and concerted international action. These resolutions merit careful 
study and a broader readership.6
As already indicated, some words of caution are nevertheless due. The exis-
tence of a considerable number of applicable principles and rules, either as 
treaty obligations or as customary international law, does not automatically 
entail that all necessary or adequate regulations and arrangements have been 
adopted or implemented. Nor does it signify that legal rules are being com-
plied with thanks to appropriate controls and enforcement.
The first word of caution has to do with the fact that many rules of the 
international law of the sea confer powers – and may be distinguished from 
rules imposing obligations or duties. In many cases they could also be seen as 
a road map or a work plan that, in turn, requires adequate action to be taken 
by the competent national authorities or international organizations, notably 
in the form of appropriate regulations.
Such rules might to some extent be compared to the operating system of a 
computer. The latter manages hardware and software resources, but requires 
additional software or applications to actually enable operations essential 
for the user. The user would usually not have to bother too much about the 
operating system, but would instead focus on this “secondary” software. Let us 
here use a simple yet classic illustration. The law of the sea empowers States to 
establish exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles. Whether to establish 
such a zone is a sovereign prerogative of the coastal State to decide. The coastal 
State may choose to establish or keep less comprehensive fisheries or ecologi-
cal zones, as long as the limits and constraints established in UNCLOS article 
311 (2) and (3) are respected, as these require consistency with the key system 
of the convention.
UNCLOS is often referred to as the international constitution of the oceans. 
A constitution will still require adoption of legislation and systems of com-
pliance, enforcement and adjudication. Within this framework, there is a 
considerable potential for creativity, innovation and adaptation to evolving 
conditions as regards policy formulation. This is also the case for the law of 
the sea. Moreover, cross- fertilization, helped by comparative studies or various 
other phenomena of reception of norms, may be particularly useful for States 
6   Notably two resolutions adopted in December 2018, respectively ‘Oceans and the Law of 
the Sea’ (UN Doc. A/RES/73/124) and ‘Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments’ (UN Doc. 
A/RES/73/125).
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and the competent international organizations considering the adoption of 
relevant measures.
More good news is that control and compliance may be aided by new 
advances in technology, science and various forms of know how building on 
best practices. Satellite tracking and digital advances related to big data are 
merely catchwords to illustrate the potential for quantum leaps in efficiency, 
which also have to be accompanied by thoughtful regulators. Yet an example of 
innovation is the approach taken by Norway in promoting development assis-
tance in the context of definition of the outer limits of the continental shelf.7 
Mr. Harald Brekke, member of the Commission of the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf from its inception in 1997 until 2012, played a key role also in this regard. 
He is among the contributors to this book on the law of the sea- bed.
This book addresses a need. It concerns a vast number of rapidly developing 
new challenges and possibilities. It contributes cross- disciplinary perspectives 
and various academic “angles of attack” on issues that merit further analysis, 
cross- fertilization and critical inquiry. A long chain of individuals, including 
practitioners and academics, e.g. geologists, policy- makers, negotiators and 
arbitrators, has contributed to the constant weaving of a less open textured 
law of the sea – yet striving at the same time for preserving due flexibility in 
light of differing geographical and local contexts and conditions. The contribu-
tors to this book are participants in this international endeavour. We are there-
fore sincerely grateful to Catherine Banet for this valuable initiative.
Rolf Einar Fife
7   R.E. Fife, ‘A Perspective on Development and the Law of the Sea: How to Provide Support for 
the Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, in Sainz- Borgo et al (eds.), 
Liber Amicorum in Honour of Gudmundur Eiriksson, University for Peace, San José, Costa Rica 
& O.P. Jindal Global University, New Dehli, 2017, 51–67.
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The Law of the Seabed
Catherine Banet
1 Focus of the Book
Humankind has always been fascinated by the seabeds for their mysteries, 
their perils and their riches, along with the beauty of their biological diversity. 
Moreover, the ocean floor comprises a constellation of components that are, 
at the same time, fragile and vital to sustainability and the balance of the rest 
of the world’s interdependent eco-systems.
For an area which is barely accessible to most human beings, the ocean floor 
plays a major role in the Earth ecological balance. Oceans cover 70 percent 
of the Earth surface and constitute more than 95 percent of the planet living 
space. The deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction covers half of the Earth’s 
surface, and 50 per cent of is below 3,000 meter depth. The seabeds sustain 
important functions and ecosystem services, including nutrient regeneration, 
carbon sequestration, biological and mineral resources.
Both the exploitation and the conservation of seabeds pose fundamental 
questions for consideration by jurists, policy makers and negotiators, issues 
associated with the man-made rule of law but with consequences surpassing 
purely legal considerations and that require great qualities of judgement and 
care. Short-term commercial aspirations compete with national strategic and 
technological goals as well as global ecological concerns. There is, as often in 
the case, a balance to strike between enabling seabed resources use and pre-
serving fragile environments. The question for lawyers is how to best ensure 
that known and potential impacts are taken into account when taking deci-
sions as to the use of the seabed and its resources, and how to ensure that 
access to seabed resources benefit all stakeholders in an equitable and sustain-
able manner. Legal principles such as the precautionary principle or common 
heritage of mankind must serve as guidance. Procedural tools, such as environ-
mental impact assessments (EIAs), aim to make sure that consequences are 
assessed and interested parties heard. Marine management tools aim to ensure 
long-term coherence between activities and interests. This book aims to offer 
a new perspective on the juridical aspects raised by the use and protection 
of natural resources on and underneath the world’s seabeds. Several chapters 
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also carry a strong call for science-based decisions and the development of 
sound ecosystem-based management rules.
There have been numerous works on the law of sea with relevance for sea-
bed uses and protection, in particular in relation to the deep seabed.1 However, 
there are to our knowledge few contributions which look at the seabed in such 
a comprehensive and transversal manner as the present book, covering several 
sectors, actors and jurisdiction areas.
This book aims to make several contributions to the literature. First, a com-
mon scientific knowledge basis is necessary to correctly design legal rules, 
appraise their consequences – known and potential –, and reach evidence-
based decisions.2 Therefore, the book starts with a multidisciplinary definition 
of the seabed that is rarely provided. Second, the book presents an up-to-
date analysis of the most pressing and fundamental legal questions related 
to the use and protection of the seabed. It does this by juxtaposing sectoral 
regimes and comparing the regulatory approach in areas within and beyond 
the national jurisdiction. In doing so, the book argues for a more consis-
tent and cross-sectoral approach, identifying some common management 
principles and tools. Third, many chapters offer a critical analysis and make 
suggestions for improvement of the applicable legal regime, the manner to fill 
legal gaps or to advance current treaty negotiations. In that sense, the book 
1   See notably: K. Zou (ed.), Global Commons and the Law of the Sea, Maritime Cooperation in 
East Asia, Volume: 5 (Brill, 2018); A.G. Elferink and E.J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Legal 
Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments (Brill, 2010); 
J.M. Van Dyke, D. Zaelke and G. Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century – Ocean 
Governance and Environmental Harmony (Island Press, 1993); Rosemary Rayfuse, Research 
Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2015); 
D. Vidas (ed.), Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation (Brill, 2010); N. Bankes 
and S. Trevisanut, Energy from the Sea: An International Law Perspective on Ocean Energy 
(Brill, 2015); E. Egede, Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind (Springer, 2011).
Some earlier publications are also of notable value, such as: Our Seabed Frontier: 
Challenges and Choices, National Research Council (The National Academies Press, 
Washington, 1989); The Ocean: Our Future, Independent World Commission on the Oceans 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998); M.G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: 
The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law 
of the Sea Convention (Oxford University Press, 1990).
2   As a matter of example, see the Treaty obligation for the European Union to take account of 
available scientific and technical data when preparing its policy on the environment (Art. 
191.3, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). See, more generally, on evidence-
based law making, but still in the case of EU law: Š. Majcen, ‘Evidence based policy making 
in the European Union: the role of the scientific community’ (2017) 24 Environmental Science 
and Pollution Research 7869. The European Commission refers itself to evidence-base deci-
sion making as part of its ‘Better Regulation Agenda’.
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aims to contribute actively to several of the current processes at international, 
European or national levels.
Providing a new comprehensive and critical perspective on seabed regula-
tion is also timely. The issues and concerns inherent to the seabed have been 
known for a long time, but new uses, new technologies, new knowledge about 
seabed ecosystems, higher tensions and potential disputes due to competing 
uses and interests, urge to reflect on which regulatory approaches to pursue.
In 2019, the United Nations (UN) celebrated the 25th anniversary of the 
entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)3 and the establishment of the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA).4 The regime for deep seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction – in 
the Area –, which is under the competence of ISA, has developed towards a 
‘Mining Code’, with the prospect of commercial activities getting increasingly 
realistic. So far, ISA has entered into 29 15-year contracts with contractors for 
the exploration of deep sea minerals, and the draft regulations on exploitation 
should be finalised in 2020.
In parallel, UN negotiations have started on an international legally-binding 
instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.5 Marine genetic 
resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits, measures such as 
area-based management tools and marine protected areas, EIAs, and technol-
ogy transfer are among the topics discussed.
Within national jurisdiction, states have been adopting legislation to imple-
ment UNCLOS and fulfil their obligations thereunder, but have also indicated 
looking at the exploitation of new minerals – beyond oil and gas – on their 
continental shelf, and have enacted new legislation in that sense. For example, 
in March 2019, Norway enacted a new Seabed Minerals Act, opening for explo-
ration for and extraction of seabed minerals on its continental shelf.6 This new 
3   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted and opened for signa-
ture 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3.
4   UNCLOS, Art. 156.
5   A Preparatory Committee was established by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution 69/292 of 19 June 2015 with the view of developing an international legally bind-
ing instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. In its resolution 72/249 of 24 December 2017, 
the UNGA decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference to consider the recommen-
dations of the Preparatory Committee. The first session of the Intergovernmental Conference 
took place on 4–17 September 2018 and the second session on 25 March–5 April 2019. The 
third session was convened from 19 to 30 August 2019. The fourth session is scheduled for the 
first half of 2020.
6   Lov om mineralvirksomhet på kontinentalsokkelen (havbunnsmineralloven) of 22.03.2019, 
entered into force on 1 July 2019.
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quest for minerals is fuelled by the needs of the digitalisation of the economy 
and the energy transition. It requires secure, stable and sufficient supply of 
metals and rare earth elements (REEs) for electronic devices like smart-phones, 
or energy technologies like solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles.7
Since the laying of the first telegraph cable across the seafloor of the Atlantic 
between Britain and the United States in 1866,8 continents have been increas-
ingly interconnected. Interconnectivity is another feature of today’s world 
which sets its mark on the seabed, whether it is for telecommunication pur-
poses (cables for transfer of digital data including telephone and the Internet) 
or energy transport purposes between coastal states or for bringing energy to 
shore (oil and gas pipelines from production field, power cables from offshore 
wind farms, interconnectors).9 Those cables have developed to form a global 
network of undersea infrastructures which, in closed-basin seas such as the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, results in a high number 
of crossings. Since each crossing is governed by a separate ‘crossing agreement’ 
entered into by the owners, the laying of a new cable or pipeline in the above 
mentioned sea areas usually involve the conclusion of a high number of those 
agreements. The laying of new undersea cables and pipelines may also involve 
crossing the continental shelf of other coastal states, a situation which may 
trigger the conclusion of a specific agreement between the states concerned, 
and/or the application of relevant provisions from UNCLOS10 and regional 
agreements. The two Nord Stream gas pipelines from Russia to Germany via 
the Baltic sea are good examples of such crossing situation, where delinea-
tion of the course for the laying, permitting procedures, due consideration to 
marine protected areas and national security interests have been among the 
legal issues at stake.
Those are only few examples of the new context for seabed resources 
management.
7    On the role of minerals and REEs in the digital economy and the energy transition, see 
for example: G. Pitron, La guerre des métaux rares : La face cachée de la transition énergé-
tique et numérique (Broché, 2018); ‘Substitution of critical raw materials in low-carbon 
technologies: lighting, wind turbines and electric vehicles’, European Commission, Joint 
Research Centre, Öko-Institut e.V., 2016.
8    Other submarine telegraph cables had been laid down previously over more limited dis-
tances, like across the English Channel between France and Great Britain in 1852. Source: 
R. Salvador, G. Fouchard, Y. Rolland et A.P. Leclerc, Du morse à l’Internet, 150 ans de télé-
communications par câbles sous-marins (AAcsM, 2006).
9    For a world map of submarine cables see for example <https://www.submarinecablemap 
.com/>.
10   UNCLOS, Art. 79.
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2 Access, Uses and Protection of Seabed Resources 
as Cross-Cutting Themes
Three cross-cutting themes structure the book: access, uses and protection of 
seabed resources. A short introduction to those three themes follows below.
2.1 The Legal Status of the Seabed and Access to Its Resources
Once jurisdiction over seabed areas has been established through a process 
of delineation, coastal states can exercise their sovereign rights within their 
national jurisdiction. This results in a definition by the negative of the Area, 
which is ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction’.11 It is notable that the question of delimitation of 
jurisdiction and of whom should have access to seabed resources, is relatively 
recent, and had mostly been a matter for private companies until the mid-
20th century.12 Technological innovation has increased interest in the use of 
the seabed for purposes of control over resources and maritime spaces, and 
claiming jurisdiction has become the primary formal step for coastal states at 
the international level when the presence of seabed resources is proven.
Defining rules for delimitating the different maritime spaces according to 
a zonal approach, and defining the rights attached to those different zones, 
have been the primary focus of negotiators at the three UN Conferences on 
the law of the sea. Still today, defining the limits of national jurisdiction can be 
a contentious matter for coastal states aiming at harnessing seabed resources.13
Besides the tensions between coastal state’s sovereign rights and maritime 
nations’ interest in ensuring free access to oceans and straits, the voice of Arvid 
Pardo, the then Maltese ambassador to the United Nations, raised in 1967, call-
ing for the adoption of a common status and regime for ‘the seabed and the 
subsoil thereof ’ beyond national jurisdiction, which will secure ‘the use of 
their resources in the interests of mankind’.14 The final text of UNCLOS defines 
the Area itself and its mineral resources as ‘common heritage of mankind’. The 
status of common heritage of mankind involves the non-appropriation of the 
seabed by states or private entities, the sharing of benefits for the common 
11   UNCLOS, Art. 1(1)(1).
12   See Chapter 3 of this book, H.W. Andersen, ‘A short human history of the ocean floor’.
13   See notably the ITLOS Special Chamber, Judgment in Dispute Concerning Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, 
23 September 2017.
14   Arvid Pardo’s speech, UNGA 22nd session, 1 November 1967, Agenda Item 92, full text 
available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/pardo_ga1967 
.pdf>.
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good of humankind, and the use of the seabed for peaceful purposes only.15 
The deep seabed and its resources is to be administered for the benefit of man-
kind as a whole, by ISA as an autonomous international organisation, on behalf 
of the international community.
This book discusses both the specific case of the Area and its mineral 
resources as well as spaces and resources falling outside that definition. For 
example, which legal status should be given to newly discovered resources such 
as marine genetic resources (MGR)? Do they pertain to global commons when 
located beyond national jurisdiction? Could the concept of common heritage 
of mankind apply to them? One recurrent theme in several chapters involves 
a discussion of the consequences of the legal status of the seabed on the types 
of exploitation and protection regimes we choose for seabed resources and 
ecosystems.
This can translate into a series of obligations for state and non-state parties. 
States in particular are bound by general principles defined in both treaties 
and international customary law, such as the precautionary principle or the 
prevention principle. More specific obligations can derive from the legal sta-
tus of the seabed, such as in Article 194(2) UNCLOS which provides for due 
diligence in the respect of marine environment protection.16 This comes in 
addition to Article 192 UNCLOS which imposes on all States a general obliga-
tion to protect and preserve the marine environment. It can also translate into 
a more detailed legal regime for access and benefit sharing.
2.2 Multiplication of Seabed Uses
The oceans and the deep sea bed are increasingly coveted and are becoming 
ever more crowded. Innovations in marine technologies open for even more 
uses of the seabed than anticipated. There has been a multiplication and 
diversification of human uses of the seabed and its resources, and perspec-
tives have differed between seeing the seabed as a medium (notably for the 
laying of infrastructures) and seeing it as a resource in and of itself (where sea-
bed resources are both geological and biological). The spectrum of actual and 
potential uses has been constantly expanding and includes, notably, the laying 
of undersea cables and pipelines, marine research, extraction of petroleum 
and other mineral resources, exploitation of the renewable energy resources of 
15   UNCLOS, Art. 137, 138 and 140(1).
16   See Advisory Opinion, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities 
in the Area, Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, 1 February 2011, itlos Reports 2011, p. 10 (Case No. 17); UNCLOS Articles 208(3) and 
209(2) 01.
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the sea (wind, wave, tidal, storage), ancillary construction of islands and plat-
forms (still mostly anchored), bottom fisheries, exploitation of marine genetic 
resources, military uses and even carbon dioxide storage beneath the seabed.
Tensions and legal issues are emerging out of the conflict of perspectives 
between those who define the seabed and its resources as the common heri-
tage of mankind and those who seek to convert the ocean floor into a ‘seabed 
factory’.17 The discussion of the conflicting interests between exploitation and 
conservation of the seabed and its resources is another leitmotiv in this book.
2.3 Conflicting Uses, Coexistence, Resolving Mechanisms 
and Protection Regimes
The multiplication of seabed uses leads to a discussion on their coexis-
tence. The predominance of a sectoral approach is highlighted, and different 
solving mechanisms discussed.
Indeed, despite the overarching regime defined in UNCLOS, the regulation 
of ocean activities is essentially a sectoral matter, both within and beyond 
national jurisdiction. The same applies to the work of the different competent 
organisations, which often lacks close coordination and prevents further con-
sistency between the regimes.18 Private parties are often relying on bilateral 
agreements to solve possible conflicts of uses of seabed space and resources. 
Finally, following a sectoral approach also means that gaps exist between the 
different regimes, bringing legal uncertainty and increasing the risk of frag-
mentation. The issue is known, but, as activities develop, there is a clear need 
for closer coordination at the overarching level, in the form of common prin-
ciples, common tools and standardised practices.
While uses of the seabed are diversifying and the prospects of a ‘blue 
econ omy’ are expanding,19 sustainable use and protection of the marine 
environment should act as an overarching goal, as reflected in UN Sus-
tainable Devel opment Goal 14 (SDG 14). SDG 14 aims to the conservation and 
17   On the concept of ‘seabed factory’, see ‘Getting to the bottom of it’, Norwegian Continental 
Shelf 2–2016, pp. 14–17, available at <https://www.npd.no/globalassets/1-npd/publikas 
joner/norsk-sokkel-en/arcive/ncs-2-2016.pdf>.
18   See, as concerns ISA’s works, Section XXII – ‘Relationship with the United Nations and 
other relevant international organizations and bodies’ in Report of the Secretary-General 
of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/25/A/2, 3 May 2019, available at <https://www.isa 
.org.jm/document/isba25a2>.
19   The sustainable exploitation of seabed resources is full part of the visions devel-
oped for the ‘blue economy’. As a matter of example, see The EU Blue Economy Report 
2019, European Commission, available at <http://periscope-network.eu/analyst/
annual-report-eu-blue-economy>.
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sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable devel-
opment.20 This necessary common approach is justified by the essential place 
the seabed has in what can be called ‘the oceans commons’.
3 Content of the Book
The book is divided into seven parts, following a systematic approach to the 
different issues of access, uses and protection of seabed resources, building on 
a distinction between the regimes applicable to areas beyond national juris-
diction and within national jurisdiction.
The book also balances theoretical chapters with case studies. Norway 
and the North Sea are at several occasions taken as examples due to the extent 
of seabed issues currently taking place in that region, but several chapters 
also present studies of the legislation in Australia, Canada, China, Namibia, 
New Zealand, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Africa and the United 
States of America (USA) in addition to the European Union and specific EU 
countries.
3.1 Part I: Defining the Seabed
Part I of the book offers a multidisciplinary definition of the seabed and its 
ecosystems. Indeed, it is necessary to combine knowledge of geoscience and 
marine biology to capture the richness and intrinsic characteristics of the sea-
bed and its biodiversity. This science-based understanding of how the ocean 
floors have been formed, and what they contain and represent as ecosystems 
for species is put in perspective with a legal history analysis of its regulation 
over time.
Braathen and Brekke (Chapter 1), both geologists, provide readers with a 
fundamental understanding of the geoscience of the seabed. They describe the 
natural processes impacting the structure of the seabed, i.e. both its topogra-
phy and subsurface geology. A detailed understanding of the seabed geology 
is a pre-condition to any exploitation decision and aims to ensure the good 
management of the resources, or, on the contrary, to preserve the seabed from 
any activity. The authors also address the manner how human activity impacts 
the physical seabed and could change it over time, affecting its physical consis-
tency. They carry out an important message towards decision makers and the 
20   For an update on the progress of SDG 14, see <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
sdg14>.
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law community in general, making some recommendations as to the regula-
tion of activities on the seabed.
Ramirez-Llodra (Chapter 2) describes the deep-sea ecosystems from a 
marine biology perspective. The chapter gives a unique picture of the high 
biodiversity and variety of faunal communities and their habitat which 
remain hardly accessible to most human beings. The deep seafloor has shown 
to support one of the highest biodiversities in the planet in a wide array of 
interconnected habitats. The chapter starts by presenting the general biologi-
cal features and key ecosystem functions of the main deep-sea ecosystems. 
The chapter continues by describing the main human activities that affect, 
directly or indirectly, deep-sea habitats and their ecosystems. These anthropo-
genic impacts are grouped into 2 main categories: waste dumping and resource 
exploitation. As Braathen and Brekke did, this chapter asks for science-based 
decisions, with a call for a better understanding of deep-sea ecosystem com-
position, diversity and functioning, and the manner they response to stressors 
when considering resource utilisation regimes.
In his chapter (Chapter 3), Andersen gives us a short human history of the 
ocean floor. He reviews the long history of how western societies have per-
ceived and to some extent experienced the deep ocean floor from the perils of 
the seafarers in the sixteenth century to UNCLOS III. The historical approach 
reveals how much influence the representation of the seafloor and its resources 
has had on their regulation. Importantly, Andersen makes clear the shift oper-
ated from conceiving the seafloor as a medium to looking at it as a resource. 
This shift in perception and interest also explains the shift in interest repre-
sentation between private companies and national governments, between flag 
states and coastal states. The chapter ends by raising the question of the suit-
ability of UNCLOS to answer the new challenges.
3.2 Part II: Delimitation of Jurisdiction over the Seabed 
and Right to Its Resources
Part II of the book is dedicated to the principles applying to the delimita-
tion of jurisdiction over the seabed as a necessary prerequisite to access to its 
resources.
Brekke (Chapter 4) reviews the main delineation principles currently 
applied in order to determine maritime jurisdiction of the coastal state over 
the seabed, as defined in Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS, and as interpreted 
by the courts. The chapter continues by reviewing the Norwegian experiences 
with setting the country’s maritime boundaries, as a concrete application 
of the principles identified. The elements related to the organisation of the 
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work for the purpose of submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS), the mapping of the outer limits and to the coopera-
tion with neighbouring states are successively analysed. The chapter ends with 
an overview of the currently identified resources on the Norwegian continen-
tal shelf.
Skaridov (Chapter 5) explores the question of delimitation of jurisdiction in 
the Arctic as a fundamental starting point for discussing the regime of explora-
tion for and exploitation of seabed resources in an area of the world which is 
subject to competing state and commercial interests, and so a source of poten-
tial conflicts. The author starts by pointing out the difficulty of establishing a 
precise scientific knowledge basis as to the volumes of resources contained 
in the Arctic seabed. Most part of the chapter is then dedicated to the ques-
tion of competing claims and the analysis of Arctic states agreements and 
disputes regarding the establishment of baselines, the delimitation of the state 
territories and the applications in the view of establishing the outer limits of 
continental shelf submitted to the CLCS. The chapter also reviews the national 
Arctic strategy of the five Arctic coastal states. The author advances several 
proposals on possible ways of resolving disputes.
Brazovskaya and Ruchkina (Chapter 6) offer a study of the international 
regulation of the seabed in the Antarctic, and address the two topics of 
delineation of maritime spaces and use of seabed mineral resources. In the 
absence of a conventional delimitation of Antarctic spaces, the authors start 
by addressing the challenging task of establishing the boundaries in the polar 
regions, which are constantly covered with ice and, accordingly, the difficulty 
of measuring the width of the territorial sea and the EEZ. Second, the authors 
note that despite the fact that this continent was discovered already in 1819, its 
geographical and climatic features do not allow its full use. Meanwhile, a series 
of legal principles defined in the Antarctic Treaty System put limits on the use 
of the territory, limiting it to peaceful purposes and scientific research. In that 
context, the authors discuss the international legal regime which would apply 
to the exploration for and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources, since, 
as they state, sooner or later, the question of industrial extraction of Antarctic 
natural resources will be raised. Given the ‘frozen’ territorial claims of coun-
tries, the authors argue that this will require the adoption of a special legal 
regime for the continental Antarctic shelf as an alternative to the continental 
shelf regime in the sense of the 1982 UNCLOS.
3.3 Part III and IV: Exploitation of Non-Living, Living and Marine 
Biodiversity Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
The next two parts of the book look at the areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ), first for the exploitation of non-living resources (Part III) and then for 
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the living and marine biodiversity resources (Part IV). Putting the regime for 
living and non-living resources in parallel enables to draw conclusions in terms 
of suitability of a common approach, or, on the contrary, the need to design 
different models, notably for the purpose of benefit sharing.
Part III of the book dedicated to non-living resources starts with Dingwall’s 
chapter (Chapter 7), which provides a comprehensive analysis of the inter-
national legal framework applicable to deep seabed mining beyond national 
jurisdiction, i.e. in the Area. This framework was elaborated under UNCLOS, 
leading to the establishment of ISA. ISA governs deep seabed mining activities 
on behalf of humanity, as a reflection of the qualification of the deep seabed 
as ‘common heritage of mankind’. The Authority is responsible for regulating 
the Area and granting mining contracts to allow States and other entities to 
explore for and exploit deep seabed minerals. The Chapter reviews the key ele-
ments of this regime, the current level of activity and the role of the different 
actors – ISA, contractors, state sponsors, the Enterprise –, and discusses as well 
the case of actors still outside the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime (non-
States Parties to UNCLOS, such as the USA).
Røsæg (Chapter 8) continues the discussion on deep seabed mining by iden-
tifying gaps in the currently applicable regime that prevent moving forward 
towards commercial activities in the Area. The unclear applicable regime for 
mortgaging the equipment involved in mining operations is seen as a problem. 
Other examples involve patent infringements, labour protection, and extra 
contractual liabilities. Balancing the pros and cons of acting outside or within 
the scope of the Authority, the chapter discusses different possible alterna-
tives, and which role sponsoring states and flag states could play for filling the 
legislative gaps and offering a more sound framework legislation for commer-
cial activities in the Area than just adding conditions to licenses.
Activities in the deep seabed area beyond national jurisdiction raise impor-
tant maritime security issues such as the emplacement of weapons of mass 
destruction, prospects of piracy and terrorism against ships engaged in deep 
seabed mining activities, as well as the challenge that deep seabed mining 
could actually raise as regards environmental security. Yet, relatively little has 
been written on maritime security and the Area. Egede makes therefore an 
important contribution (Chapter 9) by investigating possible maritime secu-
rity issues that could arise in the Area. In doing so, the chapter takes both a 
rather traditional state-centric maritime security approach and a more non-
State centric viewpoint. When discussing the notion of maritime security 
in the law of the sea, Egede points out the increasing shift from a sole focus 
on States actors to an increasing engagement with diverse non-State actors. 
Non-state actors which include international organizations, private maritime 
security companies, pirates and armed robbers at sea, private fishing trawlers 
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engaged in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, terrorists groups 
and victims of maritime crimes. This shift is accompanied by new interactions 
between State actors and non-State actors involved in peaceful and less-
peaceful activities. This triggers a discussion of the applicable international 
legal framework, including the one under the responsible of ISA.
Part IV of the book is dedicated to the exploitation of genetic resources and 
living resources, a topic which has concentrated much attention lately, with the 
ongoing negotiations on the use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (BBNJ).21 All three authors come with critical analysis of 
the current regime, the existing gaps and make suggestions for improvement.
Scovazzi (Chapter 10) discusses rights to genetic resources in ABNJ, which 
is one of the central issues of the ongoing negotiations at the United Nations. 
Among the still pending questions are whether the new regime will be based 
on freedom of the sea or common heritage of mankind or a third sui generis 
approach. Other notable questions relate to access to the resources, benefit-
sharing (both non-monetary and monetary benefits), inclusion of genetic 
resources of the water column, intellectual property rights, role of traditional 
knowledge, and ‘straddling’ genetic resources.
Tvedt (Chapter 11) continues the discussion started by Scovazzi, looking at 
the potential elements in regulating rights and use of genetic resources in ABNJ, 
as it appears that the existing Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) regimes can-
not just be copy-pasted. The author follows a practical approach and explores 
different models for how to make an ABS-system for ABNJ legally binding on 
users. This means that all suggestions are tested against whether it would be 
possible to oblige private parties to a system of both access and benefit sharing. 
For example, the chapter provides a clear view on how the proposed regula-
tory model can be aligned with the exclusive rights awarded by patents when 
the activity results in an invention. The chapter discusses open and semi-open 
source options for using repositories as a practical means of securing access to 
the resources for the many. It highlights the potential role of private contracts 
for such a global regime to become functional.
Caddell (Chapter 12) looks at the regime for exploitation of living resources 
directly on the seabed in the ABNJ. While limited regulation existed in rela-
tion to bottom fisheries two decades ago, the UN General Assembly has played 
an essential role, calling for the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems 
(VMEs) on the seabed in a series of highly influential Resolutions. This politi-
cal impetus has prompted the adoption of complementary conservation 
and management measures by regional fisheries management organisations 
21   See above (n5).
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(RFMOs), flag states and other actors. The chapter reviews the progress made 
in the development of standards for deep-sea bottom fishing. It also identi-
fies a series of shortcomings in the implementation of those standards, and 
advances a series of recommendations as to the future of the regulatory regime.
3.4 Part V: Principles Applicable to Sovereign States When Exploiting 
Seabed Resources within National Jurisdiction
Part V of the book looks at the manner sovereign states regulate or intend to 
regulate the exploration for and exploitation of seabed resources within their 
national jurisdiction, and which constraints international and European law 
put on the development of national legislation.
Roux and Horsfield (Chapter 13) offer a series of case studies of national 
legislations applicable to seabed mining within the national jurisdiction of 
coastal states. Interest in exploration and exploitation activities has been 
increasing over the past decade and has largely been concentrated in the EEZ 
of five states namely: New Zealand, Australia, Namibia, Mexico and Papua New 
Guinea. The approach, policy positions or decisions adopted by these coun-
tries in relation to seabed mining within their jurisdictions has generally been 
cautious, with due regard to the precautionary principle. These have ranged 
from permanent bans, moratoria, strategic environmental assessments and 
reviews by environmental agencies. Through a comparative analysis of these 
cases, the chapter identifies a structure for decision-making on seabed mining 
that can be used by coastal States.
Arnesen, Greaves and Pozdnakova (Chapter 14) look at the example of the 
European Union, and how the latter intends to regulate Member States’ activi-
ties on the seabed. The authors consider the question of EU competences with 
respect to the seabed, namely whether the EU has competence; what kind of 
competence it has (shared or exclusive), and the territorial limits of this com-
petence (functional approach). Then, the authors examine how the EU deals 
with two specific sectors in light of new challenges, namely, seabed mining and 
environmental protection and liability.
Chen (Chapter 15) offers another case study, reviewing the 2016 Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in 
the Deep Seabed Area (the Deep Seabed Law). The enactment of the law and 
its implementing regulations represents China’s national implementation of 
UNCLOS. The chapter raises two central questions: why does China need this 
law and why 2016 represented a positive context for its adoption. The author 
undergoes a systematic review of the provisions of the Deep Seabed Law, com-
menting specifically the three core intents, namely controlling, securing and 
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preparing. The author also compares the Law with the equivalent legislation 
of other countries and concludes with an assessment of the limitations and 
impact on China’s other areas of law. This chapter provides readers with a bet-
ter understanding of China’s strategy of building a ‘deep sea maritime power’ 
by 2020. By pointing out the legal innovation of the Deep Seabed Law, the 
author argues that it could serve as a reference for other countries that intend 
to incorporate UNCLOS obligations on deep seabed mining into their domestic 
legal system.
Chircop (Chapter 16) examines Article 82 of UNCLOS, which is a novel 
provision introducing the first-ever international royalty on production 
from non-living resources within national jurisdiction, specifically from the 
extended continental shelf as defined in Article 76. The author points out that 
Article 82 has several textual ambiguities that could pose a challenge for its 
interpretation and implementation by both affected coastal States and ISA. 
The Authority plays a particular role in the implementation of Article 82, since 
it is responsible for receiving payments or contributions in kind and for effect-
ing their distribution to States Parties to the Convention, especially developing 
countries, in accordance with equitable criteria. Article 82 is expected to be 
first activated on Canada’s extended continental shelf off Newfoundland in the 
Northwest Atlantic. In implementing Article 82 Canada faces domestic politi-
cal, economic and legal challenges, in addition to the textual ambiguities. This 
chapter discusses the major issues and underscores the important leadership 
and precedential role played by Canada in domesticating Article 82 and devel-
oping a relationship with the Authority on this matter.
3.5 Part VI: Building, Operating and Removing Installations on and 
beneath the Seabed
Part VI of the book looks at the applicable regimes for the building, operating, 
re-moving and even re-use of installations on and beneath the seabed. The use 
and re-use of installations in connection to storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
under the seabed is also part of the upcoming topics which need further legal 
scrutiny.
Bankes (Chapter 17) examines the legal issues associated with the use of 
sub-seabed transboundary geological structures, including saline aquifers, for 
storage or disposal purposes focusing on the geological sequestration of CO2. 
Underground CO2 storage represents the final stage of the carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) chain. The chapter reviews the existing law requirements and 
guidelines that frame the operations of injection of CO2 as part of enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR) as well as CO2 disposal or storage operations (CO2/EOR), 
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such as the Protocol to the London Dumping Convention. It also discusses 
the implications of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS for the situations of 
transboundary geological storage sites, including in areas of overlapping mari-
time entitlements. The author examines how these issues have been or could 
be dealt with in delimitation agreements, framework agreements and joint 
development agreements. As the CO2 storage projects worldwide get closer to 
operating phase, the legal issues raised by Bankes become increasingly impera-
tive to consider.
Trevisanut (Chapter 18) addresses the issue of decommissioning of instal-
lations placed on the seabed. The number of offshore installations, reaching 
the end of their life-cycle, are increasing and many of them can represent an 
environmental hazard or area threat for other legitimate uses of the sea and 
the seabed. This time constraint put on decommissioning decisions calls for an 
analysis of the applicable international legal framework, as undergone by the 
author who also highlights some of its ambiguities. The chapter offers a sys-
tematic review of the legal regime incorporated into UNCLOS, and continues 
by focusing on generally accepted international rules and standards (GAIRS) 
at both a global and regional level. The author makes important conclusions 
as to the manner the lack of a binding instrument at the universal level, and 
the geographical fragmentation of the existing legal regime act as an obstacle 
to the development of clear global GAIRS, and thus to a more coherent and 
effective legal framework for the decommissioning of offshore installations.
Roggenkamp’s chapter (Chapter 19) makes the link between the two topics 
of decommissioning of offshore installations and CO2 storage and disposal. 
The author examines the possibility of using depleted oil and gas fields in 
the North Sea area for CO2 storage. An important issue in this regard is the 
relationship with the removal obligations that exist offshore. Instead of remov-
ing the installations after the oil/gas production has ceased, the possibility to 
re-use the depleted reservoir for CO2 storage could entail that the offshore 
installations and pipelines have to be kept in place. The chapter looks into this 
possibility from the perspective of both international law and the national 
law of three North Sea coastal States: the Netherlands, United Kingdom and 
Norway. This review reveals legal uncertainties for the transitional period 
between production ceases and a CO2 storage permit is awarded. As the 
exploitation of oil and gas fields in the North Sea area is ageing and maturing, 
and although first steps have been made to facilitate re-use of installations, the 
author calls for legislators and policy makers to act and seize this window of 
opportunity.
In his chapter (Chapter 20), Harrison explores the extent to which the 
investment treaty framework can be applied to seabed investments and, if 
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so, the scope of protection that may be expected by investors. It addresses 
the geographical scope of international investment treaties, and considers the 
substantive protections that are available if a seabed investment is found to fall 
within the scope of those treaties. It also questions whether the treaties can be 
applied to seabed investments made within the jurisdiction of coastal states. 
The analysis demands an understanding of how international investment law 
interacts with relevant rules in the international law of the sea and interna-
tional environmental law. Given the intensification in seabed activity around 
the world, there is a need to clarify key issues that arise in the interpretation 
and application of investment standards in this context.
Waverijn (Chapter 21) questions to which extent seabed installations can 
be mortgaged as a way of reducing financing risks. To conduct his analysis, he 
takes energy installations in the North Sea as study case. Indeed, offshore oil 
and gas, offshore wind and ocean energy projects are capital intensive with bil-
lions of euros required for their construction. It is common business practice 
to raise debt to finance them, which is more expensive when risks are greater. 
Security rights such as mortgage and pledge reduce the risks of lenders, how-
ever restrictions exist under national law. In his chapter, the author analyses 
the solutions provided under Dutch property law, as it is currently impossible 
to mortgage installations situated on the seabed further than 22.2 kilometres 
off the Dutch coast. In his view, allowing for such mortgages could benefit the 
development of the offshore energy sector as this would reduce risks.
3.6 Part VII: Conflicting Uses or Coexistence, Resolving Mechanisms and 
Protection Regimes: Towards a More Integrated Approach
The final part of the book, Part VII, is dedicated to the question of coexistence 
between activities competing for the same seafloor area and which regime 
exists for solving conflicts in uses, such as resolving mechanisms. It contains a 
call for more consistency in the approach of coexistence of activities, but also 
in the manner divergent interests, including environmental protection and 
sustainable use of the oceans, can be conciliated through management tools.
Rayfuse (Chapter 22) examines the general principles which lay the basis of 
normative frameworks and management approaches in the efforts to promote 
cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination, and avoid inter-sectoral conflicts 
and negative decisions for the conservation and protection of the marine envi-
ronment. Her chapter reviews the new cross-sectoral management approaches 
and tools that are emerging. It then turns to a discussion of the key tools that 
have been developed to assist environmental management of marine and 
seabed uses and an examination of emerging frameworks for cross-sectoral 
management aimed specifically at avoiding, minimising or resolving conflict-
ing uses on the seabed, particularly in ABNJ.
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Askheim’s chapter (Chapter 23) deals with agreements between owners/
operators of crossing pipelines, power cables and telecom cables (all termed 
connectors) on the seabed. It reviews the legal basis for such agreements 
as well as their main provisions. The manner in which liability and indemnity 
clauses are designed is given attention throughout the entire implementa-
tion of the project (pre-completion, construction and post-completion). 
The chapter makes clear the need to complete the provisions of UNCLOS in 
specific crossing agreements as a way by which the owners of subsea transpor-
tation assets can organise themselves in the most balanced and predictable 
manner.
Using the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea as a case study, Langlet 
(Chapter 24) investigates how competing interests relating to submarine pipe-
lines are handled by the law of the sea. Particular attention is given to the role 
of transit states – i.e. States over whose continental shelf a pipeline is laid 
without it entering their territorial waters – and the limits to their right to reg-
ulate the laying of pipelines and thus act as arbiters of potentially competing 
interests such as the right of transport, the effective protection of the marine 
environment, and national security considerations. Only some few interests 
are recognized by UNCLOS as legitimate bases for a coastal State to adopt mea-
sures, but it could be tempting to use such grounds to pursue other objectives. 
It is concluded that although the pertinent rules in UNCLOS are complex and 
partly vague, the States concerned have in most cases diligently avoided push-
ing the limits of coastal State jurisdiction as set out in the Convention.
Svendsen (Chapter 25) looks at the regime for liability and compensation, 
and discusses which manner can best compensate damage caused by deep 
seabed mining activities in the Area. The author takes the view that the draft 
regulations for exploitation, in their present form, do not construct an ade-
quate model for liability and compensation for damage as a result of these 
activities. The chapter sketches the current parallel system of the sponsoring 
State’s responsibility for damage caused in the Area and the sponsored con-
tractor’s liability for damage caused in the Area. The chapter attempts to draw 
a model for an improved liability and compensation system for damage caused 
by deep-sea mining in ABNJ.
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chapter 1
Characterizing the Seabed: a Geoscience 
Perspective
Alvar Braathen and Harald Brekke
1 Introduction
The sea with its seabed has assets that have become extensively exploited as a 
source for food, energy and transport. Traditionally, the advancements of man-
kind on land have been more successful than in the oceans, mostly due to a 
physical setting that challenges easy-access and low-cost operations. However, 
this is gradually changing under the combined factors of the depletion of the 
required new resources as assets on land, and an increasing demand, resulting 
in an increased attention for the oceans. Meanwhile, the oceans remain mostly 
unknown, could be hostile and are for sure fragile.
In this contribution, our aim is not to explore the possibilities laying in the 
oceans and its seabed as other chapters in this book extensively cover them. 
Our objective is to inform about the seabed itself and define it, by asking some 
key questions that geoscientists could answer: What is the seabed made up 
of? Is the seabed a static entity or will the bed change over time? How could 
human activity influence the physical consistency of the seabed? These ques-
tions are basic but compulsory if one wish to implement a regulatory regime 
to seabed activities. It may be obvious, but decision-makers have to know what 
they regulate.
2 What Characterizes the Seabed?
The term seabed refers to the top-surface of earth in seas and oceans, also 
known as the seafloor or ocean floor. This surface has a topography, which is 
directly related to the nature of its subsurface geology, in places modified by 
ocean currents and sedimentary processes. Both the topography and the sub-
surface are important factors in the use of the seabed by humankind. From 
a resource perspective, humankind determines how resources from the sea-
bed may be exploited and its resources distributed or protected by preventing 
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exploitation. In all circumstances, the nature and accessibility of the seabed 
will be a crucial preliminary consideration. To understand the characteristics 
of the topography and subsurface of the seabed, we will have to look at the 
formation of the seabed, including the outer parts of the Earth’s crust below 
oceanic water (2.1), and then the nature and processes of the interface between 
solid or semi-solid earth materials and water column in the sea (2.2). These 
are subjects covered extensively in many textbooks.1 Our approach is therefore 
that of a summary.
2.1 The Earth’s Crust
The main geological difference between the continents and the deep oceans 
is the nature of the Earth’s crust. In geology, one speaks of continental crust as 
opposed to oceanic crust. The continental crust is very thick (20–40 km) and 
relatively light, while oceanic crust is thin (5–15 km) and considerably denser, 
as shown in figures 1 and 2. This is because continental crust consists of light 
minerals rich in silica and aluminium, while oceanic crust consists of heavy, 
dense minerals rich in iron and magnesium. The effect of this is that the con-
tinents float high on the earth’s mantle, like a cork on water, while the deep 
ocean floor is barely afloat, like a piece of heavy wood. This marked difference 
in buoyancy, thickness and relative elevation, is actually the underlying reason 
for the general global distribution of land and water. The thick buoyant conti-
nents support the vast areas of emergent land, while the heavy and low-lying 
oceanic crust forms the floor of the deep parts of the huge ocean basins that 
accommodate the world’s seawater.
The differences between the continental and oceanic crust relates to the 
processes by which they are formed. The outer part of the Earth, including 
the crust, is divided into several large segments called lithospheric plates, which 
fit together like pieces in a jig saw puzzle. These plates ‘float’ and drift slowly 
in different directions upon the deeper mantle of the Earth. This implies that 
along some boundaries the plates separate and move away from each other 
(divergent boundaries), while along other boundaries they collide (convergent 
boundaries). In geology, this process is called plate tectonics.
Along the boundaries where plates separate, space is continuously created 
as the plates move away from each other at the speed of 1–10 cm/yr. This space 
is immediately filled by molten rock from the mantle in the form of intrusions 
and lavas, which solidify and form new crust. This is the way the dense and 
heavy oceanic crust is formed. The process is called ocean spreading since it 
1   See notably: J.P. Kennett, Marine Geology (Prentice Hall, 1982); E. Seibold and W. Berger, The 
sea floor: an introduction to marine geology (Springer, 2017).
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implies that the ocean crust on both sides of the plate boundary is growing, 
causing the ocean to widen. Such widening oceans have all originated in break-
up zones along which old continents were rifted apart by forces in Earth’s 
mantle. These break-up zones then become new divergent plate boundaries 
between which the new ocean will form by ocean spreading. The Atlantic 
Ocean of today is such a spreading ocean, which accommodates increasing 
separation between the American continent on one side and Europe and 
Africa on the other.
Ocean spreading along some plate boundaries implies that other bound-
aries experience plate collision, making up convergent plate boundaries. At 
such boundaries, the crust of one plate will be forced under the other plate, 
with the contact termed a subduction zone. The heavy oceanic crust tends to 
be forced down. As the down-pressed plate moves down into the mantle in 
the subduction zone, the oceanic crust will melt again, and the molten rock 
will rise to the surface where it forms chains of volcanoes on the overriding 
plate. These volcanoes in many places form chains of islands, so called island 
arcs. Where the overriding plate is that of a continent the volcanoes becomes 
part of the margin of that continent. Water and sediments will be involved in 
the melting process within the subduction zone giving rocks enriched in light 
minerals akin to continental crust. As millions of years pass, such islands and/
or continental margins at convergent boundaries of plates will collide with 
islands or continents on other plates. Since they are formed of light rocks they 
will not be subducted into the mantle again, but tend to become accreted to 
the colliding islands or continent forming mountain chains. That is the way 
continents grow. For instance, the Pacific Ocean of today is surrounded by sub-
duction zones where its oceanic crust disappears beneath the American and 
Asian continents. Millions of years into the future, the Pacific Ocean will close 
and the two continents collide.
Thus, the plate tectonic process results in a cycle where oceans come and go 
while continents collide and grow (Fig. 1.1 in Annex). The plate tectonic process 
started more than 4 billion years ago when the Earth had cooled sufficiently for 
molten rock to solidify and begin forming crust on the planet’s surface.
2.2 Seabed Topography
The general topography of the seabed of the Earth may be described in terms 
of the continental shelf, the continental slope, the continental rise, the continen-
tal margin, and the deep ocean floor (Fig. 1.1). These terms are used partly in a 
legal sense by Article 76 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) to define the outer limits of coastal state’s jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf.
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The topography of the seabed is related to the lateral distribution of the two 
types of crust, as shown in Figure 1.2. All the continents, which make up nearly 
all of the earth’s land areas, have a continental shelf underlain by continental 
crust dominated by light components (minerals such as quartz and feldspar). 
This shelf is the part of the continent that is submerged below the sea, and 
make up vast areas of sea floor at a water depth starting at the beach and 
descending to some hundred meters. The shelf is bound seaward by the con-
tinental slope of similar light composition, dipping gently towards the deep 
ocean. In general, the continental slope is formed near the edge of the conti-
nental mass where the continental crust thins considerably and merges with 
the oceanic crust. At the base of the slope, at water depths below 3,000–4,000 
meters, we reach the realm of the deep ocean floor that is underlain by oceanic 
crust made up of dark, heavy components. In many parts of the world one also 
finds a continental rise, which is an area of very gentle dip between the base 
of the slope and the deep ocean floor. The classical continental rise is a wedge 
shaped pile of sediments derived from the shelf areas and accumulated next 
to the base of the slope – in many places the sedimentary wedge partly overly 
oceanic crust. 
In geology, the underwater areas of the planet are subdivided into two parts: 
the continental margins and the deep ocean floor. The continental margin 
extends from the shoreline to the end of the continental rise or to the base of 
the continental slope where no rise exists. The area seaward of the continental 
margin is the deep ocean floor.
The continental shelf is relatively flat and shallow. The widest continental 
shelves are found in the continental margins that were formed at divergent 
plate margins; also termed passive margins (see Fig. 1.1). Passive margins form 
figure 1.1 Profile showing a cross section of the elements of the general topography of 
the seabed extending from the coastline to the deep ocean floor
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figure 1.2 The Ocean Cycle. Schematic illustration of six progressive steps in the ocean cycle 
exemplified by the geological evolution of the Atlantic margins.
based on Press and Siever, 1974
1)  The evolution starts with break-up, splitting North America from Africa, lead-
ing to formation of passive continental margins separated by oceanic crust 
gradually formed by intrusion of molten rock and extrusion of lavas at the mid-
oceanic ridge (steps 1–2). This rifting and onset of ocean floor spreading of the 
Proto-Atlantic Ocean (the Iapetus Ocean) happened ca. 700 million years ago.
2)  The mature stage of the ocean floor spreading in the Iapetus Ocean in Cambrian 
times (ca. 500 million years ago). In stages 1) and 2) the margins of the conti-
nents are tectonically and magmatically relatively passive while they are being 
progressively separated by the ocean floor spreading process. Continental 
margins in this geological setting are therefore termed ‘passive margins’.
3)  The contraction stage of the Iapetus Ocean in Ordovician times by the establish-
ment of subduction zones along the continental margins. Such continental 
margins are tectonically and magmatically very active, and are therefore termed 
‘active margins’.
4)  The collision between the old continents resulting in the final closure and 
destruction of the Iapetus Ocean and the consequent formation of the 
Appalachian/Caledonian Orogen (mountain chain) about 420 million years ago.
5)  Renewed rifting along the axis of the orogen and re-establishment of seafloor 
spreading in the Atlantic Ocean through Jurassic and Cretaceous times. Note 
that continents at this stage have grown through the crustal material accreted at 
the continental margins during the continental collision and the previous ocean 
contractional stage.
6)  Present spreading stage of the Atlantic Ocean where the passive continental 
margins still grow by the deposition of continentally derived sediments in the conti-
nental slopes along the outer parts of the margins.
Note: F. Press and R. Siever. Earth (W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 
1974).
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by the extension and rifting of the continental crust prior to the break-up of 
the continent, ultimately leading to ocean floor and spreading. Thus, the wid-
est continental shelves in the world are developed in the continental margins 
of the Atlantic Ocean. Narrow continental shelves are typical in continental 
margins associated with subduction zones at convergent plate boundaries: the 
active margins. They are generally narrow, as for instance seen along the west-
ern margin of the American continent.
All continental shelves end at the continental slope. The shape and nature of 
the continental slope vary considerably around the world. Along most passive 
continental margins, the continental slope forms an overall even surface with 
low gradients. Several of these slopes are underlain by large accumulations of 
sediment derived from rivers or glaciers that has draped and smoothed ear-
lier topography. Such slopes are dominated by sedimentary processes and are 
generally accompanied by a large continental rise at the base of the slope. For 
other passive margins, however, the continental slope is a complex system of 
plateaus, ridges and steep escarpments formed by fault movements and from 
volcanic activity. For the active margins, the continental slope of the overriding 
plate typically constitutes the steep, landward slope towards the subduction 
trench (Fig. 1.2). Such trenches are the deepest places on Earth.
The topography of the deep ocean floor seaward of the continental slope 
is formed by the oceanic crust and later modified by sediment deposition. 
The oceanic crust is produced by volcanism (sea-floor spreading) along the 
diverging plate boundary. Hot rock is less dense than cold rock. Therefore, 
the young crust along the ocean spreading boundaries is relatively elevated 
to about 2,500 meters depth because the rocks are heated by the volcanic 
processes. Away from the spreading axis, the crust becomes denser as it cools 
with time and gradually subsides to large depths of about 4,000–6,000 meters. 
Thus, the spreading boundaries stand up as a global system of broad mountain 
chains (volcanoes) of the deep oceans. These mountain chains are called mid-
ocean ridges. The floor of these mid-ocean ridges is very irregular reflecting 
the original volcanic terrain of hills and mountains. Away from the elevated 
parts of the mid-ocean ridges, the crust becomes covered by sediment through 
time. In the deepest, older parts of the oceans the rugged terrain of the crust 
is totally buried by sediments, which forms the vast, flat abyssal plains of the 
world’s oceans.
The oceans are locally punctuated by a different type of volcanic edifices, 
seen as seamounts that rise several thousand meters from the deep ocean floor. 
These volcanoes are geologically different from those of the ocean spreading 
process as they form above so-called hot-spots in the deep mantle. Many of 
these seamounts are surmounted by islands like those of Hawaii and Polynesia.
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3 Seabed Composition and Its Mapping
3.1 Seabed Composition
Earth materials in the surface seabed of the continental shelf is made up of 
a veneer of material falling out of suspension, such as dust from continents, 
biological material, sometimes ash and, more recently, human waste. Seafloor 
biological activity creates debris, for instance from reefs. Sand and mud is 
mostly supplied by rivers entering the ocean at given points. From their entry 
point, biological debris, sand and mud are washed around by waves and cur-
rents in the sea before settling in positions where wave and current action 
have limited impact. Typically, this process of deposition will create distinct 
layering, or stacking of beds, of which the younging-up order, or sequence, of 
distinct beds make up a lithostratigraphy (Fig. 1.3).
With increased burial by progressive burial, or chemical reactions between 
grains in sediments and fluids, initially unconsolidated biological debris, sand, 
mud and clay will start to advance mechanical strength by creating bonds in a 
process termed diagenesis. This is the path towards lithification that ultimately 
leads to rocks, such as limestone, sandstone, mudstone and shale underlying 
the unconsolidated to poorly consolidated upper beds underneath the seafloor.
figure 1.3 Typical lithostratigraphy of the continental shelf compared to similar stratigraphy 
of the deep ocean floor, shown in stratigraphic columns in which the total thickness 
would be between 10 and 100 meters in vertical section down from the sea-floor  
(on the top). The distribution of sediments such as sand and clay is directly linked 
to the source for various sediments and subsequently the physical conditions 
(waves, currents, composition) of the water column and its impact on the seafloor.
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The seabed of the deep ocean floor shows similar traits to beds of the con-
tinental shelf. However, with increasing distance to land (source of sand), 
limited seafloor biological activity, and depths excluding wave impact, a sig-
nificant part of the seabed material has been falling out of suspension (ash, 
windblown dust, biological material). Local patches of sand and mud relates 
to infrequent currents down the continental slope. With the volcanic activity 
at the mid oceanic ridges, hard rocks from volcanic flows of the oceanic crust 
make up the units below the topside veneer of poorly consolidated sediments. 
Furthermore, cooling of volcanic material triggers hydrothermal activity, with 
seafloor groundwater venting revealed as black smokers.
3.2 Mapping the Seabed and Its Composition
In many parts of the world, the seafloor has been subject to mapping. For large 
areas, fairly detailed seafloor morphology maps are available, based in cam-
paigns by national authorities, military activity, and compilation of datasets 
from mostly commercial ships equipped with advanced echo-sounders. The 
motivation for this work has been multifold, spanning form protection of reefs 
to placement of infrastructure. In Figure 1.4 we present one example, based on 
the Norwegian Mapping authority’s (Kartverket2) efforts to manage the sea-
floor of the Barents shelf and nearby fjords of North Norway.3
In the case of the Barents Shelf seafloor, the mapping campaigns show that 
it is composed of sand, mud and shale, with some areas of concentrated bio-
logical activity displaying deep-water patch reefs. This distribution of materials 
on the seafloor is controlled by former or contemporaneous wave and current 
energy at the base of the marine water column. The basic physics behind mov-
ing sand or clay grains dictate that sand reflect most energy and shale lower 
energy. Noticeable, the energy level in areas with sand could be sufficient to 
create net seafloor erosion, hence causing gradual removal of the topmost part 
of the seabed.
In fjord areas like in Norway, the sediment distribution is closer linked to 
land, as rivers convey the bulk of the sediments to the fjord basin. Accordingly, 
sand is found at the mouth of rivers and streams, whereas mud and clay settle 
from suspension further out in the fjord. As discharge by river can be very high 
and even episodic during floods, seabed thickness varies greatly from thick 
deltas to thin deep fjord deposits.
2   Norwegian Mapping Authority (Kartverket): <https://www.kartverket.no/>.
3   For further insight, information is given on the Geological Survey of Norway’s website at 
<www.ngu.no>.
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figure 1.4 (A) Seafloor composition of the Barents Sea continental shelf, and (B) 
a similar map showing the seafloor composition in a fjord of North 
Norway.
Examples from the database of the Geological Survey of 
Norway (NGU) (ww.ngu.no). With the consent of NGU.
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Maps like those presented in Figure 1.4, directly describing seafloor compo-
sition, allow insight to temporal stability. The derived information is crucial for 
placement of infrastructure, as further outlined below. Such detailed data are 
nonetheless not common on a global scale. They mostly exist in ocean basins 
where there are significant national economic or other interests at stake. 
Hence, some areas of the world are already well mapped, while others are far 
from being mapped.
4 Natural Processes in and on the Seabed
As mentioned, in most places the seafloor experiences net deposition or 
erosion of sediments, although major or catastrophic events (e.g., storms, tsu-
namis, landslides) can temporarily change this status. From the moment a 
bed is building up, biological activity will modify its consistence. Most common 
is bioturbation by sediment eating organisms, consuming whatever organic 
material that has been captured in the sediment. These forms of life thrive in 
given positions, with deeper areas below the photogenic zone less attractive. 
Further, in shallow waters with extensive wave action, or in locations exposed 
to fresh water from streams, living conditions are uninviting. In areas where 
organic material is not fully consumed, there will be bacterial degradation cre-
ating gas (hydrocarbons). This gas is biogenic, and should not be mistaken as 
thermogenic gas. The latter relates to chemical reactions in organic shales (and 
sometimes limestones) that survived the biological activity and experienced 
deeper burial. As described above, deeper burial instigate the transition to 
rock that, combined with general heating, mobilize hydrocarbons in organic 
beds. Byproducts are gas and oil.
The transition from loose sediment to rock linked to compaction from burial 
and chemical reactions reduces the pore space available for fluids. Fluids will 
typically be captured sea water or groundwater that migrate in from other beds. 
General compaction reduces available space for fluids, forcing them to migrate. 
As basically all fluids are lighter than rock and earth materials, this migration 
follows paths that eventually will bring fluids to the surface, unless trapped. 
The consequence is that large parts of the seafloor experience expulsion of 
fluids such as fresh or salt (brine) ground water, biogenic and thermogenic gas 
and even oil. Much of this relaxed flow is bypassing the seabed during migra-
tion from deeper geological units to the surface.
There are numerous examples of the fluid expulsion at the Earth’s surface, 
with two illustrations presented in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. This phenomenon is 
not unique to the oceans, and excellent natural examples of it can be found 
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figure 1.5
A CO2 leak in Utah, USA
photograph by Alvar Braathen
figure 1.6 Pockmarks of Isfjorden, Svalbard, Norway. High-resolution multibeam 
bathymetric data from SA1 (Adventfjorden) showing the distribution  
of pockmarks. (A) The dashed-line area has c. 25–30 unit-pockmarks 
(top inset: magnified unit-pockmarks on bathymetric data; bottom 
inset: acoustic turbidity zone beneath a pockmark on the sub-bottom 
profile. (B) Structural interpretation of 2D seismic data (Line 427)  
in deeper successions beneath the pockmarks. (C) Sharply and  
less-sharply outlined circular pockmarks. Profile A-B across the  
pockmarks is illustrated beneath. (D) Multibeam backscatter data  
and corresponding A-B profile across the pockmarks in Fig. C.
modified from Roy et al. 2016
Cluster of unit-pockmarks
Pockmark trough
Forwick et al., (2009)
Fig. 7C, D
1 km Line 427 magnified











































Figure 7. (A) High-resolution multibeam bathymetric data from SA1 (Adventfjorden) showing the distribution of pockmarks. The area enclosed
by the dashed lines in the northwest of the fjord has c. 25-30 unit-pockmarks (top inset shows magnified unit-pockmarks on bathymetric data).
Bottom inset illustrates the acoustic turbidity zone beneath a pockmark on the sub-bottom profile. (B) Structural interpretation of 2D seismic data
(Line 427) in deeper successions ben ath the pockmarks. (C) Sharply and less-sharply utlined circular pockmarks. Profile A-B across he pock-
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onshore, such as in Utah (Southwest USA). This region display numerous sites 
that leakage natural CO2 to the Earth’s surface from deeper reservoirs/aqui-
fers. Extensive geological investigations suggest fluids migrate up conduits 
along narrow zones in the crust that have experienced earthquakes and which 
are called faults. This migration has lasted for at least 400,000 years.4 Not sur-
prisingly, drilling in 1937 next to a CO2 charged spring punctured one fluid 
migration route, triggering significant CO2 outbursts.
Another example of fluid expulsion from the seafloor can be found in the 
pristine High Arctic of Norway (see Figure 1.6). In Svalbard, the Longyearbyen 
CO2 Lab project undertook mapping of the fjord seafloor as a baseline study. 
The concept was to map pre-existing leaks before starting injection campaigns 
into rocks nearby. Investigations found hundreds of small depressions with 
circular rims on the seafloor, so-called pockmarks.5 They are formed by fluids 
or gas rising out of the seabed, lifting away sediments and gradually forming 
a 1–10 m deep crater. Mobilized sediments settle along the rim of the crater. 
As the wilderness of Svalbard has experienced minimal impact by human 
activity, this illustrates how fluid migration to the seafloor is a natural process, 
with pockmarks as the physical evidence. For the CO2 Lab, key questions were 
attached to timing of fluid migration and flow rate. A central question was 
notably to know whether these pockmarks were the result of ongoing flow. 
Most pockmarks turned out to be dormant, reflecting former fluid expulsion 
episodes. However, a few pockmarks in the fjord are active, showing mainly 
methane gas mixed with ground, where thermogenic gas is sourced from 
the deep subsurface. The organic black shales of the Svalbard bedrock emit 
natural gas.
For the broader audience, the two examples of Utah and Svalbard discussed 
above offer a higher learning value, which is that, basically, all geological mate-
rials will leak, given sufficient time. However, these leaks are overall slow and 
will seldom be catastrophic (in geology terms this means shorter than thou-
sand years).
4   B. Dockrill, and Z. Shipton, ‘Structural controls on leakage from natural CO2-geologic storage 
site: Central Utah’, U.S.A., Journal of Structural Geology, v. 32, no. 11 (2010) 1768–1782.
5   S. Roy, M. Hovland, & A. Braathen, ‘Evidence of fluid seepage in Grønfjorden, Spitsbergen: 
Implications from an integrated acoustic study of seafloor morphology, marine sediments 
and tectonics,’ Marine Geology, no. 380 (2016), 67–78.
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5 Seabed Resources and Human Activity
The resources of the seabed are both geological and biological. Geological 
resources are found on the surface – mainly as sand and gravel, and deep sea 
minerals –, as well as in the subsurface of the seabed – mainly as oil and gas. 
Biological resources in the form of sedentary organisms live on or just below 
the surface as part of the biodiversity, with species specialized according to 
available resources, depending on the composition of the surface and subsur-
face of the seabed, and the associated geological processes.
The floor of the continental shelf is usually underlain by thick sequences of 
sediments that may host hydrocarbon resources. This is especially the case for 
continental shelves of passive continental margins where the sediments may 
date back to long before the break-up of the continent. Therefore, these mar-
gins host most of the offshore oil and gas industry of the world.
Continental shelfs worldwide is the site for anchored infrastructures, for 
instance drill holes that bypass the seabed on their way to the deeper sub-
surface and which are placed there to extract hydrocarbons. Other drill holes 
are used to inject (waste-)water, gas or, in a few places, even anthropogenic 
CO2. Decades with learning around these operations make them familiar to 
the general public, although technical challenges around infrastructure place-
ment such as wells are resolved by experts. Similar knowledge exists around 
harvesting of biota from the seafloor (algae, shell fish, etc.) and, to a lesser 
extent, mining biota in the uppermost seabed for instance by seafloor trawl-
ing. These undertakings are well regulated in most waters, with national and 
bilateral agreements regulating undertakings.6
The deep ocean floor at 1000’s of meters depth has been regarded eco-
nomically less interesting as it is nearly barren of life that can be harvested. 
However, a growing global population facing the transition to a society increas-
ingly dependent on digital processes and renewable energy has given rise to 
a general agreement that there will be an increasing demand for metals in 
the future, both in volume and diversity. This notion is reflected in the cur-
rent significantly growing interest in deep sea mining. Exploration for deep 
sea polymetallic minerals is taking place both in the continental shelf areas 
of coastal states and in the international seabed (the Area). At present, there 
are 29 exploration contracts in the Area, and the activity is expected to move 
6   See R. Caddell, Chapter 12 of this book, ‘Deep-Sea Bottom Fisheries and the Protection of 
Seabed Ecosystems: Problems, Progress and Prospects.’
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to exploitation in a near or not too far future.7 There are two main types of 
polymetallic deposits on the seafloor of the deep oceans: ferro-manganese 
minerals and seafloor massive sulphides.8 The ferro-manganese mineral 
deposits are formed by oxyhydroxide minerals of iron and manganese, which 
also carry minor, but economically interesting quantities of nickel, copper, 
cobolt, rare earth elements (REE) and other metals. They form two types of 
deposits: nodules and crusts. The individual nodules are formed as concentric 
layers of minerals that are precipitated from the seawater above the seafloor 
or from the pore water of the sediments just below the seafloor. Nodules grow 
in areas of very sparse sedimentation and form large nodule fields in the abys-
sal plains that lie far from the sediment sources of the continents. The largest 
nodules fields are found in the Pacific Ocean. The ferro-manganese crusts grow 
as mineral lamina precipitated onto surfaces of bare rock on the seafloor (e.g. 
escarpments, ridges and seamounts). Such crusts are found in all oceans.
The seafloor massive sulphides are formed by hydrothermal processes asso-
ciated with volcanic activity, mainly along the mid-ocean ridges of the oceans 
(see above Section 2.2). The heat of the volcanic activity sets up a circula-
tion system of hot water within the ocean crust, leaching metallic elements 
from the rock and carrying them up to the seafloor in hydrothermal vents. In 
contact with the cold seawater, the metals will precipitate as a black cloud 
of sulphides; hence the name ‘black smokers’. Such deposits are known from 
all oceans, and some of them are already the object of industry activity. The 
Canadian company Nautilus is currently developing a sulphide deposit called 
‘Solwara’ within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Papua New Guinea.9 
The Japanese agency JOGMEC in August 2017 carried out a successful test of 
mining equipment on a sulphide deposit in the Okinawa Trough.10 It seems 
that deep sea mining will take place as affordable technology opens new 
avenues.
How will human activity on the seabed impact the local environment? 
Infrastructure on the shelf such as oil platforms are anchored by traditional 
7    See website of the International Seabed Authority at <https://www.isa.org.jm/>. For an 
analysis of the applicable legal regime, see J. Dingwall, Chapter 7 of this book, ‘Commercial 
Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction: The International 
Legal Framework.’
8    See R. Sharma (ed.), Deep-Sea Mining. Resources Potential, Technical and Environmental 
Considerations, (Springer International Publishing, 2017).
9    See further information on the website of the company Nautilus Minerals Inc at <http://
www.nautilusminerals.com/IRM/content/default.aspx>.
10   ‘Japan successfully undertakes large-scale deep-sea mineral extraction,’ Japan Times, 
26 September 2017 <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/26/national/japan 
-successfully-undertakes-large-scale-deep-sea-mineral-extraction/#.XA19JGyWyhc>.
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methods (chain and anchor) or, for some installations, stands on the seafloor 
by their own weight. Others stand on pillars knocked into the seabed. Future 
production facilities will however to a larger degree lay on the sea floor or be 
dug into the seabed. Common for all these semi-permanent facilities is that 
they cause changes in the physical conditions for the seafloor, thereby impact-
ing the seabed with time. Waves amplify when hitting obstacles such as pillars, 
drill hole casings, storage tanks or tubes/cables, increasing the likelihood for 
erosion of the seafloor. On the contrary, infrastructure dampening the sea 
could cause deposition. Infrastructure also has a load that could cause subsid-
ence. Further, infrastructure could generate heat and/or light impacting the 
biological environment. All these effects are in most cases technically manage-
able if considered when it comes to design. Similarly, environmental impacts 
caused by local sea floor modifications, or even spills, have been extensively 
analyzed, as has the ownership and obligations to acreage. The environmental 
impacts from local seafloor modifications are also regarded a major issue to be 
considered with regard to the future deep sea mining for minerals; or similar 
mining for biota in the seabed of the shelfs.
6 Geoscience Posts to the Regulatory Community
Our considerations around the seabed, based on our background as geologists, 
bring forward many aspects that are well known, and well regulated, but we 
feel that a reminder is in any case valuable. In order to reach science-based 
decisions reflecting a precautionary approach, lawmakers must get access to 
sufficient insight to understand the implications and impacts that the envis-
aged new laws may cause.
© Eva Ramirez-Llodra, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004391567_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License.
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We call our planet ‘Earth’, but 70 per cent of the Earth is covered by oceans, 
with oceans constituting more than 95 per cent of Earth’s living space. Fifty 
per cent of these oceans are below 3000 meter (m) depth and the average 
ocean depth is 3800 m. The largest biome on Earth is, thus, composed by deep 
marine ecosystems of about 1 billion km3 of deep water and 326 million km2 of 
deep seafloor. The deep sea is considered to start at 200 m depth, where solar 
energy cannot support primary productivity through photosynthesis. This 
depth changes regionally depending on water turbidity, but it often coincides 
with the shelf break where the seafloor transitions to the continental slope and 
is marked by a significant increase of the slope angle.1 Although large-scale 
bathymetry (depth topographic maps) exists for the whole ocean floor, deep-
sea ecosystems are still of the least explored on Earth, with less than 0,0001% 
physically sampled or visually observed.2 In the last 170 years, twenty two new 
deep-sea habitats and associated fauna have been discovered. The deep sea-
floor, long believed to be a featureless and stable environment, has been shown 
to support one of the highest biodiversities in the planet in a wide array of 
interconnected habitats.3 These ecosystems sustain important functions and 
derived ecosystem services, spanning from nutrient regeneration and carbon 
1   Tyler PA, Baker MC, Ramirez-Llodra E ‘Deep-Sea Benthic Habitats’, in Clark MR, Consalvey 
M, Rowden AA (eds) Biological sampling in the deep sea (John Wiley & Sons Ltd., West Sussez, 
2016), pp. 1–15.
2   Ramirez Llodra E, Brandt A, Danovaro R, De Mol B, Escobar E, German CR, Levin LA, 
Martinez-Arbizu P, Menot L, Buhl-Mortensen P, Narayanaswamy BE, Smith CR, Tittensor DP, 
Tyler PA, Vanreusel A, Vecchione M (2010) ‘Deep, Diverse and Definitely Different: Unique 
Attributes of the World’s Largest Ecosystem’, Biogeosciences 7: 2851–2899 doi doi:10.5194/
bgd-7-2361-2010.
3   Tyler PA, Ecosystems of the Deep Oceans Ecosystems of the World (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2003) 
p. 569.
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sequestration to biological and mineral resources, not to mention cultural 
and educational services,4 many of which are key to the health of the planet. 
Deep-sea research is rapidly progressing in parallel to technological devel-
opment, in parallel to an increase in the exploration for and exploitation of 
deep-sea resources.5 However, the limited understanding of the composition, 
diversity and functioning of many deep-sea ecosystems restricts our capacity 
to develop robust ecosystem-based management measures that are necessary 
if we are to balance resource use and ecosystem conservation.6
1.2 Aim and Structure
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general overview of deep-sea ecosys-
tems, their faunal composition and the key functions and services that they 
provide. This will allow for a better understanding of the current and potential 
impacts derived from an increasing number of human activities and indirect 
stressors.
The first part of the chapter (Section 2) briefly describes the habitat, general 
biological features and key ecosystem functions of the main deep-sea ecosys-
tems (Figure 2.1), from the shelf break to the deepest trenches. Starting from 
the shelf break (ca. 250 m deep), where the deep sea starts, the key ecological 
aspects of the different habitats found on continental margins are discussed, 
highlighting the heterogeneity of a system that was before supposed to be fea-
tureless and poor in life. The chapter then describes the vast abyssal plains that 
support a very high biodiversity of small fauna and the rich underwater moun-
tains, or seamounts, where filter feeders such as corals and sponges thrive. 
The composition and functioning of hydrothermally active and inactive habi-
tats of the mid-ocean ridges, back-arc basins and some active seamounts are 
explained, finishing with a short introduction to the deepest habitats on Earth, 
the hadal trenches.
The chapter then briefly introduces the main human activities that affect, 
directly or indirectly, deep-sea habitats and their ecosystems (Section 3). These 
anthropogenic impacts are grouped into two main categories: waste dumping 
and resource exploitation. Climate change, although a critical issue globally 
4   Thurber AR, Sweetman AK, Narayanaswamy BE, Jones DOB, Ingels J, Hansman RL ‘Ecosystem 
function and services provided by the deep sea’, Biogeosciences (2014) 11: 3941–3963.
5   Ramirez-Llodra E, Tyler PA, Baker MC, Bergstad OA, Clark M, Escobar E, Levin LA, Menot L, 
Rowden AA, Smith CR, Van Dover CL ‘Man and the last great wilderness: human impact on 
the deep sea’ PLoS ONE (2011) 6(8) e22588 doi doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022588.
6   Mengerink KJ, Van Dover CL, Ardron J, Baker MC, Escobar-Briones E, Gjerde K, Koslow A, 
Ramirez-Llodra E, Lara-Lopez A, Squires D, Sutton T, Sweetman AK, Levin LA, ‘A call for 
deep-ocean stewardship’, Science (2014) 344: 696–698.
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figure 2.1 Diagram showing seafloor habitats and the water column biome, from the coast 
to the deepest trenches. Note different depth scales at each side of the  
dotted line.
that affects the oceans as a whole, including deep-sea ecosystems,7 has not 
been included in these discussions. However, the importance of cumulative 
impacts on deep-sea ecosystems and the role played by climate change is dis-
cussed in the last paragraph.
2 Deep-Sea Ecosystems
2.1 A History of Exploration
The development of deep-sea research as a science is associated with the 
development of new techniques of navigation, sampling and measuring, and 
follows the path of great oceanic expeditions. It was during the last two cen-
turies that these expeditions obtained the first scientific results, which would 
fascinate and inspire a whole new branch of oceanographers. The cruise of 
H.M.S Beacon to the Aegean (1841–1842) could be considered one of the first 
biological deep-sea cruises. Prof. Edward Forbes, from Edinburgh University, 
joined the ship as a naturalist and made around 100 dredge hauls down to a 
depth of 420 m. As the Beacon crew dredged deeper, fewer species were found, 
7   Levin LA, Le Bris N, ‘The deep ocean under climate change’, Science (2015) 350: 766–768.
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leading to Forbes’ ‘Azoic Theory’8 where he proposed that no life existed at 
great depths. However, the British admiral Sir John Ross had already collected 
a deep-sea echinoderm while dredging at 1460 m during his exploration for the 
Northwest Passage in 1818.9 Later, the Norwegian Michael Sars (1850) published 
a list with 19 species from waters deeper than 550 m, and his son, George Ossian 
Sars extended the list to 92 species. With evidence accumulating of a diverse 
deep-water fauna, C.W. Thomson and W.B. Carpenter encouraged the Royal 
Society and the Admiralty to organise a deep-sea expedition, resulting in the 
H.M.S. Lightning cruise in 1868 to the NE Atlantic, and the H.M.S. Porcupine 
cruise (1869) to NE Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea (Rice 1986). With the 
important discoveries of the Lightning and Porcupine, W.B. Carpenter’s appli-
cation for a scientific circumnavigation expedition was accepted in April 1872. 
H.M.S. Challenger set sail from Sheerness on December 7th 1872 for her three 
and a half years cruise with C.W. Thomson as chief scientist. The Challenger 
expedition was set up to study the physical, chemical and biological processes 
in the deep ocean. This circumglobal oceanographic voyage has been consid-
ered by many to be the true birth of modern oceanography.10
The Challenger expedition was followed by an era of pioneering deep-
sea research, involving numerous ships from several countries. But it was in 
the 1960s and 1970s, that an important change in the approach of deep-sea 
biological research took place. Descriptive biology was complemented with 
a more ecological, evolutionary and experimental approach, led by North 
American researchers such as Profs. Hessler, Sanders and Grassle.11 However, 
the conquest of the oceans would not have been complete if humans had 
not developed the ways of entering the deep-sea environment, to observe, 
explore and experiment in situ. Therefore, parallel to the remarkable devel-
opments in navigation and oceanographic technologies, there is the history 
of diving, deeper and longer. Beebe’s Bathysphere in 1930 was the first deep-
water vehicle for observation of the seabed. From there, in little more than 
50 years, the advances in deep-sea technology have led to a variety of novel 
instruments. Some of these include maned submersibles, Remote Operated 
8    Forbes E, ‘Report on the Mollusca and Radiata of the Aegean Sea, and on their distri-
bution, considered as bearing on geology’, Report of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science for 1843, British Association for the Advancement of Science 
(1844) pp. 129–193.
9    Menzies RJ, George RY, Rowe GT, Abyssal Environment and Ecology of the World Oceans 
(Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1973).
10   See Tyler (n3).
11   See Hessler RR, Sanders HL, ‘Faunal diversity in the deep-sea’, Deep-Sea Research (1967) 
14: 65–78. See as well Grassle FJ, Sanders HL, ‘Life histories and the role of disturbance’, 
Deep-Sea Research (1973) 20: 643–659.
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Vehicles (ROV), Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), new chemical and 
physical sensors and cabled observatories (Figure 2.2). These instruments are 
used in combination with other sampling gear, such as multicorers, boxcorers, 
trawls and sledges to sample benthic fauna; plankton nets with several open-
ing and closing mechanisms; Conductivity-Temperature-Depth devices (CTDs) 
that measure conductivity, temperature and depth; multibeam echosounders 
and sidescan sonars to map the seafloor, etc. The use and continuous devel-
opment of these technologies provides a wealth of novel information on the 
composition, structure and functioning of deep-sea ecosystems.12 This com-
prehensive knowledge is essential for the development of robust management 
12   Clark MR, Consalvey M, Rowden AA, Biological sampling in the deep sea (John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd., West Susex, 2016), p. 451.
figure 2.2 State-of-the art equipment for deep-sea research. A: Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicle Hugin from Kongsberg Maritime (Norway). 
B: human occupied vehicle Alvin from WHOI (USA). C: Remote 
Operated Vehicle Triton XLR (Norway). D: Remoted Operated Vehicle 
Isis from the UK.
A: copyright, E. Ramirez-Llodra/MarMine. B: copyright,  
C. German, WHOI. C: copyright, E. Ramirez-Llodra/
MarMine. D: copyright P. Tyler, Uni. Southampton (UK).  
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and conservation measures to be applied to deep-sea ecosystems. Below, the 
main characteristics of the major deep-sea habitats and their communities 
are briefly considered, to set the scene for the discussion on anthropogenic 
impacts upon these ecosystems.
2.2 Continental Margins
The continental shelf expands from the coastline to the shelf break and is an 
area of relatively shallow water, mostly less than 250 m, with the exception of 
some large shelves like the Norwegian shelf, that has depth down to 500 m. 
The start of the deep sea is often considered to coincide with the shelf break, 
from which the continental margin descends along a slope from about 250 m 
to 3000 m depth (Figure 2.1). The continental margins cover about 11% of the 
ocean floor (ca. 40 million km2) and can be passive or active. Passive margins 
are found where an ocean rift has split a continent in two, generating an ocean 
basin in between, while active margins are found where the ocean floor is so 
dense that it sinks back into the Earth forming trenches along subduction 
zones.13 Continental margins are characterised by high habitat heterogene-
ity, including sedimentary slopes, submarine canyons, cold-water corals, 
cold seeps, mud volcanoes, pockmarks and oxygen minimum zones.14 These 
habitats support a variety of faunal communities that support a wide array of 
functions.
2.2.1 Sedimentary Slopes
Sedimentary slopes are often characterised by high biodiversity of small 
meiofauna (organisms retained on a 32 micron sieve, such as nematodes) 
and macrofauna (organisms retained on a 0.3 to 0.5 millimetre sieve, mostly 
small crustaceans and polychaete worms). This infauna (organisms that live 
in the surface layers of the sediment), together with the microorganisms in 
the seafloor, play a key role in the biological pump, where carbon fixed by 
shallow-water organisms through photosynthesis and subsequently falling 
to the seafloor is remineralised and carbon and nutrients that are upwelled 
fuel again primary productivity in the surface layers. The margin megafauna 
(animals identifiable from seafloor videos and photos) are often dominated 
13   Menot L, Sibuet M, Carney RS, Levin LA, Rowe GT, Billett DSM, Poore G, Kitazato H, 
Vanreusel A, Galeron J, Lavrado HP, Sellanes J, Ingole B, Krylova E, ‘New perceptions of 
continental margin biodiversity’, in McIntyre AD (ed) Life in the World’s Oceans: Diversity, 
Distribution and Abundance (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2010), pp. 79–102.
14   See Levin LA, Sibuet M, Gooday AJ, Smith CR, Vanreusel A, ‘The roles of habitat hetero-
geneity in generating and maintaining biodiversity on continental margins: an introduc-
tion’, Marine Ecology (2010) 31: 1–5. See also Menot et al. (n13).
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by echinoderms and crustaceans as well as fish, depending on the region 
(Figure 2.3A). Some of these groups include valuable commercial species and, 
thus, sedimentary slopes are subjected to increasingly intense fisheries in cer-
tain regions of the world.15
2.2.2 Submarine Canyons
Submarine canyons are large geomorphological features covering 11.2% of 
continental margins globally.16 The topography of canyons intercepts regional 
hydrographic patterns resulting in modified local currents that trap particles. 
15   Koslow J.A., Boehlert G.W., Gordon J.D.M., Haedrich R.L., Lorance P., Parin N., ‘Continental 
slope and deep-sea fisheries: implications for a fragile ecosystem’, ICES J. Mar. Sci. (2000) 
57:548–557.
16   See Harris P, Macmillan-Lawler M, Rupp J, Baker E, ‘Geomorphology of the oceans’, Marine 
Geology (2014) 352: 4–24. See also Fernandez-Arcaya U, Ramirez Llodra E, Allcock AL, 
Davies JS, Dissanayake A, Harris P, Howell K, Huvenne VA, Macmillan-Lawler M, Martin 
figure 2.3 Examples of faunal communities from continental margins. A: herd  
of the echinoid Linopheuses. B: stalked crinoids on a rocky  
submarine canyon wall. C: Cold water corals from the Gulf of Mexico. 
D: Community of Escarpia laminate from the Gulf of Mexico cold 
seeps.
PHOTOS A & B: copyright, P. Tyler, Uni. Southampton (UK) 
PHOTOS C & D: copyright, C. Fisher, PSU (USA). 
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Canyons thus act as conduits for particles from the fertile coast and shelves 
to the deep basins, fueling the deep faunal communities.17 Canyons provide 
also a variety of habitats that support diverse faunal types. The canyon head 
and walls are characterised by rocky outcrops that provide substratum for filter 
feeders such as crinoids, gorgonians or corals that use the currents in the can-
yon to filter seawater and capture food (Figure 2.3B). The axis of the canyon is 
filled with fine sediment that support rich benthic communities like the ones 
found on the sedimentary slopes. Canyons have been described as ‘essential 
habitats’18 because they can provide refuge and habitat for spawning spe-
cies and juveniles, as well as feeding grounds for certain species.19 The rough 
topography of canyons has limited fisheries, but technological developments 
are opening new fishing grounds in areas that were before difficult to access. 
Additionally, the modified currents in canyons enhance the transportation of 
chemical pollutants and litter that can accumulate at the base of the canyon.
2.2.3 Cold Water Corals
Cold-water corals are found at temperatures ranging from 4 to 13 °C and depths 
between 50 and 6000 m depths.20 Most of the reef-forming cold-water corals, 
such as the Lophelia pertusa reefs in the NE Atlantic, are found on the upper 
part of the continental slope and on seamounts. Reef-forming corals are esti-
mated to cover an area of ca. 280 000 km2 worldwide. The 3-dimensional 
structure of cold-water corals can form long-lived reefs or gardens, providing 
habitat and refuge to a large variety of organisms, both in the adult and juve-
nile stages. These ecosystems support a high biodiversity and high biomass 
along continental margins (Figure 2.3C). Extensive damage on cold-water cor-
als from trawling has occurred, resulting in highly productive systems being 
transformed into coral rubble. The recovery of damaged cold-water corals is 
J, Menot L, Nizinski M, Puig P, Rowden AA, Sanchez F, Van den Beld IM, ‘Ecological role 
of submarine canyons and need for canyon conservation: a review’, Frontiers in Marine 
Science (2017) 4: DOI=10.3389/fmars.2017.00005.
17   Masson DG, Huvenne VAI, de Stigter HC, Wolff GA, Kiriakoulakis K, Arzola RG, al., 
‘Efficient burial of carbon in a submarine canyon’, Geology (2010) 38: 831–834.
18   Company JB, Ramirez-Llodra E, Sardà F, Aguzzi J, Puig P, Canals M, Calafat A, Palanques 
A, Solé M, Sànchez-Vidal A, Martín J, Lastras G, Tecchio S, Koenig S, Fernandez-Arcaya 
U, Mechó A, Fernández P, ‘Submarine canyons in the Catalan Sea (NW Mediterranean): 
megafaunal biodiversity patterns and anthropogenic threats’, in Würts (ed) Mediterranean 
submarine canyons: ecology and governance (IUCN, Málaga, 2012), pp. 133–145.
19   See Fernandez-Arcaya et al (n16).
20   Roberts JM, Wheeler AJ, Freiwald A, ‘Reefs of the deep: the biology and geology of cold-
water coral ecosystems’, Science (2006) 312: 543–547.
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likely to be slow (decades to centuries) and when the habitat has been altered 
and the corals eliminated, recovery is unlikely.21
2.2.4 Cold Seeps
Cold seeps are found both at active and inactive margins and the estimated 
global area is 10 000 km2. These habitats are characterised by the cold seepage 
of fluid with high concentrations of methane and hydrogen sulphide. These 
reduced chemicals are used by microorganisms as source of energy to produce 
organic matter, in a process called chemosynthesis. Chemosynthetic-based 
ecosystems, such as cold-seeps or hydrothermal vents, are the only communi-
ties in the deep-ocean where the faunal communities are supported by in situ 
primary productivity. But here, this productivity is based on chemical energy 
instead of solar energy used by plants in the sunlit zone. These chemoautotro-
phic microorganims in cold seeps are found both free living and in symbiosis 
with benthic fauna.22 The primary productivity at cold seeps supports com-
munities of relatively low biodiversity but high biomass of highly specialised 
fauna. Some of the key organisms often found at cold seeps include bivalves, 
gastropods, siboglinid tubeworms, decapod crustaceans and cladorhizid 
sponges23 (Figure 2.3D).
2.3 Abyssal Plains
Abyssal plains are vast regions of relatively flat seafloor extending from 3000 
to 6000 m depth (Figure 2.1), covered by a layer of fine sediment that can reach 
thousands of meters in thickness. The abyssal plains cover a total area of 245 
million km2, about 75% of the deep seafloor, representing one of the largest 
ecosystems on Earth. Their vastness and remoteness makes abyssal plains one 
of the least explored regions of the oceans.24 As for the rest of the deep-sea 
fauna, excluding chemosynthetically-based ecosystems, the lack of light to fuel 
21   Rogers A, ‘The Biology, Ecology and Vulnerability of Deep-Water Coral Reefs’, 
IUCN-Rep-2004-002 (IUCN, 2004).
22   See Tunnicliffe V, Juniper KS, Sibuet M, ‘Reducing environments of the deep-sea floor’, 
in Tyler PA (ed) Ecosystems of the World, Vol 28 Ecosystems of the deep oceans (Elsevier, 
London, 2003) pp. 81–110. See also Baker MC, Ramirez-Llodra E, Tyler PA, German CR, 
Boetius A, Cordes E, Dubilier N, Fisher C, Levin LA, Metaxas A, Rowden A, Santos RS, 
Shank TM, Van Dover CL, Young CM, Waren A, ‘Biogeography, Ecology and Vulnerability 
of Chemosynthetic Ecosystems in the Deep Sea’, Chapter 9 in McIntyre AD (ed) Life in 
the World’s Oceans: Diversity, Distribution, and Abundance (Wiley Blackwell Oxford, 2010) 
pp. 161–183.
23   Levin LA, ‘Ecology of cold seep sediments: interactions of fauna with flow, chemistry and 
microbes’, Oceanography and Marine Biology Annual Review (2005) 43: 1–46.
24   See Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n2).
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photosynthesis results in the abyssal fauna being heterotrophic. This means 
that the organisms rely fully on the arrival of organic matter from the surface 
layers, falling as ‘marine snow’ through the water column or advected along the 
margin. Abyssal plains are thus often food limited,25 but these habitats sup-
port one of the highest biodiversities on Earth. This high biodiversity is mostly 
composed of small organisms, from microbes to meiofauna and macrofauna.26 
Abyssal plains are subjected to relative extreme ecosystem parameters, includ-
ing very high pressures (1 atmosphere for each 10 m depth), low temperatures 
(about 2 °C), usually very slow bottom currents and usually very low annual 
organic matter input.27 The quantity and quality of this flux of organic matter 
varies seasonally depending on the geographic region and the productivity of 
the surface oceanic layers. Thus, ecosystem composition, structure and func-
tion vary regionally at abyssal plains. A major characteristic of abyssal fauna is 
that rare is common. This means that most organisms collected from abyssal 
depths have been recorded as a few individuals (typically less than 5) from one 
or two sampling sites.28 Technological development has greatly increased our 
sampling activity, providing a wealth of samples with a high number of species 
new to science, most of them represented by small, single individuals. The rate 
at which potentially new species are being collected together with the decrease 
in expert taxonomists (specialists in species identification and naming) have 
led to what has been termed ‘taxonomic impediment’.29 This results in a sig-
nificant delay between the discovery of a new species (when it is collected 
and identified as new) and the scientific description of the species (when it is 
given a name and published, thus becoming available).30 Addressing this issue 
is thus essential if we are to obtain a thorough understanding of abyssal com-
munity composition, structure and function.
Although remote, abyssal plains are subjected to different environmen-
tal stressors. In particular, some abyssal plains (e.g. Pacific Ocean) include 
25   Smith C, De Leo FC, Bernardino AF, Sweetman AK, Martinez-Arbizu P, ‘Abyssal food limi-
tation, ecosystem structure and climate change’, Trends in Ecology and Evolution (2008) 
23: 518–528.
26   Ebbe B, Billett DSM, Brandt A, Ellingsen K, Glover A, Keller S, Malyutina M, Martinez 
Arbizu P, Molodtsowa T, Rex M, Smith C, Tselepides A, ‘Diversity of Abyssal Marine Life’, 
Chapter 8 in McIntyre AD (ed) Life in the World’s Oceans: Diversity, Distribution, and 
Abundance (Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2010) pp. 139–160.
27   Smith CR, Demopoulos AWJ, ‘Ecology of the deep Pacific Ocean floor’, in Tyler PA (ed) 
Ecosystems of the World, Volume 28: Ecosystems of the Deep Ocean (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
2003) pp. 179–218.
28   See Ebbe et al. (n26).
29   Ibid.
30   See Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n2).
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important mineral resources in the form of polymetallic manganese nodules 
(see below Section 3.5.1) which are currently under exploration licenses. Thus, 
improving scientific understanding of the structure and function of these 
ecosystems at the local and regional scales is essential prior to the signature 
of exploitation contracts. Climate change will also have an impact on abyssal 
faunal word wide, mainly related to changes in organic matter fluxes caused 
by changes in surface primary productivity, as well as potential water column 
stratification and changes in global circulation.31
2.4 Seamounts
Seamounts and knolls are underwater mountains rising from 100 to over 1000 
m from the surrounding seafloor (Figure 2.1). The number of seamounts and 
knolls has been estimated to be ca. 100 000, covering an area of 8.5 million km2, 
which represents 2.6% of the seafloor.32 However, the biological communities 
of only less than 300 seamounts have been studied with enough detail to pro-
vide a thorough description of their composition, let alone functioning. The 
topography of seamounts modifies locally the prevailing currents and results 
in the retention of particles above the seamount, providing an enhanced 
food supply to the seamount fauna. The available rocky substratum, eleva-
tion from the seafloor and modified hydrography of seamounts support high 
abundances and biomass of often distinct faunal communities.33 The domi-
nant fauna includes sessile, filter-feeder organisms such as corals and sponges, 
which in turn provide habitat for a variety of other species, such as fish, echi-
noderms and crustaceans. Seamounts have often been described as isolated 
habitats supporting hot spots of species richness with high degrees of ende-
mism. However, knowledge is still scarce and recent evidence does not support 
these widely accepted paradigms.34 They are also proposed to serve as stepping 
stones for dispersal of species across the abyssal plains. The high abundance of 
commercially-valuable fishes that may aggregate over seamounts has attracted 
industrial interest to these distinctive topographic habitats, with, in some 
31   See Levin and Le Bris (n7).
32   See Consalvey M, Clark MR, Rowden AA, Stocks KI, ‘Life on Seamounts’, Chapter 7, in 
McIntyre AD (ed) Life in the World’s Oceans: diversity, distribution and abundance (John 
Wiley & Sons, West Sussez, 2010), pp. 123–138. See also: Ramirez Llodra et al. 2010 (n2) ; 
Yesson, C., Clark, M., Taylor, M.L. and Rogers, A., ‘The global distribution of seamounts 
based on 30 arc seconds bathymetry data’, Deep Sea Research Part I (2011) 58: 442–453.
33   Schlacher TA, Rowden AA, Dower JF, Consalvey M, ‘Seamount science scales undersea 
mountains: new research and outlook’, Marine Ecology Progress (2010) Series 31: 1–13.
34   Rowden AA, Dower JF, Schlacher TA, Consalvey M, Clark MR, ‘Paradigms in seamount 
ecology: fact, fiction and future’, Marine Ecolgy (2010) 31: 226–241.
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cases, devastating impacts on the sessile fauna and the long-lived populations 
of target fish (see below Section 3.3).
2.5 Mid-Ocean Ridges and Hydrothermal Vents
2.5.1 Mid-Ocean Ridges
Mid-ocean ridges form a 65 000 km long, semi-continuous, linear range of vol-
canic mountains where new oceanic crust is being formed and hydrothermal 
vents are found (Figure 2.1). Mid-ocean ridges support a wealth of habitats, 
from rocky substratum that includes hills and seamounts to deep axial valleys 
that can reach 4000 m depth and are covered with fine sediment.35 The rocky 
seafloor supports communities dominated by filter feeders such as crinoids, 
sponges, corals and gorgonians and attracts motile fauna such as fish, galatheid 
crustaceans and cephalopods. This fauna contrast with the sediment commu-
nities, which are like those found in abyssal plains.36
2.5.2 Hydrothermal Vents
Hydrothermal vents and their associated fauna, discovered in 1977 in the 
Galapagos Rift (Pacific Ocean), are one of the major discoveries of the last 
decades.37 A total of ca. 2000 vents has been estimated to occur globally,38 
although recent models have suggested a number 3 to 6 times higher.39 Vents 
are found on mid-ocean ridges and back-arc basins where cold oxygen-
ated deep seawater penetrates through the cracks of the ocean crust and 
reacts with the hot rock close to the magma chamber underlying the ridge. 
35   Bergstad OA, Falkenhaug T, Astthorsson O, Byrkjedal I, Gebruk AV, Piatkowski U, Priede 
IG, Santos RS, Vecchione M, Lorance P, Gordon JDM, ‘Towards improved understand-
ing of the diversity and abundance patterns of the mid-ocean ridge macro- and mega-
fauna’, Deep-Sea Research (2008) II 55: 1–5. See also Vecchione M, Bergstad OA, Byrkjedal 
I, Falkenhaug T, Gebruk AV, Godø OR, Gislason A, Heino M, Høines Å, Menezes GMM, 
Piatkowski U, Priede IG, Skov H, Søiland H, Sutton T, de Lange Wenneck T, ‘Biodiversity 
Patterns and Processes on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge’, Chapter 6 in McIntyre AD (ed) Life 
in the World’s Oceans: Diversity, Distribution and Abundance (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford, 2010) pp. 103–121.
36   See Vecchione et al. (n35).
37   Corliss JB, Dymond J, Gordon LI, Edmond JM, von Herzen RP, Ballard RD, Green K, 
Williams D, Bainbridge A, Crane K, van Andel TH, ‘Submarine thermal springs on the 
Galapagos Rift’, Science (1979) 203: 1073–1083.
38   Baker ET, German CR, ‘On the Global Distribution of Hydrothermal Vent Fields Mid-Ocean 
Ridges’, American Geophysical Union (2013) pp. 245–266.
39   Baker ET, Resing JA, Haymon RM, Tunnicliffe V, Lavelle JW, Martinez F, Ferrini V, Walker 
SL, Nakamura K, ‘How many vent fields? New estimates of vent field populations on ocean 
ridges from precise mapping of hydrothermal discharge locations’, Earth and Planetary 
Science Letters (2016) 449: 186–196.
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During this process, the fluids can exceed 350 °C, dissolving metals and sul-
phur from the rocks. The heated fluid rises back to the surface of the seafloor 
and, when it mixes with the cold oxygenated water, the dissolved metals and 
sulphides precipitate, appearing as black smokers. The deposition of these 
particles forms the vent chimneys and can accumulate as massive sulphide 
deposits. Hydrothermal vents support unique faunal communities based on 
chemosynthetic primary productivity. As in cold seeps (see Section 2.2.4), che-
moautotrophic microbes use the reduced chemicals (e.g. hydrogen sulphide) 
from the vent fluid as source of energy to produce organic matter.40 These 
microorganisms are found free living forming bacterial mats over the vent 
chimneys, but also in tight symbiosis with benthic fauna. The availability of 
primary productivity on the seafloor supports high abundance and biomass 
of highly specialised megafauna communities. At the same time, the extreme 
environmental conditions found at vents (high temperature gradients, high 
levels of toxic chemicals, dynamism of vents) result in a low biodiversity with 
a high proportion of endemic species41 (see Figure 2.4). The deposition of 
metals from the vent fluids can result in large accumulations of commercially-
interesting minerals, in what is known as seafloor massive sulphide deposits 
(see Section 3.5.3.).
2.6 Trenches
The trenches are the deepest areas of the seafloor, extending from 6000 m to 
11 km, in what is known as the hadal zone (Figure 2.1). The deepest point on 
Earth is in the Marianas Trench, in the western Pacific, with a maximum-
recorded depth of 11 033 m in the Challenger Deep. There are 33 trenches around 
the world, covering an area of 0.2% of the seafloor.42 Trenches are covered with 
fine sediment and their main characteristic is the very high hydrostratic pres-
sure (600 to 1100 atmospheres), while temperature and oxygen variables are 
similar to those found on abyssal plains. The trench macro- and megafauna 
communities are composed by diverse fauna with a high degree of endemism, 
including hadal fish, large amphipods, shrimp, polychaetes, bivalves and 
40   Van Dover CL, ‘Mining seafloor massive sulphides and biodiversity: what is at risk?, ICES 
Journal of Marine Science (2010) doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsq086. See also Baker et al. (n22).
41   Tunnicliffe et al. (n22).
42   Blankenship-Williams LE, Levin LA, ‘Living Deep: a synopsis of hadal trench ecology’, 
Marine Technology Society Journal (2009) 43: 137–143.
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holothurians.43 The smaller faunal fraction, the meiofauna (32–63 microns) is 
dominated by soft-bodied foraminifera.44
3 Anthropogenic Impacts to the Deep Seafloor
Technological development in the last half century has facilitated access to 
deep-sea ecosystems. This has provided evidence of a wealth of undiscovered 
43   Jamieson A, The hadal zone: life in the deepest oceans (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2015).
44   Todo Y, Kitazato H, Hashimoto J, Gooday AJ, ‘Simple foraminifera flourish at the ocean’s 
deepest point’, Science (2005) 307: 689–689.
figure 2.4 Examples of hydrothermal vent ecosystems. A: black smokers from the 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge; B: the vent shrimp Rimicaris exoculata from the 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge; C: Bathymodiolus mussel bed from the Mid-Atlantic 
Ridge; D: Riftia pachyptila from the East Pacific Rise.
Photos A, B & C copyright Missao SEHAMA, 2002  
(funded by FCT, PDCTM 1999/MAR/15281)
Photo D copyright C. Van Dover, Duke Uni. (USA)
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biodiversity and ecosystem functions as well as important resources, both 
mineral (hydrocarbons, minerals) and biological (fisheries, genetic resources). 
Interest in the exploration for and exploitation of these resources is rap-
idly increasing, paralleling the increasing demand for raw materials and 
the depletion of resources on land and in the coastal area.45 Additionally, the 
remoteness of the deep seafloor has promoted for centuries the disposal of 
waste and, even under the current restrictive regulations on dumping waste 
in the seas and oceans, the issue of marine litter continues to increase. Below, 
we briefly describe the major activities that can have a significant impact on 
deep-sea ecosystems.
3.1 Marine Litter
Marine litter is defined by the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) as ‘any persistent, manufactured or processed solid material discarded, 
disposed of or abandoned in the marine and coastal environment’. Although 
dumping litter in the sea was banned by the Convention on the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 (known as 
the London Convention) and subsequent London Protocol (1996), litter con-
tinues to be a major threat to marine ecosystems. Major sources of marine 
litter are heavily populated coastal areas and rivers, as well as illegal dumping 
from boats.46 About 6,4 Million tonnes of litter have been reported to enter the 
oceans each year.47 Litter can float in the surface or water column, eventually 
sinking and accumulating on the seafloor. Plastics are the most abundant litter 
type observed on the deep seabed, followed by metal and glass48 (Figure 2.5). 
The impacts of marine litter on the benthic fauna have not been studied in 
detail, but effects such as suffocation, entanglement, physical damage, ghost 
fishing of discarded/lost nets and chemical pollution from decomposing 
materials (e.g. plastics additives, microplastics, paints) have been suggested as 
major issues requiring further investigation.
45   Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n5).
46   Ibid.
47   UNEP, Marine Litter: A Global Challenge (UNEP, Nairobi, 2009).
48   Ramirez-Llodra E, De Mol B, Company JB, Coll M, Sardà F, ‘Effects of natural and anthro-
pogenic processes in the distribution of marine litter in the deep Mediterranean Sea’, 
Progress in Oceanography (2013) 118: 273–287. See also Pham C, Ramirez-Llodra E, Alt C, 
Amaro T, Bergmann M, Canals M, Company JB, Davies J, Duinvevald G, Galgani F, Howell 
KL, A.I. HV, Jones DOB, Lastras G, Morato T, Gomes-Pereira JN, Purser A, Stewart H, Tojeira 
I, Tubau X, Van Rooij D, Tyler PA, ‘Marine litter distribution and density in European Seas, 
from the shelves to deep basins’, PLoS ONE (2014) 9(4): e95839.
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3.2 Submarine Tailing Disposal
Tailings are the fine waste produced by mining activities after extraction of the 
target metals from the ore. Most industrial mines dispose the vast amounts of 
tailing waste in land-based dams. However, in countries were the topography 
or climate do not allow for safe management of dams (e.g. Norway, Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea), the disposal of tailings in the sea is used as a suitable 
figure 2.5 Marine litter collected in the deep Mediterranean Sea with an otter trawl. A: 
plastic litter from 1200 m in the Central Mediterranean. B: oil drum collected at 
2000 m on the Western Mediterranean. C: plastics collected from 3000 m in the 
Western Mediterranean. D: glass bottles collected at 1750 m from the Western 
Mediterranean.
Photos A, B, C copyright E. Ramirez-Llodra/ICM-CSIC/BIOFUN.  
Photo D copyright A. Mecho/ICM-CSIC/BIOFUN
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option. There are currently two main types of tailing disposal in the sea.49 In 
submarine tailing disposal (STD), tailings are disposed through an underwater 
pipeline at relatively shallow depths (<100 m). Tailings create a gravity flow 
that deposits the waste on the seafloor. In deep-seat tailing disposal (DSTD), 
tailings are disposed via a submerged pipeline below the mixing zone 
(>100 m). The tailings create a gravity flow that deposits the waste on the deep 
seafloor below 1000 m depth.
The main impacts of STDs and DSTDs, reviewed in50 include: 1) smother-
ing of the benthic communities by hyper-sedimentation at the local scale; 
2) potential toxic effects from heavy metals or added chemicals (flocculants, 
floatation); 3) impact of changes in grain, which can modify the organic con-
tent in the sediment, and grain structure, with some tailing particles having 
very sharp edges that can physically damage feeding structures or the settle-
ment of larvae/juveniles; and 4) plume dispersal, upwelling and slope failure, 
which can re-distribute tailings far from the original settling area, thus affect-
ing communities at the regional scale.
Acknowledging the urgent need for further research and robust manage-
ment measures, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), together with 
the Deep-Ocean Stewardship Initiative (DOSI), the International Network 
for Scientific Investigations of the Deep Sea (INDEEP) and the Norwegian 
Research Council (NRC) funded-project MITE-DEEP, co-organised a work-
shop to discuss current knowledge on DSTD processes and environmental 
impacts. The discussions and conclusions have been synthesised in a report 
to be discussed by the parties of the London Convention/London Protocol 
for future action.51 In parallel, the European Commission is in the process 
of updating the first ‘Reference Document on Best Available Techniques for 
49   Shimmield TM, Black KD, Howe JA, Hughes DJ, Sherwin T, Final report: Independent 
Evaluation of Deep‐Sea Mine Tailings Placement (DSTP) in PNG, SAMS, Oban, UK, 2010. 
See also: Hughes DJ, Shimmield TM, Black KD, Howe JA, ‘Ecological impacts of large-
scale disposal of mining waste in the deep sea’, Nature Scientific Reports (2015) 5:09985 doi 
10.1038/srep09985; and Ramirez-Llodra E, Trannum HC, Evenset A, Levin LA, Andersson 
M, Finne TE, Hilario A, Flem B, Christensen G, Schaanning M, Vanreusel A, ‘Submarine 
and deep-sea mine tailing placements: a review of current practices, environmen-
tal issues, natural analogs and knowledge gaps in Norway and internationally’, Marine 
Pollution Bulletin (2015) 97: 13–35.
50   Reichelt-Brushett A, ‘Risk assessment and ecotoxicology. Limitations and recommenda-
tions for ocean disposal of mine waste in the Coral Triangle’, Oceanography (2012) 25: 
40–51. See also: Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n49); and Morello EB, Haywood MDE, Brewer DT, 
Atpe SC, Asmunda G, Kowng YTJ, Dennis D, ‘The ecological impats of submarine tailings 
placement’, Oceanography and Marine Biology: An Annual Review (2016) 54: 315–366.
51   Vogt C (in press) Proceedings of the GESAMP International Workshop on the Impacts of 
Mine Tailings in the Marine Environment, 10–12 June 2015, Lima, Peru.
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Management of Tailings and Waste-Rock in Mining Activities’. The revised 
‘Best Available Techniques Reference Document for the Management of Waste 
from Extractive Industries’ (MWEI BREF) is subject to the EU Directive on the 
management of waste from extractive industries (2006/21/EC) and has been 
published in December 2018.52
3.3 Fishing
Increased demand for marine biological resources and technological 
development have promoted the continuous increase of deep-sea fisher-
ies exploitation,53 with fishing grounds commonly found below 1500 m 
depth. Bottom trawling (i.e. the towing of a trawl net along the seafloor) has 
the highest impact, both on the fauna (target and non-target species) and the 
habitat. Deep-sea target species are often long-lived and have delayed matu-
rity, so the exploitation of such communities, which depletes the population 
of reproductively-active adults, has rarely proven sustainable.54 The trawling 
gear has also a major impact on the seafloor and the benthic communities. 
In sedimentary slopes, where most trawling takes place, recent studies in the 
Mediterranean have shown that the regular trawling of the seabed triggers 
sediment flows downslope, with unknown effects on the faunal communities.55 
Furthermore, long-term trawling activity in a region can modify the shape of 
the submarine landscape, reducing the original complexity of the seafloor 
in the same way that agriculture does on land.56 Fishing over seamounts has 
resulted in significant impacts, again on the target species and the ecosystem.57 
Seamounts are characterised by rich communities of sessile fauna, including 
sponges and corals that provide habitat to other fauna (see Section 2.3). These 
communities are heavily impacted by bottom trawling and their recovery is in 
the order of decades or centuries (see Section 2.2.3).
Fishing regulations are implemented by coastal states and RFMOs (Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations). These regulations may include quota 
managements, licensing systems and protection of specific habitats 
52   Available at < https://susproc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/activities/MWEI/documents/jrc109657_m 
wei_bref_-_for_pubsy_online.pdf>.
53   Morato T, Watson R, Pitcher TJ, Pauly D, ‘Fishing down the deep’, Fish and Fisheries (2006) 
7: 24–34.
54   See Clark et al. (n12).
55   Martín J, Puig P, Palanques A, Masqué P, García-Orellana J, ‘Effect of commercial trawling 
on the deep sedimentation in a Mediterranean submarine canyon’, Marine Geology (2008) 
252: 150–155.
56   Puig P, Canals M, Company JB, Martin J, Amblas D, Lastras G, Palanques A, Calafat AM, 
‘Ploughing the deep sea floor’, Nature (2012) 489: 286–290.
57   Pitcher TJ, Clark MR, Morato T, Watson R, ‘Seamount Fisheries: Do They Have a Future?’ 
Oceanography (2010) 23: 134–144.
54 Ramirez-Llodra
(e.g. seamounts, ridges, cold-water corals, upper slope) by closing the areas 
to fishing activities.58 In recent years, certain RFMOs have extended their 
regulations to the protection of vulnerable benthic marine ecosystems in 
international waters.59
3.4 Oil and Gas Exploitation
The decrease in land-based resources and developing technology has 
promoted the increase of oil and gas exploitations in deep waters, with rou-
tine drilling below 200 m depth in many regions. In well explored areas, such 
as the Gulf of Mexico, ultra-deep water drilling (>1000 m depth) activities, 
which reach 3000 m depth, are expanding.60 Impact of oil and gas exploitation 
can come from various activities related to offshore oil and gas development. 
Some of the major direct impacts are relatively local, including the physical 
damage to the benthic habitat and community caused by the installation 
of the drilling infrastructure (ca. 100 m radius), and the discharge of drilling 
muds and produced water that can affect benthic communities at distances 
of about 300 m from the source.61 Effects of drill muds on all size classes of 
the benthic community (meio-, macro- and megafauna) include changes in 
density, biomass and diversity, but little is known on the effects on the micro-
bial community. These potential effects of oil and gas exploitation activities 
are particularly important in operations close to cold-water corals, where coral 
polyps mortality can increase by burial from thin layers (6.5 mm) of drill cut-
tings.62 Additionally, large environmental impacts can occur during accidental 
oil spills, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout accident of the Macondo 
well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.63 Impacts to the deep benthic fauna have 
58   Bensch A, Gianni M, Gréboval D, Sanders J, Hjort A, ‘Worldwide review of bottom fisher-
ies in the high seas’, FAO Technical Paper (2008) 522: 1–145.
59   For a review of the applicable legal regime, see R. Caddell, ‘Deep-Sea Bottom Fisheries 
and the Protection of Seabed Ecosystems: Problems, Progress and Prospects’, Chapter 12 
of this book.
60   Reviewed in Cordes EE, Jones DOB, Schlacher TA, Amon DJ, Bernardino AF, Brooke S, 
Carney R, DeLeo DM, Dunlop KM, Escobar-Briones EG, Gates AR, Génio L, Gobin J, Henry 
L-A, Herrera S, Hoyt S, Joye M, Kark S, Mestre NC, Metaxas A, Pfeifer S, Sink K, Sweetman 
AK, Witte U, ‘Environmental Impacts of the Deep-Water Oil and Gas Industry: A Review 
to Guide Management Strategies’, Frontiers in Environmental Science (2016) 4: 1–26 doi 
10.3389/fenvs.2016.00058.
61   Ibid.
62   Larsson AI and Purser A, ‘Sedimentation on the cold-water coral Lophelia pertusa: clean-
ing efficiency from natural sediments and drill cuttings’, Marine Pollution Bulletin (2011) 
62: 1159–1168.
63   Joye SB, Bracco A, Ozgokmen T, Chanton JP, Grosell M, MacDonald IR, Cordes EE, 
Montoya JP, Passow U, ‘The Gulf of Mexico ecosystem, six years after the Macondo Oil 
Well Blowout’, Deep Sea Res. (2016) II 129, 4–19.
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been detected in an area of 300 km2, with significant impacts to the cold-water 
coral communities 22 km away from the well and at depths of 1950 m.64
Although experiments of the toxic effects on deep-sea fauna of chemical 
dispersants used during oil spills are limited, there is evidence that disper-
sants can affect larval development, cause tissue degradation in invertebrates 
and damage cold-water corals. Management of oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation licenses falls under national regulations and should include 
activity management, where some processes or technologies are restricted, 
temporal management, where temporal variations in feeding, breeding or 
migration of key species is considered, and spatial management, where 
exploitation may be restricted in relation to the proximity of sensitive species 
or habitats.65
3.5 Deep-Sea Mining
The commercial exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources has not started 
yet. However, in the last 15 years, interest in exploration for and exploita-
tion of these resources has greatly increased Currently, there are four major 
resource types that are being considered for commercial exploitation from 
habitats deeper than 200 m depth: manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, sea-
floor massive sulphides and phosphorite nodules. Each of these resources is 
found in a specific habitat with particular geochemical and biological char-
acteristics, which will define the significance of the mining impact and the 
ecosystem recovery potential.66 Below, we briefly describe each of these min-
eral resources, their associated ecosystems and main expected impacts and 
recovery potential form mining activities.
3.5.1 Manganese Nodules
Manganese nodules are polymetallic concretions made of manganese and 
iron sulphides which form by precipitation from the ambient sea-water over 
millions of years.67 Manganese nodules are rich in manganese, copper, cobalt 
and nickel and are found on abyssal plains, particularly in the Pacific Ocean. 
The sediments support rich communities of meio- and macrofauna, with 
64   Fisher CR, Hsing P-Y, Kaiser CL, Yoerger DR, Roberts HH, Shedd WW, Cordes EE, Shank, 
Timothy M., Berlet SP, Saunders MG, Larcom EA, Brooks JM, ‘Footprint of deepwater 
horizon blowout impact to deep-water coral communities’, Proceedings of the Natural 
Academy of Scienes of the USA (2014) 111: 11744–11749.
65   Cordes et al. (n60).
66   Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n5).
67   SPC, ‘Deep Sea Minerals: Manganese Nodules, a physical, biological, environmental, 
and technical review’, Vol. 1B, in Baker E, and Beaudoin, Y. (ed), Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (2013) p. 52.
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larger animals such as holothurians, sea urchins, sea stars, polycahetes and 
octocorals also present, but in lower abundance. The nodules are colonised 
by large single-celled foraminifera.68 The processes in these abyssal plains are 
very slow, with very slow sedimentation rates and very weak bottom currents. 
Additionally, nodules are formed at geological-time scales. Thus, the recovery 
and recolonization of these ecosystems will be extremely slow and not at the 
ecological time-scales that mining-licenses will operate, making robust spatial 
management plans more valuable than possible restoration measures.69
3.5.2 Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts
Cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts form by precipitation from the seawa-
ter over millions of years over all rocky surfaces free of sediment in the deep 
oceans. Potentially exploitable crusts are found on the flanks of seamounts, 
knolls and ridges at depths of 800–2500 m.70 These crusts are rich in cobalt, 
nickel and platinum. Although little is known of the fauna specifically on 
cobalt-rich crusts (in comparison to that of seamounts), these geomorpho-
logical structures provide substrate for a variety of sessile filter feeders, such 
as corals and sponges, and other motile fauna including crustaceans and 
echinoderms.
3.5.3 Seafloor Massive Sulphides
Seafloor massive sulphides (SMS) form through the precipitation of metals from 
the fluids at hydrothermal vents, typically at depths between 1000 and 3000 m. 
SMS are sources of copper, gold, silver, zinc and lead.71 Vent communities are 
characterised by very high abundances and biomass of highly adapted species, 
with a high degree of endemism, supported by microbial chemoautotrophy 
(see Section 2.4.2).72 These systems are very dynamic and subjected to sporadic 
volcanic eruptions, particularly in fast-spreading ridges, as well as changes in 
the activity of individual chimneys and sources of diffuse flow. There are two 
68   Smith and Demopoulos (n27).
69   SPC (n67).
70   SPC, ‘Deep Sea Minerals: Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts, a physical, biological, envi-
ronmental, and technical review’, Vol. 1C, In Baker E, Beaudoin Y (eds). Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (2013).
71   Van Dover, C.L., Arnaud-Haond S., Gianni, M., Helmreich, S., Huber, J.A., Jaeckel, A.L., 
Metaxas, A., Pendleton, L.H., Peterseni, S., Ramirez-Llodra, E., Steinberg, P.E., Tunnicliffe, V. 
& Yamamoto, H., ‘Scientific rationale and international obligations for protection of active 
hydrothermal vent ecosystems from deep-sea mining’, Marine Policy (2018) 90: 20–28. See 
also SPC, ‘Deep Sea Minerals: Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides, a physical, biological, envi-
ronmental, and technical review’, Vol. 1A, in Baker E, Beaudoin Y (eds). Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (2013).
72   Van Dover et al. (n71).
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scientifically documented cases where naturally impacted vent communities 
from volcanic eruptions recovered one decade after the eruption.73 However, 
these processes took place in fast-spreading ridges, while the major SMS iden-
tified to date are on slow-spreading ridges, which are much less dynamic 
systems. The recovery of such ecosystems from mining depends, thus, on the 
habitat itself, as well as on the availability of larvae, juveniles or mobile adults 
from intact populations that are able to disperse to and colonise the new vents 
systems post-mining.74 However, mining will add on to the existing natural loss 
of critical habitat, and cumulative impacts may result in significant changes 
in the abundance and distribution of vent species.75 Because of the rarity of 
active hydrothermal vent systems, their unique fauna and the challenges of 
identifying representative systems for area-based management, it has been 
proposed that active hydrothermal vents are protected legally from direct and 
indirect mining impacts.76
3.5.4 Phosphorite Nodules
Phosphorite nodules are formed from limestone deposits following chemical 
reactions in areas with upwelling and high surface productivity on upper conti-
nental slopes (200–400 m). Phosphorite nodules contain products used to make 
phosphate fertiliser and they have recently been explored off New Zealand 
and Namibia. In these regions, the dominant fauna includes echinoderms, gal-
atheid crabs, sponges, corals and bryozoans, and abundant amphipods in the 
sediment. However, the impacts of potential mining of the mineral resources 
on the upper continental margin have been little investigated.
3.5.5 Impacts of Deep-Sea Mining
The main impacts of deep-sea mining on the seafloor include the depletion or 
physical damage to the habitat and fauna by the mining equipment, changes 
in seafloor topography and geochemical characteristics, creation of sediment 
plumes and potential toxicity from metal and/or process chemicals release 
(Figure 2.6). Additionally, light and noise may be an issue for deep-water fauna 
and sediment plumes may impact pelagic life, including larvae and juveniles. 
These processes will affect the composition, structure and functioning of the 
faunal communities in different ways depending on the ecosystem considered. 
73   Tunnicliffe et al. (n22).
74   Boschen RE, Rowden AA, Clark MR, Gardner JPA, ‘Mining of deep-sea seafloor massive 
sulfides: A review of the deposits, their benthic communities, impacts from mining, regu-
latory frameworks and management strategies’, Ocean & Coastal Management (2013) 84: 
54–67.
75   Van Dover et al. (n71) and Boschen et al. (n74).
76   Boschen et al. (n74).
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For example, mining manganese nodules at abyssal plains, where processes 
such as nodule formation and sedimentation are extremely slow (millennia), 
will have a very significant and long-lasting impact on the ecosystem.
With a new deep-sea mining industry emerging, regulatory bodies, both for 
areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, need to develop regulations and 
licenses where potential economic gains need to be balanced against impacts 
on the environment, other ocean users and civil society. The need to ensure 
the protection of the environment requires a robust scientific understand-
ing of what can cause a significant adverse change to deep-sea biodiversity, 
ecosystem structure and function that will cause serious harm to the affected 
ecosystem.77 The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is responsible for the 
77   Levin LA, Mengerink K, Gjerde KM, Rowden AA, Van Dover CL, Clark MR, Ramirez-Llodra 
E, Currie B, Smith CR, Sato KN, Gallo N, Sweetman AK, Lily H, Armstrong CW, Brider J, 
‘Defining “serious harm” to the marine environment in the context of deep-seabed min-
ing’, Marine Policy (2016) 74: 245–259 doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.09.032.
figure 2.6 Deep-sea mining system and associated impacts on the pelagic and benthic 
ecosystems 
Image courtesy of Dr Malcolm Clark, NIWA (NZ) and IUCN
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regulations and license contracts for exploration and exploitation of minerals 
on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (The Area), under the principle 
that The Area and its mineral resources are ‘common heritage of mankind’.78 
Within territorial waters, regulations are often lacking, but interested nations 
are currently developing such regulations, which, for parties of the UN Law of 
the Sea Convention, must be at least as restringing as the ISA regulations.
3.6 Cumulative Impacts
The deep ocean is experiencing increasing pressure from human activities 
targeting its resources or receiving and accumulating synthetic waste and 
chemical pollution. These different impacts may have synergies on single 
ecosystems if acting together, with a magnified effect on the structure and 
functioning of the faunal communities.79 In particular, climate change-related 
stressors such as warming water masses, de-oxygenation, changes in primary 
productivity and ocean stratification, can affect the oceans globally.80 These 
global climatic stressors will add to direct impacts from other human activi-
ties, such as fishing or mining (Figure 2.7), possibly reducing resilience and 
recovery potential of the affected ecosystems. Different extractive industries 
may also be in spatial conflict. For example, in New Zealand and Namibia, 
phosphorite nodule reserves on the upper continental margin coincide with 
existing fishing grounds.81 Based on the still limited scientific understanding of 
the composition and functioning of many deep-sea ecosystems, several stake-
holders recommend the development of precautionary and ecosystem-based 
management systems. These measures should balance the use of mineral and 
biological resources with the maintenance of healthy marine systems and the 
ecosystems services they provide.82
78   See: Jaeckel A, ‘An environmental management strategy for the International Seabed 
Authority? The legal basis.’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2015) 
30: 1–27; Jaeckel A, Ardron JA, Gjerde KM, ‘Sharing benefits of the common heritage of 
mankind – Is the deep seabed mining regime ready?’, Marine Policy (2016) 70: 198–204.
79   Ramirez-Llodra et al. (n5).
80   Levin and Le Bris (n7).
81   Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) – Te Mana Rauhi Taiao. Decision on marine 
consent application. Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited, To mine phosphorite nodules on 
the Chathman Rise (2015).
82   Mengerink et al. (n6).
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figure 2.7 Interactions amongst waste disposal, exploitation of resources and climate 
change that may have synergistic effects in deep-sea ecosystems
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chapter 3
A Short Human History of the Ocean Floor
Håkon With Andersen
1 Introduction
It could be argued that representations are the key to understanding human 
actions. It is our inner picture of the sea floor that makes things happen – what-
ever picture that is. The more so since the ocean floor is not directly accessible 
to us in any way – we depend on representations. So let us start this human 
history of the ocean floor reminding ourselves that our object of study is not 
direct accessible and that our impressions of the sea floor is always mediated 
in one way or another: by different technologies, by science or by literature or 
cultural traditions.
Science came to play an important role in overtaking earlier guesswork and 
anecdotes about the sea floor. But even scientific views were changing. It suf-
fices to remember the ridicule Alfred Wegener (1880–1930) was subjected to 
with his theory of continental drift from 1912. Not to mention the fascinating 
story of the cartographer Marie Tharp (1920–2003) and her detailed drawings of 
the ocean floor that finally contributed to the breakthrough of plate tectonics 
in the late 1960s and restored Wegener’s ideas. The representations developed 
afterwards combined with all sort of technological devices have made the 
ocean floor a place for a great variety of claims and hunt for resources.
In this chapter, I will try to establish something that could be called a human 
history of the sea floor. A place so inaccessible requires other means and ways 
to figure out the relation between humans and the deep sea. It is important to 
acknowledge that the representation of the seafloor is the most important ele-
ment in this history. Secondly that the resources and their regulations always 
have been based on these representation. As time flows these have shifted and 
varied. Science has come to play an important part as have real examination 
of the sea floor. This chapter is an overview, too short of details and modifica-
tions, but it might be an introduction to an area very few have seen, but still 
covers almost 5⁄7 of the Earth’s surface.1
1   The literature in the field is particular centered on the history of oceanography. Some main 
references here are the classic study by Deacon, Margaret B. Scientists and the sea 1650–1900: a 
study of marine science (London: Academic Press, 1971). It was followed by a newer anthology 
62 With Andersen
The chapter consists of four major parts as a parallel to four major histori-
cal phases of the cultural appropriation of the sea floor. After an introduction 
(Section 1), it starts with the Carta Marina from 1539 describing the dangers of 
crossing the surface of the sea and the first attempts for soundings and mea-
suring of tidal waters (Section 2). In the second major part (Section 3), the first 
attempts to measure the deep sea and to use the seafloor as a place for cables 
are discussed. The third period (Section 4) introduces the powerful alliance 
between science and navies leading up to important research project as ‘The 
Challenger’ and ‘Meteor’ really increasing the knowledge of the seafloor. The 
last major section (Section 5) is devoted to the regulation of the seafloor end-
ing with UNCLOS III and the scientific development underpinning it.
2 The Dangerous Sea
The deep ocean has always been a mystery to mankind. The idea of something 
bottomless, a void, is frightening. Even more frightening was the idea of what 
this bottomless void could hold. Rumors and ideas were circulated and also 
collected by intellectuals in the renaissance and later.
2.1 Representing the Unknown Deep Ocean Floor
It seems appropriate that we start this decent to the deep ocean floor with 
a famous map, Carta Marina, from 1539 (Figure 3.1). The map was made by 
a clergy, Olaus Magnus (1490–1557).2 It covered most of the northern part of 
coastal Europe and the North Sea and the Atlantic. Olaus Magnus used years 
to gather knowledge and experiences from merchants, sailors, fishermen and 
whalers to be able to draw the map. To us the interesting part is not only the 
land masses and coasts that are drawn but also what is to be found in the deep 
ocean and that come to the surface of the map. Monsters, large as mountains, 
lived in the unfathomable depths, threatening every seaman who dared to sail 
across open sea. Olaus Magnus had, of cause, not seen these monsters himself, 
from 2001: Deacon, Margaret, Rice, Tony and Summerhayes, C.P. Understanding the oceans: 
a century of ocean exploration (London: UCL Press, 2001). For a newer general introduction, 
H.M. Rozwadowsky is highly recommendable: Rozwadowski, H.M. Fathoming the Ocean 
(Harvard University Press, 2009); Helen M. Rozwadowsky, ‘Focus: knowing the oceans: a 
role for the history of science’, ISIS: Journal of the History of Science in Society (2014) 105(2), 
335–337 (see as well her edited focus group of paper in Isis 2014). A good introduction to the 
historical development of plate tectonics can be found in Lawrence, David M., Upheaval from 
the abyss: ocean floor mapping and the Earth science revolution. (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002).
2   Richter, Herman and Olaus, Magnus. Olaus Magnus: Carta marina, 1539 (Vol. 11:2) (Lund: 
Lärdomshistoriska samfundet, 1967).
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he had to rely on reports as he relied on reports of coasts and lands, weather 
and winds. Hence, what we see in the map are not fantasies, but first attempts 
to empirically say something about what the deep ocean in fact contained as 
it had been witnessed by sea folks. It was a representation of what the oceans 
concealed.
2.2 Addressing the Perils of the Open Sea by Exploring the Seafloor
The sea monsters and ocean storms were perils of the open sea. There were, how-
ever, other more concrete and always threatening ways that the sea and the sea 
bottom could be a menace for the seamen and the ship masters. One thing was 
storms and bad weather, even more dangerous was the treacherous sea bottom 
threatening to ground the ship and destroy it. As late as the end of 19th century 
the largest cause of averages and losses of ship was ‘grounding’ or ‘stranded and 
abandoned’. As much as ⅔ to ¾ of all ship losses was caused by this.3
3   DnV accident statistics, from Annual report. See Paulsen, Gard, Andersen, Håkon With, 
Collett, John Peter and Stensrud, Iver Tangen Building Trust. The history of DNV 1864–2014 
(Dinamo Forlag, 2014).
figure 3.1 Carta Marina, by Olaus Magnus 
http://www.npm.ac.uk/rsdas/projects/carta_marina/ “Carta 
Marina satellite images”, Public Domain, https://commons.wiki 
media.org/w/index.php?curid=558827
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The danger of grounding and the anxiety for being stuck on the bottom lead 
very early to measures to sound the depth of the sea under the ship. Sounding 
was also used to determine if land was not too far away. However, the main rea-
son was to ensure safe travel. Still, accident happened. One of the more famous 
was for instance James Cook’s (1728–1779) grounding at the Great Barrier reef 
in the summer of 1770 when exploring the east coast of Australia.4
Sounding also made another thing clear: the ocean was very, very deep. 
Usually sounding lines would only reach some hundreds fathom deep.5 Below 
that, nobody knew and nobody cared too much. Interest turned to what was 
considered problems for shipping. Not only grounding was a threat, but in the 
same way knowledge of tides became important in the 18th century. Serious 
studies of tides and the behavioral of tides were undertaken, along with 
attempts to map coastlines with the level of tides.
Nevertheless, very few cared about the deep ocean except for superstition 
and rumors about what the deep ocean actually hid. It was still fathomless in 
the 18th century, even if Olaus Magnus´ creatures had disappeared and may be 
substituted by whales and other large sea animals with other stories connected 
to them and the few that had seen them.
A small note should be made about the real observers of the ocean: the grow-
ing whaling industry towards the end of the 17th century and through the 18th 
and early 19th century. Whalers were the only one that really crisscrossed the 
oceans on their restless hunt for the large animals. Hence, they also became 
the most important reporters of conditions at sea and the lives of ‘monsters’.6
3 Mapping the Seafloor as a First Answer to Its Growing 
Strategic Importance
Towards the end of the 18th century and start of the 19th century, the ocean 
took on a more strategic importance to the larger naval countries. It became 
important to systematize the knowledge of wind, currents and sailing condi-
tions around the globe. Knowledge about the sea floor, where it was a danger 
to ships and where it could contribute to different sailing conditions became 
important. The French navy had done this since the middle of the 18th century 
4   M.B. De Deacon, Margaret B. Scientists and the sea 1650–1900: a study of marine science 
(London: Academic Press, 1971).
5   A fathom is 6 feet or 1,83m. Older measures varies from 1,5m to 1,8m.
6   Philbrick, Nathaniel, In the heart of the sea: the epic true story that inspired Moby Dick 
(London: HarperCollins, 2001); Tønnessen, Johan Nicolay and Johnsen, Arne Odd, The history 
of modern whaling (Univ of California Press, 1982).
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while the British navy established the British Admirality’s Hydrographic Office 
in 1795. The first hydrographer of the admirality was Alexander Dalrymple 
(1737–1808), a fellow of the Royal Society. We immediately note the marriage 
between ‘science’ and the navy, a new combination that should mark the 
exploration of the seafloor for many decades to come.7
The hydrographic office should first and foremost gather intelligence 
about the sea and the oceans and improve maps and navigational manuals 
for both military and civil service. Maps had been made for commercial rea-
sons for centuries, but particularly the use of chronometers and lunatic tables 
for more exact longitudinal positions had improved the quality of maps quite 
dramatically. The Admiralty and its hydrographic office had pioneered these 
resources since the last decades of the 18th century. But the task was even 
broader: the hydrographer should be the foremost advisor to the Board of 
Admiralty on all sort of intelligence about the ocean.8 It strengthened the link 
between the navy and 19th century scientific activity at the same time as it also 
contributed to commercial activities, first and foremost through better maps 
and sailing manuals. Dalrymple, for example, came to prioritize international 
scientific cooperation and exchange of data and maps. He had obvious a desire 
to put hydrography before limited military gains.9
Matthew Fontaine Maury (1806–1873) came to play a parallel role in the 
United States in the antebellum period. In 1842, he was appointed director of 
the Navy’s Depot of Charts and Instruments and soon after the head of the 
Naval observatory.10 In connection with our study of the ocean floor Maury 
plays a prominent part as he was the first to make a crude map of the Atlantic 
Ocean floor and as such motivated the first use of the deep sea floor. We will 
come to that, but first we have to understand what was at stake for all the great 
powers hydrographic activities in the first part of the nineteenth century. We 
will use Maury as an example of this, even if more or less the same sort of 
work were conducted in Britain, France, Spain, Denmark and other European 
coastal states.
7    Webb, Adrian. ‘More than just charts: hydrographic expertise within the Admiralty, 1795–
1829’, Journal for Maritime Research (2014) 16(1), 43–54; Clissold, P. Chartering the Seas. 
The Admiralty Hydrographic Service 1795–1919. Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Day, K.B.E., C.B., 
D.S.O. (1968), Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1967, 105s. Journal of Navigation, 
21(03), 371–373.
8    Webb, Adrian (n7) p 45.
9    Webb, Adrian, ‘Foundations for « International cooperation in the field of hydrogra-
phy »: some contributions by British admirality hydrographers, 1795–1855’, International 
Hydrographic review (2010) (4) p 8.
10   Rozwadowski, H.M (2009) (n1) p 44.
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3.1 Matthew Maury’s Legacy
In 2016, a whole section of the International Journal of Maritime History was 
devoted to Matthew F. Maury and his rather mixed legacy.11 Mixed because he 
left his job to fight for the confederacy in 1861 and because he was not a real 
scientist according to historians of science. In the section, Maury’s contribu-
tion is discussed along three dimensions: Maury, the pathfinder, the scientist 
and the reformer. These three roles characterize Maury quite well, as well as 
they characterized contemporary hydrography in general. However, Maury did 
it more intensely than most others hydrographers at the time. As a pathfinder, 
he was studying ship logs and created catalogues and maps of wind, weather 
and water in such a way that he could recommend the fastest way to travel.12 
He created in a way pathways for sailing ships, not only naval but also for 
merchant ships and whalers. This empirical and systematic work over many 
years did away with much of the superstition and personal preferences of the 
captains. As the merchant ship masters saw the benefit of their observations, 
they were easily persuaded to collect more data on their travels and in this way 
strengthen Maury’s scientific work.
Maury’s interests were much wider than just finding the best traveling routes 
in the days of sail. It included all parts of the oceans: winds, salinity, currents, 
weather and depths.13 More or less unintentionally, Maury’s work came to be 
important for the first serious use of the ocean floor, as a bed for communica-
tion technology, the first transatlantic telegraph cable.
3.2 The First Submarine Telegraph Cables: the Seafloor as a Medium
In a report to the secretary of the U.S. Navy from 1853, Maury had described 
the ocean bed as ‘a plateau, which seems to have been placed there especially 
for the purpose of holding the wires of the submarine telegraph, and keeping 
them out of harm’s way’.14
It was the American entrepreneur Cyrus Field, encouraged by Maury’s 
report that initiated the attempt to lay such a cable. Moving to Britain he suc-
ceeded in rising sufficient funding for a first attempt to lay a cable. The cost was 
11   See the introductory article: Rozwadowski, Helen M., ‘Introduction: Reconsidering 
Matthew Fontaine Maury’, International Journal of Maritime History, (2016) 28(2), 
388–393.
12   Smith, Jason W., ‘Matthew Fontaine Maury: Pathfinder’, International Journal of Maritime 
History, (2016) 28(2), 411–420.
13   Hardy, Penelope K. ‘Matthew Fontaine Maury: Scientist’, International Journal of Maritime 
History (2016) 28(2), 402–410.
14   Headrick, Daniel R., Griset, Pascal, ‘Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business and Politics, 
1838–1939’, The Business History Review (2001) 3/75, 543–578.
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enormous, and the risk was high and became obvious when the first cable was 
lost in 1857. A second attempt was made in 1858. It succeeded temporarily so 
the address of the American president would reach Queen Victoria. However, 
a couple of weeks later it failed, never to work again. The Civil War prevented 
new attempts before finally the cable was laid in 1865. It broke again, but this 
time it was possible to repair it. In 1866, the cable finally worked and worked 
well: it served newspapers, business, politicians and administrations, even if it 
was expensive in use (see Figure 3.2 – Landing of the Atlantic Cable of 1866, 
Heart’s Content, Newfoundland, by Robert Charles Dudley).
In the years from the 1850s onwards submarine telegraph cables were laid 
under many seas and oceans, all of them needed sufficient knowledge about 
the ocean bottom. British firms totally dominated the business, both for cable 
laying and for submarine telegraph. In 1892, British firms controlled ⅔ of all 
submarine cables (more than 160 000 km) with the US as a good second with 
15%.15 For cable laying, knowledge of the ocean bed’s topology and the bottoms 
quality was of outmost importance. It was not any longer science for science 
sake, it was technology, it was strategy but foremost it was business.
It is difficult for us today to recognize the importance and the publicity that 
the submarine cables created. As communication technology, it was the first 
time that information and communication was separated from physical move-
ment of persons or things. It is difficult to imagine the change that the cables 
brought about. Instead of using weeks and months for news, business instruc-
tions and letters, they could now be communicated within hours and minutes. 
The price was high, of course, but suddenly the globe became much smaller. It 
can be argued that the transatlantic cable across the abyss of the ocean was the 
real start of the global information society.
15   Ibid, p 560.
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The Atlantic cable was not the first submarine cable, but it was the first to 
connect North America with Europe. Earlier submarine cables from the early 
1850s was quickly destroyed by fishermen before they were properly protected 
and the insulation was destroyed by seawater. The use of guta perca as insula-
tion and iron reinforcements proved to be effective. Hence, the possibility for 
larger distances opened up.
With the idea of a submarine cable, the seafloor was immediately brought 
to attention. The seafloor would be the medium the cable had to use, even the 
very deep seafloor. In addition, this was not a territory under national con-
trol, on the contrary, this was a transnational medium paralleled only by the 
ocean surface as used by international shipping. For the first time, technology 
demanded knowledge of the deep seafloor outside the fishing grounds on the 
shelfs and was in itself an impulse for further exploration.
4 Exploring the Seafloor
4.1 Natural Science
In the middle of the 19th century the interest for the sea bottom took on another 
new perspective. This time the interest came more directly from science, from 
both amateurs and more professionally inclined scientists. Science as a gentle-
man’s ‘sport’ was well established in Great Britain with Royal Society as a core 
elite institution. Around 1850 the combination of yachting and bottom scrap-
ing came in fashion by gentlemen scientists.16 Bottom scraping brought up a 
very new flora and fauna which could be described and discussed. In the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, bottom scraping also became increasingly popular 
among scientists in other countries. This resulted in an increased knowledge 
about the sea floor at not too great depths.17 The importance of these early 
scrapings was to open up for more serious studies of the deep ocean, were 
yachts with lines and scrapes would not be sufficient. The second part of the 
nineteen century represented in many ways the high tide for museums of nat-
ural history as the most prominent representation of modern science. As such, 
bottom scraping contributed substantially to the collections and, thus, to the 
representation of science.
A popular idea among scientists was the idea that there could be no life 
below 300 fathoms because of the loss of sunlight. The theses were put forward 
16   Rozwadowski, H.M. (2009) (n1).
17   Andersen, Håkon With et al, Aemula lauri : the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and 
Letters, 1760–2010 (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009).
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by the British naturalist Edward Forbes (1815–1854) in the early 1840s and got 
its own name: the ‘azoic theory’, i.e. the lifeless zone. Forbes had been dragging 
in the Irish sea and most important the Aegean sea and found less and less 
diversity of living beings the further down he dragged. It encouraged others to 
do the same and in the 1860s the azoic hypothesis obviously had problems. All 
these draggings increased the knowledge of life at the seafloor, even if it was 
not possible to drag very deep.18
Already the laying of the transatlantic cable found evidence to contradict 
the azoic theory when primitive lifeforms were found on broken cables that 
were brought up for repair. However, it would live on for a decade before it was 
finally rejected through the Challenger expedition in the early 1870s.
The seafloor had found a use and hence become a medium that required 
knowledge and interest. It was no longer a void only to be discussed or to be 
researched. Towards the end of the 19th century, both the U.S. navy and the 
British navy’s Hydrological office became more and more involved in what we 
might call early oceanographic scientific work in a more systematic way.
The cost of doing this kind of research in the 19th century was staggering 
and that was one reason that only the larger navies were the ones that could 
contribute with ships and seamen. Hence a pragmatic alliance between the 
navy and scientists was formed. The ocean became in a way a new frontier, to 
quote Helen Rozwadowski, as there was no more land to be found.19 New spe-
cies, new charts, new details of shores and peoples were to be ‘discovered’. In 
this the navy could be seen to continue an already old tradition from explora-
tion and occupation of territories, but this time under the sea. For the scientist 
in the Royal Society or at the universities, it was inconceivable to fund large 
scale studies of the deep ocean without the cooperation of the navy.
The understanding of the ocean floor in the first part of the 19th century was 
based on the idea of a very rugged ‘landscape’. Without the forces that would 
slowly tear and wear on mountains on land one thought that the seascape was 
even more dramatic that mountains on land. This led to the belief in so called 
‘vigias’ that simply was summits that raised so high in general deep seas that 
it was a threat for ships and lives of men. So one reason for measuring depths 
of even very deep oceans was that there might be some vigias. Maurey became 
instrumental in the early 1850s to change the view of the deep sea bottom to 
something much more like a plateau, perfectly shaped for a submarine cable.
18   Corfield, R., The Silent Landscape: The Scientific Voyage of HMS Challenger (National 
Academies Press, 2003).
19   Rozwadowski, H.M. (2009) (n1).
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During the 1850s and 1860s several expeditions were made both with 
American and British navy ships sounding and measuring temperature, salin-
ity and currents in the oceans. With the steadily expanding telegraph cables, 
this was also useful to commercial companies.
4.2 The HMS Challenger Expedition (1872–1876)
However, no initiative could compare with the three and a half yearlong 
scientific expedition of an old British navy vessel, the HMS Challenger 
(Figure 3.3 – H.M.S. Challenger 1874).20 From 1872 until 1876 she circumvented 
the earth three times and crisscrossed all large oceans, sounding depths, taking 
samples from the bottom, measuring salinity and temperature. The navy and 
scientists combined resources and intellect in a very fruitful mix. Challenger 
made around 400 deep soundings in all the larger oceans in the span of the 
three and a half years, each sounding was difficult to execute and took a fairly 
long time. In addition, they took samples of the seafloor and studied both the 
flora and fauna of the ocean (Figure 3.4 – Examining the ‘haul’ on board the 
Challenger’, W.H. Overend). The reports from the expedition filled 50 volumes 
and was not completed before 1895. They came to be the basis for all further 
investigations and new results from the findings did not stop before well into 
the 20th century.21 The Challenger was equipped with special equipment for 
sounding, including a separate steam engine to enable sounding and dragging 
at extreme depths. She was also equipped with laboratories and storeroom for 
scientific specimen brought up from the deep.
The ship itself was a 2300-ton screw corvette built in 1857. It was a full 
square rigger with an additional 1200hp steam engine. With most of its can-
nons removed and the six scientists onboard, it still had a crew of about 200 
men. In the more than three years she crisscrossed the Atlantic, the Pacific, the 
Indian Ocean and the Antarctic she regularly stopped every 200 miles to do 
soundings, scrapings and all sort of measurements, particularly temperature 
at different depths, salinity and currents. It was the grandest and most costly 
scientific expedition ever to have been carried through.22
The expedition was initiated by science, through the initiative of the vice 
president of The Royal Society, W.B. Carpenter (1813–1885). Charles Wyville 
Thomson (1830–1882) was to become the scientific leader of the Challenger 
expedition. He had led a couple of shorter expeditions to the North Atlantic in 
20   Brunton, E.V., The Challenger Expedition, 1872–1876: a visual index (Natural History 
Museum, 1994). Corfield, R., The Silent Landscape: The Scientific Voyage of HMS Challenger 
(National Academies Press, 2003).
21   M. Deacon et al., 2001 (n1) p 31.
22   Ibid and Lawrence, David M. (2002) (n1).
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the smaller naval vessels, HMS Lightening and HMS Porcupine in the late 1860s. 
Both the navy and the Hydrographer of the Admiralty was positive to the proj-
ect, and so was the Treasury. There were several reasons for this most unusual 
strong support for a very expensive and long expedition. One of them was the 
newly advance of subsea telegraph cables. Another was the treat of American 
deep sea explorations, following up on Maury’s earlier work. A third reason 
was the way the government’s financial structure was newly restructured.23 
Finally, it should be noted that Britain, as the total dominating sea power of 
23   M. Deacon et al., 2001 (n1) p 28.
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the world at that time, had to take on the responsibility of figuring out more 
about the seafloor than the other and much smaller maritime nations.
The leader of the expedition, Charles Wyville Thomson, died in 1882 and 
had to leave the completion of the reports to his younger colleague who also had 
participated in the whole expedition, John Murray (1841–1914). It was mainly 
due to his work that the result of the Challenger expedition came to put its mark 
on the next half hundred years of research and exploration of the sea floor.
The discoveries of Challenger were many and had profound consequences. 
First of all, one got to know how deep the ocean actually was and how the 
topography of the bottom varied with seamounts, ridges and large flat territo-
ries and also with extreme depths in deep trenches. Secondly, one got an idea of 
what the ocean floor consisted of, with the light oozes picked up all round the 
globe. With 200 miles between each sounding, the maps were not very good, 
but it sufficed to get an idea of the bottom. The extremely detailed reports 
that came from John Murray’s hand were to be used for many decades into the 
future. The Challenger really shifted, or maybe better, created our view of the 
sea floor that to some extent still is valid today even as impressionistic as it was.
However, the number of soundings were rather small, compared with the 
enormous area of the oceans. To make profiles of the sea bottom for the laying 
of telegraph cables the soundings were not only suspicious few, the problems 
of correct soundings were also great. Already Maury in 1858 had shown how 
different soundings of the same route gave quite different profiles of the sea-
floor, mainly because the number of soundings were so few. Scientifically one 
could live with this uncertainty, but for telegraph cables it was another ques-
tion. Here, the ocean floor as a medium for the cable was very important.
4.3 Follow-up Expeditions: Meteor
The Challenger expedition was also the breakthrough for oceanographic 
research internationally. However, no one had the resources or the patience 
to repeat such grandiose expedition as that of Challenger. Around the turn of 
the century, much interest turned away from the ocean floor and instead con-
centrated on the resources at sea: fish and fishing. With telegraph cables on the 
ocean floor now as quite ordinary business – even if it was very expensive and 
needed bottom surveying and fathoming, migrant fish schools and fish repro-
duction in the ocean became the new focus.24
24   Hamblin, Jacob Darwin, ‘Seeing the Oceans in the Shadow of Bergen Values’, History of 
Science Society, Inc (2014) Vol. 105, pp. 352–363. Rozwadowski, Helen M., The sea knows 
no boundaries : a century of marine science under ICES, International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (Seattle, Wash: ICES in association with University of Washington 
Press, 2002). Schwach, Vera, Havet, fisken og vitenskapen : fra fiskeriundersøkelser til havfor-
skningsinstitutt 1860–2000 (Havforskningsinstituttet, Bergen, 2000).
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figure 3.5 The Meteor expedition, original plan (1925–1927)
A. Merz, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DAE_
Reiseplan_orig.jpg
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons
Scientific expeditions did not stop even if interest turned to other problems. Of 
particular interest is the German Meteor expeditions in 1925–1927 (Figure 3.5 – 
The Meteor expedition, by A. Merz). For the first time sounding was carried 
out without line and heavy weights. The Meteor expedition pioneered acous-
tic waves as sounding method. Suddenly it was possible to do many more 
soundings and at the same time reduce the uncertainty connected to the real 
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depth. While Challenger made 400 soundings, Meteor was able to do more 
than 6000 soundings in a much shorter time. From the 1920s we could say 
that it was possible to realistically profile the ocean floor.25 Meteor was using 
an echo sounder based on a design by the Canadian inventor and professor 
Reginald A. Fessenden (1866–1932). Fessenden was originally known for his 
inventions in radio communication but had turned to echo sounding and ‘ice-
berg warning’ later in life. The Meteor expedition set the state for a much better 
knowledge of the subsea floor.26
5 Governing Deep Sea Resources
The 1930s saw in embryonic form another approach to the ocean and deep 
sea: the attempt to control resources in the sea much further away from land 
than until then had been customary law. Some South American nations were 
particularly eager to control what they considered their resources. Let us, 
however, take a small step back and consider the historical development of 
international law with respect to the ocean.
5.1 The Shortcomings of the First International Law Response
As many authors have pointed out, there was actually no law of the oceans 
aside for customary rules and, of course, private law regulating much of the 
shipping business. The reason was quite obvious, since no one needed such 
laws apart for the common conception of the free ocean and the limitation of 
the territorial sea to a cannon shot, usually interpreted as three nautical miles.
With expanding fisheries and the introduction of large steamer fishing ves-
sels, conflicts escalated, particularly after the turn of the century. The contours 
of the frontlines that marked most of the 20th century became clearer: the 
large shipping nations (flag states) against the coastal states. The first ones 
fighting claims to increased national control over the coastal seas, the other 
ones wanted to protect what they considered their resources, also outside the 
rather narrow territorial waters.
Already in the early 1920s, the League of Nations started working finding out 
where there was a need for new international public law. In 1924, the Council of 
the League of Nations established a Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law. The law of the sea was one topic considered 
25   Höhler, Sabine, ‘Depth records and ocean volumes: ocean profiling by sounding technol-
ogy, 1850–1930’, History and technology (2002) 18(2), 119–154.
26   Lawrence (2002) (n1) p 102–108. Höhler (2002) (n25).
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for codification by the Committee of Experts. Through a series of debates, the 
Committee narrowed the questions concerning the seas down to the question 
of territorial waters.27
In 1930, the preparatory work of the Expert Committee was the basis for an 
international diplomatic conference: The Hague Codification Conference. It 
turned out that the second Committee that was charged with questions related 
to territorial waters was unable to conclude.28 The conference was a failure 
and is often seen as irrelevant since it did not give any results on the territo-
rial seas. Others might see it a bit differently. The conference was premature 
but the different view between the flag states and the coastal states became 
apparent and led several of the last to threaten to increase their own territorial 
waters unilaterally.29
To complicate the situation even further just after World War II, one of the 
most powerful shipping nations made two unilateral proclamations increasing 
both their fishing rights and, what interests us most here, their claim on the 
seafloor and the recourses in the subsoil of the continental shelf. This has later 
been known as the Truman declarations from September 28, 1945.30
The background was the search for oil that already before the war had lead 
oil companies into the Gulf of Mexico to search for oil in increasingly deeper 
water. Actually, this was not the first claim on the sea floor. In 1942, Britain 
signed an agreement with Venezuela on the Gulf of Paria (between Trinidad 
and Venezuela) on the rights to the seafloor and the water above.31 In both 
cases, the agreement stated that the arrangement would not interfere with 
the right of shipping and would thus preserve the freedom of the seas, even 
if the resources in the water column and the continental shelf were claimed.
Until the mid-20th century, the ocean floor was interesting and experienced 
as a medium and as a scientific object of study. The question of resources 
or to whom it belonged was far away and outside anyone’s actual claim. We 
should also note a particularity concerning the use of the ocean as a medium. 
It was largely dominated and regulated by private companies, not by states. We 
have already mentioned that shipping was mainly regulated by private laws 
and agreements, but so was also the telegraph cables. They were both laid, 
27   Harrison, James, Making the law of the sea: a study in the development of international 
law, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p 29.
28   Ibid, p 30.
29   Gold, Edgar, Maritime transport: the evolution of international marine policy and shipping 
law (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1981).
30   Ibid, p 252.
31   Ibid, p 252.
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controlled and operated by large, mainly private, companies, even if they of 
course were of strategic importance for states.
5.2 New Attempts to Regulate the Seafloor through International Law in 
Changing Global Power Balance (1950s)
In the 20th century, both fish and oil became important as it was possible 
to move further out from the shores. Hence, the quest for appropriation of 
both the water column and the ocean floor and its subsoil became an issue. 
Even if the League of Nation’s conference failed in 1930, the United Nation 
tried again, both in 1958 and 1960 with the first and the second Law of the Sea 
Conferences, both a rather mixed success and partly failure.
For the seafloor, however, the conferences resulted in some constructive 
conclusions, even if they were rather temporary and incomplete. The 1958 
conference was able to conclude with a regulation of the continental shelf. 
The shelf and its resources belonged to the coastal state until the depth of 
200 meters or as deep as it was possible to extract resources. This was a rather 
unclear and technology dependent limit, but was probably the best that could 
be achieved at that time. As for the water column and its resources, none of 
the conferences were able to reach an agreement. Even if the ambition was 
reduced compared to the 1930 conference, the different views were still too 
antagonistic. The flag states opposed the claims of the coastal states. It should 
also be noted that with regard to the surface, the larger shipping nations 
blocked the establishment of a UN organization for regulating shipping busi-
nesses. The International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO, later 
IMO), which was established in 1949, did not get sufficient ratifications before 
1959, mostly due to the opposition of the major flag states. In the light of this, 
one could say that the agreement on the continental shelf was an exception to 
be explained.32
Resources have to be controlled, one way or another. What we have seen 
through the first three quarters of the 20th century was a fight over the con-
trol of resources in the sea column, that is mainly fish. Large maritime nations 
wanted not only to have free access to oceans and straits, but also to be able to 
fish everywhere. Hence it was important to keep the limit of territorial waters 
to a minimum. Coastal states on the contrary wanted to lay their hands on 
larger areas of the sea that they argued was their rightful resources. As for the 
seafloor, it was not that much of a threat since, in most cases, it was not seen 
32   Cafruny, Alan W. Ruling the waves : the political economy of international shipping (Vol. 17) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
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as relevant for either fishing or shipping and only on very shallow waters was 
considered relevant for oil.
The cold war was another factor in this game. The US and Britons were 
opposed to larger territorial waters in light of the submarine warfare possi-
bilities and threats even if this was not clearly stated. However, military and 
strategic concerns played a central role in the further development of the law 
of the sea, even if it was not clearly articulated.
It is important in this discussion to bear in mind a couple of important facts 
as for international law of the sea. The first fact of importance is to recognize 
Britain’s immense dominating position as maritime power around 1900. Half 
of the world fleet was British. They also dominated both shipbuilding and 
subsea telegraph cable companies. Add to this the British empire and their 
domination is complete. As for shipping, another growing power became sec-
ond only to the British: the US fleet or rather the fleet controlled by US owners. 
Rules set by the British Board of Trade was the closest one could come to inter-
national law of the sea.33 Other large shipping nations, as the Scandinavians 
and Greece, followed closely the British policy and the rules of the Board of 
Trade, simply by necessity.
This situation could not last. The cod wars between Iceland and Britain 
towards the end of the 1950s was only a sign that times were changing. As the 
Empire shrank and countries got their independence one after the other, the 
demand of the coastal states grew stronger by the day. At the end of the 1960s, 
it was only a question of time before large exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 
would be a reality. At the same time the prospect of technological change had 
made the old limitation of the continental shelf irrelevant (200m).
5.3 Changing Scientific and Political Parameters: the 1960s
For the history of the seafloor, the 1960s was fascinating in two very different 
ways, scientific and political. It was a time of great upheaval in both dimen-
sions. Let us start with the scientific one. Almost one hundred years after the 
Challenger expedition, a totally new perspective on the ocean floor would 
be found, a paradigmatic change almost without parallel. It started in a dis-
credited place, with the geophysicist Alfred Wegener’s (1880–1930) theses of 
continental drift from 1912/1915. Wegener argued that all the continents once 
had been one, the Pangea, and then drifted apart, colliding and turning.34 One 
reason for the rejection was that Wegener was not able to give any mechanism 
33   This might clearly be seen in the case of an international loadline for merchant ships, 
finally established in 1930.
34   Lawrence (2002) (n1), p 33 ff.
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for the continental drift and his theory was regarded as rather odd. It was a 
common consensus that both the continents and the seafloor was of the same 
constitution and of the same age.
The 1960s marked the return of Wegener’s ideas, but now in a totally differ-
ent form, i.e. as a theory of plate tectonics and this time with explanations on 
mechanisms for plate drifts. The closer knowledge of oceanic ridges and the 
creation of new ocean floor at the same time as the oldest part moved slowly 
into the magma under the continents proved surprisingly to give a radical new 
understanding of the ocean floor’s creation, young age and volcanic activity. 
The ocean floor was dramatically different from the continents: in age, struc-
ture, thickness and durability.
However, nobody had ever seen this part of the world, even if there were 
enormous amounts of soundings. An important contribution to the solution 
came to be a painstaking detailed drawing of the ocean floor that still today 
is quite amazing. Marie Tharp’s (1920–2006) drawings are today considered to 
be major works in international cartography.35 The seafloor’s relatively young 
age, its thin structure and the volcanic activity gave rise to speculations of what 
was to be found on the seafloor. Already Challenger had noted the manganese 
nodules on the seafloor in the Pacific, but this new view from the late 1960s on 
the seafloor re-opened the question.
Hand in hand with the new scientific findings, a new political reality was 
also dawning. As the number of member states to the United Nations steadily 
increased during the de-colonialization process in the 1960s, the political bal-
ance and competition in the organization changed. The share of new states 
increased and the balance of power shifted from the old flag states to the new 
really international organization. The context at the end of the 1960s was quite 
different than before: a new scientific view on the ocean floor and a new politi-
cal situation pushed for new ways of doing things.
If we add to this an increased technological and industrial pressure on the 
resources in the water column (fishing) and on the seabed (oil and all sorts of 
valuable minerals) there were every reason to reconsider the situation of the 
oceans. In particular, John Mero’s book from 1965 on the Mineral Resources of 
the Sea came to play an important role for the understanding of the potential 
richness of the deep sea floor. The ocean as an open common needed some sort 
of regulation and control of access, at least to the resources that was limited.
35   Ibid. For a view of the refined map see ‘Manuscript painting of Heezen-Tharp “World 
ocean floor” map by Berann (1977), available at <https://www.loc.gov/resource/g9096c 
.ct003148/>.
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5.4 Arvid Pardo’s Legacy
In 1967, the Maltese ambassador to the United Nation, Arvid Pardo (1914–
1999), made a speech at the UN General Assembly that later has been hailed 
as exceptional and most important.36 The title of the item submitted by the 
Maltese delegation and presented by Pardo was: ‘Examination of the question 
of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the 
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits 
of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interest of 
mankind’. Pardo’s idea was basically that the ocean bottom and the subsoil with 
all its resources should belong to all mankind, regardless of their nation, land-
locked or coastal, large or small. The seafloor should be declared the heritage of 
mankind and administrated by some new agency under the United Nations. It 
was a grand idea, since 70 percent of the Earth was ocean floor. Pardo’s speech 
struck a note. The Maltese delegation left it to the Secretariat to further work 
on a resolution or to choose other means to forward the proposition.37
Pardo’s argumentation and conclusion brought the full question of all the 
possible uses of the sea floor into the UN. In addition to the importance of the 
topic, the timing was perfect. The ocean and seabed was under attack in so 
many different ways: nuclear pollution, military appropriation and use of the 
deep seabed, the quest for the enormous amount of riches in the deep sea-
floor including mineral extraction, the unclear limit of the continental shelfs 
as for oil and gas extraction. Two international features made the period even 
more crucial: first, all the new developing states that from the end of the 1950s 
had been gaining power in UN; and, second, the contemporary technologi-
cal optimism. It was an optimism not without reason. The space adventures 
had its high days, nuclear power promised low cost energy, nuclear bombs and 
missiles with several war heads, electronic computers, microelectronics, dis-
coveries in biology (DNA) and medicine and so on, all made deep sea floor 
extraction seem realistic.
A policy to avoid a new run for the rich countries to carve up the seafloor 
like they did some decades earlier in Africa was welcomed in many quarters. 
Pardo was very explicit on the point that the developing countries should have 
a preference when the wealth of the seafloor was to be distributed.
Pardo’s speech triggered a process that ended with calling a new conference 
on the law of the sea, the third in line. It might be debatable if there would 
36   Arvid Pardo’s speech, UNGA 22nd session, 1 November 1967, Agenda Item 92, full text 




figure 3.6 Arvid Pardo monument at the University of Malta
Continentaleurope at English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47519850
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have been a third conference anyway since more mundane problems like the 
extension of the continental shelfs and the still unsolved question of territo-
rial sea and control over fish resources remained unsolved. However, no one 
can deny the visionary talk of Pardo as concerns the use of the deep sea floor, 
even if he was far ahead of his time and all too optimistic both on behalf of the 
volume of resources and of the appropriate technology.
Pardo’s suggestion had a parallel that might have inspired the proposal. It 
was linked to the rather fresh agreement on de-militarization of outer space. 
An agreement had already been made and was open for signatures from 
January 1967. Here, the peaceful use of outer space to the benefit of all man-
kind was a central value.38
In 1973 started the United Nation Law of the Sea Conference number III, the 
UNCLOS III. It was the fourth attempt to make ‘a constitution for the oceans’, 
and this time, after several years of work, they succeeded. Meanwhile, it was 
not until 1994 that Pardo’s international ‘heritage of mankind’ had been given 
an administration that would answer to its name. By then, it had shrunk sub-
stantially as the coastal states had expanded their legitimate continental shelfs 
well beyond anything that was thought as realistic in the 1950s. The old mari-
time powers had lost out on most issues, including on EEZs of 200 miles and 
territorial waters of 12 miles.
6 Conclusion
The old maritime powers, the old flag states, had the tendency to stretch the 
idea of control over the resources to control over the waters and the seafloor. 
Control over resources turns out to be similar to control over territory, as it 
might be argued it is at the seafloor.
Then, maybe Philip Steinberg is right: today we have very conflicting views of 
the ocean. As for the surface and for shipping, the ocean is a freeway, a medium 
owned by nobody, used by all. For the large continental shelves and the water 
column, the national ownership of the resources seems to drift in the direc-
tion of a nationally controlled territory. Lastly, the environmental aspects have 
become of central importance, with a stronger focus on the consequences of 
the common heritage regime, the responsibility for the ocean’s ecology and on 
38   Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature on 
27 January 1967 and entered into force on 10 October 1967. Available at <http://disarma 
ment.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space>.
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the stewardship of the environment.39 The environmental question might now 
have taken the place that a just distribution of wealth had in the 1970s. It raises 
the question of how well UNCLOS is designed to handle these kinds of ques-
tions or if amendments or new treaty approaches are needed.
39   Steinberg, Philip E., ‘Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions’, 
Atlantic Studies (2013) 10(2), 156–169.
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Part VI of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, the 
Convention) deals with the regime of the continental shelf of coastal states. 
Article 77 provides for the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf, 
while Article 76 provides for the limits of that shelf. The coastal state has the 
obligation to delineate and establish those limits in accordance with Article 76 
and Annex II of the Convention. Until now, 72 coastal states have made submis-
sions in this respect. The background, principles and practical work involved 
in this procedure are described in this chapter.
After a review of the main delineation principles currently applied in 
order to determine maritime jurisdiction of the coastal state over the seabed, 
as defined in UNCLOS and interpreted by the courts (Section 2), the chapter 
continues by reviewing the Norwegian experiences with setting the country’s 
maritime boundaries, as a concrete application of the principles identified. 
The elements related to the organisation of the work for the purpose of sub-
missions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 
(Section 3), the mapping the outer limits (Section 4) and to the cooperation 
with neighbouring states (Section 5) are successively analysed. The chapter 
ends with an overview of the currently identified resources on the Norwegian 
continental shelf (Section 6).
2 Delineation Principles of Article 76 UNCLOS
In the 1958 Geneva Convention, the limit of the jurisdiction over the seabed, 
i.e. the continental shelf, is made dependent on exploitability so that it may 
extend ‘to where the depth of the superjacent water admits of the exploitation 
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of the natural resources.’1 As technology developed in the 1960s, this criterion 
turned out not to imply any limit at all. Therefore, states agreed on provisions 
in the Convention for the precise definition and establishment of continental 
shelf limits as ‘final and binding’.2
The agreement, however, is not about the specific limits for each state, but 
an agreement on the set of rules and provisions on how these limits are to 
be measured and generated. As regards the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), their limits are generated directly 
from the coastal baselines of the coastal States.3 The limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) are different because they are not mea-
sured from the baselines.
The extent of the continental shelf of a coastal state is defined in Article 76 
of the Convention. The principles of Article 76 are founded on the distinction 
between the terms the continental shelf and the continental margin. Both terms 
are defined in Article 76 for the purpose of the Convention by incorporating 
both legal and scientific aspects.
In geo-science, the continental margin is generally understood to be the 
submerged prolongation of the continent and is defined as the area of seafloor 
between the coast of a continent and the plains of the deep ocean floor at 
generally 4,000–6,000 meters (m) depth. Most definitions of the continental 
margin are based on the widely accepted morphological subdivision of its sea-
bed into the continental shelf, the continental slope and the continental rise. 
In this context, the continental shelf is the relatively shallow seabed area (100–
400 m depth) adjacent to the coast and landward of the continental slope.
Paragraph 1 of Article 76, however, defines the continental shelf of a coastal 
State as the seabed areas that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of the coastal State’s land territory. Being a natural 
prolongation of the territory implies that, for the purposes of the Convention, 
the term the continental shelf is a juridical term meaning the seabed areas 
over which the coastal State has jurisdiction. Furthermore, Article 76 provides 
that this juridical continental shelf may extend up to the outer edge of the 
continental margin (or to 200 nm, whichever is the farther). That is, the conti-
nental shelf in its juridical sense may encompass the whole continental margin 
and not only its inner, shallow parts as in its scientific sense. In this way, the 
1   United Nations Treaty Series No. 7302, vol. 499, pp. 312–321; Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. Done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958, Article 1.
2   UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraph 8.
3   ‘Norwegian Baselines, Maritime Boundaries and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 
B.G. Harsson and G. Preiss, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 3, 1/2012 p. 108–129. ISSN 
1891–6252.
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Convention is using the concept of the continental margin as a means of mea-
suring and delineating the limits to the prolongation of the continental shelf.
To this end, the Convention has introduced its own conceptual definition 
of the continental margin. Paragraph 3 of Article 76 states that:
The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the 
land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of 
the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor 
with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.
In this definition, the starting point of the continental margin is not a con-
tinent as such, but the land mass of a coastal State, either it be hosted in a 
continent or in an oceanic island. This implies that the existence of a State 
is a prerequisite for the existence of a continental margin for the purposes 
of the Convention. Thus, paragraph 3 links the term the continental margin to 
the jurisdiction of a State but still incorporates elements that have kept their 
scientific, geological and morphological meaning, i.e. land mass, shelf, slope 
and rise.
Being the yardstick for the extent of the continental shelf, the submerged 
prolongation of the continental margin determines the natural prolongation of 
the land territory of a coastal State as referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 76. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 76, gives the operational definition for the outer edge of 
the continental margin for the purposes of the Convention. According to this 
paragraph, the outer edge of the continental margin is to be established at a 
certain distance from the foot of the continental slope by either of two meth-
ods: the Hedberg rule, or the Gardiner rule (Figure 4.1). This must imply that the 
natural prolongation referred to in paragraph 1 is not a separate property of 
the continental shelf itself but emanates from the application of paragraph 4.
This understanding is also supported by the International Tribunal of the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS, the Tribunal) in the case between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.4 (That case also illustrated that the principles involved in the delin-
eation of the outer limits of the continental shelf may be brought into a dispute 
on the delimitation between states.5) In its decision on the case, the Tribunal 
4   International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 2012; Case No. 16, Dispute Concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
Bengal, adopted 14 March 2012.
5   C. Schofield, ‘One step forwards, two steps back? Progress and challenges in the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries since the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea’ in G. Xue and A. White (ed), 30 Years of UNCLOS (1982–2012): Progress and Prospects 
(2013) 217–239.
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spells out their view on the question of the natural prolongation in paragraphs 
433 to 437 and concludes as follows:
437. For these reasons, the Tribunal is of the view that the reference to 
natural prolongation in article 76, paragraph 1, of the Convention, should 
be understood in light of the subsequent provisions of the article defin-
ing the continental shelf and the continental margin. Entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm should thus be determined by reference 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, to be ascertained in accor-
dance with article 76, paragraph 4. To interpret otherwise is warranted 
neither by the text of article 76 nor by its object and purpose.
Thus, the application of Article 76, paragraph 4 is the basis for defining the 
outer edge of the continental margin and thereby identifying the entitlement 
to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Hence, the location of the foot of the 
continental slope is the critical factor, both for the entitlement to, and extent 
of, the continental shelf of a State.
Identifying the outer edge of the continental margin by such measurements 
deviate from the common geoscientific concept of the margin but has the 
advantage of defining a precise location of its outer edge. A coastal State may 
apply the two methods to suit its own interest, i.e. by applying only one, or 
alternating between the two, along its continental margin in order to establish 
figure 4.1 Schematic profile of the continental margin with geological terms in black and 
delineation terms of Article 76 in red. According to Article 76, the outer edge of 
the continental margin is to be set at a distance of either 60 nm from the foot of 
the slope (the Hedberg Rule) or at a location where the sediment thickness is not 
less than 1% of the distance to the floor of the slope (the Gardiner Rule)
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
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the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. A coastal 
State that intends to establish such limits, must submit the particulars of these 
limits to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS, the 
Commission) along with supporting scientific and technical data.6
In order to apply the provisions and methods given in Article 76, the 
coastal State needs certain geophysical, geological and geodetic7 data cover-
ing the critical parts of its continental margin. Bathymetric data is needed to 
map the topography of the seafloor and to identify the foot of the continen-
tal slope. Seismic data is needed to determine the thickness and, sometimes, 
the nature of sediments of the sub-surface. In many cases, geological data is 
required to characterize important seafloor features like submarine ridges and 
elevations. Geodetic methods and data are required to calculate the appropri-
ate distances and construct the final limits. The acquisition and use of these 
data requires the expertise of geophysicists, geologists and hydrographers. 
This is also the reason why the Convention stipulates that the members of the 
Commission shall be experts in one of these fields.
The Commission gives recommendations to each coastal state separately 
on the location of outer limits of the continental shelf as it may be established 
according to Article 76, without regard to the outer limits of the continental 
shelf of neighbouring states. In several cases, this leads to areas of overlap-
ping continental shelf of states with adjacent or opposite coasts. The settling 
of bilateral boundaries in such cases is up to the states involved only.8 The final 
and binding limits of the continental shelf enters into force when their partic-
ulars are deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN and/or the Secretary 
General of the International Seabed Authority.9
3 Norway’s Work with the Submissions to the CLCS
3.1 Norwegian Organization of Work
Norway signed the Convention on the day it was opened for signature and 
ratified it on 24 June 1996. It entered into force in Norway on 24 July 1996. 
The same year, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry initiated the work related to 
6   UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraph 8, and Annex II, article 4.
7   Geodetic data means the formally correct data and information that are needed to produce 
a map, including datum, projection, coordinates and distance calculations.
8   UNCLOS, Article 83. See on that point M.D. Evans, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in 
D. Rothwell, A. Oude Elferink, K. Scott and T. Stephens, ‘The Oxford Handbook of The Law of 
the Sea’ (Oxford, 2015), chapter 12, pp. 254–279.
9   UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraph 9, and Article 84.
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the establishment the outer limits of the continental shelf of Norway beyond 
200 nm in accordance with Article 76 and Annex II of the Convention.
The particulars of these limits along with supporting scientific and techni-
cal data were organized in two partial submissions to the Commission. The first 
submission was made on 27 November 2006 in respect of areas in the Arctic 
Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. The second submission was 
made on 4 May 2009 in respect of areas in the South Atlantic Ocean adjacent to 
the Bouvet Island, and the Southern Ocean adjacent to Dronning Maud Land 
in Antarctica.
Each submissions consisted of three parts as prescribed in the Scientific and 
Technical Guidelines of the Commission, i.e. an Executive Summary, a Main 
Body, and a third part with all the supporting scientific and technical data.10 
The Executive Summary was posted on the CLCS website11 and contained a 
short description of the different parts of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nm, charts and list of coordinates defining their outer limits, references to the 
provisions of Article 76 invoked, and a status of any delimitations matters with 
neighbouring states. The Main Body contained a detailed description of the 
hydrography and geology of the relevant continental margins, and the techni-
cal procedures and scientific methodologies applied in the implementation 
of Article 76 to delineate the continental margin. The results were presented 
by maps and coordinates and documented by all relevant data. The third part 
contained a copy of all data and computer-based analyses (e.g. GIS projects) 
referred to in the main body.
The submissions were prepared under the direction of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD, the 
Directorate), an independent agency under the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (MPE), was the technical coordinator and carried out the technical 
preparation of the submissions. The Directorate is Norway’s expert body for 
offshore geology and geophysics. For the specific needs of the project, the NPD 
carried out an extensive marine programme for acquiring geophysical and geo-
logical data. These data were in general interpreted and analysed by the NPD. 
In addition, the data were made available to various other national agencies 
and institutions, including the Norwegian Mapping Agency, the Universities of 
Bergen, Oslo and Tromsø, and the Norwegian Polar Institute, which also made 
scientific and other contributions to the preparations of the submissions.
10   CLCS/11 The Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, paragraphs 9.1.4, 9.1.5 and 9.1.6.
11   Document available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.
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The NPD also established technical cooperation programmes with their 
peer institutions of the neighbouring coastal states with which Norway would 
have overlapping continental shelf areas beyond 200 nm, i.e. Russia, Iceland 
and Denmark with Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The cooperation included 
data exchange and joint mapping programmes. All of these activities were 
funded by the Government through the NPD.
3.2 Commission Procedures and Recommendations regarding the 
Submission of 27 November 2006
On 2 April 2007, the Commission established a sub-commission of seven of 
its members to examine and consider the details of the submission made by 
Norway. During the next two-year period, Norway provided clarifications and 
further data and information on request by the Sub-commission, made writ-
ten responses to its preliminary considerations, and met regularly twice a year 
with the Sub-commission in New York. The Norwegian delegation was headed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the NPD as technical assistant on a per-
manent basis. Experts from universities and the National Mapping Agency 
were included as needed. The Department of Geosciences at the University of 
Oslo was represented on an almost permanent basis because of their involve-
ment in the previous joint Norwegian-Russian cooperation projects. During 
the two years of interaction with the Sub-Commission, Norway provided 34 
documents with annexes, 25 PowerPoint presentations, and 31 CD/DVDs with 
supplementary information and data. On 13 March 2009, the sub-commission 
submitted its recommendations to the plenary of the Commission.
On 27 March 2009, the Commission adopted its recommendations concern-
ing the Norwegian submission. The Commission agreed with the outer limits 
as submitted by Norway, except for recommending a minor reduction of area 
in the Norwegian Sea and a slight increase in the Nansen Basin in the Arctic 
Ocean (see Figure 4.2).
3.3 Commission Procedures and Recommendations regarding the 
Submission of 4 May 2009
In accordance with the request of Norway,12 with reference to the Antarctic 
Treaty System as explained below, the Commission decided not to take any 
12   Document available at: <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
nor30_09/nor2009_executivesummary.pdf>.
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action on the part of the submission that related to the continental shelf 
appurtenant to Antarctica, i.e. the areas appurtenant to Dronning Maud Land.13
For the parts of the submission concerning the continental shelf appur-
tenant to the Bouvet Island in the South Atlantic Ocean, the Commission 
established a sub-commission of seven members at its 32nd session in 
August 2013. During the next three-year period, Norway provided further data 
and information on request by the Sub-commission, made written responses 
to its preliminary considerations, and met regularly thrice a year with the 
Sub-commission in New York. Again, the Norwegian delegation was headed by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the NPD as technical assistant on a perma-
nent basis. Experts of the Department of Geosciences at the University of Oslo 
were represented on an almost permanent basis because of their expertise in 
geophysical modelling.
Norway was of the opinion that since the time the submission was made in 
2009, the practice of the Commission had evolved in a way that made it rel-
evant for Norway to revise the outer limits of the continental shelf in the area 
appurtenant to the Bouvet Island.
Norway agreed with the Sub-commission that the amendment of the outer 
limits proposed by Norway required the submission of a revised Executive 
Summary to be posted on the website of the Commission. Accordingly, Norway 
submitted a revised Executive Summary on 21 May 2015 that was posted on 
the website the same day. On the request of the Sub-commission, Norway col-
lected and made available supplementary data to support the revised limits.
Based on all the data thus made available, the Sub-commission agreed with 
the revised outer limits as submitted by Norway and adopted its recommen-
dations to this effect on 11 August 2016. The Sub-commission subsequently 
submitted its recommendations for the Commission’s 41st plenary session 
during which Norway delivered its final presentation to the Commission on 
16 August 2016. However, the term of the Commission members ended in 
June 2017 and the Meeting of States Parties elected members for the next five-
year term on 14 June 2017. The consideration of the recommendations of the 
Sub-commission was then passed on to this new set of members. On request, 
Norway was given the opportunity to repeat its final presentation to the new 
Commission members on 7 August 2018.
On 8 February 2019, the Commission adopted its recommendations to 
Norway concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in the area 
13   Brekke, H. 2014. Defining and recognizing the outer limits of the continental shelf in the polar 
regions. In: R. Powell and K. Dodd (Editors), Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources 
and Legal Regimes. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Celtenham, UK; Northampton, MA, 
USA.: 38–54.
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appurtenant to the Bouvet Island. The Commission agreed with the outer lim-
its as submitted by Norway, with minor changes.
The sub-commissions for the two submissions carried out very thorough 
examinations of the substantial amount of data and information submitted. 
The role of the Norwegian delegation was essentially to give assistance to the 
sub-commissions in their examinations by providing clarifications and sup-
porting data. The sub-commissions put much of their time and work into 
satisfying themselves that the foot of the slope points were correctly defined 
and adequately documented. In this respect, the recommendations issued for 
the areas of the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea estab-
lished a precedence for how to define the location of the foot of very low 
gradient continental slopes of sedimentary origin. The Sub-commission for 
the areas of the South Atlantic Ocean, put much emphasis also on satisfying 
itself that it could support the principle applied for the maximum constraint 
of the continental self. The recommendation on the area in the South Atlantic 
Ocean may become an important reference regarding the submerged prolon-
gation of the landmass of oceanic islands and their maximum outer limits. 
The Norwegian delegation was dedicated to meeting the concerns of the sub-
commissions with responses that would instil confidence in the basis for the 
recommendations on the final outer limits.
4 Mapping of the Outer Limits and Cooperation with Neighbour 
States
The technical work of the NPD consisted of four parts:
1. NPDs data acquisition program;
2. Data acquisition in cooperation with academic and peer government 
institutions;
3. NPD scientific cooperation with academic institutions and neighbour 
state’s peer government institutions;
4. NPD analyses, compilation of all data and information, and preparation 
of final submission documents and supplementary material.
The technical work covered areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in five 
different oceans and seas (See Figure 4.2):
– The Barents Sea, in the area enclosed by the 200 nautical mile limits of 
Norway and Russia, also known as the ‘Loop Hole’;
– The Arctic Ocean, in an area north of Svalbard known as the ‘Nansen Basin’;
– The Norwegian Sea, in the area enclosed by the 200 nm limits of Norway, 
Iceland and Denmark with the Faroe Islands and Greenland, also referred 
to as the ‘Banana Hole’;
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– The South Atlantic Ocean, in the area around the Bouvet Island in the South 
Atlantic;
– The Southern Ocean, in the area north of Dronning Maud Land in Antarctica.
The work progress and the conclusions reached for each for those five areas are 
reviewed successively in the sections below.
4.1 The Barents Sea
The Barents Sea is a vast shallow water shelf area situated north of mainland 
Norway and Russia, bounded in the east by Novaya Zemlya and the Kara Sea, 
and in the north and west by the archipelagos of Franz Josef Land and Svalbard 
and the deep waters of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas. The ‘Loop Hole’ 
is an area beyond, and entirely enclosed by, the 200 nm limits of Norway and 
Russia. This area forms part of the shallow waters of the Barents Sea, and all 
of it is situated landward of the foot of the continental slope and the 2,500 m 
isobath. With reference to the applicable rules in Article 76, paragraphs 3–5, 
of the Convention, Norway submitted that the area may be considered to be 
part of the continental shelf and that there was no need for further scientific 
or technical documentation.
4.2 The Arctic Ocean
The Arctic Ocean is enclosed by the shallow shelf areas of the five Arctic states: 
Canada, United States of America (USA), Russia, Norway, and Denmark with 
Greenland. A central topographic element of the Arctic Ocean is the submerged 
Lomonosov Ridge that extends right across the ocean between the Greenland 
and Siberian shelves. This ridge divides the ocean into two parts, the complex 
Amerasian Basin on the American side and the oceanic Eurasian Basin on the 
other. The Eurasian Basin in turn, is subdivided into the Amundsen Basin to 
the north and the Nansen Basin to the south.
The northward extension of the shallow shelf areas of the Barents and Kara 
Seas ends at the continental slope along the Nansen Basin. In the continental 
margin in the western part of this basin, north of the archipelagos of Svalbard 
and Franz Josef Land, it was clear that Norway and Russia would have over-
lapping areas of continental shelf. Thus, the two states agreed that it was in 
the interest of both to cooperate in the mapping and delineation of the outer 
limit of the continental shelf in this region. Accordingly, the NPD and its peer 
Russian institute, the All-Russia Research Institute of Geology and Mineral 
Resources of the World Ocean (VNIIOkeangeologia) in St. Petersburg entered 
into a joint research project in this regard. Besides the scientific results, the 
main purpose of the project was to establish a common view of the location 
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of the outer limits of the continental shelf in the region and to provide the 
required supporting data and information needed by the two states to prepare 
their submissions to the Commission. For the purposes of the submissions, the 
project started in 1996 and ended in 2006. For scientific purposes, however, this 
cooperation between Norway and Russia has continued since.
The project included data exchange and the establishment of a common 
database of existing data. To cover gaps in the database, Norway in 2001 and 
2005 acquired an additional 1,000 km of seismic and 2500 km of bathymetric 
data with the Swedish icebreaker ‘Oden’ and with the assistance of experts 
from the University of Bergen. All the data finally available, the analyses 
thereof, and results of the joint Norwegian/Russian research, formed the basis 
for the Norwegian submission in this region.
4.3 The Norwegian Sea
The Norwegian Sea is the part of the North Atlantic Ocean west of the coast of 
Norway between Stad (62° N) and Senja (70° N). To the west, it is bordered by 
the Greenland Sea along a submarine ridge system running from Iceland, via 
Jan Mayen to Bear Island. To the south, it is bordered by the North Sea and a 
submarine ridge connecting the Faroe Islands and Iceland. To the north, it is 
bordered by the shallow shelf areas of the Barents Sea.
Norway’s continental margins in this region comprise two parts. One part is 
constituted by the continental margin of mainland Norway and the Svalbard 
archipelago. It extends from the North Sea in the south, through the Norwegian 
and Greenland Seas, and into the Arctic Ocean. The other part is the continen-
tal margin surrounding the island of Jan Mayen. The two parts face each other 
with the area beyond 200 nm, the ‘Banana Hole’, located in the middle.
This area comprised the potentially largest area of continental shelf beyond 
200 nm of Norway in the northern hemisphere. The shallow shelf areas within 
200 nm in this region was geologically well known because it had been sub-
ject to extensive exploration for, and exploitation of, oil and gas since the late 
1970s. The deep ocean within the ‘Banana Hole’, however, needed a closer study 
in order to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf. Therefore, the 
NPD carried out three major marine campaigns on tender to acquire sufficient 
data for the purpose of the submission. This amounted to 10,500 km of seis-
mic data and 270,000 km2 of multi-beam bathymetric data. It was clear that 
in the southern part of the Banana Hole there would be a potential overlap 
with the continental shelf of Iceland and Denmark with the Faroe Islands. 
From the start, there was communication between the three states on both 
diplomatic and technical level. At the technical level, the NPD engaged in a 
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data exchange programme and professional discussions with its peer institu-
tions, the Faroese Earth and Energy Directorate (Jarðfeingi) of Denmark, and 
Iceland GeoSurvey (ISOR) of Iceland.
4.4 The South Atlantic Ocean
The Bouvet Island is located around 54° S, 4° E. The submerged prolongation 
of the landmass of the island consists of a wide submarine elevation that nar-
rows north-eastwards into a long spur. The outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline, which are based on this subma-
rine elevation extends north-eastwards to about 50° N, 15° E. The baseline of 
the Bouvet Island was established by Royal Decree of 25 February 2005, and 
deposited with the Secretary-General on 31 March the same year. The origi-
nal submission in respect of the Bouvet Island was based mainly on publicly 
available data derived from previous Norwegian and international scientific 
expeditions.
However, in regard of the revision of the submission described in section 
3.3, Norway carried out a new marine acquisition survey to provide further 
bathymetric data in critical parts of the area. This survey was carried out by 
the Norwegian Polar Institute in January 2014. In order to acquire further sup-
plementary data as requested by the Sub-commission, Norway engaged the 
Russian State Research Navigation-Hydrographic Institute (GNINGI) to carry 
out an expedition to gather multi-beam bathymetric data and seabed rock 
samples for geochemical studies. For this purpose, GNINGI made available 
the research vessel R/V Akademik Fedorov during its annual visit to Antarctic 
waters in March 2016, and with VNIIOkeangeologia as operator for the rock 
sampling. The expedition resulted in the acquisition of 3,200 line km of MBES 
data, including an area of 8350 km2 full coverage, and 88 rock samples by 
dredging.
4.5 The Southern Ocean
The Southern Ocean is the area of seas south of 60° S surrounding the 
Antarctic Continent. Within this ocean, the continental margin appurtenant 
to Dronning Maud Land extends beyond 200 nautical miles as measured from 
relevant basepoints established by Norway along the coastline of the land area. 
The seafloor of the continental margin in this area includes several large eleva-
tions and ridges. In order to establish a reliable outline of the outer edge of this 
continental margin in accordance with the provisions of article 76, Norway 
had to acquire more data. The whole area of the Southern Ocean is subject to 
the Antarctic Treaty System, and Norway recognized that any data acquisition 
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should serve scientific purposes. In order to achieve this, Norway financed a 
three-year joint scientific program between the University of Bergen and the 
two research institutes VNIIOkeangeologia and PMGRE in St. Petersburg. The 
latter made available the research vessel R/V Akademik Karpinsky, which on 
an annual basis visit Antarctic waters, for acquiring bathymetric and seis-
mic data. In addition, Norway also funded a data acquisition cruise with the 
Norwegian research vessel R/V G.O. Sars in the area. It all added up to 8000 
km of seismic data and 9000 line km of multi-beam bathymetry data. The data 
acquired became the basis for several Master and PhD degrees and scientific 
publications. All data from the Southern Ocean have been submitted to the 
database of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).
5 Relationship with Neighbouring States
Upon receiving the submission from a coastal state, the Commission pub-
lishes the executive summary of the submission on its website.14 A period of 
at least three months is then allowed for comments by other states before the 
Commission puts that submission on its agenda. This website has become a 
forum in which states make known their statements and views on the submis-
sions of other states and any other related issues, in the form of notes verbale.
The submission that Norway made in respect of the Arctic Ocean, the 
Barents Sea and the Norwegian Seas implied actual and potential overlaps 
with the continental shelf limits of the neighbour states, Russia, Iceland and 
Denmark with Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
5.1 Relationship with Russia
Russia had made its first submission in 2001, in which it submitted a sector line 
as the western limit of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and western 
Nansen Basin. This included almost the entire Loop Hole. Norway submit-
ted the median line with Russia as its eastern limit of the continental shelf. 
Thus, there was an area of overlapping continental shelf area throughout the 
Barents Sea and into the Nansen Basin in the north. This overlapping area was 
not new to the two states; Norway and Russia had been negotiating their bilat-
eral, marine boundary in this area since 1971. By mutual notes verbale, the two 
states made it clear that their continental shelf submissions did not prejudice 
anything in these negotiations.
14   Website of the CLCS: <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.
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Following the submission by Russia in 2001, Norway submitted a note verbale 
to be posted on the website of the Commission. By this, Norway referred to the 
unresolved delimitation issue with Russia and specified the area under nego-
tiations by giving the coordinates of each of the two state’s positions. Norway, 
with reference to paragraph 5 of Annex I of the Rules of the Procedure of the 
Commission, declared that it had no objections to the Commission consider-
ing and making recommendations with regard to the Russian submission as 
these recommendations would not prejudice the future delimitation between 
the two states (now customary known as a note verbale of non-objection).15
Following the submission by Norway in 2006, Russia submitted a 
similar note verbale of non-objection with regard to Norway. The wording of 
the two notes verbale are identical, except for comments on details regard-
ing coordinates, confirming prior, close consultations regarding these notes. 
In its note, Russia also made the reservations that the note itself should not 
prejudice the position of Russia ‘towards the Spitsbergen archipelago and its 
continental shelf ’, and that the recommendations of the Commission should 
be without prejudice to ‘the provisions of the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen of 
1920 and, accordingly, to the regime of maritime areas adjacent to Spitsbergen’.16
On 27 June 2002, the Commission adopted its recommendations concerning 
the submission made by Russia in 2001. The Commission agreed to and recom-
mended the outer limits in the Barents Seas as submitted by Russia. As regards 
the Central Arctic Ocean, the Commission recommended that Russia make a 
revised submission.17 This implied that at the time Norway made its submis-
sion in 2006, the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea was already recommended as 
continental shelf area, while the area in the Nansen Basin was pending the 
outcome of the submission by Norway and the revised submission of Russia 
(See Figure 4.2).
After the Commission adopted its recommendations concerning the 
Norwegian submission in 2009, Norway and Russia also moved towards a final 
agreement in their delimitation negotiations. After 40 years of negotiations, 
the two states reached a maritime delimitation agreement that was signed in 
Murmansk on 15 September 2010 and entered into force on 7 July 2011. The 
agreed delimitation line extends to a point north of the outer limit as recom-
mended by the Commission in order to accommodate a possible intersection 
with the future outer limit of the continental shelf of Russia.
15   Document available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ 
CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf>.
16   Document available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/ 
rus_07_00325.pdf>.
17   Reports of the Secretary-General: A/57/57/Add. 1, paras 38–41, https://documents-dds-ny 
.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement.
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figure 4.2 The continental shelf of Norway in the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea. Red lines – agreed maritime delimitation with neighbour 
states, including the Agreed Minutes with Iceland and Denmark with Faroe 
Islands. Pink lines – 200 nautical mile lines of Norway. Yellow lines – outer 
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as recommended 
for Norway by the Commission, but yet to be concluded by bilateral delimita-
tion pending the future recommendations for Russia in the Arctic Ocean and 
Denmark with Greenland in the Norwegian Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The 
areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles are highlighted as yellow 
polygons. Thin green lines – outer limits of the continental shelf of Norway as 
originally submitted to the Commission by Norway in 2006. Thin purple line – 
western limit of the continental shelf of Russia in the Barents as submitted by 
Russia in 2001. Thin white line – delineation of the Russian part of the enclave 
of area beyond 200 nautical miles in the Barents Sea (the ‘Loop Hole’).
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
5.2 Relationship with Denmark with Greenland
On 20 February 2006, Norway and Denmark with Greenland signed an agree-
ment concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the area between 
Greenland and Svalbard.18 Upon the submission made by Norway to the 
18   Document available at: <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002 
80064a71>.
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Commission later the same year, Denmark with Greenland submitted a note 
verbale of non-objection.19
At that time, the states anticipated a slight potential overlap of conti-
nental shelf areas in the northern border zone of the Banana Hole. Such 
overlap was confirmed in the submission made by Denmark with Greenland 
26 November 2013. In 2006, no overlap of the continental shelf areas was fore-
seen in the Nansen Basin. However, at the time of the submission made by 
Denmark with Greenland in the Arctic Ocean on 15 December 2014, it turned 
out to be a substantial potential overlap with the continental shelf area of 
Norway already recommended by the Commission in this region. Norway 
issued notes verbale of non-objection on both of these occasions.20
5.3 Relationship with Iceland and Denmark with the Faroe Islands
During the preparation of their submissions in respect of the Banana Hole, 
Norway, Iceland and Denmark with the Faroe Islands developed the shared 
view that the whole area concerned consists of continuous continental shelf. 
It also became clear that there would be potential overlaps of continental 
shelf areas of the three states in this region, and that Norway would be the 
first state in position to make its submission to the Commission, while the two 
others would submit some years later. On this basis, Iceland and Denmark 
with the Faroe Islands approached Norway and proposed to discuss a pos-
sible future delimitation in the area before Norway lodged its submission. 
The Agreed Minutes that came out of these discussions were published on 
21 September 2006.21 These minutes include a Model Agreement and the coor-
dinates for the points on which the future delimitations would be based. The 
final delimitation would be concluded at the time when all three states had 
received their recommendations from the Commission.
Iceland and Denmark with the Faroe Islands both made their submis-
sions with respect to this area on 29 April 2009. In accordance with the 
Agreed Minutes all three states issued notes of non-objection with regard to 
19   Document available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
nor06/dnk07_00218.pdf>.
20   Documents available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
dnk68_13/2014_01_21_NOR_NV_UN_001_14-00060.pdf>, and <http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/2014_12_17_nor_nv_dnk4_001.pdf>.
21   Document available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Agreed-Minutes/
id446839/?q=Agreed minutes>.
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each other’s submissions.22 The Commission adopted its recommendations 
for Denmark with the Faroe Islands, and Iceland in respect of this area on 
11 March 2014 and 10 March 2016, respectively. Accordingly, the three states 
have now moved on to conclude their bilateral delimitation as agreed.
5.4 The South Atlantic Ocean
The outer limits of the continental shelf appurtenant to the Bouvet Island 
borders in its entirety with the international seabed, i.e. the Area. The sub-
mission made by Norway to the Commission in respect of the Bouvet Island 
of 4 May 2009, including its revision of 21 May 2015, did not attract any notes 
verbale from other states.
5.5 The Southern Ocean
In its submission of 4 May 2009, Norway noted that appurtenant to Antarctica 
there exist areas of continental shelf that has yet to be defined. In this context, 
Norway referred to two ways in which a submission in respect of such areas of 
continental shelf may be made:
– States concerned may submit information to the Commission, which would 
not be examined for the time being, or
– make a partial submission not including such areas of continental shelf, 
for which a submission may be made later, notwithstanding the provisions 
regarding the ten-year period established by article 4 of Annex II to the 
Convention.23
The outer limits of the continental shelf appurtenant to Dronning Maud 
Land on the Antarctic Continent as submitted by Norway are located entirely 
within the area of the Antarctic Treaty System. Consistent with the first option, 
Norway requested the Commission not to take any action for the time being 
with regard to this area.24 Among the other claimant states in Antarctica, 
Australia and Argentina also referred to this option,25 while United Kingdom, 
22   Document available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissi 
ons.htm>.
23   http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor30_09/nor2009_exe 
cutivesummary.pdf.






New Zealand and France referred to the second option.26 Chile has announced 
that it will inform the Commission on this matter in due course.2728
The submission by Norway attracted notes verbale from five states: USA, 
Russia, India, Netherlands and Japan, all of which confirmed that they do not 
recognize any State’s claim to territory in Antarctica and that they acknowl-
edged Norway’s request to the Commission not to take any action on its 
submission concerning this area.29
6 Resources from the Seabed of the Continental Shelf
According to Article 77 of the Convention, the coastal state has the right to 
exploit the resources of the continental shelf, specified as the resources of 
the seabed and the subsoil thereof. These include the conventional geologi-
cal resources as oil, gas and metallic seabed minerals, as well as biological 
resources in the form of sedentary species living on or within the seabed. As 
regards the Norwegian continental shelf, its oil and gas resources are located 
almost entirely within the 200 nautical miles limits. Establishing the outer 
limits in accordance the recommendations of the Commission, implies the 
inclusion of possible oil and gas resources only in the area of the Loop Hole 
in the Barents Sea and in some minor areas along the 200 nautical miles limits 
of the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea (Figure 4.3). The latter areas are in 
relatively deep waters and in part strongly invaded by subsurface magmatic 
rocks of low resource potential.
The areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Nansen Basin and in 
the Banana Hole consist mainly of deep ocean floor with no potential for oil 
and gas. These areas, however, have a good potential for metallic seabed min-
erals, namely polymetallic sulphides and polymetallic manganese crusts. Such 




27   http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/chl2009not 
e_e.pdf.
28   H. Brekke, ‘Defining and recognizing the outer limits of the continental shelf in the polar 
regions’, in R.C. Powell and K. Dodds (eds) Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and 
Legal Regimes (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham, UK, 2014), pp. 38–54.
29   http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor_30_2009 
.htm, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/337/97/PDF/N1033797.pd 
f?OpenElement.
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minerals are already discovered in the deep ocean areas of the Norwegian and 
Greenland Seas, both within and beyond 200 nautical miles (Figure 4.3). More 
knowledge about their distribution, volume or exploitability is needed for 
management purposes and estimation of their economic value.
The known biological resources of the continental shelf, like crustaceans 
and shellfish, are all associated with the shallow shelf areas, at depths down to 
100–400 meters. All of these areas, except for the Loop Hole, are within the 200 
nautical mile limits. The biology of the seabed of the deep ocean areas of the 
continental shelf is much less known. Current scientific research on the deep 
ocean seabed in the Norwegian Sea, however, has revealed the existence of a 
benthic fauna that may become an economic genetic resource in the future.
The seabed of the continental shelf around the Bouvet Island consists of 
magmatic rocks and thin sedimentary cover that cannot host oil or gas. There 
is a potential for mineral resources in this area, while the potential for biologi-
cal resources is unknown.
figure 4.3 Map showing the possible distribution of petroleum and mineral resources of 
the Norwegian continental shelf
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
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A general question underlying current competing state interests in the Arctic 
is whether claims to the Arctic continental shelf are justified by existence of 
potential resources. Indeed, the assumption that a significant proportion of the 
world’s undiscovered oil and gas deposits lie beneath the Arctic seabed have 
turned the Arctic into a region of considerable geopolitical interest. However, 
geological investigations cover just small Arctic seabed areas; all other estima-
tions are based on mathematic and methods of probabilistic modelling.
For the purpose of this chapter, we present estimations made by 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) which were based on a geological probabilistic 
methodology. The USGS estimated the deposits of undiscovered oil and gas in 
33 geologic provinces that thought to be prospective for petroleum. The sum of 
the estimates for each province indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 tril-
lion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may 
remain to be found in the Arctic, of which approximately 84 % is expected to 
be found in offshore areas.1 Another popular speculation regarding the Arctic 
is that, because of the changing climate of the Arctic, ice cover will reduce in 
the near future and most spaces of the Higher North will be available for nor-
mal navigation, which will dramatically influence the global shipping.2
Meanwhile, the USGS study, like other ones, is limited in its knowledge 
basis and method, also because of the geographical limitation of the seabed 
areas which were studied and their depth.3 That is why, in our view, present 
1   U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, ‘Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: 
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,’ USGS Fact Sheet 2008–
3049. Available at: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>.
2   The third of the Arctic Ocean is covered with old ice, the surface of newly-formed ice is 
changing from year to year, and from measurement season to season; furthermore, there is a 
lot of data that the surface of newly-formed ice can enlarge.
3   In the USGS study, were included only those stocks that are considered to be recoverable using 
existing technology, even in conditions of permanent ice cover and depth of about 500 m.
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aspirations of coastal countries to divide the Arctic spaces are not very much 
related to current scientific knowledge about seabed resources. All our further 
conclusions in this chapter will be made on the grounds that the above-
mentioned statements do not have sufficient scientific proof and cannot be 
taken as a major challenge to the issue of the delimitation of the Arctic seabed. 
What is more important are the facts that only few nations4 own the Arctic 
coast, and, because of this, those states have a much higher responsibility in 
the protection of Polar spaces than other states.
Another obvious consideration is that coastal economy attracts more and 
more resources, and its value is significantly increasing, which at the national 
level requires different conditions for investment and due consideration to the 
people living in the Arctic regions and who consider themselves indigenous.5
Certainly, the assumption that Arctic resources potential is exaggerated is 
not a strong enough argument to stop the process of establishing the bound-
aries and delimitation of the seabed. However, the desire to establish the 
boundaries far beyond the real possibilities of operation is in stark contrast 
with the simplicity and clarity of existing international legal norms regulating 
the delimitation and the legal regime of Arctic spaces.
This chapter explores the question of delimitation of jurisdiction in the 
Arctic as a fundamental starting point for discussing the regime for exploration 
for and exploitation of seabed resources in an area of the world which is sub-
ject to competing state and commercial interests, and so to potential conflicts. 
It starts by a brief historical sketch of countries claims to the Arctic seabed 
(Section 2), before considering the respective ambitions and so conflicting 
interests of the Arctic states (Section 3). The chapter ends with a reflection on 
possible ways of resolving disputes (Section 4).
2 Delimitation and Competing Claims over the Arctic Seabed
2.1 Application of UNCLOS Provisions
At least two key issues should be raised here: the applicability of the provisions 
of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), and the legitimate access 
to Arctic resources by non-Arctic states.6
4   Russian Federation and Canada own 80% of the Arctic coastal area, Norway and Denmark 
about 16%, the USA 4%.
5   For example, for Russia comprises nearly 20,000 km of state border, about 11% of national 
income. Considerable amount of hydrocarbon and other minerals are already extracted 
there. It is the center of shipbuilding with ports and port stations.
6   In this chapter, we are not going to cover the last point since it needs a separate study.
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From our point of view, the attempts of many scholars and official com-
mentators to build up various concepts of extension of special rights (within 
national jurisdiction) on regulation the exploitation of the resources of the 
Arctic shelf and transport of goods based on the provisions of Article 234 
UNCLOS (Ice covered areas) cannot be considered reasonable. This Article in 
UNCLOS does not deal with exclusive ‘Arctic reference’ (we can find ‘ice cov-
ered areas’ in other parts of the World ocean), and contains the terms which 
are not determined by the Convention, but which are key for the application of 
the UNCLOS. For instance, it is not obvious what to perceive by ‘severe climate 
conditions’, ‘serious damage to ecological balance’.
It is the view of the author that the application of the UNCLOS provisions 
to the Polar regions without taking into consideration their peculiarities, will 
contradict the natural conditions of the environment. As a matter of fact, we 
cannot consider the icefield as an area of normal navigation, as well as define 
baselines to determine the outer limits of the territorial sea or other spaces if 
an island or a part of land which are surrounded by permanently frozen areas, 
such as icefront, grounded ice or grounded hummock. In other words, equating 
the Arctic Ocean without regard to the physical condition of the environment 
to any other area of the ocean does not add the natural grounds for the resolu-
tion of present and future delimitation. The preparatory documents analysis of 
UNCLOS gives evidence that the negotiators did not want to make all process 
of negotiations still more complicated and discuss such a difficult matter from 
the point of view of law.
2.2 Position of the Five Arctic Coastal States (Ilulissat Declaration) 
and Continental Shelf Delineation
On May 28, 2008 in Ilulissat in Greenland, the five Arctic coastal states (A-5)7 
adopted a declaration where they recall that an extensive international legal 
framework applies the law of the sea to the Arctic ocean which provides for 
important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits 
of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, includ-
ing ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and 
other uses of the sea. The countries stated that they remained committed to 
this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping 
claims. The A-5 see no need to develop a new comprehensive international 
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.8
7   A-5 is the short name for the five Arctic coastal states: Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia 
and USA.
8   The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008. 
Available at: <http://www.arcticgovernance.org/the-ilulissat-declaration.4872424.html>.
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Canada, Denmark,9 Norway and Russia ratified the UNCLOS,10 while the 
United States of America is still working on it. Each A-5 country claimed exclu-
sive economic zones (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (nm), and continental shelf 
areas adjacent to their coasts.
The definition of the continental shelf and the criteria by which a coastal 
State may establish the outer limits of its continental shelf are set out in 
UNCLOS, Article 76. In addition, the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea adopted on 29 August 1980 a Statement of Understanding which 
is contained in Annex II to the Final Act of the Conference.11
Pursuant to Article 76(7) UNCLOS, information on the limits of the conti-
nental shelf (CS) beyond 200 nm from the baseline from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) set up on the basis 
of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recom-
mendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the 
outer limits of their continental shelf. It is essential to stress that the limits of 
the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of CLCS recommendation 
will be final and binding only after adoption by the coastal states.
Article 76 uses two different terms in the meaning of the description of 
the boundaries: ‘delineation’ and ‘delimitation’ The first one refers to the line 
which should be determined by the coastal state as the outermost points of the 
continental margin to a distance drawn according to UNCLOS.12
The UNCLOS requirements concerning deposit of, and publication of the 
charts or lists of geographical coordinates showing the outer limits of the CS 
practically remained unfulfilled and experts, for visualization of the Arctic 
9    Via Greenland. Denmark’s sovereignty over all of Greenland was recognized by the United 
States in 1916 and by an international court in 1933. Denmark could also conceivably claim 
an Arctic sector (60°W to 10°W).
10   Norway ratifies the UNCLOS on June 24, 1996; Russian Federation ratifies the UNCLOS on 
March 12, 1997; Canada ratifies the UNCLOS on November 7, 2003 ; Denmark ratifies the 
UNCLOS November 16, 2004.
11   Where a State establishes the outer edge of its continental margin by applying the method 
set forth in the preceding paragraph of this statement, this method may also be utilized 
by a neighboring State for delineating the outer edge of its continental margin on a com-
mon geological feature, where its outer edge would lie on such feature on a line estab-
lished at the maximum distance permissible in accordance with article 76, paragraph 4(a)
(i) and (ii), along which the mathematical average of the thickness of sedimentary rock is 
not less than 3.5 kilometers.
12   In accordance article 76 incl. paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii)…. either shall not exceed 200 
nautical miles where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance … or 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territo-
rial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobaths, 
which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters.
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boundaries used drawn hypothetical boundaries which could be found in dif-
ferent publications and on the web. We also suggest an approximate perception 
of the Arctic borders position based on the maximum furthest outer bound-
aries from baselines, current agreements and claims, and on the principle of 
equidistance, accuracy of which are defined by the map scale. It is obvious that 
if we used maximum criteria of the width of CS delineation, it would leave the 
distinct polar enclave drawing on the map. However, coastal countries did not 
begin to define coordinates of the shelf outer boundary within 4–5 articles 76, 
but claimed submarine ridges that by UNCLOS are ‘natural components of the 
continental margin’ in the spaces of the seabed where they meet the criteria 
applied to submarine elevations through the second sentence of Article 76(6), 
in as much as the morphological ridgelike features are included in the defi-
nition of submarine elevations according to common and accepted formal 
definitions of submarine seafloor.
2.3 Historic Claims over the Arctic and State Practice on Delimitation 
of the Continental Shelf
2.3.1 Review of Historic Claims over the Arctic
On December 20, 2001 Russia delivered submission to the CLCS claiming 
that the Lomonosov Ridge was an extension of its continental shelf. Russia 
stood to potential acquisition of nearly one-half of the Arctic Ocean, including 
the North Pole. In 2002, the UN Commission neither rejected nor accepted the 
proposal, recommending an additional research was necessary. On August 4, 
2015, Russia resubmitted its bid, containing new arguments based on the new 
scientific data collected in years of Arctic research.13
On November 27, 2006, Norway made an official submission into the CLCS 
and provided arguments to extend the Norwegian seabed claim beyond the 
200 nm in three areas of the northeastern Atlantic and the Arctic: the ‘Loop 
Hole’ in the Barents Sea,14 the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, and 
the ‘Banana Hole’ in the Norwegian Sea.15 On March 27, 2009, Norway received 
recommendations from the CLCS with the advice to clarify territorial disputes 
in the Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean, Norwegian and Greenland Seas. The CLCS 
13   Through this bid, Russia is claiming 1.2 million square kilometers (over 463,000 square 
miles) of Arctic sea shelf extending more than 350 nautical miles (about 650 kilometers) 
from the shore.
14   The delimitation of the continental shelf and the 200-mile zones in the Barents Sea is an 
essential basis for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum deposits in the area of 
overlapping claims, which covers an area of 175 000 square kilometers.
15   The submission also states that an additional submission for continental shelf limits in 
other areas may be posted later.
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also acknowledged that the information for the Loop Hole contained in the 
Submission of Norway of 27 November 2006 fully satisfies the requirements 
of a submission for continental shelf beyond 200 M from the territorial sea 
baselines of Norway in accordance with article 76, paragraph 8, and article 4 
of Annex II to the Convention. Only a bilateral delimitation between Norway 
and the Russian Federation remained to be carried out to delineate the extent 
of each coastal State’s continental shelf in the Loop Hole.16 The Commission 
recommended that Norway proceed with the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 M in the Loop Hole by agreement with the Russian Federation 
with the assurance that both coastal States share entitlement to the seabed 
and subsoil located beyond 200 M in this part of the Barents Sea as the natural 
prolongations of their land territories.
The Commission recommended to Norway that, in accordance with article 
84 of the Convention, upon entry into force of a maritime boundary delimi-
tation agreement with the Russian Federation in the central Barents Sea, it 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations charts, or a list of 
geographical coordinates of points, showing the line of delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
On December 15, 2014, the Kingdom of Denmark submitted to the CLCS in 
respect of the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland, to attempt to prove 
that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Greenland’s land mass.
On 6 December 2013, Canada made its own submitted to the CLCS.
In sum, currently, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian 
Federation assert that the Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of their own 
continental shelf, while the US claims it to be an oceanic ridge and thus not an 
extension of any State’s continental shelf.
The provisions of Article 76 do not prejudice the question of delimitation 
of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. In 
Arctic, continental shelves of coastal countries are adjacent and, according to 
Article 83 UNCLOS, delimitation should be carried out on the grounds of agree-
ment based on international law in order to reach a fair decision. However, this 
formula has not always been working, and each country has its own history of 
polar claims and methods of delimitation.
16   The same approach has been taken to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
fisheries zones in the area between Greenland and Svalbard, which has now been settled, 
and to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Norwegian Sea. It is also being used 
in dealing with the unresolved questions related to the delimitation line between Norway 
and Russia in the Barents Sea.
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In February 1907, Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier proposed a resolution 
before the Canadian Senate to declare possession of the lands and islands 
between Canada and the North Pole. 18 years later, in June 1925, Canada 
became the first State to claim that its boundaries extended into to the Arctic 
and up to the North Pole by adoption Amendment to the Northwest Territories 
Act. Less than a year after President Truman established Proclamation 2667,17 
Canadian Ambassador to the US Lester Pearson, attempted to claim not only 
the islands, but the frozen sea north of the mainland between the meridians 
of Canada’s east and west boundaries, extending up to the North Pole under 
Canadian sovereignty. Canada became the first country to extend its maritime 
boundaries based on the ‘Sector principle’ (between 60°W and 141°W).
In 1910–1915, Russia claimed territorial sea to 12 nm and organized Arctic 
Ocean Hydrographic Expedition, the first ever traverse of the Northern Sea 
Route. It represented a great effort by the Imperial Russian Navy to explore, 
survey, and chart the Northern Sea Route for commercial purposes. On 
15 April 1926, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) issued its ‘Arctic 
Decree’ where declared sovereignty over all lands and islands (including those 
that may be discovered in the future) between the USSR and the North Pole. 
The Decree was seen as a response to previous Canadian claim to the territory 
between its mainland and the North Pole the previous year. In 1926, Russia 
fixed its claim in Soviet law (between 32°04’35”E to 168°49’30”W).18
By a 2004 Norwegian legislation, the breadth of the territorial sea has been 
increased from 4 to 12 nm for mainland Norway, Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen. 
In 2005, this was also implemented for Bouvet Island. In connection with the 
extension of the territorial boundary in 2004, the EEZ extended to 200 nm 
beyond the baseline. Where there is less than 400 nm to another state’s base-
line, the zone is delimited by the agreed demarcation lines between the states.19 
In a legal sense, the Norwegian continental shelf is the seabed from the ter-
ritorial boundary at 12 nm from mainland Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen 
17   In his proclamation (July 1946), President Truman sought to preserve and utilize the 
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf (beyond the 3-mile 
limit) beneath the high sea that extended from the United States’ shores, affirmed that 
the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over its continental shelf resources.
18   Norway (5°E to 35°E) made similar sector claims – as did the United States (170°W to 
141°W), but that sector contained only a few islands so the claim was not pressed.
19   At Svalbard a fish protection zone has been established. This is calculated in the same 
manner from the baselines of the Svalbard archipelago. The zone is limited by the outer 
boundary of Norway’s economic zone and agreed demarcation lines towards Greenland 
and Russia.
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and out to the outer limits of the continental shelf or agreed demarcation line 
against another state.
2.3.2 The 2010 Delimitation Treaty between Norway and Russia
Norway and Russia have a longstanding delimitation history.20 In the course of 
the fifteen to eighteenth centuries coastal border spaces between Norway and 
Russia did not have official delimitation and got their names ‘common areas’ 
( fellesdistrikter).21 These areas remained the areas of common use for more 
than five centuries.22
In 1825, demarcation of the border was carried out in ‘common area’ which 
was 4,4 thousand of square km, according to Norwegian maps, and which was 
later owned by the Swedish-Norwegian Union for various reasons. Demarcation 
was acknowledged by the Convention ‘Borders between Russia and Norway in 
the area of Lapland pogost’, signed in 1826.
In 1871–1872, the united government of Sweden and Norway exchanged 
memoranda with the Russian government, where the equality of all states in 
the use of Spitsbergen natural resources was acknowledged. Reasonability of 
research work implementation in archipelago was acknowledged, the idea 
of exclusive ownership of the archipelago by one of the states was denied. 
International legal status of Spitsbergen as a terranullius was defined by the 
Convention. Actually, up to the adoption of the Convention about Spitsbergen 
in 1920 the stated territory was in common use by the states. Historically it 
resulted in the international practice of peaceful economic and scientific use 
of Spitsbergen transformed into custom and legally adopted in 1871–1872. This 
treaty was called ‘Spitsbergen treaty of 1872’.23
In spite of the ratified agreement between the USSR and Norway about the 
marine borderlines between the two countries signed on February 15 1957, 
the negotiations about economic zones and continental shelf boundaries in the 
Barents Sea did not stop. From the very beginning of the official negotiations,24 
20   The first reference of the contractual design of bilateral relations belong to the XIII cen-
tury. In 1251, the first agreement on the settlement of relations in border areas between 
Russia (Novgorod) and Norway was concluded. In 1326, the agreement ‘On Eternal 
Peace’ was concluded between the Novgorod Republic and the Swedish-Norwegian king 
Magnusom-Erikssonom, which fixed the actual existing border.
21   This territory included three counties along the river Neiden (Nyavdem) Pasvig (Pazrek) 
and Pace (Pechenga) with settlements of three groups of East Sami (Skolt).
22   L.M. Poval Russian-Norwegian agreement on the division of the Arctic spaces. Arctic and 
North. 2012 №6.
23   Dekanozov R.V. 1872 Agreement on Svalbard – Questions of Soviet legal theory. 
Novosibirsk, 1968. p. 133.
24   From 1974.
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the Soviet Union and Norway had fundamentally different standpoints and no 
willingness to compromise.25 But on September 15, 2010 Norway and Russia 
signed a treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean.26 By the agreement, the Barents Sea is fully enclosed 
by the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Spitsbergen Archipelago to the north-
west, the Russian Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya to the north and the 
east, and the adjacent mainland coasts of Norway and Russia to the south.27
The 2010 Agreement28 defines the maritime delimitation line by eight points 
and splits the disputed area nearly in half. The underlying calculation accounts 
for the longer Russian coastline, but other factors Russia invoked earlier do not 
seem to have influenced the boundary line. The northern terminal point of 
the delimitation line is defined as the intersection of the line drawn through 
points 7 and 8 and the line connecting the easternmost point and the western-
most point of the still undefined outer limits of the states continental shelves.
Thus, we can state that even the coastal countries agreed to apply to the 
Arctic spaces ‘delimitation tools’ of UNCLOS, they are not very much suc-
ceeded in overcoming disagreements on its implementation. In retrospect, we 
can turn to the initial Canadian offer of 1925, followed by the Russian govern-
ment regulation of 1926, Russian-American delimitation line adopted in 1990, 
the Norwegian offer dating 1975 which proposed geometrical delimitation 
based on sector division; so we cannot leave this method to oblivion due the 
fact that it gives the choice of the delimitation method by the countries having 
opposite and adjacent coasts.
The Russian-Norwegian agreement is the unique example of compromising 
which does not offer a widely recognized methodology to resolve all disagree-
ments on delimitation issues which have to turn our attention to the other 
Arctic states policy and implementation practice.
25   Between the two states’ preferred borderlines, lay a disputed area of 176’000 square km. 
with rights to exploit the resources unsettled. The disputed area made up 12 percent of 
the whole Barents Sea, which is the equivalent of 45 percent of Norway’s total land area.
26   Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Sept. 15, 
2010, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engel 
sk.pdf.
27   From the very beginning of the official negotiations in 1974 the Soviet Union and Norway 
had fundamentally different standpoints and no willingness to compromise. Between the 
two states’ preferred borderlines, lay a disputed area of 176’000 square kilometres with 
rights to exploit the resources unsettled. The disputed area made up 12 percent of the 
whole Barents Sea, which is the equivalent of 45 percent of Norway’s total land area.
28   The delimitation line between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, agreed in 2010 and 
effective from 7th July 2011.
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3 Respective National Strategy of the Arctic Coastal 
States in the Arctic
3.1 U.S. National Strategy in the Arctic
In the USA there is a good deal of documents forming the national strategy 
in the Arctic.32 Under the US legislation, the US Arctic strategy is supposed 
to be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the trea-
ties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, 
and with customary international law as recognized by the United States, 
including with respect to the law of the sea. The key term here is ‘recognized’ 
and if not, the decision could be based only on the current state interests.
In accordance with the current policy, it is declared by the US pretty 
much the same objectives as similar documents issued by other countries: pro-
tect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources; ensure that 
natural resource management and economic development in the region are 
environmentally sustainable; strengthen institutions for cooperation among 
the Arctic nations; involvement the Arctic’s indigenous communities in deci-
sions that affect them and enhance scientific monitoring and research into 
local, regional, and global environmental issues. Nothing we can find in those 
documents related to the seabed delimitation.
Most of the NSD29 were adopted in the US by the president G.W. Bush admin-
istration (2009). Under President B. Obama, the administration announced its 
own vision on ‘Arctic strategy’ (2013)30 and adopted final rules that require 
companies working in the offshore Arctic to put in place new safety precau-
tions to prevent and contain oil spills in the remote and forbidding region.31 
Even the US NSD are not very much concrete with regard to the future delimi-
tation policy, we can find some useful provisions:
29   National Security documents.
30   Not many deviations from the previous strategy.
31   The rules are rooted in part in the administration’s experiences with Royal Dutch Shell, 
which encountered a series of setbacks when it pursued exploratory drilling in the Arctic 
in 2012 and 2015.Under the Bush Administration, roughly 80 million acres in Arctic waters 
were opened to energy development as part of the 2007–2012 offshore drilling plan. Six 
sales were planned, but only one occurred – Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193 – before the DC 
Circuit Court of Appeals declared the plan illegal. Numerous companies, including Shell, 
acquired leases for exploration in the Chukchi Sea off the Alaskan Coast. In March 2010, 
the Obama administration cancelled all future lease sales in the Arctic Ocean, citing a 
lack of information to support moving forward, but kept the three million acre Chukchi 
Lease Sale 193 intact, amounting to nearly USD$2.7 billion.
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(1) In respect of Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues … “the 
most effective way to achieve international recognition and legal cer-
tainty for our extended continental shelf is through the procedure avail-
able to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
(2) For unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea, the United States policy 
recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance.”
(3) For the US-Russian boundary the United States expect that the maritime 
boundary treaty concluded in 1990 will come into force.32
From all these we can draw following conclusions: for the US the Arctic region 
is primarily a maritime domain for which existing policies and authorities 
relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law 
enforcement and the government will take all actions necessary to establish 
the outer limit of the continental shelf appertaining to the United States, in the 
Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent permitted under international 
law, without clear definition what should be understood by this term.
3.2 Russia’s Strategy in the Arctic
The main goals, strategic priorities and the Russian Federation state policy 
mechanisms of implementation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and fur-
ther prospects are defined in ‘The foundation of the state policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic’.33 Both the American doctrine and this document 
contain pretty much common provisions about strengthening of the bilateral 
efforts of the region countries and within regional organizations like the Arctic 
Counsel and Barents/Euroarctic region Counsel; provisions of good-neighborly 
relations with coastal states, the development of economic, research, cultural 
cooperation including the field of effective development of natural resources 
and environment protection in the Arctic; improvement of living conditions 
of native population and social conditions for economic activity in the Arctic.
Above all these this document states that a strategic priority of Russian 
policy in the Arctic is the implementation of cooperation between Russia and 
coastal states in order to delimitate marine spaces on the basis of International 
Law, mutual agreements taking into account national interests of the Russian 
Federation and also to decide matters on International legal justification of 
the outer border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;34 delimitation 
of marine spaces in the Arctic Ocean and the provision of mutually beneficial 
32   NSC-26, “D”.
33   Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of September 18, 2008 N Pr-1969.
34   Paragraph 7(а) Russian Arctic state policy adopted in 2008.
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presence of Russia on Spitsbergen archipelago.35 All mentioned provisions 
concerning delimitation don’t seem exact with the exception of Spitsbergen; 
although in Article 9 of the document the main state Russian policy goals in 
the Arctic can be reached on the basis of the preparation of Russian legal acts 
on the defining of the geographical borders of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic.36
3.3 Norwegian Strategy in the Arctic
On December 1, 2006 the Norwegian Government releases its ‘High North 
Strategy’ to clarify long-term Norwegian policy in the Arctic “in order to secure 
economic resources and its security into the future.”37 It was stated in the 
document that one of the government’s most important priorities in the years 
ahead will be to take advantage of the opportunities in the High North. The 
term ‘to take an advantage of the opportunities’ is not determining, but brief 
objectives of Norway High North strategy are following:
– continue to build on good neighborly relations with Russia;
– continue to exercise responsibility for combating illegal fishing and manag-
ing the renewable fish resources for present and future generations;
– take advantage of the opportunities the Barents Sea presents as a new 
European energy province in accordance with the principles of sustainable 
development;
– take environmental and climate considerations into account in all state 
efforts;
– improve living conditions, opportunities and the quality of life for all those 
who live in the High North.38
Actually, each A-5 country could sign mentioned above provisions as its own 
and all countries declare that would like to sea not only Barents Sea, but the 
whole Arctic as a ‘ocean of cooperation’.
What Norway consider as the ‘conflict of interest’ – related to the utilization 
of fisheries resources and future offshore petroleum resources.39 Probably, from 
real practice one should read the Norway Arctic strategy more expanded. One 
of the issue is the differing views on the geographical scope of the Spitsbergen 
35   Paragraph 7(e) Russian Arctic state policy adopted in 2008.
36   Paragraph 9(в) Russian Arctic state policy adopted in 2008.
37   The Norwegian government’s High North strategy, p. 1–18 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/strategy-for-the-high-north/id448697/.
38   The Norwegian government’s High North strategy, p. 5 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/strategy-for-the-high-north/id448697/.
39   The Norwegian government’s High North strategy, p. 16 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/strategy-for-the-high-north/id448697/.
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Treaty. Norway’s position that the treaty, in accordance with its wording, only 
applies to the archipelago and the territorial waters. Spain, Iceland and Russia 
have disputed this right with reference to the provisions of the Spitsbergen 
Treaty.
It was also stated that Norway’s policy towards Russia is based on pragma-
tism, interests and cooperation. Norway ensure sustainable use of resources 
and sound environmental management in the Barents Sea with Russia’s 
engagement and Norwegian-Russian cooperation. The Government there-
fore intends to strengthen cooperation with Russia on ecosystem-based 
manage ment of the whole Barents Sea, both in the Joint Norwegian-Russian 
Commis sion on Environmental Protection and in the Joint Norwegian- 
Russian Fisheries Commission. This cooperation includes measures to combat 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
As it was further written, developing close cooperation with Russia on 
sound exploitation of the petroleum resources in the Barents Sea should be 
Norwegian government ambition and both the former and present Norwegian 
Government accepted President Putin’s invitation to forge a strategic part-
nership between Norway and Russia in the North, but in reality looks rather 
doubtful. Much more realistic looks Norwegian ambitions of the future role of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces with obligations to:
– strengthening capacity of the Coast Guard vessels and the Orion aircraft to 
spend more time at sea and in the air, respectively;
– provide more close cooperation between the civilian and military 
authorities;
– provide background information for national decision-making through 
up-to- date surveillance and intelligence;
– maintain the presence of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the High North 
both to enable Norway to exercise its sovereignty and authority and to 
ensure that it can maintain its role in resource management.
3.4 Canada’s Strategy in the Arctic
Canadian Arctic strategy was adopted in 2009 and its main provisions are very 
similar to all other A-5 countries and focuses on four priority areas: exercis-
ing our Arctic sovereignty; promoting social and economic development; 
protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and improving and devolving 
northern governance, so that Northerners have a greater say in their own des-
tiny.40 Making more colorful statements like that: the Government of Canada 
40   Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future. Published under 
the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal 
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is firmly asserting its presence in the North, ensuring we have the capability 
and capacity to protect and patrol the land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic 
territory. We are putting more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy 
water and a better eye-in-the-sky41 in the same time for our object we can find 
very little except that Canada dealing with Arctic problems will use coopera-
tion, diplomacy and international law as Canada’s preferred approach in the 
Arctic.42
What is more important that Canada claims rights in its continental shelf 
under the 1997 Oceans Act, where adopted the default length of Canada’s con-
tinental shelf extends to 200 nautical miles from the straight baselines. On 
December 6, 2013 Canada made partial submission to the CLCS in respect of 
Atlantic ocean, continuing the data collection for the Arctic spaces.43 The dis-
pute in the Beaufort Sea concerns the maritime extension of the land boundary 
between Yukon and Alaska will certainly influence further delimitation nego-
tiations, which will be under undoubtedly pressureof the assumptionthat the 
area is considered to be resource-rich. Canada claims that the maritime bound-
ary runs along the 141st meridian as an extension of the territorial boundary 
agreed with the United States. However, the United States rejects this posi-
tion, arguing that the boundary must be determined by using the equidistance 
principle – a recognized mode of maritime delimitation that traces a line at 
equal distance from the closest land point of each state. This produces a line 
that reflects more closely the direction of the respective coast lines. Canada 
and the United States are in effect both promoting the use of a delimitation 
method that will best serve their respective interests and that will produce, 
from each of their perspectives, the largest maritime zone possible. Resolution 
of this dispute is still pending.
Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians Ottawa, 2009 (http://www.northernstrat 
egy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp).
41   http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp.
42   The US and Canada on January 11, 1988 signed the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation 
between two states. Following the United States Coast Guard Polar Sea’s crossing of the 
Northwest Passage without formal Canadian governmental consent, the Canadian gov-
ernment established straight baselines around Canada’s perimeter.
43   Canada is expected to submit a claim to the CLCS, within UNCLOS, to prove the 
Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of its own continental shelf.
Canada is expected to claim that the ridge is an underwater extension of Ellesmere 
Island. If it’s proven that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Canada’s continental shelf, 
Canada would obtain unfettered access beyond their EEZ of 200nm, and instead, would 
gain access to the seabed and its resources across the continental shelf. Canada would be 
required to submit bathymetry, seismic and gravity data to substantiate its claim.
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3.5 Denmark’s Strategy in the Arctic
Within the 2011 ‘Kingdom of Denmark: Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,’ 
Denmark asserts that it will submit data and other material to the CLCS as a 
basis for extension of the continental shelf beyond 200nm on three areas near 
Greenland, including the Lomonosov Ridge. Proof that the Lomonosov Ridge 
extends from Greenland’s continental shelf would give Denmark unfettered 
access to much of the seabed surrounding the North Pole.
On December 17, 1973 Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark sign the 
agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland 
and Canada.44 The agreement was designed to distinguish territory for 
the purposes of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the 
continental shelf. Two countries agreed to divide the ocean floor between 
Canada and Greenland using a median or ‘equidistance’ line.45 Both delayed 
any decision regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island.46 The treaty also has 
provisions concerning the possible discovery of hydrocarbons along or near 
the boundary – neither Party shall issue licenses for exploitation of mineral 
resources in areas bordering the dividing line without the prior agreement 
of the other Party as to exact determination of the geographic co-ordinates of 
points of that part of the dividing line bordering upon the areas in question.47
This provision of the agreement makes its legal value in the CS resources 
exploitation of the void. Article V, of mentioned above agreement, created 
pretty less critical model of the relations by simple formula: if any single geo-
logical petroleum structure or field, or any single geological structure or field 
of any other mineral deposit extends across the dividing line is exploitable, 
wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Parties shall seek 
to reach an agreement as to the exploitation of such structure or field. In other 
words, this formula does not solve problem and postpones its decision to the 
occurrence of a particular dispute for resource exploitation.
44   Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government 
of Canada relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and 
Canada (17 December 1973).
45   A line that at every point is an equal distance from the nearest point on each of the two 
opposing coasts. In this case 109 ‘turning points’ of the 127 were agreed.
46   The agreement distinguished territory between Canada and Greenland. Both delayed 
any decision regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island – a small 1.3 square kilometer 
uninhabited island in the Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait between both Canada’s 
Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland. Both Canada and Denmark (via Greenland) 
claim the island that exists on both Canadian and Danish sides of the Strait.
47   Michael Byers & James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge University 
Press University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom, p. 30, 2014.
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Both countries agreed in 1984 to extend the work to clarify the computa-
tion of the equidistance line48 south of 75°N which came to an end in 2003. 
Amendment to the coordinates will be provided in several data and may 
reduce the number of turning points of the boundary from the present 113 
points (south of 75°N).
3.6 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the Arctic delimitation policy? 
Despite the fact that the several coastal States have concluded bilateral agree-
ments governing the territorial delimitation they did not completely solve the 
problem of the seabed delimitation.
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (via Greenland), and the Russian 
Federation each assert that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of their own 
continental shelf. Proof of its continuation, would give the State access to the 
sea bed and natural resources beyond the current 200 nm limit. The United 
States claims it to be an oceanic ridge and thus not an extension of any State’s 
continental shelf, and therefore refutes any claim to its ownership.
There is a dispute between Canada and Denmark about delimitation line at 
Hans Island and in the Lincoln Sea, challenges Lomonosov and claims the USA 
the direction of the sea border line in the Beaufort Sea.
In 2015, Russia delivered another submission to the CLCS once again claim-
ing the extension of its continental shelf, which stood to potentially acquire 
nearly one-half of the Arctic Ocean.
The border line with the USA is shown as a direct line coinciding with ‘the 
western limit’ in the Article 1 of the Russian-American agreement of 1867 
on the Alaska Purchase which comes through the point in the Bering Strait 
(65 degrees, 30 minutes) in its crossing with the meridian at equal distance 
of the Kruzenshtern Isle from the Ratmanov Isle, and goes along the unlim-
ited line towards the North until it’s fully lost in the Arctic ocean …49 The 
Russian-American agreement of 199050 ‘clarified’ the delimitation point and 
stated that the border in the Bering Strait and further in the Chukchi sea 
goes along the meridian 168° 58’ 37” W up to the limits until it’s allowed by 
International law. It may be admitted that the agreement of 1990 states the 
delimitation line but it’s obvious that it is not enough for the seabed delimita-
tion; if we try to find the outer delimitation point in the Chukchi sea on the 
48   The Canadian maps and charts were drawn on the North American Datum (NAD) 1927 
and the Danish maps and charts on the Qornoq Datum which uses a different ellipsoid.
49   Full complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. II. Volume XLII. Dep. 1. 1867.
50   The Soviet-American agreement on the maritime border by June 1, 1990.
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principle of equidistance,51 it will be located a bit to the west from the straight 
line connecting the delimitation point in the strait and the North Pole which 
used to be drawn on the majority of presentation maps and in some official 
sources.
Except ostentatious, in our view, pretentiousness coastal states policy, there 
is another problem which affects the possibility to deal with coastal coun-
tries contradictions. Despite the fact that practically all of them tend to stress 
the necessity to turn the Arctic into the ‘peace zone’, their military presence 
in the region is escalated, and there is typical reasoning that polar regions 
are both vital from economic, ecological point of view, and for the reasons of 
national security.
On the one hand, all countries’ claims are equally categorical in the region; 
on the other hand, opportunities to provide military presence in the Arctic 
coastal regions are different.
The USA is the only country which didn’t ratify UNCLOS; anyway, it can’t 
be the sign of the drawback of legal policy of the state which has been defin-
ing and clarifying its Arctic national interests since 2004. In terms of strategy 
implementation there are at least 3 main points:
– to make every effort to provide national security;
– to joint efforts with other coastal states within both NATO and the Arctic 
Counsel keeping the possibility of other unions;
– to maintain the freedom of navigation according to the norms of 
International Law.
As these are the points from the strategy ‘open’ part’, it may be presumed that 
the real ‘joint effort’ is nothing but actions within traditional military alliances, 
and there is no doubt that the USA wouldn’t really tend to cooperate with at 
least one country among the region states. It is most likely that the last point 
concerns the efforts to give the Northern sea route the status beyond the laws 
drawn by the Russian Federation.
The USA does not have big military-industrial bases on the Arctic coast 
with the exception of temporary base in Barrow which can be regarded as a 
small base rather than a Navy base. It’s obvious that in order to solve problems 
maintaining the US interests in the Arctic by force which are also connected 
with the resource extraction activities, will demand the deployment of the 
Pacific forces command. This fact makes the idea of attracting of the allies 
owing coastal infrastructure very appealing, what actually are doing the USA 
getting involved into military cooperation North-European countries within 
NORDEFCO (Nordic Defense Cooperation).
51   This is not the only method, and is cited as an example.
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Canada, as well as Denmark, does not have ground forces in the Arctic zone. 
Nevertheless, the Canadian government builds so-called ‘hubs’ there (North 
Operations Hubs, NOH). Such first hubs were built in Resolute Bay and Iqaluit 
(the south-east of the Baffin Island), and by 2018 the Canadian Navy ships fuel-
ling point is being planned to be constructed in Nanisivik (North-western part 
the Baffin Island).
Norway actively supports the NATO ‘Arctic vector’, and was one of the ini-
tiators of ‘the NATO Arctic strategy’ (January 2009), promotes Scandinavian 
countries’ efforts to create a special security zone, already given the name 
‘mini-NATO – creation of the defense alliance’ of 5 states – Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Finland and Sweden to strengthen their military position in the Arctic.
Russia is the only country which has not only permanent military bases but 
nuclear forces, military infrastructure objects, including the unique shipbuild-
ing and other industrial enterprises. This complex was formed long ago since 
the surge of interest to the Arctic.52
In response to strengthen the military activity in the Arctic, Russia in 2014 
announced about the creation of the Arctic forces within the frames of the 
North fleet,53 in 2016 the decision was made to locate special subdivisions in 
Chukotka. The location of military objects is carried out not only in traditional 
places of Archangelsk and Murmansk regions, but on the islands – Novaya 
Zemlya and Franz Josef land, ‘polar trainings’ have begun more active.
Above all this, Russia has started to use military objects in the peace-
ful purposes by attracting military personal and staff for the research work. 
The example is mutual efforts at the station ‘Barneo’, not far from the North 
Pole.54 Moreover, infrastructural objects ‘GLONASS’ and ‘ISS’ ‘Arctica’;55 com-
munication systems to navigate ships and aircraft on cross-polar routes,56 
52   The first Naval ships in the North of Russia were built under Peter I, and the first regular 
Flotilla was formed in 1916 and was named the ‘Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean,’ which in 
September 1917 included 89 combat and support ships. In 1937, the Flotilla transformed 
into the Northern Fleet.
53   “The Northern Fleet – United Strategic Command” (SF-USC) with the of ‘military district’.
54   Drifting base ‘Barneo’ is created in the Arctic every year. Such an object can be attributed 
to the objects of dual-use, which could be recognized as novelty in the practical develop-
ment of the Russian Arctic.
55   MSS ‘Arctica’ is composed of three sub-systems intended for hydrometeorological and 
climate (‘M’) monitoring; radar monitoring ice conditions (“P”) and provide satellite com-
munication and navigation ‘MS’). In the nearest future with the cable laying ‘Polarnet 
System’ it will be incorporated to the ‘United information space of the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation’.
56   Flights of this type operate 11 airlines, including Russian, Canadian, American and 
Chinese.
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reconstruction of the research objects on the islands of archipelago Severnaya 
Zemlya, rebuilding of the northern aerodromes (Tiksi, Naryan-Mar, Alykel, 
Amderma, Nagurskaya, Anadyr and Rogachevo)… are also on ‘military 
shoulders’.
All these facts may serve only as positive circumstances but they cannot 
change general tendency to militarization of the Arctic, which make chances 
to compromise pretty low.
4 Addressing and Solving Conflicts regarding Seabed 
in the High North
So, we may make presentations at international forums, assemblies, sessions 
of the Arctic counsel assure each other in peaceful intensions, but the fact 
is – there is no real peace in the Arctic – rivalry is escalated, and all states 
of the region are not prepared to compromise defending their national inter-
ests. Adding the traditional ‘NATO spice’ on top of that, increase of military 
trainings in the Arctic zone, already exceeding the level of the cold war, active 
involvement of Iceland, Finland and Sweden in military games57 adding to this 
Russian efforts in strengthening its Northern fleet, which includes the nuclear 
component the conclusion on unfavorable political and legal environment is 
quite obvious.
Now, my experienced reader, ask yourself a question – what peaceful meth-
ods must be chosen to resolve present delimitation contradictions. Although 
the conclusion about the need to reduce the intensity of the ‘struggle for the 
Arctic resources’ although trivial, but it is the ground of all other efforts. And 
what delimitation methods would be chosen its implementation in reality 
without establishing political warming in Arctic seems to be useless. In addi-
tion, the principle question whether the Arctic coastal states have to have 
the same level of responsibilities in the spaces beyond the 200 nm limits as the 
non-regional states remains unanswered. Formula “apply UNCLOS and enforce 
freedoms granted by the Convention” without considering the peculiarities of 
the region,- is completely irresponsible decision.
What could be the principles for the seabed delimitation in Arctic? 
Theoretically states have three options: to follow the provisions of the UNCLOS, 
to create specific regime outside UNCLOS frames by bilateral agreement or 
57   It is known that the United States, Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and 
Iceland propose to create a military group of the rapid response, including ice-breaking 
ships, amphibious units and air forces. 
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keep talking maintaining sluggish negotiations or by using the delimitation 
disputes for periodic outburst of political activity in the region.
A-5 agrees to apply international law provisions for activity in the Arctic 
Ocean with regard to the delimitation of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf the coastal states should recognize their obligations and responsibilities 
under the Law of the Sea in the Arctic, including their commitment to the 
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.
A-5 also agrees that the provisions of the UNCLOS should be the legal base 
for the resolving the Arctic claims58 particular Article 83, which relate to the 
continental shelf delimitation agreements which are to be based on inter-
national law and the uniform geodetic coordinate system59 to achieve an 
equitable solution.
In all cases the decisions of the CLCS with adoption of the continental shelf 
outer limits will need to be delineated on the basis of CLCS recommendations 
which will be final and binding only after adoption by the coastal states.
The adjacent boundaries were adopted by the three agreements – between 
Norway and Russia (which is limited by the point 8);60 between Norway – 
Denmark61 and Denmark – Canada. The US and Canada have the dispute in 
the sea of Beaufort and the Arctic boundary between the US and Russia is 
uncertain.
According to the decisions established by the International Court of Justice, 
the starting point is the delimitation line should follow the median line 
between the two states’ coastlines. The starting points of the US-Canadian 
and the US-Russian boundaries are agreed, but the direction of the first one 
is in dispute, and the second is uncertain. If even the 1990 US-Russian agree-
ment will be ratified the concept ‘as far as permitted under international law’62 
58   The Ilulissat Declaration was announced on May 28, 2008.
59   As an example – agreement between Canada and Denmark, where from a surveying 
stand-point, the interesting aspect is the fact that the Canadian maps and charts were 
drawn on the North American Datum (NAD) 1927 and the Danish maps and charts on the 
Qornoq Datum which uses a different ellipsoid. The technical experts knew that there 
was a difference between the geodetic coordinate systems but had no way of knowing the 
magnitudes. So the practical solution was to set the problem aside for future consider-
ation and to assume that the two coordinate systems were identical.
60   Norway–Russia agreement in the Varangerfjord area 2007 and 2010 Treaty between the 
Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.
61   On the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fisheries zones in the area between 
Greenland and Svalbard 2006.
62   USA-USSR 1990 Agreement. Annex: ‘From the Initial point, 65° 30’ N., 168° 58’ 37” W., the 
maritime boundary extends north along the 168° 58’ 37” W. meridian through the Bering 
Strait and Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law.’
124 Skaridov
could not be applied for the delimitation of the seabed and subsoil based on 
the UNCLOS provisions.
In the same time, keeping in mind that the US did not ratified the UNCLOS, 
based on the customary international law this line could be as far as the agree-
ment between two states will allowed.
In any case, it can be argued that the provisions of the UNCLOS do 
not prevent the Arctic countries to use bilateral agreements, based on its 
own method of delimitation, where geographical criteria would greatly 
simplify the delineation of adjacent spaces up to the Northern Pole. It could 
also be the ground for an agreement for mutual exploitation of the resources 
beyond the 200 nm limits in the Arctic seabed by way of a joint development 
agreement. Such agreement would enable to mutually share the exclusive 
rights as regards natural resources in the contested areas without abandoning 
their claims and also without the need for a final resolution of all legal outer 
limits delimitation issues.
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chapter 6
Current Human Impact on Antarctic Seabed 
Environment and International Law
Yana Evgenyevna Brazovskaya and Gulnara Flurovna Ruchkina
1 Introduction
Antarctica is perhaps the most mysterious and breath-taking continent of our 
planet by its extreme natural conditions and the absence of a native human 
population. Located ‘opposite the Arctic,’ it is the world’s largest and coldest 
desert, the highest continent of the Earth, and, at the same time, a mostly 
unknown and still under-researched area. Remoteness, permanent glacial cover 
of the continent, and exceptionally severe weather conditions have apparently 
also influenced the legal status of the Antarctic territories and the legal regime 
of their use. Indeed, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 which together with related 
protocols and conventions form the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), affirms in 
its Article I.1 that ‘Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.’ Parties 
to the Treaty have, so to speak, cut the southern polar region2 off of the pos-
sible proliferation of nuclear weapons and conduct of any military activities.3 
The parties also excluded the possibility of regulating the development of 
industrial development of mineral resources of the Antarctic. However, the 
Antarctic Treaty aims to facilitate scientific research in Antarctica.4
The level of political tensions in the Arctic is much higher than that 
observed in the Antarctic, with only attempts to raise Antarctic delimitation 
claims. However, the constant pressure on worldwide natural resources sheds 
a new light on the more remote areas, including Antarctica, with the sub-
jacent race to claim jurisdiction over those. A first example relates to access 
to fresh water. A growing number of research shows that water scarcity rep-
resents a major threat on vital resources for mankind, threatening the life 
1   The 1959 Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington and entered into force on June 23, 1961, 
after being signed by the 12 nations that were the Treaty’s initial parties. Since then, other 
nations have acceded the Treaty, which now counts 53 parties.
2   Which covers almost 50 million square kilometres, or 10% of the planet’s area, and the main-
land is twice the size of Europe. Source: https://ria.ru/spravka/20141130/1035503295.html.
3   Article I.1 and V.1, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
4   Articles II, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
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conditions of hundreds of millions of people around the world.5 This has led 
to increased competition for scarce resources, which can both exacerbate old 
security dilemmas and create new ones.6 Access to ice reserves in Antarctica 
will open almost 80 percent of total fresh water reserves on the planet. A 
second natural resource is catching attention in the Antarctic. It is highly 
probable that various kinds of mineral raw materials are present in the interior 
of Antarctic. Unlike solid minerals, the forecast of hydrocarbon resources in 
the Antarctic is mainly based on the materials of structural-tectonic zoning, 
carried out using remote geophysical methods, paleotectonic reconstructions 
and geohistorical analysis. According to scientists, there may be about 900 
significant crude ore deposits in Antarctica. Despite the fragmentation and 
small size of the overglacial outcrops of the bedrock even in relatively naked 
mountainous areas of Antarctica, they found many manifestations of ore 
and non-metallic minerals, representing weak mineralization.7 According to 
British scientists, there are coal deposits in the depths of the sixth continent, 
and American scientists insist that Antarctica has oil and gold.8 The presence 
of hydrocarbon reserves9 in the seabed may therefore reasonably be assumed, 
with estimated 35–51 billion tons of conditional fuel to be present on the self 
of Antarctic seas.10 Those are only two examples in an area which is the least 
explored of the two circumpolar regions.
2 Jurisdiction Delimitation Claims in the Antarctic
It is believed that Antarctica is the only continent with no history of human 
habitation,11 but at present this glacial region is the one most ‘densely 
5    A. Kushnarenko, ‘Lack of Fresh Water: Problems and Solutions,’ The W&L, 28.05.2015. 
Source: <http://thewallmagazine.ru/lack-of-fresh-water/>.
6    Speech of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the Security Council session in 2011. 
Source: http://www.un.org/ru/sections/issues-depth/water/index.html.
7    G.E. Grikurov, G.L. Leichenkov, E.V. Mikhalsky, A.V. Golynsky, V.N. Masolov ‘Antarctic min-
eral resources: geological preconditions and perspectives of development’ Source: http://
evgengusev.narod.ru/vniio/grikurov-2000.pdf.
8    ITAR-TASS. ‘Antarctic: history and problems’. Source: https://tass.ru/spravochnaya-informa 
ciya/628230.
9    The forecast of hydrocarbon resources of Antarctica is based mainly on the materials 
of structural tectonic zoning by remote geophysical methods, paleotectonic reconstruc-
tions, and geo-historical analysis.
10   Antarctica: History and Problems, 03.07.2013. TASS: http://tass.ru/spravochnaya-informa 
ciya/628230.
11   Linda Nowlan. Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection. IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper No. 44, p. 41.
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populated’ by scientists.12 The lack of native human population has not pre-
vented states from claiming sovereignty over the Antarctic areas. At least 
seven countries have put forward territorial claims: Argentina, Australia, Chile, 
France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom.13 However, in the view 
of the present authors, these claims are more of a historical nature. Russia and 
the United States have reserved their rights; they consider themselves pio-
neers of Antarctica, entitled to requiring the sovereignty of the territory.14 It 
should be noted that the claimant nations did not abandon their territorial 
claims for Antarctica. For instance, in 2004, Australia sent a request to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for the Antarctic shelf 
adjacent to the ‘Australian Antarctic Sector,’ which, incidentally, was rejected.15
The question of the islands and associated continental shelf, located 
between 40° and 60° south latitude is disputable respectively, whichever the 
boundary of the Southern Ocean is: the Antarctic Circumpolar current (area 
of 40° south latitude) or the area regulated by the Antarctic Treaty (area of 60° 
south latitude).
Both the prospects of accessing in rich natural resources and the effects of 
climate change have the potential to revive old and new claims. Indeed, the 
effects of climate change in Antarctica will mainly result in a warmer climate 
in that part of the Earth, according to scientists. Because of global warming 
and sea level rise, many of the largest megacities of the planet, as well as small 
island nations, will disappear. If all glaciers of the mainland melt, Antarctica 
will become an archipelago (a chain of islands),16 and the territorial claims 
issue will appear in much brighter colours.
12   Approximately 29 nations operate seasonal (summer) and year-round stations on the 
continent and in the coastal zone. The number of scientists engaged in scientific research 
on the continent and nearby islands varies from around 4,000 in summer, and up to 1,000 
in winter; in addition, about 1,000 specialists, including ship crews, are located in the 
waters adjacent to the continent. As of 2004, the largest number of researches during 
the summer season was deployed by the USA (about 1,100), Russia, Chile, and Argentina 
(300), Australia (200) and the United Kingdom (192). During winter, it was Russia, Chile, 
and Argentina (approximately 200) and the USA (120–130). There are 42 year-round sta-
tions in Antarctica (6 belong to Russia and Argentina, 4 to Australia and Chile, 3 to the 
USA and 2 to the UK).
13   T.B. Mordvinova. A.S. Skaridov, M.A. Skaridova. Polar Law. M., Justitia, 2017, at 200.
14   Who and why is interested in Antarctica? June 07, 2017. Source: http://www.profi-forex 
.by/news/entry5000037141.html.
15   The United Kingdom, Argentina, New Zealand, and South Africa may submit similar 
requests for the Southern Ocean shelf. See Recommendations (9 April 2008) Source: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_aus.htm.
16   Antarctic Mainland, 24.06.2017. Source: http://mirplaneta.ru/materik-antarktida 
-opisanie-relef-klimat.html.
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At the present time, the coastal contours of Antarctica are above the Arctic 
coastline. They are in fact static coastal fast ice, forming ice fronts almost all 
over, whose height above sea level varies from a few to dozens of meters. Of 
the total length of the Antarctic coastline (30,000 km), 92 percent are ice banks 
and only 8 percent are rocky shores. The Southern Ocean is a deep-sea basin. 
Areas with depths of 3,000 meters occupy about 77 percent of the total area of 
the ocean. Due to the huge glacial load, the Antarctic shelf is immersed to a 
depth of up to 500 meters and stretches in a relatively narrow strip, about 280 
kilometres on the average.17
It should be noted that the international agreement on the delimita-
tion of Antarctic spaces does not exist, as it does for the Arctic. According to 
A. Skaridov, the international legal doctrine has at least three points of view in 
this regard, namely that: (i) the areas are outside the jurisdiction of any coun-
try, to which the rules of international law apply; (ii) they are areas of joint use 
of countries (by condominium theory they should be managed by all countries 
with the assistance of an international organization); (iii) division into sectors 
to be fully owned by various countries.18
While the situation is relatively straightforward in the first two points of 
view, the theory of sectoral delineation may be less complicated than foreseen 
to apply in Antarctica. It should be noted that most of the Arctic countries 
deny the sectoral delineation, but this does not necessarily mean that the sit-
uation in Antarctica will cause a similar response,19 taking into account the 
previously mentioned claims of the sectoral nature. In order to consolidate 
rights to a certain sector, justifications such as geographical proximity, right 
of discovery, or continuous control or occupation of the territory are often 
referred to.20 On the one hand, the division of Antarctica into sectors is the 
simplest and most acceptable way to solve the problem of territorial claims, 
but on the other hand it is strongly criticized by many lawyers and politicians. 
For example, US lawyer R. Hayton is of the opinion that geographical prox-
imity, or in other words ‘attraction’, does not give countries any rights to own 
17   Ice Navigation Conditions in the Southern Ocean. A.A. Romanov. Marine Meteorology 
and Related Oceanographic Activities, Issue No. 35//WMO/TD-No. 783.
18   A. Skaridov, Maritime Law. Moscow, URAIT, 2014, at 167–169. See chapter 5 of this book, 
A. Skaridov, ‘The seabed in the High North – How to address conflicts?’.
19   Although the Arctic and Antarctic regions are similar in many ways, there are also signifi-
cant differences between them. The Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continents, while 
Antarctica is a continent surrounded by oceans.
20   N. V Ilyushina, ‘Problem of Territorial Division of Antarctica’.Topical Issues of Current 
International Relations, 2015. Available at <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problema 
-territorialnogo-razdela-antarktiki>.
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Antarctica.21 He finds it impossible that the rest of the community of nations 
may be willing to cede all rights to uninhabited lands that may be of strategic 
importance.
The unilateral establishment of a sectoral division of Antarctica is con-
trary to the interests of most countries of the world, but assuming that the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty ceases to exist and the continent is divided by a sectoral 
principle, countries will need to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), that is, to resolve the issue of maritime 
boundaries, and here additional difficulties may arise.
Indeed, in accordance with Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), the normal baseline for measuring the 
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast.22 Pursuant 
to Article 7 of the same Convention, straight baselines should also connect the 
appropriate points on the shoreline. It is noteworthy that this Convention does 
not determine the notions of ‘shore’ and ‘shoreline’.
The UN technical expert team determine the shore as a line of contact of 
the aquatic environment and the land. Since in the establishment of mari-
time borders, polar borders included, the key is the legality of the definition 
of the reference base, the definition of what should be understood under the 
shore, takes a fundamental importance. However, it is not clear what should be 
understood under ‘land’ or ‘shore’ in Antarctic conditions as there is no physi-
cally defined concept of ‘shore’.23
Ice as a physical category may have different origins, but from a legal stand-
point, ice mobility is probably its most important hydrographic characteristic. 
If the outer edge of the glacier, i.e. the line where two ecosystems with different 
physical characteristics get in contact, is virtually static, that is, not subject to 
seasonal fluctuations, it can be considered as a coastline. So, the edge of such 
geomorphological phenomenon as a multi-year glacial fast ice, or the edge of 
a hummock attached to the shore or fast ice, in case they are naturally con-
nected to the coast and the lack fluctuations due to seasonal cycles may be 
considered in the polar areas as a coastline in the sense that is applies to the 
provisions of Articles 5, 7 and 47 of the 1982 UNCLOS to such a line.24
Unfortunately, the 1982 UNCLOS did not take into account the peculiarities 
of establishing borders in constantly ice-covered polar regions. Only in its 
21   R.D. Hayton, ‘The Antarctic Settlement of 1959’, American Journal of International Law 
(1960: 54), No. 2. at 359–360.
22   For a review of the international process, see chapter 4 of this book, A. Brekke, ‘Setting 
boundaries: Experiences from Norway’.
23   Law of the Sea: a textbook for masters/A.S. Skaridov. – 2nd edition as extended and 
amended. – M.: URAIT Publishing House, 2012. 167 pages.
24   Ibid. P. 168.
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Article 234 it indicates that coastal countries have the right to adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduc-
tion and control of marine pollution from vessels within the limits of the EEZ, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm 
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
However, the text of the Convention contains provisions which may be con-
sidered as an indirect confirmation of the legality of accounting for static ice 
massifs, which are a continuation of the shore, as a reference point for the 
outer limits of maritime spaces. For example, natural formations such as reefs 
have almost the same geophysical dynamics in the south as ice massifs in the 
north. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land, land areas may 
include waters lying within the fringing reefs of islands and atolls, including 
that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed 
by a chain of limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the 
plateau (paragraph 7, Article 47 of UNCLOS.) The 1982 Convention also reads 
that in the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, 
the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-
water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially 
recognized by the coastal state.
Thus, the placement of points defining the position of the baselines on the 
outer edge of the foundation of the coastal fast ice may be found not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of UNCLOS, and it may be assumed that the difficulty 
of delimiting maritime and submarine areas near the Antarctic continent will 
be related to the uncertainty of the definition of the datum, i.e. baselines.
In addition, with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
in Antarctica, it should be noted that, under the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, the term ‘continental shelf ’ is used as referring to the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area 
of the territorial sea (Article 1 (a)). But according to UNCLOS, the ‘continental 
shelf of a coastal state’ comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory (Article 76 (1)).
Taking into account the conventional position, it is possible to speak about 
continental shelf of a coastal state only. The institution of continental shelf is 
inseparably tied to the institution of territorial sea, hence legally there is no 
such thing as continental shelf of international territory.
That is, by implication of the 1958 Convention and the 1982 Convention, the 
continental shelf of a coastal state begins where the bottom of its territorial 
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sea ends. Therefore, due to the fact that no state has its territorial sea washing 
Antarctica, it is not possible to discuss any continental shelf of Antarctica.
3 Exploitation of Mineral Resources from the Seabed in the Antarctic
To date, the legal regime of Antarctic regions is formed by four basic agree-
ments as part of the ATS:
– The Antarctic Treaty, 1959;
– Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, 1991 (Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol);
– Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 1972;
– Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 1980 
(CCAMLR).
At the time of signing the Antarctic Treaty, the member countries25 were 
mainly focused on: security issues (in the Treaty, the parties secured their 
renunciation of claims to territorial sovereignty (Article IV)); the prohibition 
of any measures of a military nature, except for the use of military person-
nel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose 
(Article I); and the freedom of scientific investigation (Article II). But after the 
1998 Madrid Protocol entered into force, some scholars believe that the rules 
governing the legal regime of Antarctica have essentially acquired an ’ecologi-
cal vector’.26
The analysis of the above rules allows to assert that international law does 
not regulate the industrial development of mineral resources in Antarctica. 
In accordance with Article 7 of the 1991 Protocol, ‘any activity relating to min-
eral resources, except for scientific research, shall be prohibited.’ However, 
scientific research in this field are carried out on regular basis, despite the fact 
that Antarctica is not the best terrain for the placement of drilling rigs. For 
the purpose of exploration and development of possible mineral deposits, 
new techniques are being implemented, which will entail the development of 
25   The Parties to the Treaty are 50 countries constituting about two thirds of the world popu-
lation, and 28 countries have become Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP).
26   At the 40th Consultative Meeting, the participants agreed and adopted documents and 
decisions on the practice of “ecological expeditions” in Antarctica, which implies that 
research activities in Antarctica is based on the principles of friendly and careful atti-
tude to the environment, i.e. scientists and explorers will strive to minimize the negative 
impact of their activities on the polar environment.
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large deposits in previously undeveloped regions, such as exemplified by the 
ice Lake Vostok.27
Sooner or later, the question of industrial extraction of Antarctic natural 
resources will be raised, which, given the ‘frozen’ territorial claims of countries, 
would require the adoption of a special legal regime for continental Antarctic 
shelf as an alternative to the continental shelf regime in the sense of the 
1982 UNCLOS. Thus, we may state that the established legal regime of the use 
of Antarctic areas does not solve long-arisen problems of activity on the 
continent. Recent advances in science and technology, and the overall devel-
opment of productive forces have made Antarctica more accessible, and the 
resources of the continent arouse high interest in the region.
The situation in Antarctica is complicated by the fact that the mainland 
part is covered by an insuperable ice sheet. Consequently, the development of 
offshore fields in Antarctica will be obstructed by icebergs and the work would 
take place at a depth of more than 500 meters.28 The practicability of safe trans-
portation of oil from Antarctica via pipelines is also questionable. Norwegian 
companies have begun to implement underwater mining complexes in the 
Arctic. Antarctica in turn has its climatic features, plus it is at a considerable 
distance from the states interested in mineral resources. According to experts of 
the Research Institute of Oceanology, currently there are no such technologies 
that can be effectively used in Antarctica.29 It is believed that the extraction of 
Antarctica oil and gas is mostly hampered by super-harsh climatic conditions 
on the ice continent, which also affects the profitability of the company.
International legal regulation of the Antarctic mineral resources regime 
was supposed to be governed by the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of 
Mineral Resources of Antarctica, which was to establish that the search, explo-
ration, and development of Antarctic mineral resources should be exclusively 
in accordance with the said Convention. The main idea and purpose of the 
Convention is that the development of resources should not cause any harm 
to the natural environment. It is controlled by the establishment of conditions 
and procedures for the development and production of mineral resources.
According to the 1988 Convention, the limit of its distribution is the entire 
continent of Antarctica and all Antarctic islands, including all ice shelves, 
27   In Antarctica there are 89 scientific polar stations and bases of various countries, which 
conduct seasonal (summer) and year-round scientific (including biological, geographical, 
geological and meteorological) research on the continent and its coastal area.
28   There is oil in Antarctica, but it is impracticable to extract it. Alexander Danilov, Deputy 
Director (Research), Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AANIA), 24.01.2012. Source: 
RIA Novosti https://ria.ru/eco/20120124/547701814.html.
29   Ibid.
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south of 60 degrees south latitude and the seabed and subsoil of adjacent off-
shore areas up to the deep seabed (up to the limits of the continental shelf).
In view of the special importance of Antarctica as a natural reserve for the 
development of science, the adoption of the 1988 Convention caused a nega-
tive reaction by the international community,30 which expressed concerns 
about the possibility of industrial development of Antarctic mineral resources 
and the related serious threats this may cause to the environment.31
4 Environmental Protection of Antarctic Seabed Resources
In order to rectify the situation, as well as to improve the protection of 
Antarctic ecology and its dependent and related ecosystems, and to increase 
the guaranteed nature of the use of Antarctic region exclusively for peace-
ful purposes and to improve the ATS, a special Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting at the XI session in 1991 adopted The Protocol on Environmental 
Protection32 to the Antarctic Treaty.
It should be noted that the Protocol does not change and does not amend 
the 1959 Treaty, but only complements it (Section 4, Art. 4).
The protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and asso-
ciated ecosystems should be one of the main factors in the planning and 
implementation of any activity in the Antarctic Treaty area (Article 3 of the 
1998 Protocol).
To achieve these goals, special protective measures should be planned and 
developed in Antarctica to avoid anthropogenic environmental impact, includ-
ing through the prohibition of any activity on the industrial development of 
mineral resources. An exception is provided for scientific research (Article 7).
The protocol prioritized the provision that ‘The protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems shall be fundamental 
considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic 
Treaty area’. In order to achieve these objectives, special activities should 
be planned and developed in Antarctica in order to avoid human impact 
on the environment, in particular by prohibiting any activity for industrial 
30   This position was outlined in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 
43th session in 1988, which expressed “deep regret” in connection with the adoption of 
the 1988 Convention.
31   Modern International Law of the Sea and Practice of its Application. Monograph. – M.: 
Nauchnaya Kniga. 2003. – 236 pp.
32   So-called Madrid Protocol.
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development of mineral resources, with exception provided for scientific 
research.33
5 Concluding Remarks
Today, the issues of legal regulation of international relations, in particular 
those directly related to the use of natural resources, take special importance. 
The solution to these problems is in fact closely linked to the crucial issue of 
our era, i.e. the struggle for peace. It is in connection with the use of resources 
that the interests of different countries clash most acutely. The way these inter-
ests are reconciled depends largely on whether international cooperation will 
be established or strengthened; if not, an environment fraught with dangerous 
aggravation of relations will grow.34
A possible solution to the problem of delimitation of maritime areas and 
therefore of possible claims by different countries for marine resources includ-
ing the seabed may be the adoption of a special legal regime for the continental 
shelf of Antarctica and conclusion of bilateral agreements on the delimitation 
of maritime areas.
It is also likely that Antarctic mineral resources will be considered as a very 
remote reserve for future generations for a long time. In the near future, there 
is no reason to expect that the priority of scientific geological and geophysical 
research will be undermined by unilateral infringement or early lifting 
of the moratorium on geological prospecting and mining work. Nevertheless, 
the attention given to the potential resources of Antarctica under the influ-
ence of the oil crisis of the early 1970s, leading to the forced elaboration of 
the International Mineral Exploration Convention, frozen in 1991, indicates 
the severity of the problem, which for the duration of the moratorium may 
become more geopolitical than economic.35
Most likely, countries with territorial claims in Antarctica, industrialized 
countries that do not have their own resource base (Japan, Germany) or 
33   It is well known that at fluctuations in the number of populations or in biodiversity of 
communities of living organisms, a negative role can be played not only by man-made 
impacts, but also by problems of climate and food potential changes, viral diseases of 
organisms caused by impacts of transboundary transfers in the ocean and atmosphere, or 
large-scale natural disasters (volcanism, earthquakes, collapse of icebergs, tsunamis etc.).
34   V.A. Avkhadeev Issues of Current Territorial Claims in Antarctica … “Law of the Sea” web 
magazine, 2008.
35   Mineral Resources of the Arctic: Geological background and development prospects. 
G.E. Grikurov, G.L. Leichenkov, E.V. Michalski, A.V. Golynsky, V.N. Masolov. // Exploration 
and protection of subsoil. 2000. No. 12.
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whose strategic line is for the conservation of national resources (USA), will be 
enhancing the scope of research work aimed at revealing the prospects of the 
region’s mineral resources and strengthening their presence on the continent 
through research, and establishment of stations and bases.

part 3
Exploitation of Non-Living Resources from the 
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chapter 7
Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed 




The deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction covers approximately half of 
our planet, yet it is the most inaccessible and least explored area on earth.1 It is 
home to a wealth of mineral resources, including a variety of valuable metals 
and rare earth elements.2 Deep seabed minerals await discovery on volcanic 
ridges, rocky outposts and amongst the sediment of the ocean floor, typically 
at depths of up to around 5,000 metres.3
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the 
Convention) established the regime which governs mining in the deep seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction (referred to in this Chapter as the ‘deep seabed’ 
or the ‘Area’).4 The Convention defines the Area as comprising ‘the seabed and 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’5 At 
present, as many coastal States have still to determine the outer boundaries of 
1   The author’s analysis of the status of the deep seabed mining regime, and the extent of min-
ing activities within it, is current as at 1 November 2018. All web links cited in this Chapter 
are correct as at that date. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Scottish Government or the University of 
Glasgow. Elements of this Chapter are also addressed by this author in Joanna Dingwall, ‘The 
International Legal Regime Applicable to the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed’ (2018) 
9 Eur YB of Intl Economic L 261–287.
2   International Seabed Authority ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (2003) <www.isa.org.jm/files/
documents/EN/Brochures/ENG6.pdf>; Jim Hein ‘ISA Briefing Paper 02/12 – Prospects for 
Rare Earth Elements from Marine Minerals’ (May 2012) <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/
EN/Pubs/BP2.pdf>.
3   ISA, ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n2).
4   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted and opened for signature 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, Part XI and Annex III.
5   UNCLOS, art 1(1).
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their continental shelves, the precise boundaries of the Area remain ‘fluid.’6 
However, to put the size of the Area into perspective, it constitutes approxi-
mately 260 million square kilometres, which is around 72% of the total surface 
area of the oceans.7
UNCLOS created the International Seabed Authority (ISA or the Authority), 
which is the autonomous international organisation charged with overseeing 
and administering a system for deep seabed mining.8 The ISA is responsible 
for regulating the Area and granting contracts (also referred to as licences) 
to explore for and exploit deep seabed mineral resources.9 The regime incor-
porates various key elements, including benefit-sharing aspects and marine 
environmental protections.10 Moreover, the ISA is empowered to develop a 
comprehensive Mining Code, intended to augment the regime and govern the 
entire lifecycle of deep seabed mining operations.11
In relation to deep seabed mining in the Area, the Convention defines 
‘resources’ as ‘all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area 
at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules.’12 Once extracted 
from the Area, such resources are referred to as ‘minerals.’13 The Area and its 
resources constitute ‘the common heritage of mankind.’14 As the UNCLOS 
6    Michael W Lodge, ISA Secretary-General, ‘Statement to the Open Meeting of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’ (United Nations, New York, 
10 March 2017) 4 <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/SG-Stats/2017/CLCS-10Mar17.
pdf>. For analysis of the boundary between national jurisdiction and the Area, see 
Chapter 4 of this book, H. Brekke ‘Setting maritime limits and boundaries: Experiences 
from Norway.’ See also, e.g., Erik Franckx, ‘The 200 Mile Limit: Between Creeping 
Jurisdiction and Creeping Common Heritage?’ (2007) 39 George Washington Intl Rev 
467; Erik Franckx, ‘The International Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of 
Mankind: The Need for States to Establish the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf ’ 
(2010) 25 Intl J Marine and Coastal L 543.
7    Michael W Lodge, ‘Satya Nandan’s Legacy for the Common Heritage of Mankind’ 
in Michael W Lodge and Myron H Nordquist (eds), Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans 
(Brill 2014) 290, fn22. See also BW Eakins and GF Sharman, ‘Volumes of the World’s 
Oceans from ETOPO1’ (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
National Geophysical Data Center 2010) <www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/global/etopo1_
ocean_volumes.html> (the surface area of the oceans is 361.9 million square kilometres).
8    UNCLOS, art 156.
9    UNCLOS, arts 153, 157(1) and see also Annex III.
10   See, e.g., UNCLOS, arts 140, 145, 148.
11   For further consideration of the ISA’s Mining Code, see Chapter 25 of this book, 
K. Svendsen, ‘Liability and Compensation for Activities in the Area’.
12   UNCLOS, art 133(a).
13   UNCLOS, art 133(b).
14   UNCLOS, art 136.
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deep seabed mining regime is not applicable to living resources, controversy 
remains as to whether marine genetic resources constitute part of the com-
mon heritage.15
The focus of this Chapter is to provide an introduction to the Convention’s 
deep seabed mining regime and the extent of commercial activities currently 
occurring within it. In order to conduct this analysis, Section 2 of this Chapter 
provides a brief snapshot of the regime’s historical development. Section 3 then 
evaluates the current scope of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime and 
the manner in which commercial actors may participate within it. Thereafter, 
Section 4 provides a flavour of the status of commercial mining activities in the 
Area so far. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks on the deep seabed 
mining regime.
2 The Development of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The mineral resources of the deep seabed have considerable economic poten-
tial. As early as the 1800s, the HMS Challenger expedition had already discovered 
the existence of polymetallic nodules on the deep ocean floor.16 However, the 
economic prospects of deep seabed resources only began to catch the inter-
national community’s imagination half a century ago. During the 1960s, the 
prospective riches of the deep seabed began to seem within humanity’s grasp.17 
As technology advanced, for the first time the untold wealth of the seabed 
appeared tantalisingly close.18
15   For analysis of this issue, see: Chapter 10 of this book, T. Scovazzi, ‘The Rights to Genetic 
Resources beyond National Jurisdiction: Challenges for the ongoing Negotiations at 
the United Nations’; Chapter 11 of this book, M.W. Tvedt, ‘Marine genetic resources: A 
Practical Legal Approach to Stimulate Research, Conservation and Benefit Sharing’. See 
also, e.g., Konrad Jan Marciniak, ‘Marine Genetic Resources: Do They Form Part of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?’ in Lawrence Martin and others (eds), Natural 
Resources and the Law of the Sea: Exploration, Allocation, Exploitation of Natural Resources 
in Areas under National Jurisdiction and Beyond (Juris Publishing 2017).
16   See Chapter 3 of this book, Håkon With Andersen, ‘A Short Human History of the Ocean 
Floor’. See also John Murray and Alphonse François Renard, ‘Report on Deep-Sea Deposits 
Based on the Specimens Collected During the Voyage of HMS Challenger in the Years 1872 
to 1876’ (Neill & Co for HM Stationary Office 1891).
17   See, e.g., John L Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Elsevier 1965).
18   See, e.g., UNGA First Committee (22nd Session) ‘Speech by Arvid Pardo’ (1 November 1967, 
3 pm) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1516, para 9.
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of decolonisation, 
entitlement to deep seabed resources became an ideological battleground, 
split into broadly two camps.19 In one camp were the industrialised States, 
favouring freedom for all States to exploit deep seabed resources on a first-
come, first-served basis. In the other camp were the developing States, fighting 
for a contrary system whereby deep seabed resources could be exploited only 
for the benefit of humanity.20 The latter camp were motivated by the realisa-
tion that without careful regulation, to allow freedom for all to exploit deep 
seabed resources would not be as egalitarian as it appeared.21 A free-for-all 
system would in fact preserve deep seabed mining as the domain of the small 
number of wealthy States possessing the relevant technical expertise, who 
would be in prime position to carve up the spoils between them.22
In a remarkable feat, after decades of wrangling, the developing States 
achieved their vision in many key respects. The UNCLOS deep seabed regime, 
which was finally agreed in 1982, is a unique scheme for common resource 
management. It is underpinned by the principle that the deep seabed consti-
tutes ‘the common heritage of mankind’ and cannot be alienated unilaterally.23 
This application of the common heritage concept to the deep seabed was a 
notion first formally introduced before the UN General Assembly by Malta’s 
Ambassador, Arvid Pardo on 1 November 1967.24 In terms of the content of the 
common heritage concept, as commentary explains:
19   For further elaboration on the regime’s historical development, see, e.g., Martti 
Koskenniemi and Marja Lehto, ‘The Privilege of Universality: International Law, Economic 
Ideology and Seabed Resources’ (1996) 65 Nordic J Intl Law 533, 536–552; RR Churchill and 
AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester UP 1999) 224–229; ED Brown, Sea-Bed 
Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, vol 2 (Martin Nijhoff Publishers 
2001), Ch 2; Erkki Holmila, ‘Common Heritage of Mankind in the Law of the Sea’ (2005) 
1 Acta Societatis Martensis 187; John E Noyes, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Past, 
Present, and Future’ (2012) 40 Denver J Intl L & Policy 447, 459–460; Helmut Tuerk, ‘The 
International Seabed Area’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Norman A Martinez Gutierrez 
(eds), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, vol I (OUP 2014) 280–282.
20   See, e.g., UNGA Res 2574D (XXIV) (15 December 1969), which called for a moratorium on 
deep seabed mining in the Area, pending establishment of an international legal regime.
21   Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process – International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 
Press 1994) 130–131.
22   Higgins (n21) 130–131; and Koskenniemi/Lehto 540; Churchill/Lowe 225; Noyes (2012) 459–
460 (all n19).
23   UNCLOS, arts 136 and 137, respectively.
24   UNGA First Committee (22nd Session) ‘Speech by Arvid Pardo’ (1 November 1967, 10.30 
am) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1515. See also UNGA Res 2749 (XXV) (17 December 1970) (the 
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
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The common heritage concept implied that [the deep seabed] was 
open to use by the international community, but was not owned by it. It 
required a system of management in which all users had a right to par-
ticipate as well as an active sharing of benefits and reservation for future 
generations, and thus also had environmental implications.25
As this Chapter addresses further below, all of these elements are captured 
within the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime.
Part XI of UNCLOS contains the legal regime applicable to deep seabed 
mining, and this is elaborated in Annex III, which details the licensing appli-
cation process and conditions. However, industrialised States viewed Part XI 
as having swung too far in favour of developing States.26 The regime’s particu-
larly contentious features included requirements for mandatory transfer of 
technology,27 and the expansive role envisaged for the ISA’s intended mining 
arm, the Enterprise, together with the subsidisation of the Enterprise by States 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction) (which captured Pardo’s com-
mon heritage vision for deep seabed mining). For discussion of precursors to Pardo’s 
speech by nineteenth century jurists, see Myron H Nordquist and others (eds), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol VI (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2002) 6–7; Michael W Lodge, ‘International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area’ (2002) 20 J Energy and 
Natural Resources L 270, 271, fn5; Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind in International Law (Martin Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 80–81.
25   Tuerk (n19) 280. See also LFE Goldie, ‘A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of “The Common 
Heritage of Mankind”’ (1983) 10 Syracuse J Intl L and Commerce 69; Michael W Lodge, ‘The 
Common Heritage of Mankind’ (2012) 27 Intl J Marine and Coastal L 733. On the concept 
of the common heritage more broadly, including in relation to the seabed, the moon 
and Antarctica see, e.g., see Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘The Principle of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind’ (1983) 43 Heidelberg J Intl L 312; Christopher C Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the 
Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 190; Barbara Ellen Heim, 
‘Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International 
Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica’ (1990–91) 23 Vanderbilt J 
Transnational L 819; Baslar (n24); Graham Nicholson, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind 
and Mining: An Analysis of the Law as to the High Seas, Outer Space, the Antarctic and 
World Heritage’ (2002) 6 New Zealand J Intl L 177; Jennifer Frakes, ‘The Common Heritage 
of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed 
and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?’ (2003) 21 Wisconsin Intl L J 409; Edward 
Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing the 
Deep Seabed?’ (2003) 4 Melbourne J Intl L 376; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Common Heritage of 
Mankind’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP 2009); Noyes (2012) (n19) 447.
26   Churchill/Lowe 231; Tuerk 282 (both n19).
27   As originally detailed in UNCLOS, Annex III, art 5.
144 Dingwall
Parties.28 Therefore, for over a decade, there was a stalemate. Many industri-
alised States, including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Russia, refused to ratify UNCLOS, thereby 
impeding the Convention’s entry into force.29
Eventually, in 1994, the international community reached a compromise. 
This took the form of the Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of 
UNCLOS (1994 Agreement).30 Whilst retaining the tenor of the deep seabed 
regime as envisaged originally by UNCLOS, the 1994 Agreement made signifi-
cant modifications to its operation, eliminating some of its more controversial 
aspects.31 For example, the 1994 Agreement removed from the regime both 
the subsidisation of the Enterprise and the mandatory transfer of technology 
requirements.32 In light of the 1994 Agreement’s modification of the deep sea-
bed mining regime, the Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994.
Presently, the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime (as modified by the 
1994 Agreement) enjoys broad support throughout the international com-
munity. The overwhelming majority of States are parties to UNCLOS (with 
perhaps the most notable exception being the US). Currently, UNCLOS has 168 
28   As mandated previously by art 170(4) of UNCLOS, read in conjunction with arts 171 and 
173(2)(b).
29   In numerical terms there were sufficient developing States to bring the Convention into 
force (only sixty State ratifications were necessary to achieve this, as per UNCLOS, art 
308). However, in practice, the Convention system could not operate successfully without 
political and financial support from industrialised States. See Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 
534–535, 542–544; Churchill/Lowe (n19) 230–231; Lodge (2002) (n24) 272.
30   Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (adopted 28 July 1994, entered into force pro-
visionally 16 November 1994 and definitively 28 July 1996) 1836 UNTS 3.
31   On the fundamental changes which the 1994 Agreement introduced, see, e.g., DH Anderson, 
‘Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 886; Bernard H Oxman, ‘The 1994 Agreement and the 
Convention’ (1994) 88 AJIL 687; Louis B Sohn, ‘International Law Implications of the 1994 
Agreement’ (1994) 88 AJIL 696; ED Brown, ‘The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of 
Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?’ (1995) 
19 Marine Policy 5; LDM Nelson, ‘The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime’ (1995) 10 Intl J 
Marine and Coastal L 189; Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 535, 549–551; RP Anand, ‘Common 
Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Idea’ (1997) 37 Indian J Intl L 1; Churchill/Lowe 
(n19) 238, 248–251; Nordquist (n24) 4, 67; Lodge (2002) (n24) 272.
32   See 1994 Agreement, Annex ss2(3) and 5, respectively. In addition, the role of the 
Enterprise was curtailed significantly; 1994 Agreement, Annex s2. For discussion on all 
these points, see Nordquist (n24) 4.
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States Parties, including the European Union (EU).33 In addition, the ISA also 
has some 30 States participating in its activities as observers (including the 
US), together with various observer international organisations and NGOs.34 
Moreover, many aspects of UNCLOS are recognised as having the status of cus-
tomary law, binding on all States irrespective of whether or not they are parties 
to the Convention.35 Against this backdrop, Section 3 of this Chapter will now 
address key aspects of the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime.
3 The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is contained within Part XI of the 
Convention and elaborated upon in Annex III, as modified by the 1994 
Agreement. The provisions of Part XI of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement are 
to be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument; but, in the event 
of inconsistency between them, the provisions of the latter prevail.36 In addi-
tion, the ISA is augmenting the regime through adoption of rules to regulate 
deep seabed mining.
The following analysis addresses the key features of the regime (3.1), the 
means by which commercial operators can participate within the licensing 
process (3.2) and the position of actors outside of the regime (3.3).
3.1 Key Elements of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The premise of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is that the deep seabed 
and its resources are the ‘common heritage of mankind’37 and mining activities 
33   The 1994 Agreement has 150 States Parties (all of which are also parties to UNCLOS itself). 
See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Chronological 
List of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related 
Agreements’ (3 April 2018) <www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_
of_ratifications.htm>.
34   UNCLOS, art 156(3); see also ISA, ‘Observers’ <www.isa.org.jm/observers> for the current 
list of ISA observers. See James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (CUP 2011) 128 on the 
role of these observers.
35   Churchill/Lowe (n19) 24; Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, ‘UNCLOS III and the Process 
of International Law-Making’ in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Law of 
the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 
376, 380; Harrison (n34) 52–56; John E Noyes, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the 
United States of America’ (2014) 47 Revue Belge de Droit Intl 15, 32.
36   1994 Agreement, art 2(1).
37   UNCLOS, art 136.
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must be carried out ‘for the benefit of mankind as a whole.’38 Accordingly, 
the deep seabed mining system must take the interests of developing States 
into account and promote their effective participation.39 Moreover, the ISA is 
charged with developing mechanisms to guarantee equitable sharing of finan-
cial and other economic benefits derived from the Area.40 Another key element 
of the regime is the protection of the marine environment.41 Fundamentally, 
pursuant to the regime, States and other actors are prohibited from conduct-
ing unilateral deep seabed mining activities. No State or entity can unilaterally 
claim sovereignty over the deep seabed or its resources.42 Rather, all explora-
tion and exploitation activities in the Area are subject to the permission and 
oversight of the ISA.43
As an international organisation, the ISA has international legal per-
sonality, entitling it to the full range of international rights and duties of an 
international person.44 The two principal organs which establish the ISA’s 
policies and govern its work are the Assembly, in which all States Parties are 
represented; and the 36-member Council elected by the Assembly, which func-
tions as the ISA’s executive organ.45 The Secretariat is the ISA’s third principal 
organ and it conducts the ISA’s administration.46 The ISA is also assisted by 
its Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), which is an organ of the Council,47 
38   UNCLOS, art 140(1).
39   UNCLOS, arts 148, 152(2).
40   UNCLOS, arts 140(2), 160(2)(f)(i), 160(2)(g) and 162(o)(i).
41   See, e.g., UNCLOS, art 145. For analysis of issues concerning environmental protec-
tion in deep seabed mining, see, e.g., Kristina M Gjerde, ‘Challenges to Protecting the 
Marine Environment beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2012) 27 Intl J Marine and Coastal 
L 839; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘The Contribution of the Regulations of the International 
Seabed Authority to the Progressive Development of International Environmental Law’ 
in Michael W Lodge and Myron H Nordquist (eds), Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans 
(Brill 2014); Tullio Scovazzi, ‘The Exploitation of Resources of the Deep Seabed and 
the Protection of the Environment’ (2014) 57 German YB Intl L 181; Aline L Jaeckel, The 
International Seabed Authority and the Precautionary Principle – Balancing Deep Seabed 
Mineral Mining and Marine Environmental Protection (Brill 2017) 121–131.
42   UNCLOS, art 137.
43   UNCLOS, art 137(2); see also arts 153 and 157(1) and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(1).
44   UNCLOS, art 176. See also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
Case (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179; Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligations 
Under International Law (OUP 2013) 121.
45   UNCLOS, arts 158(1), 159–162.
46   UNCLOS, arts 158(1), 166.
47   UNCLOS, arts 163(1)(b), 165. The Convention provided also for the Council to be supported 
by an Economic Planning Commission, but that body is not operational; see UNCLOS, arts 
163(1)(a), 164; cf. 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(4).
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and the Finance Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, composed of 
representatives of the Council.48 The Authority’s mining arm, the Enterprise, 
is not yet operational.49
The ISA is a unique and unusual body with far-reaching institutional pow-
ers of a kind which are arguably unparalleled within the international legal 
system.50 It plays the crucial role of custodian of the deep seabed, a role which 
is enshrined in both UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement.51 The ISA’s mandate is 
expressed most clearly in Article 157(1) of UNCLOS, which provides that ‘[t]he 
Authority is the Organization through which States Parties shall, in accordance 
with [Part XI], organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a 
view to administering the resources of the Area.’ The ISA is entrusted with the 
role of organising, implementing and controlling activities in the Area ‘on 
behalf of mankind as a whole.’52 To that end, the ISA has the power to adopt 
rules and regulations to govern deep seabed mining activities, with the aim of 
developing a comprehensive Mining Code to regulate exploration and exploi-
tation for all forms of resources in the Area.53
The Mining Code adds another layer to the Convention’s byzantine deep 
seabed mining regime and constitutes secondary law by the ISA.54 The ISA is 
still in the process of creating a bespoke Mining Code to govern the entire life-
span of deep seabed mining operations. Thus far, the ISA has implemented 
three sets of regulations, which concern prospecting and exploration activi-
ties for three types of minerals (namely, polymetallic nodules, polymetallic 
48   1994 Agreement, Annex, s9; see also s3(4), (7).
49   UNCLOS, art 170; 1994 Agreement, Annex, s2.
50   See, e.g., Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of 
Administrative Functions: The Example of the International Seabed Authority, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Fisheries Organizations’ 
in Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions – Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer 2010) 917 (citing the ISA 
is a ‘rare’ example of an international entity ‘exercising functions equivalent to those of 
States’ on the basis that it exercises executive and legislative functions and has jurisdic-
tion to enforce its rules directly via a binding dispute resolution system. As such, the ISA is 
‘without question, a prime example of what may be referred to as an international admin-
istration’ (at 934)). See also Jaeckel (n41) 146–148.
51   UNCLOS, art 137(2); see also arts 153 and 157(1) and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(1).
52   UNCLOS, art 153(1); see also art 137(2).
53   UNCLOS, arts 140(2), 145, 160(2)(f), 162(o), 165(2)(f), and Annex III, art 17; 1994 Agreement, 
Annex, s1(1), (5)(f)–(g), (15). For analysis of the ISA’s broad powers to progressively develop 
the deep seabed mining regime, see Harrison (n34) 122–123, 152.
54   Karavias (n44) 121–122.
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sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts),55 together with environ-
mental recommendations.56 Moreover, the ISA is working at present to develop 
regulations for the exploitation of all resource types within the Area, through 
an extensive stakeholder process.57
3.2 Participating within the UNCLOS Licensing Regime for Deep Seabed 
Mining
Under the terms of the ISA’s licensing regime, only certain actors are enti-
tled to apply to conduct deep seabed mining operations in the Area.58 The 
Convention provides that such activities in the Area may be carried out by 
States Parties to the Convention or by ‘state entities or natural or juridical per-
sons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled 
by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such States.’59 The ISA’s explo-
ration regulations echo this requirement of nationality or control.60 Therefore, 
non-State actors, such as private corporations, seeking to participate within 
the UNCLOS regime must obtain sponsorship from all States of which they are 
nationals, and ‘[i]f another State or its nationals exercises effective control, the 
sponsorship of that State is also necessary.’61 Only upon receiving appropriate 
55   ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area 
(adopted 13 July 2000) ISBA/6/A/18, (updated 25 July 2013) ISBA/19/C/17 (Nodules 
Regulations); ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides 
in the Area (adopted 7 May 2010) ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (Sulphides Regulations); ISA, 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in 
the Area (adopted 27 July 2012) ISBA/18/A/11 (Cobalt Regulations).
56   See, e.g., ISA LTC, ‘Recommendations for the Guidance of Contractors for the Assessment 
of the Possible Environmental Impacts arising from Exploration for Marine Minerals in 
the Area’ (1 March 2013) ISBA/19/LTC/8.
57   For an overview of this process, see ISA, ‘Ongoing Development of Regulations on 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area’ <www.isa.org.jm/legal-instruments/
ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area>. The ISA’s cur-
rent draft exploitation regulations are ISA LTC, ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of 
Mineral Resources in the Area’ (9 July 2018) ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1.
58   For more detailed analysis by this author of the operation of the UNCLOS deep seabed 
mining regime, see Dingwall (n1).
59   UNCLOS, art 153(2)(b).
60   Nodules Regulations, reg 9(b); Sulphides Regulations, reg 9(b); Cobalt Regulations, 
reg 9(b).
61   Responsibility and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011) ITLOS Reports 2011, 10 (ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion) para 77. This is confirmed also in Regulation 11(1)–(2) of the Nodules, 
Sulphides and Cobalt Regulations. Regulation 11(1) specifies that ‘[i]f the applicant has 
more than one nationality (…) each State involved shall issue a certificate of sponsorship.’ 
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sponsorship from a States Party will a non-State actor be entitled to submit an 
application to the ISA to conduct exploration or exploitation activities.62
Indeed, as the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Chamber) of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has emphasised, the ‘notion of “spon-
sorship” is a key element in the system for the exploration and exploitation of 
the resources in the Area.’63 One purpose behind the sponsorship requirement 
is ‘to achieve the result that the obligations set out in the Convention, a treaty 
under international law which binds only States Parties thereto, are complied 
with by entities that are subjects of domestic legal systems.’64 Moreover, by 
entering into a contract with the ISA, a non-State contractor becomes directly 
bound to adhere to various international legal obligations concerning deep 
seabed mining.65
To similar effect, Regulation 11(2) requires that ‘[w]here the applicant has the national-
ity of one State but is effectively controlled by another State or its nationals, each State 
involved shall issue a certificate of sponsorship.’
62   The sponsorship scheme does not, however, apply to applications by States Parties, who, 
by virtue of their sovereign status, are not required to demonstrate sponsorship. See 
UNCLOS, Annex III, art 4(5): this interpretation is confirmed by ITLOS Advisory Opinion 
(n61) para 79.
63   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 74.
64   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 75; as the Chamber acknowledged, this end is also 
achieved by virtue of the ISA’s regulations, which apply to all contractors. Notably, States 
Parties are responsible for ensuring that any activities that they (or State-sponsored 
entities) conduct in the Area are carried out in conformity with the Convention regime; 
UNCLOS, art 139. Any States Party failing to discharge this responsibility will be held 
responsible at international law. However, as per UNCLOS, art 139(2), a States Party does 
not incur liability for wrongful activities of its sponsored entity if that States Party has 
taken ‘all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective compliance’ by the 
sponsored entity; see also arts 153(4) and 138. See further ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) 
para 122 (considering the extent of sponsoring State liability for State-sponsored entities 
and endorsing a high standard of due diligence, encompassing a legal obligation upon 
States to apply the precautionary approach and best environmental practices); see also 
David Freestone, ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities With Respect To Activities in the Area’ (2011) 105 AJIL 755.
65   Karavias (n44) 124 (‘[t]he Standard Clauses [to the ISA contract], in turn, transpose the 
content of the [UNCLOS] provisions regarding activities in the Area and of the [ISA] 
Regulations into the contractual arrangement, thus providing a nexus between [UNCLOS] 
and the secondary law enacted by the ISA and the contract for exploration.’).
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States or State-sponsored entities seeking to explore for and exploit deep 
seabed resources must submit a plan of work for the ISA’s approval. Once 
approved by the ISA and signed, the plan of work takes the form of a contract 
between the ISA and the contractor.66
The UNCLOS regime was intended to function as a parallel system: States 
and State-sponsored entities would be permitted to conduct deep seabed min-
ing activities in tandem with the ISA’s mining arm, the Enterprise.67 To that 
end, it institutes a site-banking system, whereby a contractor’s plan of work 
must specify a total area for exploration or exploitation which is ‘sufficiently 
large and of sufficient estimated commercial value to allow two mining opera-
tions’ and ‘indicate the coordinates dividing the area into two parts of equal 
estimated commercial value.’68 On that basis, the ISA designates one part of 
the submitted area as a ‘reserved area.’69 Before the 1994 Agreement’s modifi-
cations, the UNCLOS regime envisaged that mining activities in reserved areas 
would be conducted ‘solely’ by ‘the Authority through the Enterprise or in asso-
ciation with developing States.’70 However, the 1994 Agreement suspended the 
role of the Enterprise for the time being.71
Under the present regime, the State or entity which contributes a particular 
area to the ISA as a reserved area now has the right of first refusal to enter into 
a joint venture agreement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploita-
tion of that reserved area.72 In the event that that right of first refusal is not 
exercised, it is open for developing States and entities sponsored by them, 
including private actors, to apply to explore and exploit the reserved area.73 
In relation to sulphides and cobalt crusts exploration, the ISA modified the 
66   UNCLOS, art 153(3) and Annex III, art 3(5); see also 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(6)(a)(i).
67   UNCLOS, art 153(2).
68   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8.
69   See UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8 and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(10).
70   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8; see further art 9. See also UNCLOS, Annex IV.
71   1994 Agreement, Annex, s2. In the interim period, the ISA Secretariat performs the 
Enterprise’s functions. The Secretariat is presently conducting a study into the Enterprise’s 
operationalisation; the terms of reference for this study are contained in ISA Secretariat, 
‘Note on Issues Relating to the Operation of the Enterprise, in Particular, the Legal, 
Technical and Financial Implications for the Authority and for State Parties’ (12 June 2014) 
ISBA/20/LTC/12, Annex. The Secretary-General anticipates that the Council will con-
sider a full proposal for operationalisation of the Enterprise during 2019; IISD Reporting 
Services, ‘Summary of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Session of the International Seabed 
Authority (Second Part): 16–26 July 2018’ (29 July 2018) 25:168 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
10 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb25168e.pdf>.
72   1994 Agreement, Annex, s2(5).
73   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 9(4).
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site-banking system further, permitting an applicant seeking permission to 
explore for sulphides or cobalt crusts to offer an equity interest in a joint ven-
ture arrangement to the Enterprise instead of submitting a reserved area.74 At 
present, the LTC is considering whether to amend the Nodules Regulations to 
align them with the approach to sulphides and cobalt crusts in this regard.75
Once exploitation commences, the ISA will oversee redistribution of finan-
cial and other economic benefits derived from the resources of the Area. These 
benefits are to be shared equitably, on a non-discriminatory basis, through a 
mechanism which the ISA has still to devise.76 Currently, deep seabed min-
ers contemplating exploitation activities face continued levels of uncertainty, 
given that levels of fees and royalties and precise terms of exploitation con-
tracts are still to be determined. However, despite this, the ISA’s stakeholder 
consultation process provides a unique opportunity to harness input from 
a wide range of actors, including commercial operators and environmental 
experts.77 This process could facilitate achievement of an exploitation regime 
which allows commercially viable mining activities while ensuring appropri-
ate safeguards for the environment and the common heritage principles at the 
heart of the regime.
Indeed, as Section 4 of this Chapter will demonstrate, notwithstanding the 
developing nature of the existing regime, participation in the Area is increas-
ing. Various States, State actors and private entities are positioning themselves 
to take advantage of the perceived opportunities afforded by deep seabed 
resources. However, what is the position of actors which are positioned outside 
of the UNCLOS regime, such as States which are not parties to the Convention, 
or their nationals? This following Section will address this point.
3.3 The Position of Actors outside of the UNCLOS Deep 
Seabed Mining Regime
The result of the Convention’s system for participation is that non-States 
Parties to UNCLOS (NSPs) are not eligible to participate within the regime. 
Equally, non-State actors which have the sole nationality of a NSP cannot 
74   Sulphides Regulations, regs 16, 19; Cobalt Regulations, regs 16, 19.
75   ISA LTC, ‘Report of the Chair of the Legal and Technical Commission on the Work of the 
Commission at the First Part of its Twenty-Fourth Session’ (26 April 2018) ISBA/24/C/9 
para 18; see also ISA Secretariat, ‘Issues Related to the Possible Alignment of the Authority’s 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration Concerning the Offer of an Equity Interest in 
a Joint Venture Arrangement’ (6 February 2018) ISBA/24/LTC/4.
76   UNCLOS, art 140(2).
77   On this process, see text to n57 above and accompanying citations.
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obtain sponsorship and apply to the ISA to explore for or exploit deep seabed 
resources. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the UNCLOS deep seabed min - 
ing regime now constitutes ‘the only game in town’ and any competing regime 
would ‘surely be condemned as inconsistent with international law.’78
Arguably, elements of the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime, such as 
its prohibition on unilateral mining activities in Article 137, may have attained 
the status of customary law.79 For example, Koskenniemi and Lehto catego-
rise the UNCLOS deep seabed regime as ‘having become part of the normative 
reality’ and maintain that ‘[u]nilateral mining outside the Convention will be 
illegal.’80 Various factors support this conclusion. The UNCLOS deep seabed 
mining regime is adhered to or recognised by the international community as 
a whole.81 This near-universal acceptance of the regime, coupled with the lack 
of contrary deep seabed mining practice outside of the regime (including by 
key NSPs),82 renders it difficult to refute the claim that a State or other actor 
undertaking unilateral deep seabed mining activities would violate custom-
ary law.83 Egede reaches this conclusion upon an assessment of State practice, 
concluding that the UNCLOS regime is ‘binding on all states (both states par-
ties and non-states parties) and consequently no state, not even non-parties, 
may unilaterally embark on mining activities in the Area.’84
78   Noyes (2012) (n19) 465.
79   Custom is ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’; Statute for the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) (opened for signature 26 June 1945 as annex to UN Charter, entered 
into force 24 October 1945) UKTS 67 (1946), art 38(1)(b). See also ILC, ‘Identification of 
Customary International Law – Text of the Draft Conclusions as Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on Second Reading’ (17 May 2018) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.908*, Draft Conclusion 2.
80   Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 551–552. Similarly see Jonathan I Charney, ‘The United States 
and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS III – The Impact of General International Law’ 
(1983) 46(2) L and Contemporary Problems 37, 49; Holmila (n19) 202–205; Edwin Egede, 
Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind (Springer 2011) 66–69; Noyes (2012) (n19) 465; Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
81   As noted at text to n34 above, almost all NSPs to UNCLOS participate within the ISA as 
observer States. See also Lodge (2012) (n25) 737–738.
82   Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras 72–74 (where the ICJ recog-
nised that treaty provisions may generate new customary law provided that they have 
a ‘fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as the basis for a 
general rule of law’ (para 72). Moreover, in order for treaty provisions to create new cus-
tomary rules, ‘even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very wide-
spread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided 
it included that of States whose interests were specially affected’ (para 73)).
83   See, e.g., Nelson (n31) 202; Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 551–552; Holmila (n19) 205; Egede 
(n80) 66–69; Noyes (2012) (n19) 465; Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
84   Egede (n80) 69.
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Certainly, the only definitive way in which NSPs can render their nationals 
eligible to undertake mining activities in the Area is through the ratification 
of UNCLOS. For example, as the US is not a party to UNCLOS, neither the US 
nor any US nationals are entitled to participate in the ISA’s licensing system. 
Only by ratification of UNCLOS would the US be eligible to apply to the ISA 
for mining rights or to sponsor US entities who wish to obtain ISA approval 
to mine. Thus, only by acceding to UNCLOS could the US secure for itself and 
its nationals legally recognised, internationally enforceable deep seabed min-
ing rights backed by investment protections and binding international dispute 
resolution options.85
Any entity conducting mining operations in the Area without ISA 
authorisation – and absent the rights of exclusivity and security of tenure that 
an ISA contract affords86 – would expose itself to tremendous risk. Given the 
significant investment required to mount deep seabed mining operations, it 
does not seem credible that an actor would engage in mining activities without 
a clear legal basis and enforceable legal title.87
This is borne out in practice: NSPs or their nationals are not in fact conduct-
ing mining activities in the Area outside of the UNCLOS regime.88 For example, 
the US maintains a domestic regime for exploration and exploitation of min-
eral resources in the Area: the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (US 
Act), which it enacted in 1980.89 At present, only two deep seabed exploration 
licences remain active under the US Act, and both of these are held by US 
85   For detailed analysis by this author of the investment protections and dispute resolu-
tion options for deep seabed miners within the UNCLOS regime, see Joanna Dingwall, 
‘International Investment Protection in Deep Seabed Mining Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ (2018) 19 J World Investment & Trade 890.
86   UNCLOS, art 153(6) and Annex III, arts 3(4)(c), 16; these rights are reflected in Standard 
Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of ISA exploration contracts contained within the fourth annex to the 
Nodules Regulations, Sulphides Regulations and Cobalt Regulations. See also Charney 
(n80) 50–51; Karavias (n44) 124–125.
87   John Noyes, ‘Ocean Resources and US Acceptance of the LOS Convention’ (Opinio Juris, 
14 June 2012) <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/14/ocean-resources-and-u-s-acceptance-of 
-the-los-convention/>. This sentiment holds equally true for the exploitation phase, once 
it begins: Brown (2001) (n19) 3 (‘the very considerable investment needed to finance such 
exploitation would become available only if a legal regime could be created under which 
potential exploiters could acquire secure legal titles’).
88   Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
89   Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 30 USC §§ 1401–1473 (2002) (USA); see also 
NOAA, Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses 15 Code of Federal 
Regulations § 970.100 2016.
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defence giant, Lockheed Martin.90 However, as the US has recognised, in order 
for Lockheed Martin’s US licence claims to be afforded ‘international recogni-
tion’ and security of tenure, the US would need to accede to UNCLOS.91 Indeed, 
the US Department of State opined that if Lockheed Martin proceeded with 
exploration activities absent such international recognition, this would violate 
its licence terms.92
In September 2017, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) addressed the interaction of these US licences with the UNCLOS 
deep seabed mining regime. Firstly, NOAA acknowledged that the US Act’s 
‘express purpose’ is to establish an interim deep seabed mining regime, pend-
ing US ratification of UNCLOS.93 As such, as NOAA explained, a licence under 
the US Act ‘gives the holder the exclusive right to explore a specific area, but 
only as against other US entities.’94 On this basis, ‘[a]ny rights a US company 
may have domestically are not secured internationally because US companies 
are not able to go through the internationally recognized process at the [ISA] 
established for Parties to [UNCLOS].’95
In fact, instead of proceeding outside of the UNCLOS system, NSP nationals 
are structuring their investments in a way that permits participation within 
UNCLOS. For example, operating within the framework of UNCLOS, the UK 
has sponsored two applications to the ISA by a British corporation seeking to 
explore for polymetallic nodules. Both applications were made by UK Seabed 
Resources Ltd (UKSRL), which was incorporated in May 2012 and is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin.96
90   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Deep Seabed Mining – Report to Congress’ 
(December 1995) i <www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_dsm_1995_report.pdf>.
91   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Extension of Deep Seabed Exploration Licenses: 
Response to Comments’ (30 December 2015) Vol 80, Issue 250 FR 81529, 81530.
92   80 FR 81529 (n91) 81530. To similar effect see also US Department of Commerce, NOAA, 
‘Deep Seabed Mining: Request for Extension of Exploration Licenses’ (29 February 2012) 
Vol 77, Issue 40 FR 12245, 12246; US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Coastal Programs 
Division’ (10 July 2012) Vol 77, Issue 132 FR 40586.
93   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Deep Seabed Mining: Approval of Exploration 
License Extensions’ (7 September 2017) Vol 82, Issue 172 FR 42327, 42328.
94   82 FR 42327 (n93) 42328.
95   82 FR 42327 (n93) 42328.
96   UKSRL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin UK Holdings Ltd, which is the 
UK-based component of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The Lockheed Martin conglom-
erate is headquartered in Maryland, US.
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Provided the test of effective control is met,97 the deep seabed regime con-
tains no proscriptions to prevent a subsidiary constituted in the territory of 
a States Party and sponsored by that States Party from applying to engage in 
activities in the Area in this manner. Indeed, ITLOS has confirmed implicitly the 
freedom of commercial actors to set up companies in foreign States and acquire 
the nationality and sponsorship of those States.98 Although the Chamber cau-
tioned against ‘[t]he spread of sponsoring States “of convenience”’, this was 
in the context of determining whether developing and developed States were 
subject to the same responsibilities and liabilities when acting as sponsoring 
States.99 Therefore, by pursuing deep seabed mining activities through a UK 
subsidiary, US national Lockheed Martin managed to circumvent successfully 
the legal restrictions upon its participation.
In light of the above, deep seabed mining activity outside of the UNCLOS 
regime appears unlikely to occur at present due to the commercial, financial 
and legal risks and uncertainty that it would involve for any entity.
4 The Extent of Commercial Activities within the Area
4.1 Commercial Prospects for Deep Seabed Mining in the Area and 
Environmental Concerns
A host of actors are now participating in deep seabed mining activities in the 
Area. Currently, these activities are still at the exploration phase. Long-term 
commercial prospects for the deep seabed mining industry remain uncertain 
given the high costs and technological challenges involved in deep seabed 
mineral extraction, compounded by other factors such as fluctuating metal 
prices and environmental concerns.100
Notably, deep seabed mining faces major opposition on environmental 
grounds.101 On that basis, in January 2018, the European Parliament called 
97   See discussion at text to nn59–61 above.
98   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159.
99   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159 (the Chamber found that in order to prevent a 
race to the bottom, the regulatory burden must be equally applied to developing and 
developed States, otherwise corporations could choose to route their activities through 
the former to take advantage of lesser regulation).
100   Rahul Sharma, ‘Deep-Sea Mining: Economic, Technical, Technological, and Environmental 
Considerations for Sustainable Development’ (2011) Marine Technology Society J 45(5) 28, 
28–31.
101   See overview in Luz Danielle O Bolong, ‘Into the Abyss: Rationalizing Commercial Deep 
Seabed Mining through International Law’ (2016) 25 Tulane J Intl & Comparative L 127, 
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for a moratorium on deep seabed mining until its impacts on the marine envi-
ronment are more fully understood.102 Within civil society, a variety of NGOs 
oppose deep seabed mining, with the Deep Sea Mining Campaign supporting 
the ban of deep seabed mining activities in both international and national 
waters, and Greenpeace vehemently protesting future exploitation of deep 
seabed minerals.103 Deep seabed exploitation, in particular, presents certain 
common concerns irrespective of the type of mineral being exploited. These 
include direct destruction of habitats, together with marine degradation 
through plumes of seafloor sediments generated by mining activities and other 
resultant effects, such as underwater noise, vibration and light pollution.104
Environmental controversy notwithstanding, the exploitation phase of 
deep seabed mining may begin in the coming years.105 As the ISA’s Secretary 
General remarked in February 2018, ‘[a]t a time when some appear to want 
to enter into an existential debate about whether deep sea mining should be 
permitted to go ahead or not, we do well to remember that the international 
community passed that point already many years ago.’106 Indeed, Michael 
Lodge, the current Secretary-General of the ISA, previously described the scale 
141–146. For a scientific assessment of environmental concerns posed by deep seabed 
mining, see, e.g., Rahul Sharma, ‘Environmental Issues of Deep-Sea Mining’ (2015) 11 
Procedia Earth & Planetary Science 204. For detailed legal consideration of the balance 
between mineral exploitation and marine environmental protection, see, e.g., Jaeckel 
(n41); see also Gjerde (n41).
102   European Parliament, ‘International Ocean Governance: An Agenda for the Future 
of our Oceans in the Context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals’ 
(16 January 2018) <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P 
8-TA-2018-0004+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.
103   The Deep Sea Mining Campaign is an association of NGOs, including Oxfam Australia 
and Mining Watch Canada, together with other concerned individuals; Deep Sea Mining 
Campaign <www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/>. See also Greenpeace International, 
‘Deep Sea Mining’ (Background, 20 March 2014) <www.greenpeace.org/international/
en/campaigns/oceans/marine-reserves/deep-sea-mining/>. Greenpeace, alongside over 
70 other NGOs, is part of the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (an umbrella movement 
seeking to protect deep sea ecosystems): Deep Sea Conservation Coalition <www.savethe 
highseas.org/>.
104   Sharma (2015) (n101) 205; Jaeckel (n41) 11–14.
105   See, e.g., ISA Press Release, ‘Commercialization of Marine Minerals in Deep Seabed Well 
Within Reach, International Seabed Authority Secretary-General States as He Introduces 
Annual Report’ (19 July 2016) SB/22/11.
106   Michael Lodge, ISA Secretary-General, ‘Statement at the Workshop on the Draft 
Regulations for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area: Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Considerations’ (London, 12–13 February 2018) 1 <www.isa.org.jm/sites/
default/files/documents/EN/SG-Stats/sg-statement_0.pdf>.
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of deep seabed mineral deposits as ‘staggering.’107 Based on industry projec-
tions, by 2030, deep seabed mining could constitute 10% of all global mining 
activity and have a value of around $65 billion in 2010 prices.108 Notably, this 
level of activity would be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the potential 
resources present on the ocean floor. For example, the value of gold deposits 
lurking on the deep seabed has been calculated at $150 trillion in 2013 prices.109
As noted above, thus far, licences for exploration relate to three particular 
types of minerals: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-
rich crusts.110 The first of these resource types, polymetallic nodules, are 
potato-sized rock deposits on the deep ocean floor, containing manganese, 
iron and other metals, such as copper and nickel. The second resource type, 
sulphides, generally contain iron, copper and zinc and may contain quantities 
of gold and silver. Most commonly, such sulphides emanate from hydrother-
mal vents on the mid-ocean ridge, where tectonic plates meet. Thirdly, cobalt 
crusts often form on rocky outcrops and ridges in the sea floor and contain ele-
ments such as manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel and lead. Each of these seabed 
deposits comprise relatively high concentrations of valuable metals as com-
pared to equivalent minerals extracted on land.111 As terrestrial metal stocks 
become depleted due to rising material consumption, experts anticipate that 
107   Michael Lodge, ‘Deep Sea Mining: The New Frontier in the Struggle for 
Resources?’ [2014] World Economic Forum <https://agenda.weforum.org/2014/11/
deep-sea-mining-the-new-frontier-in-the-struggle-for-resources/>.
108   European Commission, ‘Blue Growth – Opportunities From the Marine and Maritime 
Sustainable Growth’ COM (2012) 494 final, 10; Sheila Moorcroft, ‘Ocean Mining – a Race 
to the Bottom’ (Shaping Tomorrow, 17 April 2013) <www.shapingtomorrow.com/home/
alert/94162-Ocean-mining–a-race-to-the-bottom>.
109   Meghan Miner, ‘Will Deep-Sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?’ National 
Geographic News (3 February 2013) <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/ 
13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-precious-metals -oceans-environment/ 
#.UysXr_ldXGA>.
110   For an overview of the geological characteristics of these resource types, see Chapter 1 of 
this book, Alvar Braathen and Harald Brekke, ‘Characterizing the Seabed – A Geoscience 
Perspective’. See generally Tim Schröder (ed), World Ocean Review: Marine Resources – 
Opportunities and Risks, vol 3 (Maribus 2014).
111   James R Hein and others, ‘Deep-Ocean Mineral Deposits as a Source of Critical 
Metals for High- and Green-Technology Applications: Comparison With Land-Based 
resources’ (2013) 51 Ore Geology Reviews 1; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, 
‘Marine Mining: Underwater Gold Rush Sparks Fears of Ocean Catastrophe’ The 
Observer (2 March 2014) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/
underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat>.
158 Dingwall
corresponding costs will continue to rise.112 In this context, experts predict 
that metals extracted from the deep seabed will be increasingly sought after.113
Moreover, seabed minerals may contain traces of rare earth elements 
(REEs).114 REEs are highly desirable commodities: critical for the manufactur-
ing of green energy technology, such as solar panels, wind turbines and hybrid 
cars, and in the weapons industry. They are also essential in the electronics 
industry for production of high-tech gadgets such as smart phones, laptops 
and flat-screen televisions. The volume of REEs available from the deep seabed 
could potentially exceed global land reserves of REEs.115 In this context, global 
excitement is growing over potential deep seabed mining for REEs in both 
national and international deep seabed areas.116 Deep seabed mining for REEs 
could be a viable means by which to secure a reliable supply chain, insulated 
from potential geopolitical ruptures.
As the following Section will address, in pursuit of deep seabed resources, 
commercial actors have already made significant investments, and there are 
indications that commercial mineral extraction could begin in the Area in the 
years to come.117
112   UN Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Wealth in the Oceans: Deep Sea Mining on the 
Horizon?’ (Global Environmental Alert Service, May 2014) 1 <https://na.unep.net/geas/
archive/pdfs/GEAS_May2014_DeepSeaMining.pdf>; Yves Fouquet and Denis Lacroix, 
‘Study Summary’ in Yves Fouquet and Denis Lacroix (eds), Deep Marine Mineral Resources 
(Springer 2014) 5; European Commission, ‘Report on Critical Raw Materials for the EU: 
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials’ (May 2014) 9 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10010/attachments/1/translations/en/ren 
ditions/native>; Houses of Parliament, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 
‘Deep-Sea Mining’ (POSTnote 508, September 2015) 1–2 <http://researchbriefings.files 
.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0508/POST-PN-0508.pdf>.
113   European Commission (2012) (n108) 10; UNEP (n112) 1; Houses of Parliament (n112) 1–2.
114   Hein (n2) 1–2; Yves Fouquet and Bruno Martel-Jantin, ‘Rare and Strategic Metals’ in Yves 
Fouquet and Denis Lacroix (eds), Deep Marine Mineral Resources (Springer 2014) 63ff.
115   Yasuhiro Kato and others, ‘Deep-Sea Mud in the Pacific Ocean as a Potential Resource for 
Rare-Earth Elements’ (2011) 4 Nature Geoscience 535, 538.
116   Ian Coles, ‘Rare Earth Elements: Deep Sea Mining and the Law of the Sea’ (2014) 14 Pratt’s 
Energy L Rep 4, 8–10; Bolong (n101) 134–135.
117   See, e.g., ISA Press Release (n105); see also UNEP (n112); Houses of Parliament (n112). See 
further David Shukman, ‘Deep Sea Mining “Gold Rush” Moves Closer’ BBC News Online 
(18 May 2013) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22546875>; Goldenberg 
(n111); Adam Minter, ‘Seafloor Gold Rush Could Have Alarming Impact’ Japan Times 
(21 August 2016) <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/08/21/commentary/world-
commentary/seafloor-gold-rush-alarming-impact/#.W2sBQLllJaQ>; Julie Packard and 
Chris Scholin, ‘The Deep Sea May Soon Be Up for Grabs’ New York Times (8 June 2018) 
<www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/opinion/the-deep-sea-may-soon-be-up-for-grabs.html>.
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4.2 Current Participants in Deep Seabed Mining Activities in the Area
As of the end of 2018, the ISA has entered into mining contracts with twenty-
nine contractors for exploration in relation to the three minerals types currently 
regulated (nodules, sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts).118 These figures include 
a significant increase in the number of contracts granted in recent years. As 
recently as early 2011, the ISA had approved only eight applications for explora-
tion; by late 2015, that figure had more than tripled.
The total area of deep seabed which the ISA has approved for exploration 
now surpasses 1.3 million square kilometres: an area approximately equivalent 
to the land mass of Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Denmark com-
bined.119 Although this approved area may seem vast, in fact it represents only 
half a percent of the entire deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction which is 
open to licencing by the ISA.
The ISA holds exploration contracts with a wide variety of actors, including 
States, State enterprises, State institutions, State-controlled corporations and 
several private corporations. At present, of the existing twenty-nine contracts, 
one is held by an international consortium of States (exploring for nodules), 
eight are held by States (exploring for nodules, sulphides or cobalt crusts), 
and fifteen are held by State enterprises, State institutions or State-controlled 
corporations (of which nine contracts are for nodules exploration and the 
remainder concern exploration for sulphides or cobalt crusts). In terms of State 
or State-controlled activity, the nations which have been most active so far in 
securing ISA licences are China, Russia, and South Korea. These three States 
are the only ones to hold exploration contracts relating to all of the three types 
of mineral which are currently regulated. At present, China has the greatest 
number of licences of any State or national. China’s fourth contract for deep 
seabed mineral exploration rights (and its second in respect of nodules) was 
signed in 2017 by the ISA and China’s State-owned metals and minerals trading 
company, China Minmetals Corporation.
The remaining five ISA contractors are private corporations exploring for 
polymetallic nodules (with two active in reserved areas). The first private 
118   Seventeen of the ISA’s mining contracts relate to nodules exploration, seven are 
for sulphides exploration, and five are for exploration of cobalt-rich crusts. For an 
overview, see ISA, ‘Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors’ <www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed 
-minerals-contractors>.
119   This figure includes all areas approved for exploration, excluding any reserved areas 
which are not currently subject to exploration. For information on the exploration con-
tracts approved by the ISA to date, including details of size and location of exploration 
sites, see the ISA website: <www.isa.org.jm/>.
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actor to enter a contract with the ISA for nodules exploration was Tonga 
Mining Offshore Limited (TMOL) in 2012.120 The contract concerns portions 
of reserved areas originally contributed by French, German and Japanese State 
entities and South Korea. A Tongan national, TMOL is a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Canadian mining company Nautilus Minerals Inc (Nautilus).
In 2013, Belgian corporation, G-Tec Sea Minerals Resources NV (GSR), and 
UK corporation, UKSRL, both entered contracts with the ISA.121 In March 2016, 
UKSRL entered a second contract with the ISA for nodules exploration.122 As 
noted above, UKSRL is a subsidiary of the US defence giant, Lockheed Martin. 
The remaining private contractor in the Area is Ocean Mineral Singapore Pte 
Ltd (OMS), a Singaporean corporation with an ISA contract to explore for nod-
ules in a reserved area originally contributed by UKSRL.123
In addition to acting directly as contractors, some private corporations also 
have links to activities in the Area by State-controlled actors. For example, the 
Cook Islands Investment Corporation (CIIC), a State enterprise, entered a con-
tract with the ISA in July 2016 for nodules exploration.124 CIIC entered into 
a joint venture agreement with GSR to jointly explore the area within CIIC’s 
ISA contract, under the proviso that future profits would be shared equally 
between CIIC and GSR.125
120   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to a Request for Approval of a Plan of Work 
for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by Tonga Offshore Mining Limited’ 
(19 July 2011) ISBA/17/C/15.
121   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating 
to a Request for Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules 
Submitted by G-TEC Sea Mineral Resources NV’ (26 July 2012) ISBA/18/C/28; ISA Council, 
‘Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to a Request for 
Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by UK 
Seabed Resources Ltd’ (26 July 2012) ISBA/18/C/27.
122   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a Plan 
of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by UK Seabed Resources Ltd’ 
(21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/25.
123   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a Plan 
of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by Ocean Mineral Singapore 
Pte Ltd’ (21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/27. OMS is majority owned by Keppel Corporation, 
a Singaporean corporation and one of the world’s largest offshore and marine groups. 
Minority shares in OMS are held by UKSRL and Lion City Capital Partners Pte Ltd, a 
Singaporean private investment company.
124   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a 
Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by the Cook Islands 
Investment Corporation’ (21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/29.
125   SOPAC, ‘Cook Islands Enters New International Seabed Minerals Arrangement in 
Cooperation with GSR of Belgium’ (The Prospect, 3 January 2014); Michael Henry, 
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In practical terms, joining forces with private actors may provide developing 
States lacking in technical capabilities and resources, one of the only viable 
means by which to become active in deep seabed mining.126 For example, in its 
application, CIIC stated that its combined approach with GSR would ‘[enable 
them] to enhance all relevant synergies in scientific, ecological and economi-
cal research and studies to the absolute maximum.’127
To sum up, exploration activities in the Area are increasing, and this is espe-
cially so for private corporate contractors. Despite remaining uncertainties 
concerning long-term commercial prospects of deep seabed mining, increas-
ing investment in the industry gives a strong indication that it may soon 
proceed towards commercialisation.
5 Conclusion
In the coming years, commercial extraction of deep seabed minerals may 
become feasible. As this Chapter has explored, despite continued uncertain-
ties and challenges within the deep seabed mining industry, commercial 
investment in deep seabed mining is growing, and the volume of exploration 
activities in the Area continues to rise. An increasing number of States, State 
entities and private investors are now participating in deep seabed explora-
tion activities under the ISA’s licensing process within the UNCLOS regime. In 
this context, the ISA Secretary-General anticipates that deep seabed mining 
beyond national jurisdiction is ‘well within reach’ and ‘attainable in the fore-
seeable future.’128
Under international law, there is a detailed legal framework for deep seabed 
mining activities within the Convention and associated instruments, includ-
ing the 1994 Agreement and the ISA’s Mining Code. All deep seabed mining 
activities in the Area are occurring under the auspices of this UNCLOS regime. 
‘International Seabed Authority Contract Signing’ (Cook Islands Investment Corpo-
rations Online News, July 2016) <http://ciiconline.com/latestnews/international-seabed 
-authority-contract-signing/>. In an interesting dynamic, the area which CIIC intends to 
explore is a reserved area which was originally contributed by GSR pursuant to its 2013 
nodules exploration contract with the ISA.
126   Tuerk (n19) 301.
127   ISA LTC, ‘Application for Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules by the Cook Islands Investment Corporation’ (8 November 2013) ISBA/20/LTC/3 
para 13.
128   ISA Press Release (n105).
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In practice, one key test for the future success of the regime will be the precise 
shape of the ISA’s expanding regulatory code governing the exploitation phase, 
including its financial terms and environmental protections. Therefore, the 
ISA’s current efforts to draft workable exploitation regulations, which takes on 
board the views of stakeholders in the industry, is a crucial movement towards 
the long-term realisation of a viable deep seabed mining industry in the Area.
© Erik Røsæg, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004391567_010
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License.
chapter 8




When commercial activities, primarily mining,1 are carried out in the Area,2 
a framework of commercial law is as helpful on sea as on land. For example, 
workers should be protected against unfair contract terms, and entrepreneurs 
should be able to mortgage their equipment to ease financing. However, there 
is no state to provide this legal framework by general legislation. Could it be 
established in other ways?
The International Seabed Authority (ISA)3 has a mandate to grant licenses 
for the exploitation of seabed resources in the Area, including setting condi-
tions to ensure, for example, environmental protection and safety.4 This could 
work well to establish some of the desired legal framework, at least to the 
extent that states are parties to UNCLOS or recognize the Authority.5
The ISA possesses considerable power in granting licenses with conditions 
and revoking them if necessary.6 In addition, the risk of not getting licenses in 
the future can have a disciplinary effect.
However, not all kinds of rules can be implemented in this way.7 For exam-
ple, conditions for licenses cannot be used to alter the position of third parties 
to their detriment. An example of framework legislation that cannot be simu-
lated by setting conditions for licenses is arrangements for mortgaging seabed 
installations.
1   Which activities follows the rules in respect of mining and which other activities there are in 
the Area are elaborated in section 4 below.
2   The Area is defined in UNCLOS art. 1(1)(1).
3   This is the “Authority” referred to in UNCLOS; see art. 1(1)(2).
4   See below in part 2.1.
5   Notably, the USA is not a party to UNCLOS. However, US firms apparently register subsidiar-
ies in States Parties if they wish to participate in industrial exploitation in the Area.
6   See below in part 2.1.
7   Ibid.
164 Røsæg
Because of these limitations, there may be a need for regulation that is more 
comprehensive than what can be achieved by adding conditions to licenses. 
This paper focuses on rules of this kind. How is the possible need for such 
legislation taken care of in the Area? How can the necessary commercial 
framework legislation be implemented?
In the following, the main general jurisdictional bases will be discussed in 
section 2. These are the powers of ISA under UNCLOS, flag state jurisdiction 
and the jurisdiction of the sponsoring states and other states over companies. 
In section 3, some examples of how the jurisdictional problems are resolved or 
not resolved will be discussed. These examples concern patents, security inter-
ests (such as mortgages), labor law, and extra contractual liabilities.
Initially, the discussion will assume that the commercial activity is within 
the authority of the ISA. In section 4 below, the situation outside the authority 
of the ISA will be discussed.
2 General Jurisdictional Bases
2.1 Incidental Jurisdiction of the ISA in Respect of Commercial 
Framework Legislation
While coastal states have “sovereign rights” for the purpose of, for example, 
continental shelf jurisdiction,8 the International Seabed Authority has more 
limited powers. In respect of licensing, a number of policies are set out in 
UNCLOS,9 and there is a list of conditions (albeit non-exhaustive) in its Annex.10
Although the ISA has mainly focused on granting and setting conditions for 
licenses, its mandate is broader, and can possibly be utilized to create the nec-
essary commercial framework legislation. The mandate for the ISA reads:
8    UNCLOS art. 77.
9    UNCLOS art. 150 ff.
10   UNCLOS, Annex III, in particular art. 17. The conditions are set out in the so-called Mining 
Code, consisting of a number of regulations. To date, the Authority has issued Regulations 
on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (ISBA 19/C/17, 
adopted 13 July 2000) which was later updated and adopted 25 July 2013 (ISBA 19/A/9); the 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area (ISBA 
/16/A/12 Rev.1, adopted 7 May 2010) and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration 
for Cobalt-Rich Crusts (ISBA 18/A/11, adopted 27 July 2012). The work is ongoing and, in 
the following, draft revisions and consolidations will also be referred to.
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Article 157 Nature and fundamental principles of the Authority
1. The Authority is the organization through which States Parties shall, 
in accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, 
particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area.
2. The powers and functions of the Authority shall be those expressly 
conferred upon it by this Convention. The Authority shall have such inci-
dental powers, consistent with this Convention, as are implicit in and 
necessary for the exercise of those powers and functions with respect to 
activities in the Area.
The first part of paragraph 2 apparently excludes implied powers,11 while the 
second sentence extends the powers to “incidental powers.” This apparent 
contradiction reflects the power struggle in the negotiations, where the indus-
trialized nations opposed granting wide, implied powers to the ISA.12 The text 
was repeated without clarification in the 1994 implementing agreement.13
It is difficult to reconcile the text with an absolute ban on necessary, inci-
dental powers relating to organizing and controlling activities in the Area. 
Such incidental powers could be used to adopt commercial framework legisla-
tion if absolutely necessary.
11   Without such exclusion, additional powers would be implied. See for example ICJ, 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports (1962), 151, 168.
12   V Scatz, art. 157, mn. 7 in Preulss, UNCLOS, 1st ed 2017, ED Brown, Sea-bed energy and 
minerals: the international legal regime, Vol. 2: Sea-bed mining (2001) p. 193, S Mahmoudi, 
The law of deep sea-bed mining: a study of the progressive development of international 
law concerning the management of the polymetallic nodules of the deep sea-bed (1987) 
p. 281, SN Nandan et al., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 : a com-
mentary : Vol. 6 : Articles 133 to 191, Annexes III and IV, Final act, Annex I, Resolution II, 
Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI, Documentary annexes (2002), art. 
157 para 157.13(b), FH Paolillo, The institutional arrangements for the international sea-
bed and their impact on the evolution of international organizations, Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law, Volume: 188 (1984), p. 273, BH Oxman, The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 
The American Journal of International Law 1 (1980), 15.
13   Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Annex to UN Document A/RES/48/263, 
Annex, s. 1 (1).
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Such broad interpretation would be in line with ITLOS’14 findings that 
similar powers of a coastal state to regulate fisheries within its EEZ include 
regulations for offshore bunkering:15
217. The Tribunal is of the view that the regulation by a coastal State of 
bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in its exclusive economic zone is 
among those measures which the coastal State may take in its exclusive 
economic zone to conserve and manage its living resources under article 
56 of the Convention read together with 64 article 62, paragraph 4, of 
the Convention. This view is also confirmed by State practice which has 
developed after the adoption of the Convention.
It is not obvious that this case is pertinent. Article 157 relating to the powers 
of the ISA does not refer to “sovereign rights” as does Article 56 relating to the 
EEZ. Furthermore, there is as yet no practice – and indeed no state practice – 
one way or the other relating to the Area. Still, it is likely that a similar broad 
reading of the powers of the ISA would be permitted, as there is a practical 
need for it. In particular, this is so when there is no question of creeping juris-
diction on the part of the ISA at the expense of states.
However, if there is a work-around for the problem of lack of commercial 
framework legislation, it would not be necessary for the ISA to act, and there 
would be no incidental powers. In the text below, several such workarounds 
will be discussed.
If the ISA has competence to legislate, final court decisions on the legislation 
are enforceable in all States Parties to UNCLOS.16 The ISA may also withdraw 
licenses17 and take past performance into consideration when granting new 
licenses.18
The ISA has not yet issued legislation of this kind. There is a reason for this 
reluctance. Both the secretariat and the decision-making bodies have limited 
resources, and they are not able to deal with the intricacies of private and pro-
cedural law. In addition, the ISA is handicapped because there is no existing 
14   The Seabed Dispute Chamber International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) set-
tles disputes between a state party and the ISA regarding the competence of ISA, UNCLOS 
art. 187.
15   ITLOS Case No. 19 The M/V “Virginia G” Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau).
16   UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 21(2).
17   UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 18.
18   UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 10. This article was modified by the 1994 implementing agree-
ment (fn. 13), Annex, s. 1(13).
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regime to build on, and each participating state would be likely to insist that 
its traditions be preserved. Whether or not the ISA has the legal competence to 
deal with the matters discussed here is thus probably a moot point, as it may 
not be able to enact change in any event.
2.2 Flag State Jurisdiction over Ships Involved in Seabed Activities
The water column above the Area is part of the high seas.19 In the high seas, the 
flag state jurisdiction prevails.20 Flag states therefore have general jurisdic-
tion over ships involved in seabed activities in the Area. There is no indication 
that the powers of the ISA are exclusive in all matters, so flag state jurisdiction 
could be a good alternative to the ISA’s jurisdiction in private law and other 
matters not relating to licensing.
In respect of protection of human life, UNCLOS presupposes that the juris-
diction of the ISA should be ancillary to other international provisions, which 
typically are based on flag state jurisdiction in respect of ships:
Article 146 Protection of human life
With respect to activities in the Area, necessary measures shall be taken 
to ensure effective protection of human life. To this end the Authority 
shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures to supplement 
existing international law as embodied in relevant treaties.
Similarly, flag state jurisdiction supplements the ISA’s jurisdiction in respect 
of pollution:
Article 209 Pollution from activities in the Area
1. International rules, regulations and procedures shall be established in 
accordance with Part XI to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from activities in the Area. Such rules, regulations 
and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary.
2. Subject to the relevant provisions of this section, States shall adopt laws 
and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels, installa-
tions, structures and other devices flying their flag or of their registry or 
operating under their authority, as the case may be. The requirements of 
19   UNCLOS art. 86.
20   UNCLOS art. 87 and 92.
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such laws and regulations shall be no less effective than the international 
rules, regulations and procedures referred to in paragraph 1.
The coastal states have no special part in the enforcement of such provisions, 
while flag state enforcement presumably is retained:
Article 215 Enforcement with respect to pollution from activities in 
the Area
Enforcement of international rules, regulations and procedures estab-
lished in accordance with Part XI to prevent, reduce and control pol-
lution of the marine environment from activities in the Area shall be 
governed by that Part.
Under flag state jurisdiction, flag states implement a number of convention-
based provisions that are impactful in private law matters. In addition to 
conventions like SOLAS21 and MARPOL,22 most flag states are parties to a 
number of conventions that are concerned with matters other than safety and 
pollution, such as arresting vessels,23 labor law,24 liens and mortgages,25 and 
anti-terrorism measures.26 Also, UNCLOS sets out the responsibility of flag 
states regarding their vessels.27 Through these provisions, flag state jurisdic-
tion fills a considerable gap in the legislation concerning activities in the Area.
Not all flag states are party to all conventions, and ship owners are free to 
choose almost any flag state for their vessels. However, the states with flags 
of convenience tend to ratify private law conventions, and ship owners do 
not avoid these flag states, as order and predictability is more important than 
deregulation in private law. Conventions are often compromises between 
interested parties and are thus acceptable.
The conventions are not complete codes, despite their broad scope. 
Therefore, they have to be supplemented by national legislation. Such legisla-
tion may vary quite a bit. It could wind up not regulating offshore activities by 
21   International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended.
22   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by the Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL).
23   International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships, 1952.
24   Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.
25   International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993.
26   Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA), 1988, as amended.
27   UNCLOS art. 94.
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will, by drafting errors, or simply because no one has considered the need for 
regulating industrial activity on the high seas, as opposed to ships simply sail-
ing there. Therefore, flag state jurisdiction that is based only on international 
conventions may leave gaps in the regulation of the activities of ships operat-
ing in the Area.
Flag state regulation of ships is common and usually recognized in other 
states. Even if the legislation may not be given preference under choice of law 
rules, flag state legislation would prevent a legal vacuum. The ultimate sanc-
tion of the flag state against a ship disrespecting its legislation is to withdraw 
the right to fly its flag, leaving the ship subject to the jurisdiction of any state. 
In most cases, this would be regarded as a sanction too harsh.
Sometimes, a ship may be governed by the legislation of two cooperating 
states. The ownership of the vessel is registered in one state, while the vessel is 
flying the flag of another.28 For our purposes, this is irrelevant; the sum of the 
jurisdiction of the two states is neither greater nor smaller than the jurisdic-
tion of a single flag state.
Different vessels involved in the same operation may fly different flags. 
Thus, different sets of rules may apply to each ship. However, experience from 
offshore exploitation indicates that this is not a practical problem. If there is a 
safety aspect to the differences in regulation, the ISA is certainly competent to 
issue supplementary rules.29
The main problem with flag state jurisdiction is that not all units in the Area 
are ships; for example, they may be platforms and excavators operating on the 
seabed. This is problematic in two regards.
First, the, the acquis of conventions relating to ships may not always apply. 
There is a need to fill this void with new rules and standards.
Second, the traditional role of the flag state to regulate may be challenged, 
and it may not even be clear which state is the flag state. A state may invoke 
personal jurisdiction over the owners, but that may be challenged, for exam-
ple, by the operator’s home state.
Both in respect of flag state jurisdiction of ships and similar jurisdiction of 
other units, UNCLOS Annex III on Basic Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration 
and Exploitation restricts the use of flag state type of jurisdiction, etc.:
28   This is often referred to as bare boat registration or temporary change of flag.
29   See above in section 2.1.
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Article 21 Applicable law
3. No State Party may impose conditions on a contractor that are incon-
sistent with Part XI. However, the application by a State Party to contrac-
tors sponsored by it, or to ships flying its flag, of environmental or other 
laws and regulations more stringent than those in the rules, regulations 
and procedures of the Authority adopted pursuant to article 17, para-
graph 2(f), of this Annex shall not be deemed inconsistent with Part XI.
This provision only applies in so far as the rules affect the licensee contrac-
tor negatively. Labor protection laws may be in this category, while the rule 
will most likely not affect legislation concerning legal infrastructure providing 
an option for mortgaging the unit used in the Area. If the licensee is affected, 
States Parties to UNCLOS cannot legislate, even if there is jurisdiction under 
the general principles of international law.
However, even when the licensee is affected negatively, flag state regula-
tion of ships in respect of protection of the marine environment30 is expressly 
allowed, and so is similar regulation of sponsoring states. Sponsoring states are 
in a way the “flag state” of the licensee.31
The net result of article 21 in respect of commercial framework legislation is 
that there is a fairly wide discretion of flag states and the like to supplement the 
regulations of the ISA and UNCLOS if they have jurisdiction on other grounds.
Flag state jurisdiction appears to be dominating in respect of ships, also in 
the Area.
2.3 Company Jurisdiction over Companies Involved in Seabed Activities
In order to obtain a license, a private company must be sponsored by a state:
Article 153 System of exploration and exploitation
2. Activities in the Area shall be carried out as prescribed in paragraph 3: —
(b) in association with the Authority by States Parties, or state enterprises 
or natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States 
Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when 
sponsored by such States, or any group of the foregoing which meets the 
requirements provided in this Part and in Annex III.
30   This follows from the reference to UNCLOS Annex III, art. 17(2)(f).
31   See below in section 2.3.
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The licensee must be effectively controlled by a sponsoring state. The sponsor-
ing state (as all states parties) shall assist the ISA,32 and the sponsoring state 
has the responsibility to ensure that a licensee shall carry out activities in the 
Area in conformity with the terms.33 It is for that reason control is needed. If 
more than one state has control, they must all sponsor.34 The state in which a 
prospective licensee is registered (or in which the licensee is a national) must 
be a sponsoring state, but that does not always suffice.35 The involved states 
may be liable for failure to comply with this part of UNCLOS.36 The sponsoring 
state must issue a certificate of sponsorship.37
If a state can control a private entity to this extent, perhaps the same 
mechanism could be utilized to provide supplementary legislation to create 
commercial framework legislation, subject to the limitations discussed above.38 
But how efficient is this kind of jurisdiction over a licensee or another com-
pany in the Area?
A problem could be that jurisdiction over the company is limited to the 
company. Thus, it is not able to address the relationships between different 
parties in the Area, such as the relationship between two subcontractors. Two 
examples of such relationships are provisions for knock-for-knock agreements39 
and channeling of liability.40 Likewise, the state with jurisdiction over the com-
pany cannot regulate mortgages and other third-party relations when the third 
parties are the general creditors of the company. However, the sponsoring state 
can exercise its jurisdiction over the licensee or other companies under its con-
trol to ensure that it implements certain provisions in subcontracts.
Even when feasible as a regulatory technique, legislation of a sponsor-
ing state may not be easily enforceable. If a company is registered in the 
32   UCLOS art. 154(4).
33   UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 4(4).
34   UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 4(3).
35   Ibid.
36   UNCLOS art. 139, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in 
the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10, and Kristoffer 
Svendsen’s contribution to this volume.
37   Se for example Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Crusts 
(fn. 10), reg. 11.
38   UNCLOS Annex III, art. 21; see above in section 2.2.
39   Knock-for-knock means that liability is waived in advance on a reciprocal basis in order 
to benefit from simpler and more inexpensive insurance arrangements made possible in 
this way.
40   Channeling of liability means that only one of several potential liability subjects shall be 
held liable in order to simplify claims handling.
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sponsoring state and that state has some jurisdiction thereby, the sponsoring 
state does not have full control. In particular, this is so if both the assets and the 
directors of the company are abroad and thus able to escape direct enforce-
ment. If claims are enforced against the licensee to the extent that bankruptcy 
is declared, that may not take place in the land of registration and may not 
be subject to the laws of that state.41 However, winding-up as a sanction is a 
possibility,42 as well as withdrawal of the sponsorship of the licensee.43 These 
sanctions would in many cases be considered too strong.
In summary, the sponsoring state can contribute to commercial frame-
work legislation in the Area. However, there are such limitations in both the 




There is no doubt that commercial claims may be related to a site in the Area. 
In most cases, one can find ways to pursue the claims effectively, such as in the 
state where the damage occurred (in a torts claim) or in the home state of 
the debtor (in a contract claim). However, some problems are special to the 
Area in this respect.
First, there is the vacuum problem: Legislation that we take for granted on 
land or in coastal waters may not extend to the Area. Does a national rule of 
strict liability for pollution apply in the Area, or only in the territorial waters 
of the state in question? And do national rules on registration of mortgages 
in drilling rigs apply in the Area, or only on the continental shelf of the state 
41   See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast), Art. 3, which locates insolvency proceed-
ings to the center of main interest of the debtor (COMI), which may be a state other than 
the state of registration. This is also the rule in UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2014), see para 31.
42   In Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (fn. 41), the compulsory winding-up of companies for rea-
sons other than insolvency are not subject to the regulation, and then not necessarily its 
choice of forum to the COMI (Art. 1(1) of the Regulation).
43   ISA Document ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1, 9 July 2018, Draft Regulations on Exploitation 
of Mineral Resources in the Area, reg. 22. The sponsoring state may incur liability if it 
remains passive; see Kristoffer Svendsen’s contribution to this volume.
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in question? If the rules do not apply,44 and the ISA has not issued such rules, 
there is a vacuum problem.
Such a vacuum may hamper commercial activities or leave vital interests 
without protection.
Second, there is the redundancy problem. It may happen that several states 
have made some of their legislation or other legal rules applicable worldwide 
or specifically in the Area. Which set of rules should prevail? This is tradition-
ally governed by conflict of law rules, which vary between jurisdictions. The 
redundancy problem is likely to be an issue in the Area, as there is no natural 
presumption for which state’s legislation shall apply; all situations will have 
only weak connections to states, and usually there are connections to many 
states.
Redundancy may cause a problem of forum shopping – legal action will be 
taken in the jurisdiction that will apply the rules that most benefit the party 
bringing the action. It is generally recognized that this is not a desirable sys-
tem, both because it encourages parties to be the first to bring an action and 
because the foreseeability for the commercial parties is very limited.
In addition, some of the common choice of law rules are difficult to apply in 
the Area. One example is the general choice of law principle for property law, 
wherein the law of the state where the property is situated should be applied 
(lex rei sitae). This is relevant if, for example, there is an ownership dispute on 
machinery in the Area. Another example is the rule that the form of a docu-
ment is governed by the law of the state in which the document is issued (locus 
regit actum, relevant if a bill of lading is issued at sea above the Area). New 
situations call for new private international legislation.
Some clauses in international investment treaties aim at protecting inves-
tors against less favorable framework legislation. Such treaties are unlikely to 
apply in the Area, to the national legislation applicable there and to the voting 
of states in the ISA. The ISA has not entered into any such agreements.
The following sections will discuss some situations in which the application 
of private law or private international law may cause problems in the Area in 
connection with different kinds of commercial framework legislation, namely 
patens, mortgages, labor law and liability.




A patent is the exclusive right to manufacture, use, or sell an invention for a 
certain number of years. There are already a substantial number of patents 
related to deep seabed mining and other activities in the Area, and it is also 
likely that many general patents are used there. Is there, and could there be, a 
similar protection against patent infringements in the Area as on land?
There is no such thing as a patent that grants exclusive rights worldwide. 
Patent law is national, so each state has to issue a patent. A “world patent” is 
a collection of such national patents. However, to some extent the states do 
cooperate and recognize each other’s patents.
In line with this recognition, states tend to limit the scope of patents (exclu-
sive rights) issued by them to the territory including the territorial seas.45 Some 
states extend the scope of their patents to their own continental shelf.46 But to 
my knowledge, no state extends the patents beyond that, to the Area.
The ISA has not issued any rules on patents. Therefore, there is a vacuum 
problem here; there is no applicable patent law in the Area. This is unfortu-
nate, as patents are likely to be just as beneficial for the commercial life in the 
Area as elsewhere.
The patented device may be on board or form a part of a ship or another 
unit operating in the Area. If the ship or unit enters a port, there is still no pat-
ent infringement as covered by a special rule in the Paris Convention:47
Article 5ter Patents: Patented Devices Forming Part of Vessels, Aircraft, 
or Land Vehicles
In any country of the Union the following shall not be considered as 
infringements of the rights of a patentee:
(i) the use on board vessels of other countries of the Union of devices 
forming the subject of his patent in the body of the vessel, in the 
machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories, when such vessels 
temporarily or accidentally enter the waters of the said country, 
provided that such devices are used there exclusively for the needs 
of the vessel;
(ii) the use of devices forming the subject of the patent in the construc-
tion or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of other countries of 
45   A Stenvik, Patentrett (3rd ed. 2013) p. 282 ff and MCA Kant, Cross-Border Patent 
Infringement Litigation within the European Union (2015) p. 41 ff.
46   See, for example, Norwegian Petroleum Act, 1996, s. 1–5.
47   Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883, as amended.
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the Union, or of accessories of such aircraft or land vehicles, when 
those aircraft or land vehicles temporarily or accidentally enter the 
said country.
These exceptions are wide, and make it difficult to enforce patents when used 
in the Area.
When this exception does not apply, a number of activities are defined as 
patent infringements. An example is the EU law:48
Article 25 Prohibition of direct use of the invention
A Community patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent all 
third parties not having his consent:
(a) from making, offering, putting on the market or using a product 
which is the subject-matter of the patent, or importing or stocking 
the product for these purposes;
(b) from using a process which is the subject-matter of the patent …;
(c) from offering, putting on the market, using, or importing or stock-
ing for these purposes the product obtained directly by a process 
which is the subject-matter of the patent.
In some states, acts such as offering the patent can be a patent infringement 
in the territory even if the patented object is situated outside the territory, for 
example in the Area.49
Despite such rules, patents are not well protected in the Area. States could 
easily extend their patents legislation to remedy this (which may raise the 
need for choice of law rules). It is not necessary that the ISA intervenes, and 
the conditions for the use of its incidental powers are not fulfilled.50
3.3 Mortgages on Property, etc. Used in Seabed Activities
An activity like deep seabed mining requires a significant amount of capital 
to invest in ships, rigs, and other equipment. Loan financing is a common way 
to obtain such capital if the enterprise engaging in the activity can offer the 
bank a privileged position in its eventual bankruptcy by way of mortgage. In 
that way, the bank could seize ships, rigs, and other equipment for repayment 
48   Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, annexed to Council 
Agreement relating to Community Patents, 1989 (89/695/EEC).
49   Stenvik (fn. 45), p. 292–293.
50   See above in section 2.1.
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if necessary. A bank is likely to find an enterprise attractive for loans if its secu-
rity interest in the equipment is legally recognized and protected by a system 
of law.
Such systems for recognition and protection of mortgagee banks could 
either be a register similar to land registries or an alternative pledge. The sys-
tems vary with the assets offered as collateral. In either case, the question is 
whether such systems are established or could be established in the Area.
3.3.1 Registrable Items
Recording of mortgages in a registry is well known for ships, and applies 
equally well to ships used in exploiting the Area. Although such registries are 
neither uniform nor universal, the systems in different jurisdictions are similar 
enough to form a single workable system. Ownership and mortgages are rec-
ognized based on the ship’s registration in a flag state.51 Forced sales may be 
carried out if a vessel is present in the jurisdiction, although such sales may not 
be recognized by all states.52 Some states have ways to order ships flying their 
flags to proceed to an appropriate jurisdiction for a forced sale.53
Some valuable equipment on the vessel may be considered an appurte-
nance even if it is not required for navigation.54 This legal status creates clarity, 
but may come as a surprise if the owner or mortgagee of the equipment is not 
the owner or mortgagee of the vessel. In particular, in offshore exploitation, 
the value of the appurtenances may exceed the value of the vessel.
The same types of rules often apply to floating platforms. Regardless of 
whether they are considered ships by conventions or customary public inter-
national law, such platforms usually have a flag state and they are registered in 
a particular state, similar to ships.55 Again, flag state jurisdiction saves the day 
in respect of mortgages, and coastal state jurisdiction in respect of arrest and 
enforcement.
Fixed installations could be subject to a similar system. While registra-
tion of mortgages is organized by a state when the platform is located on its 
51   See, for example, International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages (fn. 25), 
art. 1.
52   Ibid. art. 12.
53   See, for example, the Norwegian Enforcement of Claims Act, 1992, Ch. 11 IV and s. 11–3.
54   See to this E Røsæg, Liens and Mortgages on the Ship – Their Relation to the Charterer’s 
Equipment on Board in O Basurko and JMM Osante, New Trends in Maritime Law : 
Maritime Liens, Arrest of Ships, Mortgages and Forced Sale (2017) p. 339 ff. and B-E 
Reinertsen Konow, Løsørepant over landegrenser (2006) p. 176 ff.
55   See, for example, Norwegian Maritime Code, 1994, s. 507.
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continental shelf56 without any particular legal basis in international law,57 the 
ISA has not organized a similar registry for the Area. As long as this situation is 
maintained, platforms could be recorded in a registry similar to a ship registry 
by a willing flag state. It is likely that that the flag and registered encumbrances 
would be recognized in the same way as ships and floating platforms. For prac-
tical reasons, a forced sale must be carried out while the installation remains 
onsite, but such a sale would be organized and recognized by the state of regis-
try. However, it is less certain that other states would recognize the sale. In any 
event, the fixed installation may not be worth much if the associated project 
is doing poorly.
In all these cases (ships, appurtenances, floating platforms, and fixed instal-
lations), unsecured creditors could secure their claims through the legal 
system of the state of registry. The arrangements for fixed installations may 
not be widely recognized, and alternatives may be necessary.58
3.3.2 Non-Registrable Items
In addition to registrable units and their appurtenances, it is likely that there is 
other valuable equipment at a site, such as remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). 
Can these effectively be offered as collateral for financing of, for example, a 
mining project?
Usually, pledges are governed by the laws of the state in which the equip-
ment is located (lex rei sitae).59 However, in our case, the equipment is not 
located in a state and thus there are no relevant laws. Therefore, the creditors 
cannot get the desired certainty that they are secured creditors.
56   See, for example, Norwegian Petroleum Act, 1996, ch. 6 and HLJ Roelvink, Het continen-
taal plat als IPR-aanknopingspunt, SCJJ Kortmann et al (ed.), Op recht : bundel opstellen, 
aangeboden aan Prof. Mr. A.V.M. Struycken ter gelegenheid van zijn zilveren ambtsjubi-
leum aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (1996).
57   UNCLOS art. 77: “The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.” There are examples 
of express powers in this respect, for example Abkommen zwischen Norwegen und 
Deutschland über den Transport von Gas durch eine Rohrleitung vom norwegischen 
Festlandsockel und von anderen Gebieten in Deutschland (1993), art. 3.
58   See below in section 3.3.2.
59   See, for example, C Wendehorst art. 43 mn. 83 in HJ Sonnenberger et al., Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch : Bd. 11 : Internationales Privatrecht: Inter-
nationales Wirtschaftsrecht, Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche 
(Art. 25–248) (5. Ed. 2010) and A-R Borner, Comment on the Private Law Aspects of the 
Nord Stream Pipeline, 52 German Y.B. Int’l L. 355 (2009) p. 360.
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It has been suggested that the law of the first jurisdiction where the equip-
ment arrives should be the governing law.60 However, this will not create 
foreseeability for the pledgee. A better alternative would be the law of the state 
of the owner or the law of the last state the equipment was located in before 
its deployment to the Area. However, these are not widely accepted rules and 
cannot be counted on to create foreseeability.
Regardless of registration, ownership is likely to be recognized by all courts 
pursuant to rules that are based on contract and therefore quite similar. An 
effective pledge on the equipment could therefore be achieved by pledging the 
shares of the company that owns it, which may be registered in any state. The 
pledging is then dealt with ashore in a way that creates foreseeability, removed 
from the legal difficulties of the deep seabed.
Problems may arise if the equipment-owning company goes bankrupt. As 
mentioned previously, bankruptcy proceedings may occur in a state other than 
the one in which the equipment-owning company is located.61 Usually, such 
proceedings will take place in the state in which the debtor’s center of main 
interest (COMI) is located, which may not recognize the security interest in the 
equipment or the shares.
Because of this, equipment-owning companies should have a COMI in 
their states of incorporation. As some bankruptcy courts may look for a com-
mon COMI among a group of companies, it may also be wise to ensure that the 
COMI of the group is located in the state in which the proceedings take place.
With the necessary precautions regarding the location of the bankruptcy, 
pledging of non-registrable assets in the Area could effectively be arranged by 
pledging the shares of the company that owns them.
3.3.3 The License
The value of an exploitation license can be used as collateral. Pledging or mort-
gaging the license does not include the value of the equipment on site.
In the draft regulations, approval of the ISA is necessary to establish such 
security interests,62 and the security interest can be registered in a Seabed 
Mining Register run by the ISA.63
60   Ibid., mn. 106. The Uniform Commercial Code of the United States art. 9–301 points to 
the location of the debtor or the “local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or 
minehead is located” in these cases.
61   See above in fn. 41.
62   Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area (fn. 43), reg. 23. This is 
in line with UNCLOS, Annex III, art. 20.
63   Ibid., art. 78.
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The Draft Regulations are intended to safeguard the position of the ISA. 
There are no provisions of recognition or enforcement of the collateral inter-
est in the license. The license is not to be governed by any specific national law, 
such as the law of the sponsoring state.64 The value of a collateral interest in 
the license in the bankruptcy of the licensee is therefore open to doubt. This 
point is crucial, as the entire purpose of collateral is to secure the interests of 
the pledgee or mortgagee in the case of a bankruptcy.
3.3.4 Conclusion
In summary, it seems possible to overcome most problems regarding security 
interests and property seizure in the Area. Intervention of the ISA is therefore 
not warranted beyond what has been proposed, perhaps with the exception of 
a register for fixed installations.
3.4 Labor Law in the Area
Deep sea mining is likely to employ a number of people offshore. For onshore 
mining, employment contracts are subject to mandatory legislation in many 
states (as well as work safety legislation and the right to form labor unions). 
How could similar legislation be brought about in the Area?
The ISA previously drafted a provision that would make the relevant legisla-
tion of the sponsoring state applicable and require use of ships from flag states 
that had implemented the key international conventions.65 Now the approach 
is to make the contractor responsible for compliance with international and 
other standards, regardless of the flag of the vessel:66
2. The Contractor shall ensure compliance with the applicable interna-
tional rules and standards established by competent international orga-
nizations or general diplomatic conferences concerning … the treatment 
of crewmembers, as well as any rules, regulations and procedures and 
Standards adopted from time to time by the Council relating to these 
matters.
64   Ibid., art. 18.
65   Developing a Regulatory Framework for Mineral Exploiting in the Area. Report to 
Members of the Authority and all stakeholders (ISA 2016), Annex VII (to Annex I) 
Standard Clauses for Exploitation Contract. This is well in line with UNCLOS art. 146, 
which defines the task of the ISA in respect of protection of human life to supplement 
existing international law.
66   Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area (fn. 43), reg. 32.
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3. In addition, Contractors shall:
(a) Comply with the relevant national laws relating to vessel standards 
and crew safety of their flag State in the case of vessels, or their 
sponsoring State or States in the case of Installations; and
(b) Comply with the national laws of its sponsoring State or States in 
relation to any matters that fall outside of the jurisdiction of the 
flag State, such as worker rights for non-crew members and human 
health and safety that pertains to the mining process rather than to 
ship operation.
At a stroke, this provision will make a set of relevant regulations applicable. 
A diligent sponsoring state or flag state may even issue special regulations for 
this activity if necessary. The IMO is now preparing safety regulations for crew 
carriage,67 which is very relevant for offshore mining.
When enacting the draft provisions on safety, labor, and health standards, 
the ISA has effectively resolved the matter of labor protection legislation. 
There is no vacuum. However, in case of redundancy of regulation, there are 
no choice of law provisions giving the legislation of the flag state or the spon-
soring state precedence.
3.5 Extra Contractual Liability for Damages Caused by 
Activities in the Area
Offshore mining will most likely cause damage from time to time. The licensee 
is responsible for such damage:68
Article 22 Responsibility
The contractor shall have responsibility or liability for any damage aris-
ing out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations, account being 
taken of contributory acts or omissions by the Authority…. Liability in 
every case shall be for the actual amount of damage.
The basis for liability is not exhaustive,69 and the licensee may also be held 
liable under national law, for example where the damage occurs.
67   IMO Document MSC 97/22/Add.1, Annex 11, Resolution MSC.418(97) (2016) Interim 
Recommendations on the Safe Carriage of More Than 12 Industrial Personnel on Board 
Vessels Engaged on International Voyages.
68   UNCLOS, Annex III.
69   UNCLOS art. 304 and 235. Also the ISA and the sponsoring states may incur liability, 
see UNCLOS art. 139 and Kristoffer Svendsen’s contribution to this volume.
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The liability will eventually be backed by insurance70 and a trust fund.71 The 
liability rules will be detailed to some extent.72 However, the regulation is a 
long way from becoming a full-fledged liability law.73 In most states, such a law 
takes years to develop, and is adapted to local laws and conditions. Yet, this is 
probably as far as one can get in developing a special torts law for the Area.
4 Commercial Framework Legislation When There Is No ISA 
Authority
The discussions above have assumed ISA authority. However, this assumption 
is not always correct. On the one hand, a state that is not a party to the UNCLOS 
(or companies registered in that state) may be involved. These states are not 
bound to recognize the decisions of the ISA. The most important example is 
the USA, but (as already mentioned) American companies tend to operate in 
the Area via subsidiaries registered in a state party to the UNCLOS.
On the other hand, ISA may not be involved because the activity in question 
falls outside its mandate. The mandate of the ISA is limited to “activities in the 
Area”, see in particular:
Article 153 System of exploration and exploitation
1. Activities in the Area shall be organized, carried out and controlled by 
the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole in accordance with this 
article as well as other relevant provisions of this Part and the relevant 
Annexes, and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.
Similar limiting references to the “activities in the Area” are found in other 
parts of article 153 as well as other key provisions setting out the competence 
of the ISA.74
70   Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area (fn. 43), reg. 38. It is 
not clear from the wording whether one also has liability insurance in mind.
71   Ibid., reg. 52 ff. This was suggested by ITLOS, see Responsibilities and obligations of States 
with respect to activities in the Area (fn. 31) para 205.
72   Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area (fn. 43), Annex X 
Standard clauses for exploitation contract, section 6–8.
73   See, for example, the issues listed in ISA Discussion Paper No. 4 Enforcement and Liability 
Challenges for Environmental Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining (1996) p. 24.
74   Articles 140(2), 144, 145, 146, and 147.
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The term “activities in the Area” is much narrower than it first appears due 
to the definitions. Article 1 of UNCLOS defines the term in this way:
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention: —
(3) “activities in the Area” means all activities of exploration for, and 
exploitation of, the resources of the Area;
Thus, “activities in the Area” is limited to one specific activity, namely explora-
tion for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area. The key term “resources” 
is further narrowed in article 133:
Article 133
For the purposes of this Part:
(a) “resources” means all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in 
situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic 
nodules;
Therefore, the term “activities in the Area” and the mandate of the ISA is lim-
ited to all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, all solid, liquid or 
gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, includ-
ing polymetallic nodules of the Area. Activities outside the mandate of the ISA 
include marine scientific research, historical and archeological research, pipe-
lines and cables,75 catch of sedentary species, thermal energy, CO2 storage, and 
utilization of genetic resources at the seabed, if any.
UNCLOS article 157 apparently suggests that the ISA has a wider mandate:
Article 157 Nature and fundamental principles of the Authority
1. The Authority is the organization through which States Parties shall, 
in accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, 
particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area.
The part starting with “particularly” perhaps suggests that the mandate is 
wider than “the resources in the Area”. However, the first part of the sentence 
confirms that the mandate is limited to “activities in the Area”, in line with the 
other provisions of UNCLOS. The idea is then presumably to state that when 
75   See also UNCLOS art. 87(1)(c) and 112.
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organizing and controlling, particular attention should be given to administer-
ing the resources.
On this basis, it is submitted that situations exist, in which the ISA is not 
recognized or that fall outside the authority of the ISA. How would then frame-
work legislation for commercial activities in the Area be dealt with?
The discussions above conclude that regulation in the Area in many cases 
must rely on flag state jurisdiction and jurisdiction over companies (or indi-
viduals). This was so in relation to patens as well as mortgages and other 
securities.76 This kind of jurisdiction is available also outside the authority of 
the ISA. The mechanism requires that all involved states take responsibility, 
exactly as within the authority of the ISA.
Registering security interests in licenses is possible even if the licenses are 
issued by a state, and not by the ISA.77 However, the license is perhaps not 
much worth when any state can issue a new one with the same right, and the 
rights under the license might not be recognized by other states.
Labor protection within the authority of the ISA is based on a duty for 
the licensee to comply with international standards and national legislation 
of sponsoring states and flag states.78 Outside the authority of ISA, there are 
no sponsoring states, but other involved states may enforce rules based on flag 
state or personal jurisdiction. Such rules may or may not comply with interna-
tional standards. If they do not, there is no mechanism to enforce compliance. 
This makes it possible for entrepreneurs to choose to involve states with lenient 
enforcement or lenient standards.
Extra contractual liabilities for activities subject to ISA authority is based on 
special, positive law,79 which is not applicable in other cases. However, there 
is a long-standing practice that states can seize jurisdiction where the damage 
has occurred and apply their own substantive torts law or their own choice of 
law rules.80 There may be some difficulties enforcing the judgement, and there 
is no insurance or trust fund to back it.
In sum, the commercial framework legislation is much less well developed 
outside the scope of the authority of the ISA.
76   See section 3.2 and 3.3 above.
77   See section 3.3.3 above.
78   See section 3.4 above.
79   See section 3.5 above.
80   For example PK Mukherdjee, Jurisdictional issues in maritime zones, the high seas and 




Making a new legal order is not easy, even if only for the needs of the 
Area. The safest route is to use the legal systems of existing states and in 
particular the sponsoring states and flag states. This route may create choice of 
law problems, as the legislation of many states may be relevant. If using local 
law is not possible, then – and only then – the ISA could develop new rules 
under its inherent jurisdiction, available only when necessary. Developing 
such a new law is challenging, and it is not immediately obvious that states 
will recognize and enforce it.
In patents law, there is a problem that the law is national, and that national 
patents laws as a rule are not extended to the Area. In respect of security inter-
ests such as mortgages, only securities in the license is regulated by the ISA. 
Securities in the involved ships are subject to flag state jurisdiction, while secu-
rity interests in other units may have to be arranged by pledging the shares in 
the company that owns them. Labor law in the area is subject to the appli-
cable international conventions and legislation of flag states and sponsoring 
states by an obligation put on the contractor to make sure these standards are 
complied with. Liability rules are still fragmentary, but emerging under the 
auspices of the ISA.
Outside the scope of the authority of the ISA, the commercial framework 
legislation is much less reliable than within its authority.
© Edwin Egede, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004391567_011
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The phrase, maritime security, has assumed prominence, mostly due to pirati-
cal acts off the coast of Somalia that had a serious impact on international 
sea trade in the Gulf of Aden, a critical trade corridor linking the Suez Canal 
and the Indian Ocean.1 Although maritime security is currently a widely used 
phrase, its exact scope is not very clear. From a focus on naval sea power, piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, there is increasingly an expansion of the scope of 
what falls within maritime security. However, relatively little has been articu-
lated in the discourse on maritime security on its impact on the Deep Seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), which under the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 1982 is declared to be the Common 
Heritage of Mankind (CHM).
Yet the Area raises certain important maritime security issues such as the 
emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in the Area, prospects of piracy 
and terrorism against ships engaged in deep seabed mining (DSM) activities, 
as well as the challenge that DSM activities could actually raise issues as regard 
environmental security. Therefore, this chapter aims to investigate possible 
maritime security issues that may arise in the Area, engaging with what could 
be considered as a rather traditional state-centric maritime security approach 
(State/Military implications), as well as certain maritime security implications 
in the Area from a non-State centric perspective. The chapter begins by explor-
ing the concept of maritime security as an unclear and expanding one (Section 
2). Thereafter, it examines the notion of maritime security and the Area from 
a state-centric perspective (Section 3). Subsequently, it delves into maritime 
1   This led to United Nations Security Council involvement. See Edwin Egede, ‘Piracy and the 
East African Region’ In Koutrakos, P. & Skordas, A. (eds.) The Law and Practice of Piracy at 
Sea: European and International Perspectives. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2014), pp. 249–265.
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security and the Area, engaging with it from a more non-state centric view-
point (Section 4). The chapter ends with some concluding remarks (Section 5).
2 Maritime Security – an Expanding Concept?
Although maritime security has recently become a popular buzz phrase in 
international relations,2 the notion of maritime security does underpin a 
large chunk of the development of the law of the sea.3 For instance, the whole 
idea of the territorial sea and the so-called cannon shot rule of measuring this 
part of the sea was based on the security of the coastal State.4 In a similar way, 
the conception of freedom of navigation of the high seas was originally put for-
ward by Grotius based on the economic ground of allowing the Dutch access 
to the high seas in order to partake in the highly lucrative East Indian trade; it 
was subsequently utilized to provide justification for big naval powers to patrol 
freely on the high seas displaying their sea power in their pursuit of security.5 
Furthermore, the age long understanding of pirates as ‘enemies of the human 
race’6 with all States having universal jurisdiction, depicts that maritime secu-
rity has always been an intrinsic part of the law of the sea. What, arguably, is 
novel about the growing notion of maritime security in the law of the sea is the 
increasing shift from focusing mainly on States actors to an increasing high-
profile engagement with non-state actors, including organizations, such as 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO); private maritime security 
companies; the perpetrators of maritime security crimes, such as pirates and 
armed robbers at sea, private fishing trawlers engaged in Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, terrorists groups carrying out their dastardly 
acts at sea and gangs involved in illegal trafficking of people by sea; as well as 
human security aspects focused on the rights of victims of maritime crimes, 
such as seafarers and hostages held by pirates for ransom, as well as vulnerable 
2   C. Bueger, ‘What is maritime security?’ (2015) 53 Marine Policy, 159–164 at 159.
3   However, it must concede that the phrase, ‘maritime security’, was not until recently a vocab-
ulary used in the law of the sea. For instance, the phrase ‘maritime security’ to the knowledge 
of this author was not used during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) negotiations, neither is it mentioned in the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC) 1982.
4   W.L. Walker, ‘Territorial Waters: the Cannon-Shot Rule,’ (1945) 22 British Yearbook of 
International Law, 210–231.
5   T. Scovazzi, ‘The Evolution of International Law of the Sea: New Issues, New Challenges’, 
(2001) 289 Recueil des Cours, 39–243.
6   Le Louis case (1817) 2 Dods at 210.
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migrants at sea. Theoretically, this could be regarded as a swing from a purely 
realist perspective focusing solely on States to a more liberalist position that 
recognizes that international relations must necessarily also engage with non-
State actors as well.7 However, it must be pointed out that even in cases when 
maritime security engages with non-State actors, there still remains a key role 
for State actors to play, in taking enforcement actions and countering mari-
time (in)security arising from threats of such non-State actors.8 They can do so 
through agencies such as the navy and the coast guards.
Klein points out that ‘[t]he term “maritime security” has different meanings 
depending on who is using the term or in what context it is being used.’9 In her 
opinion, it may best be understood from two key aspects, namely, traditional 
security concerns and responses to perceived maritime security threats. The 
former, she states, primarily refers to border protection, involving preventing 
incursions into areas that are considered as the sovereign domain of a State. 
It also refers to power projections, involving a State exercising naval military 
power in its relationship with other States. The latter, on the other hand, 
reflects certain steps taken by States to reduce the risk of certain crimes or 
activities which they believe would prejudice or injure their interests and soci-
ety.10 Klein then provides a definition of maritime security as ‘the protection 
of a State’s land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment, 
and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea.’11 This definition is 
rather restrictive because it appears to over-emphasize more on the interest of 
the State and deemphasizes engagement with the interests of non-State actors, 
including international organizations, private companies and individuals, as 
regards maritime security.
7    A. Slaughter, ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’ (2000) 94 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, 240–248.
8    This is not to say that non-State actors, such as private security companies, do not play a 
role in countering maritime security threats and challenging the monopoly of States in 
this regard. See: Carolin Liss, ‘New Actors and the State: Addressing Maritime Security 
Threats in Southeast Asia,’ (2013) 35(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 141–162; and Elke 
Krahmann, ‘From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of Security Governance’ in 
Elke Krahmann (ed.), New Threats and New Actors in International Security, (2005, United 
States of America, Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 3–19.
9    N. Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (2011, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) at 4.
10   N. Klein, ‘Maritime Security’ in D.R. Rothwell, A.G., Elferink Oude, K.N.Scott, and 
T. Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2015) at pp. 582–583.
11   Ibid at 583.
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The recently adopted African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and 
Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) defines maritime security for the pur-
poses of the Charter as: ‘the prevention of and fight against all acts or threats 
of illicit acts against a ship, its crew and its passengers or against the port facili-
ties, maritime infrastructure, maritime facilities and maritime environment.’12 
Again, this definition appears to be rather limited as it does not focus on mari-
time security issues that arise from State to State tensions, such as age-long 
conflicts between the navies of different States and clashes that may arise from 
maritime delimitation disputes.
Another example of definition of the concept of maritime security, this 
time in the national context, is the one of the UK National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, which states that it is: ‘The advancement and protection of 
the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active manage-
ment of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to 
strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help 
shape a stable world.’13 This rather broad and vague definition is wide-ranging 
enough to cover virtually every threat arising from the maritime domain. It is 
also not very clear what ‘the active management of risks and opportunities’ is 
in practice and which tools would be used to implement this management.
Bueger, in an interesting article interrogating the meaning of maritime 
security,14 concludes that it:
[…] has no definite meaning. It achieves its meaning by actors relating 
the concept to others, by attempts to fill it with different issues and by 
acting in the name of it. If actors agree on the value of maritime security 
in general terms, its practical meaning will always vary across actors, time 
and space. Striving for a universally acceptable definition of maritime 
security is hence an unproductive quest.15
12   Art.1(1). The Lomé Charter was adopted as a binding treaty by 30 African States on 
15 October 2016 at the African Union Extraordinary Summit at Lomé, Togo. The Lomé 
Charter is available at: http://www.african-union-togo2015.com/en/accueil.
13   UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, May 2014 at 15, https://www.gov.uk/govern 
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_
Maritime_Security_2014.pdf.
14   Bueger, op.cit. at pp. 160–163 explored the meaning of maritime security using three 
frameworks: a semiotic viewpoint of seeking to grasp its meaning by exploring its rela-
tions with other terms; a constructivist securitization framework and the actual practice 
of relevant actors.
15   Bueger, op.cit. at 163.
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Then again, Germond introduces a geo-political dimension to the exploration 
of maritime security and points out that: ‘Maritime security has to do with 
(illegal and disruptive) human activities in the maritime milieu, that is to say 
a certain geographically delimited space. Thus, states are differently impacted 
by maritime security threats depending on their actual geographical location.’16 
Thus, one could rephrase the renowned statement of the eminent constructiv-
ist, Wendt, that: ‘maritime security is simply what States make of it!’17 Although, 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ definition of maritime security various intergovern-
mental organizations and States have adopted strategies or non-binding Codes 
to deal with maritime security threats.18 More recently, the African Union has 
even adopted a binding treaty on maritime security.19
In essence, since the exact scope of the concept of maritime security is 
highly contested, there is nothing that forecloses its application to the Area 
because there is a real possibility of ‘illegal and disruptive human activities’,20 
amounting to a threat to security, occurring as regard the Area. This is further 
supported by the requirement under the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
Law of the Sea (LOSC) that the Area be used for peaceful purposes only, espe-
cially since peace generally in international relations is used along with the 
16   B. Germond. ’The geopolitical dimension of maritime security’ (2015) 54 Marine Policy, 
137–142 at 138.
17   A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ 
(1992) 46 International Organization, 391–425.
18   See, for example: the ‘European Union Maritime Security Strategy: Responding Together 
to Global Challenges: A Guide for Stakeholders’ (EUMSS), Council of the EU, 24 June 2014, 
and its Action Plan of 16 December 2014, as revised on 26 June 2018; NATO Alliance 
Maritime Strategy 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm; 
African Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2014, http://pages.au.int/mari 
time/documents/2050-aim-strategy-0 ; the US National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
September 2005, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/255380.pdf; US Asia- 
Pacific Maritime Strategy 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ND 
AA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF; and UK 
National Strategy for Maritime Security 2014. For non-binding Codes, see the following 
IMO inspired agreements: The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 2004; the Code of Conduct concern-
ing the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct), 2009 as revised by the Jeddah 
Amendment 2017; and the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed 
Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (the 
Yaoundé Code of Conduct, 2013, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/
Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf.
19   See note 12 above.
20   Germond, op.cit at 138.
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notion of security.21 Recently, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) has 
acknowledged the need to consider maritime security in the Area in the Draft 
Regulations on Exploitation of the Minerals Resources in the Area, where 
it requires operators applying for a plan of work to exploit to also include, 
amongst other things, a health, safety and maritime security plan along with 
their application.22
3 Maritime Security and the Area: a State-Centric Focus
3.1 Area, Peaceful Purposes and Military Activities: a Matter of 
Definition
One of the crucial points raised in Arvid Pardo’s renowned address to the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1967, of the need to establish a regime 
for the exploitation of the resources of the Area, was that activities in this part 
of the sea should take place in a ‘peaceful atmosphere’. He stressed the rising 
concern that the Area could ‘… progressively and competitively [be] appro-
priated, exploited and used for military purposes by those who possess the 
21   See for instance Articles 1(1) and 24(1) of the United Nations Charter which state that the 
Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace’ and ‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action 
by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
Article 1 of NATO treaty states that: ‘The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are 
not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’
Article 3(f) of the African Union Constitutive Act states: ‘The objectives of the Union 
shall be to … promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.’
22   See Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area: Prepared by 
the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1 of 9 July 2018, Draft 
Regulation 7(3)(f). Annex IV of this Draft Regulations on the nature of the Health, Safety 
and Maritime Security Plan has not been developed and the annex states as follows: ‘[To 
be populated following discussion with the IMO Secretariat, members of the Authority 
and Stakeholders].’
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required technology.’23 This celebrated address, which called for this part of 
the sea to be declared as the Common Heritage of Mankind, acted as a trigger 
for the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
that eventually culminated in the adoption and the eventual coming into force 
of the LOSC 1982. The Convention requires that: ‘The Area shall be open to use 
exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or land-locked, 
without discrimination and without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Part.’24 The phrase ‘use exclusively for peaceful purposes’ was not defined by 
the Convention. This therefore raises the issue of whether the peaceful pur-
poses provisions of LOSC completely prohibit all military activities.
The scope of military activities must here be examined. According to 
Wolfrum, virtually all military activities at sea would fall under at least one of 
the following activities:
1. Navigation on the water surface or in the water column including all 
military activities connected with navigation.
Navigation and connected activities are performed as routine marine 
operations or periodic conditioned manoeuvres. They may serve one 
or more of the following purposes: exercising of ships, co-operation 
between navy, air force and land forces of one or more nationalities, 
the latter adding a further co-operation aspect (e.g. Ocean Venture 
1981), control of the sea, projection of naval presence (e.g. the presence 
of US units in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf) and deterrence;
2. Emplacement of sea-based missiles for strategic purposes. This activity 
is presently fulfilled (mainly) by missile launching nuclear submarines;
3. The emplacement of sea-based surveillance devices such as fixed 
acoustic detection systems;
4. The emplacement of sea-bed based weapons systems for strategic or 
tactical purposes such as magnetic or acoustic mines against surface 
ships or submarines. Furthermore, the emplacement of strategic missiles 
on the seabed has been discussed;
5. The emplacement of sea-bed based surveillance devices like the fixed 
acoustic detection array systems which according to some sources have 
been deployed along the east and west coast of the United States and 
some strategically important points in the oceans;
23   Para 5 of UN General Assembly 22nd Session, Official Records of Fifth Committee, 1515th 
Meeting, 1 November 1967 (Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the UN) http://www.
un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/pardo_ga1967.pdf.
24   Art.141, LOSC.
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6. Military research including the testing of weapons, conducted either 
on the water surface, in the water column, or the subjacent seabed and 
subsoil.’25
It is doubtful that the list above could be regarded as a completely exhaustive 
list of what constitutes ‘military activities.’
Recently, an arbitral tribunal has had the occasion to give its interpretation 
of the definition of military activities. The Arbitral Tribunal in the South China 
Sea Arbitration (Merits) between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
People’s Republic of China,26 in seeking to determine whether it had jurisdic-
tion over the case, had to ascertain if the Chinese activities in the South China 
Sea were military in nature. The latter issue was reserved from its previous 
award on jurisdiction and admissibility.27 The Tribunal was, however, quick to 
point out that its remit was merely to consider Article 298(1)(b), which applies 
to ‘“disputes concerning military activities” and not to “military activities” as 
such.’ In its view, the relevant question was to consider whether ‘the dispute 
itself concerns military activities, rather than whether a party has employed 
its military in some manner in relation to the dispute.’28
Nonetheless, the decision of the Tribunal in this regard raises some stimu-
lating ideas that could provide some guidance on what are military activities. 
For instance, the Tribunal points out that what represents a ‘quintessentially 
military situation’ is a state-centric conflict that involves the military forces 
of one State (i.e. Philippines) against a combination of military and paramili-
tary forces of another State (i.e. China) ‘arrayed in opposition to one another.’29 
Furthermore, the Tribunal, in determining that certain Chinese activities 
25   Wolfrum, R., “Restricting the Use of the Sea to Peaceful Purposes: Demilitarization in 
Being?” (1981) 24 German Yearbook of International Law p. 200 at 205–6.
26   In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an arbitral tribunal constituted 
under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between 
the Republic of The Philippines and The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No 2013–19 
of 12 July 2016. Available at: <http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%20201 
60712%20-%20Award.pdf>
27   Art. 298(1)(b) of LOSC allows State Parties to exclude by way of declaration the compul-
sory jurisdiction under the treaty in ‘disputes concerning military activities, including 
military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, 
and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal …’ By decla-
ration dated 25 August 2006, China had triggered all of these exceptions listed in Art. 
298, including the ‘military activities’ exception. See Para.161 of PCA Case No. 2013–19 of 
12 July 2016 and also the award on jurisdiction and admissibility of 29 October 2015.
28   Para.1158 of PCA Case No. 2013–19 of 12 July 2016.
29   Ibid, para.1161.
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were not military in nature, was happy to rely on China’s repeated statements 
and position that the activities were primarily, if not wholly, for civilian use.30 
Ostensibly, this could appear to suggest that a State may solely decide on 
whether or not their activities at sea is military in nature. However, when this 
position is read along with the opinion of the Tribunal that it was not deter-
mining military activities, as such, but merely seeking to decide on whether 
Article 298(1)(b) was applicable to the arbitration, it becomes clearer that the 
Tribunal was merely taking the position that China ought to be estopped from 
relying on the exclusionary provisions of the Article. China had consistently 
declared that such activities were civilian and not military.
Clearly military activities would involve military confrontation between 
two or more states. However, it is clear that it goes beyond this as could be 
seen from the rather long, but obviously not exhaustive list, of possible mili-
tary activities at sea provided, as quoted earlier, by Wolfrum.31
3.2 Are All Military Activities in the Area a Security Threat?
Yet the question arises as to whether all military activities in the Area constitute 
a breach of the peace thereby raising maritime (in) security concerns. Various 
States have interpreted this differently to suit their national interests. Certain 
States, especially developed States with nuclear capacity, interpret this provi-
sion as merely prohibiting military activities that has an aggressive purpose. 
These States argue that this provision would only prohibits military activities 
that are inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations 
under international law, which is what would create maritime (in)security.32 
In support of this viewpoint it has been stated that Article 141, as well as other 
provisions related to use of the ocean for peaceful purposes,33 should be inter-
preted in the light of Article 301 which states: ‘In exercising their rights and 
performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from 
any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles 
30   Ibid, paras.925–938, 1024–1028 and 1164.
31   See note 25 above.
32   See M. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – A 
Commentary, Vol III (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1995), pp. 90–91; E. Egede Africa and 
the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind (Springer, Heidelberg, 2011), pp. 79–80; J Kraska and R. Pedrozo, International 
Maritime Security Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013) at pp. 304–309 and M. Lodge, ‘The 
Deep Seabed’ and J. Kraska, ‘Military Operations’ in D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, 
K.N. Scott, and T. Stephens, (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 230 and 868–869 respectively.
33   See Articles 88, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155(2), 240(a), 242(1) and 246(3) of LOSC 1982.
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of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.’34 The 
United States of America is an example of a State that adopts this viewpoint. 
In a commentary which accompanied the transmittal by the President of the 
LOSC 1982, President Clinton stated:
In furtherance of this principle, article 141 declares the Area to be open 
to use by all States. Only mining activities are subject to regulation by the 
International Seabed Authority […]. Other activities on the deep seabed, 
including military activities, telecommunications and marine scientific 
research, may be conducted freely in accordance with principles of the 
Convention pertaining to the high seas, including the duty to have rea-
sonable regard to other uses.35
In addition, the commentary points out that none of the LOSC provisions on 
‘peaceful purposes’ and ‘peaceful use’ where intended to create new rights 
or obligations nor impose restraints upon military operations, or impair the 
inherent right of self-defense, and so long as the military activities are con-
sistent with the principles of international law they were not prohibited by 
international law generally and the LOSC in particular.36 Kraska and Pedrozo 
further cite a 1985 United Nations Secretary-General’s Report, which concluded 
military activities that were consistent with the provisions of Article 2(4) and 
Article 51 are not prohibited by the LOSC.37 It would appear that from this 
standpoint military activities are not prohibited by the LOSC in the Area in 
the following instances: first, if they do not amount to a threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; second, if 
the activities are a valid exercise of the right to self-defense or if such activities 
amounting to the threat or use of force is done with the authorisation of the 
Security Council; third, if it is not expressly prohibited by a conventional or 
customary international law norm.
On the other hand, for certain other States, the peaceful purposes provi-
sion in Part XI of the LOSC, connotes that all military activities in the Area 
34   Although Art.301 uses the phrase ‘peaceful uses’ instead of ‘peaceful purposes’ it has been 
pointed out that these two phrases are synonymous. See Kraska and Pedrozo, International 
Maritime Security Law, op.cit. at pp. 305–306 citing the Virginia Commentary.
35   See Letter of Transmittal, White House, October 7, 1994 at p. 61, Senate Treaty Doc.103–39, 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/treaty_103-39.pdf.
36   Ibid at p. 94.
37   Kraska and Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law at 307.
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are strictly prohibited.38 For instance, the then Organisation for African Unity 
(OAU) captured this position by stressing that the Area ‘should be used exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes [and] [a]ny utilisation of this zone for military 
purposes is strictly prohibited.’39
Francioni, points out that a minority of scholars support the latter view. 
Using the analogy of certain other treaties it has been argued that there is an 
absolute prohibition of military activities.40 For instance, the Antarctica Treaty 
1959 in Article 1 titled – Peaceful Purposes – states that:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of 
military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or 
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
Francioni points out that early negotiations in the UNCLOS III were based 
upon a generally prevalent view that the seabed which is the common heri-
tage of mankind was to be completely demilitarized as it was meant to be used 
for peaceful purposes only.41 However, a close examination of the relatively 
detailed provisions of the Antarctica Treaty, in comparison with the provisions 
of the LOSC on peaceful purposes, would appear to indicate that the LOSC did 
not intend to prohibit all military activities. While the Antarctica Treaty specif-
ically and explicitly prohibits ‘any measure of a military nature’, the provision 
of the LOSC does not explicitly indicate such prohibition.
Conversely, one could criticize those States and scholars that claim that 
certain military activities may take place in the Area for erroneously conflat-
ing the provisions on peaceful purposes in Article 88 (high seas) with that 
of Article 141(the Area). In doing so, they would wrongly interpret the two 
38   See for instance, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African 
Unity on the International Zone extending beyond National Jurisdiction, DOC/A/
CONF.62/50 of 14 September 1976.
39   Doc.A/CONF.62/50 of 14 September 1976 referred to in UNCLOS III Official Records Vol VI, 
p. 121.
40   See for instance, Antarctic Treaty 1959, Art.1 and Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, Art. IV. See Francesco Francioni, ‘Peacetime use of Force, Military 
Activities, and the New Law of the Sea, (1985) 18(2) Cornell International Law Journal, 
p. 203 at 221–225.
41   Ibid at 223–224. See Art.141 of LOSC.
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provisions in an identical way.42 First, the two provisions have different word-
ings, while Article 88 states that the high seas would be ‘reserved for peaceful 
purposes’, Article 141 states that the Area should be used ‘exclusively for peace-
ful purposes.’ Second, the provisions apply in essence to two different regimes 
having two different applicable principles: for the high seas, res communis; and 
for the Area, common heritage of mankind. It would be recalled that Article 141 
points out that the peaceful purposes must be in line with the relevant part of 
the Convention. Whilst the peaceful purposes as used under Article 88 is com-
patible with military activities, especially with the long historical connection 
with such military activities and the whole notion of the freedoms of the sea, it 
is not so with the common heritage of mankind. The latter principle, which is 
a relatively recent one, is premised mainly around resource exploitation of this 
part of the sea, a core activity that is not necessarily reconcilable with military 
activities.
An interesting practical example, of the conundrums that may arise from 
these divergent views on the peaceful use of the Area is with regard to manned 
subsea ‘space station’ that could be used not only for civilian, but also for mil-
itary purposes, such as surveillance through, for instance, having sensors to 
detect the submarines of other States.43 This raises two interesting issues.
First, whether the use of such mixed-use (or hybrid) installations or struc-
tures in the Area would be regarded as military activity. Although, the question 
of the mixed-use of installations or structures was raised by the Philippines in 
its arguments in the South China Seas arbitration in relation to whether China’s 
island building activities fell within the ambit of military activities under 
Article 298(1)(b) of LOSC, the Tribunal did not directly engage with this point.44 
In this author’s view, two possible approaches may be adopted to determine 
this – the initial or original purpose and predominant use approaches. The for-
mer focuses on the initial or original purpose for setting up the installation or 
structure. If such was for civilian purpose then it could be arguably regarded as 
being used for non-military activities, while if such was originally constructed 
for a military purpose then it could perhaps be regarded as used for military 
activities. However, this may raise complexities when such submersible struc-
ture or installation though initially set up for civilian purposes is subsequently 
42   See Isaak I. Dore, “International Law and the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer 
Space as Zones of Peace: Progress and Problems” (1982)15(1) Cornell International Law 
Journal, pp. 1–61 at 21–22.
43   See ‘China is Planning a Massive sea lab 10,000 feet underwater’, Bloomberg, 
June 8, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-07/china-pushes-plan 
-for-oceanic-space-station-in-south-china-sea.
44   Paras. 893 and 1013–1014, PCA Case No .2013–19 of 12 July 2016.
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predominantly used for military purposes. The predominant use approach 
would probably be a better approach. Here the predominant and prevalent use 
of the installations or structures would determine whether such installation or 
structures should be characterized as being used for military activities or not.
Another issue is whether the use of such submersible installations or struc-
tures should be regarded as amounting to allowable military activity in the 
Area. Obviously, as indicated above, States that argue that the peaceful use 
clause does not prohibit all military activities would take the position that 
such non-aggressive use of the Area would amount to allowable military activ-
ity. According to Treves:
… listening and other detection or communication devices are consid-
ered more acceptable than weapons. Weapons are inherently dangerous, 
while detection devices are considered more acceptable than weapons. 
Weapons are inherently dangerous, while detection and communica-
tions devices are not. This judgement will probably have some bearings 
on the solution of conflicts among different uses of the seabed. It seems 
easier to accommodate the emplacement of detection or communica-
tion devices to other uses, such as those related to resources, than the 
emplacement of weapons.45
On the other hand, those who argue that all military activities are prohibited 
in the Area would obviously take the view that, as long as such activity may be 
categorised as a military one, it is not allowable in the Area.
3.3 The Area and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty 1971
The paramount security concern in the Area is the prospect of emplacement 
of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the seabed, 
ocean floor and subsoil of the Area. As far back as 1971, prior to LOSC, the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil thereof (the Seabed Arms Control Treaty) was adopted to deal with this 
issue.46 This treaty, which has been described as an example of ‘superpower 
45   Tullio Treves, “Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed”, (1980) 74(4) 
American Journal of International Law, pp. 808–857 at 809–810.
46   This treaty of 10 Articles was adopted by a large number of States, (104 in favour, 2 against 
and 2 abstentions) on February 11, 1971 and came into force on May 18, 1972. So far 94 States 
have become States Parties. Only France out of the P-5 members of the UNSC is not a 
Party. See http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5187.htm.
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symbiosis’,47 arose from a strictly Statist concern about maritime security con-
cerning the Area. The key concern was the possibility of States, especially the 
big powers, utilising the Area as another venue for furthering their nuclear 
arms race. This concern was not far-fetched, especially since during the Cold 
War there was intense nuclear competition between the bipolar powers the 
USA and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), along with their 
respective allies.
The Convention, which is still in force, prohibits the emplanting or emplac-
ing of any nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction, 
as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically 
designed for storing, testing or using such weapons on the seabed, ocean floor 
and the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limits of the territorial seas (which of 
course would include the Area).48 The Treaty makes provision for verification 
through the observation by State Parties of the activities of other States Parties, 
provided that observation by the former does not interfere with the lawful 
activities of the latter.49 If after such observations there are still doubts as to 
whether the obligations under the Treaty are being carried out, the State Party 
carrying out the observations and the other one carrying out the activities giv-
ing rise to the doubts are required to consult together with a view to removing 
the doubts. If, however, the uncertainty still persists, the State Party having the 
doubts is required to notify the other States Parties to the Treaty, who are to 
cooperate on further procedures for verification, as they may agree, including 
the appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facili-
ties that reasonably may be expected to be in breach of Article 1 of the Treaty. 
The State Parties located in the region of the activities, including any coastal 
State, and any other Party so requesting, are also entitled to participate in such 
consultation and cooperation. After completion of the further procedures for 
verification, an appropriate report is required to be circulated to other State 
Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.50
The Treaty also makes provision for situations where the State responsible 
for the activities that raise doubt cannot be easily identifiable. Here, in the 
case of the initial step of consultations, the State having doubts is to notify and 
47   See James Barry Jr., “The Seabed Arms Control Issue 1967–1971 A Superpower Symbiosis” 
in Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore(eds.), Role of International Law and an Evolving 
Ocean Law, (Newport, 1980), pp. 572–585 at 573, where this phrase was used and described 
as ‘a relationship in which advanced States with divergent goals temporarily join forces to 
achieve a specific end.’
48   See Arts. I and II.
49   Art. III(1).
50   Art. III(2).
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make appropriate enquiries with State Parties in the region where the activi-
ties has taken place or from any of the other State Parties. If the identity of 
such State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these 
inquiries, the inquiring State Party may undertake further verification pro-
cedures, including inspection, and shall invite the participation of the State 
Parties in the region where the activities is taking place, including any coastal 
State, and any other Party desiring to cooperate.51 In the event that the con-
sultation and verification process fails to clarify the doubt and there are still 
serious questions concerning the fulfilment of obligation under the treaty, the 
State Parties may refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, who 
may take action in line with its primary responsibility to maintain peace and 
security under the UN Charter.52
There are, however, some criticisms of the Seabed Arms Treaty. For one, 
although there are currently a huge number of States Parties to the Treaty,53 
including a number of nuclear weapons States, some known nuclear weap-
ons States, such as France, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, are yet to become 
Parties to this important Treaty framework. Another problematic area of the 
Convention is the escape clause whereby States Parties may withdraw from 
the Treaty in the following instance:
Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty 
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordi-
nary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such with-
drawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations 
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its 
supreme interests.54
The ground for withdrawal is rather vague and subjective. Furthermore, the 
requirement that the Party which seeks to withdraw merely gives three months- 
notice to other States Parties and the Security Council is rather problematic. 
This appears to be a rather short notice period for such a significant issue 
as this. The 2003 withdrawal of North Korea from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
51   Art. III(3).
52   Art. III(4).
53   See note 42 above for the number of Parties to the Treaty.
54   Art. IV.
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Treaty, with similar provision,55 is instructive of the challenge with this provi-
sion. Obviously, when a State Party withdraws from the Treaty it would be res 
inter alios acta in relation to such State. However, States who are outside the 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty framework could only be bound by the obligation 
prohibiting the emplacement or emplantment of nuclear weapons and WMD 
in the seabed beyond the territorial sea if it could be argued that this norm has 
crystallised into Customary International Law.56
Another criticism is that the Treaty does not prohibit mobile installations 
such as a nuclear submarine resting at the bottom of the sea or the deployment 
of ‘crawlers’ and also mobile missile platform that may move along the ocean.57 
The ambiguity of the Treaty is also reflected in the reference to structures and 
installations ‘specifically designed for storing, testing or using’ WMD, which 
gives the almost absurd indication that the ban depends on its initial design 
and not its purpose.58 Furthermore, the Treaty, for obvious reasons is limited 
to nuclear weapons, as well as other types of WMDs, but does not really ban 
nuclear devices to be used for ‘peaceful’ purposes.59 It thus does not cover the 
possibility of nuclear disasters of a scale such as the Chernobyl and Fukushima 
disasters that may arise from such ‘peaceful’ use of nuclear materials in the 
Area, which may have environmental implications and raise issues of environ-
mental (in) security through the actions of States.60
What is clear, is that the Seabed Arms Treaty although it seeks to put in 
place some control over the use of nuclear weapons in the seabed, including 
the Area, does not effectively denuclearize the seabed, and neither does it cre-
ate some type of nuclear weapons free zone in the Area.61 Of course, another 
major gap of this rather dated Seabed Control Treaty is that it does not cover 
non-state actors, notably terrorist groups, which this chapter would discuss 
further in section 4 below.
55   See Art. X of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
56   See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ICJ Rep.1969, p. 3 at 41–44; Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) ICJ Rep.1986, p. 14 
at 98.
57   See Barry Jr., ‘The Seabed Arms Control Issue 1967–1971 A Superpower Symbiosis’, supra 
at p. 583 and Dore, ‘International Law and the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer 
Space as Zones of Peace: Progress and Problems’, supra at 15.
58   See Art. 1 and Dore, Ibid at pp. 15–16.
59   Dore, ibid at p. 13.
60   See below section on non-State centric approach for more discourse on environmental 
security.
61   For nuclear Free Zones in the World see https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/
nwfz/.
201Maritime Security & Deep Seabed beyond National Jurisdiction
3.4 Maritime Security and Prospect of Inter-State Tensions over Mining 
Sites in the Area
Another key maritime security issue from a State-centric approach is the risk of 
inter-State tensions over maritime mining sites, which may escalate into con-
flicts. This threat is reduced in the case of deep seabed mining (DSM) activities 
due to the crucial role of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as the inter-
governmental organization vested under the LOSC to act on behalf of mankind 
and who is in charge of allocating mining sites in the Area.62
However, a scholar had pointed out that ‘[a]lthough the International 
Seabed Authority has shouldered the responsibility for managing the activities 
on the International seabed beyond national jurisdiction, future exploration 
is sure to raise many jurisdictional challenges akin to fossil fuel resources, and 
some claims and counterclaims regarding certain areas can be expected.’63 
Kraska, in an interesting article on Indian Ocean Security,64 provides the 
example of India’s security concerns, as regards the allocation by the ISA to 
China, its regional rival, (via the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and 
Development Association [COMRA], a State owned entity), of mining site in 
the Southwest Indian Ocean for the exploration of polymetallic sulphide ore 
deposit.65 He points out that this was unsettling for India and states that:
New Delhi fears it will provide China with “an excuse to operate their 
warships in [the] area.” The Directorate of Naval Intelligence in New 
Delhi warns that the seabed mining development gives China a reason 
to “maintain a continuous presence” in the central Indian Ocean. The 
Ministry of External Affairs called the Chinese seabed mining plan a 
“worrying development.”66
This does indicate a potential for State to State tensions over allocation of min-
ing sites for DSM. For instance, India in its recent Maritime Security Strategy 
2015 also mentioned its DSM activities in the Indian Ocean as one of its overseas 
62   See Arts.137(2) and (3), 153(2)–(6), 157(1) and 162(2)(j)–(l). See Chapter 7 of this book, 
J. Dingwall, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework.’
63   Nirmal Verna, ‘India and Transnational Maritime Challenges’ in Mohan Malik, Maritime 
Security in Indo-Pacific Perspectives from China, India and the United States of America, 
(Bowman & Littlefield, London, 2014), pp. 209–214 at 211.
64   James Kraska, ‘Indian Ocean Security and the Law of the Sea’, (2012) 43 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law, pp. 434–493, especially at 459–462.
65   Exploration Contract began November 18, 2011 and to end November 17, 2026. See https://
www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-contractors.
66   Kraska, op.cit at p. 461.
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maritime investments that need to be secured.67 Furthermore, Japan in its 
National Security Strategy, under the heading ‘[r]isks to Global Commons,’ 
which it identifies as one of its national security challenges, points out that 
‘[c]ases of conflicts of interest over the sea are increasing. There is a growing 
risk of incidents at sea and of possible escalation into unexpected situations.’68
4 Maritime Security and the Area: A Non-State-Centric Focus
Contemporary discourse of maritime security seems to be increasingly focused 
on threats by non-State actors in the maritime domain. This section would 
explore three possible future security threats by non-State actors with regard 
to the Area as an important maritime domain, perhaps more so when the 
actual exploitation in the Area begins, namely: piracy against production sup-
port vessels (4.1), maritime terrorism (4.2) and environmental security (4.3).69
4.1 Piracy against Ships and Production Support Vessels (PSVs)
A critical aspect of deep seabed mining is the use of vessels, ranging from state 
of the art multipurpose research vessels to Production Support Vessels (PSVs). 
One of the commonly indicated method of mining operations from available 
technology and data mining operations in the Area is the use of autonomous 
underwater vehicles (AUVs), which would be used to survey the seabed prior 
to extraction, and also remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) that play a role not 
only in obtaining samples of deposits, but could also be used in mining itself – 
passing resources extracted from the Area through a steel riser pipe (a riser lift 
system) to a PSV situated on the high seas.70 It is important to note that ships 
67   Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/
files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf.
68   National Security Strategy of Japan 2013, p. 5, para.1(4), http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/ 
131217anzenhoshou/pamphlet_en.pdf.
69   The DSM industry is currently at the exploration stage, however, the ISA has already begun 
work on drafting the Exploitation Mining Code. See https://www.isa.org.jm/legal-ins 
truments/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area.
70   See Anon., ‘Nautilus sets out its deep sea mining stall,’ The Naval Architect, February 2016, 
http://www.rina.org.uk/Nautilus_sets_out_its_deep_sea_mining_stall.html which men-
tions a newer innovation of the PSV, the Production Support and Storage Vessel (PSSV). 
It states that ‘the PSSV is an innovative design as the vessel and its mining system are the 
first of their kind in the world. The ultra-deep water mining process begins at the seafloor 
where three large mining ROV’s cut rock and turn it into slurry for pumping. The slurry is 
pumped to the PSSV via a Subsea Slurry Lift Pump (SSLP) through a top tensioned riser. 
At the PSSV the slurry is delivered to a Dewatering Plant (DWP) and then into the vessels’ 
holds for storage. The stoned ore is reclaimed from the ship’s holds and offloaded via a 
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and PSVs play an important role in deep seabed mining in the Area. The ITLOS 
Seabed Chambers in its first advisory opinion in response to questions formu-
lated by the Council of the ISA in making a distinction between transportation 
that should be regarded as ‘activities in the Area’ and that which would not 
clearly highlights this.71 According to the Chambers:
Transportation to points on land from part of the high seas superjacent to 
the part of the Area in which the contractor operates cannot be included 
in the notion of “activities in the Area”, as it would be incompatible with 
the exclusion of transportation from “activities in the Area” in Annex IV, 
article I, paragraph I, of the Convention. However, transportation within 
that part of the high seas, when directly connected with extraction and 
lifting, should be included in activities in the Area. In the case of poly-
metallic nodules, this applies, for instance, to transportation between 
the ship or installation where the evacuation of water and the prelimi-
nary separation and disposal of material to be discarded take place. The 
inclusion of transportation to points on land could create an unnecessary 
conflict with provisions of the Convention such as those that concern 
navigation on the high seas.72
With research ships and PSVs having to operate in the high seas to conduct 
deep seabed mining research or to facilitate seabed mining, as the case may 
be, there is the risk of piratical attacks on these vessels. The LOSC states that:73
[p]iracy consists of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the juris-
diction of any State.
It also includes the act of voluntarily participating in the operation of a ship 
or aircraft with the knowledge that these are being used for acts of piracy, as 
cargo handling system into a bulk carrier moored alongside. The bulk carrier then tran-
ships the ore to market.’
71   Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area, ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion No. 17 of 2011.
72   Ibid at para.96.
73   Art.101(a) of LOSC 1982(identical to Art.15(1) of the High Seas Convention 1958).
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mentioned in the definition above, as well as any ‘act of inciting or of intention-
ally facilitating an act of piracy,’ as described above.74 Due to what is perceived 
as the heinous nature of piracy it is said that there is universal jurisdiction 
over the crime.75 Although, in theory it is easy to discern what piracy is from 
the definition provided in the LOSC, in reality it may sometimes be contested. 
There are debatable issues that arise from the definition of piracy that scholars 
have engaged with.76 However, it is unlikely, for instance, that acts of violence 
against a vessel engaged in deep seabed mining activities by a vessel with envi-
ronmental protesters would be regarded as piracy.77 Nonetheless, there may be 
other liability issues that may arise from this, such as criminal or civil damage 
to property or person.
Currently, there are incidents of piracy in Asia (various seas in Asia), off 
the coast of Somalia (Indian Ocean) and the Gulf of Guinea, off the West 
African Coast (Atlantic Ocean), with piratical acts involving petty theft, hijack-
ing of vessels and kidnapping of crew in vessels, as well as well as violent acts 
of robbery, sometimes accompanied by resource theft.78 These various regions 
have adopted instruments clearly indicating that piracy is a major maritime 
threat and a present maritime security concern.79 Some of these regions, such 
as the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, have deep seabed mining sites.80
A stimulating issue is whether a PSV or submersibles, such as the AUVs and 
ROVs, used for deep seabed mining, may be regarded as ships for the purposes 
of Article 101 of the LOSC? In an article on the application of maritime con-
cepts to seabed mining, Spicer and L’Esperance, evaluated whether sea bed 
mining vessels and submersibles would qualify as ‘ships.’81 They indicated that 
74   Art.101(b) and (c) of LOSC.
75   Art.105 of the LOSC. Also see E. Kontorovich and S. Art, “An Empirical Examination of 
Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy,” American Journal of International Law (2010:104), 
436–453.
76   See R.Churchill, “The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – Fit 
for Purpose?” In P. Koutrakos & A. Skordas (eds.) The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: 
European and International Perspectives. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2014), pp. 9–32 for interesting and insightful analysis of the problems with defining piracy.
77   See In the Matter of the Artic Sunrise Arbitration (The Kingdom of the Netherlands v. The 
Russian Federation, (Award on Merits), PCA Case Nº 2014–02, https://pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/1438.
78   See Egede, ‘Piracy and the East African Region’ in P. Koutrakos, & A. Skordas (eds.), op.cit. 
249 at 255–257.
79   See note 18 above.
80   See ISA Contractor areas, https://www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-contractors/
overview.
81   W. Spicer and P. L’Esperance, ‘Seabed Mining and the application of Maritime Law 
Concepts’, LawyersIssue, July 11, 2016, http://www.lawyerissue.com/seabed-mining-and 
-the-application-of-maritime-law-concepts/.
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a quick survey of the rather voluminous legislation and case law of certain 
States would appear to suggest that for an object to be a ship it must satisfy 
the following requirements: partial navigational use; navigational capabili-
ties; navigation through or above water; vessel under construction and that 
the mode of propulsion is irrelevant.82 They then suggested that the PSV may 
satisfy many of the common elements of ships, especially when they are inde-
pendently navigating between extraction sites. They were, however, rather 
skeptical on whether PSVs permanently moored or positioned to engage 
in DSM activities for extended period of time would be regarded as a ship. 
Further, they take the view that the status of AUVs and ROVs as ships is rather 
ambiguous.83 This would need more clarity. If we are to accept the position of 
Spicer and L’Esperance on PSVs, an attack on a PSV would only be piracy when 
such PSV qualifies as ‘ships.’
4.2 Maritime Terrorism
Another risk to ships and PSVs engaged in DSM activities is maritime terrorism. 
The United Nations, as far back as 1988, had adopted The Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, 
and the subsequent Protocols, as one of its sectoral Conventions to counter 
terrorism.84 This Convention criminalises attacks against vessels beyond the 
outer limits of the territorial sea of States which may involve acts such as, a 
person or group of persons seizing or exercising control over a ship by force 
or threat of such force; the committing of acts of violence against individuals 
on a ship or destroys such ship or causes damage to such ship or its cargo.85 
In recent times, a series of incidents occurred, such as the failed attack on 
USS The Sullivans in January 2000, or the successful attacks on the USS Cole 
in October 2000, and the French supertanker, MV Limburg in October, 2002, 
Superferry 14 just outside Manilla Bay in the Philippines in 2004. As a result, 
efforts have focused on addressing the issue of terrorist attacks on ships and 
installations at sea, by upgrading maritime terrorism to a major maritime secu-
rity threat.86 The possibility of such attacks against vessels engaged in DSM 
could therefore not be ignored.
82   Ibid at p. 4.
83   Ibid.
84   Preamble 3 states that the Convention was a response to ‘world-wide escalation of acts of 
terrorism in all of its forms.’
85   Art.3.
86   See for instance, Art. V(d) of the EU Maritime Security Strategy 2014; Indian 
Maritime Security Strategy 2015 at pp. 38–39 and Part X of the 2050 Africa’s Integrated 
Maritime Strategy, 2014.
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Furthermore, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attack against the USA, there 
have been concerns about terrorist groups having access to nuclear weapons 
and other types of WMDs.87 The Seabed Control Treaty, as mentioned above, 
as a State-centric treaty, does not in any way cover the possibility of non-State 
actors emplacing nuclear weapons or other WMD in the seabed, including the 
Area. Article 1(1) of the Seabed Control Treaty declares that ‘[t]he States Parties 
to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace …’, while Article 1(2) says 
that ‘[t]he States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or 
induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 …’, thereby 
effectively excluding non-State actors, such as terrorist groups from the ambit 
of the Convention. As a response, the United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, such as resolutions 1540 and 1887,88 as well as the Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005, have sought to fill this gap.
4.3 Environmental Security
One of the key risks of deep seabed mining is the chance of it having seri-
ous adverse impacts on the marine environment. According to Greenpeace, 
deep seabed mining is likely to cause serious environmental damage that may 
destroy vital habitats and could lead to the killing of marine life, including 
the extinction of certain unique species, as well as potentially generating toxic 
sediments that could contaminate the food chain.89 These environmental 
concerns have been described at various times as a ‘new Ocean threat,’90 ‘an 
emerging threat to our Oceans’,91 ‘a global threat to our Oceans’,92 ‘a serious 
87   See the testimony of George Tenet before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
‘The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,’ 24 February 2004, 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/10.pdf?_=1316466791.
88   UNSC Resolution 1540(2004) and Resolution 1887(2009).
89   See Indian Ocean Observatory, ‘Deep seabed mining will cause serious environmental 
damage’ - Greenpeace’, March 10, 2016, http://www.theioo.com/index.php/en/insight/
item/486-deep-seabed-mining-will-cause-serious-environmental-damage-greenpeace 
See also, Michelle Allsopp, Clare Miller, Rebecca Atkins, Steve Rocliffe, Imogen Tabor, 
David Santillo & Paul Johnson, ‘Review of the Current State of Development and Potential 
for Environment Impacts of Seabed Mining Operations,’ http://www.greenpeace.to/
greenpeace/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/seabed-mining-tech-review-2013.pdf.
90   Richard Steiner, ‘Deep Sea Mining a New Ocean Threat’ The Huffington Post, 
20 October, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-steiner/deep-sea-mining-new 
-threa_b_8334428.html.
91   Greenpeace, ‘Deep seabed mining: an emerging threat to our oceans’, 31 July 2013, http://
www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/Deep-seabed-mining/
blog/46110/.
92   WWF South Africa, ‘Seabed Mining a global threat to our Oceans: International Contexts’, 
http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/sosc_factsheet3_web.pdf.
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threat to the stability of Oceans systems and processes’93 and ‘next frontier of 
maritime insecurity.’94
With the protection of the environment increasingly becoming an issue 
foremost on the agenda of the international community, there is a growing 
interest in environmental security since the end of the Cold War. Although, 
the concept of environmental security is essentially a contested one, the aca-
demic literature is steadily engaging with the notion that there is some kind of 
linkage between the environment and security, and the extent to which envi-
ronmental degradation may be regarded as a security threat.95
As far back as 1990, the United Nations Secretary-General stated that: ‘eco-
logical threats to the marine environment are also increasingly seen as a more 
serious threat to national security.’96 Also, the United Nations Secretary-General 
High Level Panel 2004 Report on Threats, Challenge and Change identified 
some crucial linkages between environmental degradation and security.97 
While the linkage between environmental degradation and security may be 
easier to discern when such degradation arises from military activities of State 
actors, for instance, in the case of the Area, the possibility of a nuclear disaster 
as a result of military activities by nuclear submarines in the seabed, it is some-
times difficult to fathom such linkages when the degradation is caused by the 
activities of non-State actors. For instance, NATO in recognition of the possibil-
ity of environmental security threats arising from military activities states that: 
‘the Alliance is working to reduce the environmental effects of military activi-
ties and to respond to security challenges emanating from the environment.’98 
But, even at that, the NATO, in explaining environmental security, appears 
to recognise that its remit, in this regard, may actually go beyond the direct 
impact of military activities on the environment, to engaging with certain 
environmental issues that may have an indirect effect on security by stating:
93   Sylvia Earle, ‘Deep Seabed Mining: An Invisible Land Grab’, July 20, 2016, https://www 
.mission-blue.org/2016/07/deep-sea-mining-an-invisible-land-grab/.
94   Maurice Beseng, ‘Will deep sea mining be the next frontier of maritime insecurity in 
Africa?’ July 12, 2016, http://www.maritimesecurity.global/2016/07/12/deep-sea-mining/.
95   Nina Græger, “Environmental Security?” (1996)33(1) Journal of Peace Research, 
pp. 109–116 and Karen Hulme, “Environmental Security: Implications for International 
Law,”(2009)19(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp. 3–26.
96   Para.36, Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General, Doc. A/45/721 & Coor.1 of 
19 November 1990. See also NILOS, International Organizations and the Law of the Sea, 
Documentary Yearbook, Vol.6, (London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), pp. 70–114 at 79.
97   Section III, Paras.53–55, UNGA Doc.A/59/565 of 2 December 2004, https://documents 
-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/PDF/N0460231.pdf?OpenElement.
98   ENVIRONMENT – NATO’S STAKE, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048 
.htm.
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Based on a broad definition of security that recognizes the impor-
tance of political, economic, social and environmental factors, NATO is 
addressing security challenges emanating from the environment. This 
includes extreme weather conditions, depletion of natural resources, 
pollution and so on – factors that can ultimately lead to disaster, regional 
tensions and violence. The Alliance is looking closely at how to best 
address environmental risks to security in general as well as those that 
directly impact military activities.99
However, more and more there has been a push to see environmental security 
as going beyond the limited prism of its linkage with military activities. Some 
scholars, such as Barnett, adopt a broader notion of environmental (in)secu-
rity by linking environmental degradation with human security.100 He explains 
environmental (in)security as follows:
Environmental insecurity is defined here as the vulnerability of people 
to the effects of environmental degradation. So environmental insecu-
rity is more than the physical processes of environmental degradation; it 
includes the way this degradation affects the welfare of human beings … 
Environmental insecurity is very much about risk. In the first instance, a 
risk to biosphere integrity entails risks to human health.101
Hulme points out that the broadest definition of environmental security would 
include ‘man’s ability to impact the stability and viability of the biosphere.’102
Even recently, we see that maritime security strategy instruments include 
the environmental issues, although the latter do not necessarily link directly 
to military activities, but become indirectly a vital maritime security chal-
lenge.103 Some of these strategy instruments provisions are broadly framed 
to also regard environmental degradation by non-State actors in the relevant 
maritime zone as a maritime security threat. For instance, the European 
Union Maritime Strategy 2014, includes as part of maritime security risks and 
threats, environmental risks, which it relates to: the ‘unsustainable and unau-
thorized exploitation of natural and marine resources, threats to biodiversity, 
IUU fishing, environmental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge, 
99   Environmental Security, Ibid.
100   J. Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New 
Security Era, (London, Zed Publishers, 2001).
101   Ibid at p. 17.
102   Hulme, ‘Environmental Security: Implications for International Law,’ op.cit. at p. 9.
103   See for instance, Art. V(g) of the EU Maritime Security Strategy 2014 and Part XI of the 
2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2014.
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chemical, biological and nuclear pollution, in particular sea-dumped chemical 
munitions and unexploded ordnance.’104
As a result of the possibility of serious environmental impacts due to deep 
seabed mining, the protection of the environment is high on the agenda of 
the ISA and it is taking steps to minimize and manage the environmental risks 
of DSM.105 As an illustration, the first advisory opinion of the ITLOS Seabed 
Disputes Chambers on the Responsibilities and obligations of States spon-
soring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area was mainly 
devoted to engaging with the extent of sponsoring States’ obligation under 
LOSC 1982 for the protection of the environment as regard DSM activities by 
contractors sponsored by such States.106 These contractors, including not 
only State entities, but also private commercial entities, such as Multinational 
Corporations.107 As a matter of fact the Chambers in this advisory opinion sets 
the highest standards of due diligence and goes ahead to endorse a legal obli-
gation to apply the precautionary approach, best environmental practices, and 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).108 Thus environmental security is an 
issue of vital concern as regard the Area.
104   Ibid. This has revised by a 2018 update and action plan which stresses that environ-
mental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge is a key maritime risks and 
threat. See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/26/marit 
ime-security-eu-revises-its-action-plan/.
105   See Arts.139, 145, 209 and 215 of LOSC. Also, the ISA in its recent draft strategic plan for 
the period 2019–2023 gave the following as its mission statement: ‘The mission of the 
International Seabed Authority is to be the organization through which States Parties 
organize and control activities in the Area, which is the common heritage of mankind, to 
promote the orderly, safe and responsible management and development of the resources 
of the Area for the benefit of mankind as a whole, including through the effective pro-
tection of the marine environment and contributing to agreed international objectives 
and principles, including the Sustainable Development Goals. This will be accomplished 
by developing and maintaining a comprehensive regulatory mechanism for commercial 
deep seabed mining that incorporates effective protection of the marine environment 
and of human health and safety, the equitable sharing of financial and other economic 
benefits from activities in the Area and allows for fully integrated participation of devel-
oping States through knowledge and best practice exchange consistent with the principle 
of the common heritage of mankind.’ See ISBA/24/A/4 of 21 May 2018.
106   ITLOS Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, Case No. 17, https://www.itlos.org/cases/
list-of-cases/case-no-17/.
107   See list of contractors, https://www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-contractors.
108   ITLOS Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011. For analysis of this decision see David 
Freestone, ‘Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea on “Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring 





Maritime security, though a popular buzzword in contemporary times, is a neb-
ulous concept that may mean different things to different people. In practical 
terms it is a matter that has relevance both in maritime zones within national 
jurisdiction and that beyond. This chapter has sought to explore key maritime 
security issues that are of relevance to the Area. It explored maritime security 
from the State-centric perspective of using the Area for exclusively peaceful 
purposes, and the variance in interpretation of what this actually means, as 
well as issues arising from the Seabed Arms Control Treaty framework, and its 
limitations. In addition, it explored the possibility of sponsoring States ten-
sions with regard to mining sites allocated by the ISA. It further engaged with 
certain possible non-State centric maritime security future scenarios that the 
international community may need to take on as time goes on, especially when 
exploitation actually begins in the Area, such as piratical and terrorist acts 
against vessels involved in DSM, as well as the issue of environmental security 
arising from the risk of environment degradation due to DSM activities.
The Area, which has been described as ‘a new frontier’ for future mineral 
development and contains extremely valuable mineral resources, is a vital 
maritime zone that should be kept secure so users of this maritime domain 
would be protected. This is in line with the Common Heritage of Mankind 
which emphasizes the peaceful use of this maritime space and the impor-
tance of the effective protection of human lives.109 ISA, as the international 
organization charged with the responsibility to ‘organize and control activities 
in the Area,’110 need to start thinking seriously about developing some sort of 
maritime security strategy as regard the Area to avoid irreparable damages to 
security interests of States, interested parties and the environment.
109   Arts.141 and 146 of LOSC.
110   Art.157(1) of LOSC.
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chapter 10
The Rights to Genetic Resources beyond 
National Jurisdiction: Challenges for the Ongoing 
Negotiations at the United Nations
Tullio Scovazzi
1 A New Negotiation
On 19 June 2015, following the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of National 
Jurisdiction, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus 
Resolution 69/292, relating to the development of an international legally-
binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
A Preparatory Committee (Prepcom), chaired by Mr. Eden Charles, was 
established by Resolution 69/292 with the mandate to make substantive rec-
ommendations to the General Assembly on the elements of a draft text of an 
international legally-binding instrument under the UNCLOS. The negotiations 
addressed four main topics, intended as a “package”, in the sense that none of 
them can be separated from the others, namely:
– marine genetic resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits;
– measures such as area-based management tools, including marine pro-
tected areas;
– environmental impact assessments;
– capacity building and transfer of marine technology.
On the basis of the recommendations of the Prepcom, the General Assembly, 
by Resolution 72/249 of 24 December 2017, decided to convene an intergovern-
mental conference, with a view to developing the above mentioned instrument 
as soon as possible. The first session of the conference, chaired by Ms. Rena 
Lee, was held in September 2018.
Because of its scope and objectives, the present negotiation is likely to 
become a turning point in the progressive development of international 
law of the sea. A number of issues that are not fully covered by the UNCLOS 
are being addressed and hopefully will be regulated under an internationally 
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agreed regime. However, the path towards the new legal instrument is far from 
being an easy one. While many States feel that there is a need for a new agree-
ment to fill gaps in the UNCLOS, a minority of States express scepticism about 
such an instrument. They think that a better implementation of existing instru-
ments would be sufficient to address the questions posed by conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction.
The topic of marine genetic resources, including questions on the sharing 
of benefits, presents a number of conceptual, political and legal difficulties 
that probably make it the most challenging aspect of the negotiation. After 
the second session of the Prepcom (2016), the chairperson published a docu-
ment with his understanding of possible areas of convergence of views and 
possible issues for further discussion emanating from the discussion.1 After the 
first session of the conference (2018), the chairperson issued a paper, called 
“President’s aid to negotiations”.2 It presents options of provisions, including 
the “no text” option, that reflect the different positions taken by the negotiating 
States. Both documents show that fundamental differences persist as regards 
a number of matters on which the future regime should be built. This chapter 
reviews the main pending questions relating to the genetic resources regime.
2 The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind
Under Art. 136 of the UNCLOS, the “Area”, that is the seabed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and its resources, 
are the common heritage of mankind. This is the main innovating aspect of 
the UNCLOS with respect to the previous law of the sea regime. It is based on 
a new concept which is completely different from both the traditional con-
cepts of sovereignty, which applies in the territorial sea and, to a certain extent, 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), or freedom, which applies on the high 
seas. The common heritage of mankind is a third option (tertium genus), refer-
ring to a particular kind of resources located in the seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction.
The principle of common heritage of mankind was launched in a memo-
rable speech made on 1 November 1967 at the United Nations (U.N.) General 
Assembly by the representative of Malta, Mr. Arvid Pardo. The opportunity for 
1   See the document Preparatory Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 
69/292: Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological 
Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction – Chair’s Overview of the Second Session of the 
Preparatory Committee, available on the website of the United Nations.
2   U.N. Doc. A/CONF.232/2019/1 of 3 December 2018.
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proposing it came from the technological developments which were expected 
to lead in a relatively short time to the commercial exploitation of the poly-
metallic nodules located on the surface of the deep seabed and containing 
some valuable minerals, such as manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper. The 
application of a regime of sovereignty was likely to lead to a series of competi-
tive extensions by coastal States of the limits of national jurisdiction on the 
sea bed. The application of the regime of freedom was likely to lead to a rush 
towards the exploitation of economically and strategically valuable minerals 
under a first-come-first-served criterion. According to Mr. Pardo, the conse-
quences of both possible scenarios would have been equally undesirable. They 
would have encompassed political tension, economic injustice and risks of 
pollution. In a few words, “the strong would get stronger, the rich richer”.
The basic elements of the regime of common heritage of mankind, apply-
ing to the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, are the prohibition 
of national appropriation, the destination of the Area for peaceful purposes, 
the use of the Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
with particular consideration for the interests and needs of developing coun-
tries, as well as the establishment of an international organization entitled 
to act on behalf of mankind in the exercise of rights over the resources. The 
assumption that sovereign States are bound to share the profits resulting from 
the exploitation of some natural resources could be considered as the second 
most revolutionary idea ever conceived in the framework of international 
law (of course, the first is the prohibition to make war, as embodied in the 
U.N. Charter).
The proposal by Malta led to Resolution 2749 (XXV), adopted on 
17 December 1970, whereby the U.N. General Assembly solemnly declared that 
“the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction (…), as well as the resources of the area, are the common 
heritage of mankind” (Art. 1). It should be noted that, according to this resolu-
tion, all the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, fall under the 
common heritage of mankind regime.
Today the basic elements of the concept of common heritage of mankind 
can be found in Part XI of the UNCLOS. The Area and its resources are the com-
mon heritage of mankind (Art. 136). No State can claim or exercise sovereignty 
over any part of the Area, nor can any State or natural or juridical person appro-
priate any part thereof (Art. 137, para. 1). The Area can be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes (Art. 141). All rights over the resources of the Area are vested 
in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf an international organization, that is 
the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA), is entitled to act. Activities in the 
Area are carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of 
the geographical location of States, whether coastal or land-locked, and taking 
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into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States (Art. 
140, para. 1). The ISBA provides for the equitable sharing of financial and other 
economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through an appropriate 
mechanism (Art. 140, para. 2).3
As it is well known, in 1982 the text of the UNCLOS was submitted to vote 
after all efforts to reach consensus had been exhausted. It received 130 votes in 
favour, 4 against and 17 abstentions. Many developed States were among those 
which cast a negative vote or abstained. The main criticism was addressed 
to the regime of the Area. According to the developed States, it would have 
discouraged mining activities by individual States and private concerns, 
would have unduly favoured the monopoly of activities by the ISBA, would 
have burdened the contractors with excessive financial and other obligations 
relating also to the field of transfer of technology and would have disregarded 
the interests of industrialized countries in the decision-making procedures 
of the Council, the executive organ of the ISBA.
In 1994 it was clear that the UNCLOS was expected to formally enter into 
force without the participation of many developed countries, that is without 
the participation of the only States having the command of the high tech-
nological and financial capability required to engage in deep seabed mining 
activities. To avoid this danger, a new negotiation began on Part XI of the 
UNCLOS. It resulted in the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of 
Part XI of the UNCLOS, which was annexed to Resolution 48/263, adopted by 
the General Assembly on 17 August 1994. This resolution, while reaffirming 
that the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, recog-
nizes that “political and economic changes, including in particular a growing 
reliance on market principles, have necessitated the re-evaluation of some 
aspects of the regime for the Area and its resources”.
The provisions of the Part XI Implementation Agreement and those of Part XI 
of the UNCLOS “shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instru-
ment” (Art. 2). However, in the event of any inconsistency between the Part XI 
Implementation Agreement and Part XI itself, the provisions of the former 
shall prevail. In fact, the label of “implementation agreement” is a diplomatic 
device – a fig leaf, in non-diplomatic language – that covers the evident reality 
that the UNCLOS was amended and several provisions were changed within 
the original system for exploitation of the resources of the Area.
Following the adoption of the Implementation Agreement, the UNCLOS 
has today achieved a broad participation (with some notable exceptions). 
Although modified, the original spirit of the UNCLOS is not betrayed. The 
3   See chapter 7 of this book, J. Dingwall, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework’.
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principle of common heritage of mankind is still there and remains a major 
source of inspiration for a treaty that aims not only at the codification, but also 
the progressive development of international law.
Since several years the ISBA has been working on its mandate. In 2000, 
the ISBA Assembly approved the Regulations on prospecting and explora-
tion for polymetallic nodules and in 2010 the Regulations on prospecting and 
exploration for polymetallic sulphides. The approval of a third set of regula-
tions, relating to prospecting and exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese 
crusts has taken place in 2012. Several plans of work for exploration for poly-
metallic nodules and polymetallic sulphides have so far been approved by 
the ISBA Council. On 1 February 2011 the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rendered an advisory opinion on 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, as requested by the ISBA Council, which pro-
vides important clarifications on a number of aspects of the mining regime.4
However, the prospects coming from the mineral resources in the Area 
remain uncertain, as some factors have a negative impact on progress towards 
their commercial exploitation. They include the great depths at which deposits 
occur, the high costs involved in research and development of mining technol-
ogy and the fact that, under current economic conditions, deep seabed mining 
may remain uncompetitive if compared to land-based mining.
3 The Conflicting Views on the General Principles Applicable to 
Genetic Resources beyond National Jurisdiction
In the meantime, the exploitation of genetic resources found beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction has become a commercially promising activity. 
The deep seabed is not a desert, despite extreme conditions of cold, complete 
darkness and high pressure. It is the habitat of diverse forms of life associated 
with typical features, such as hydrothermal vents, cold water seeps, seamounts 
or deep water coral reefs. In particular, it supports forms of life that present 
unique genetic characteristics. For instance, animal communities of micro-
organisms, fish, crustaceans, polychaetes, echinoderms, coelenterates and 
molluscs live in the complete absence of sunlight where warm water springs 
from tectonically active areas (so-called hydrothermal vents). These commu-
nities, which do not depend on plant photosynthesis for their survival, rely 
on specially adapted micro-organisms able to synthesize organic compounds 
4   For further consideration of the ISBA’s Mining Code, see Ibid, chapter 7 of this book, 
J. Dingwall.
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from the hydrothermal fluid of the vents (chemosyntesis). The ability of some 
deep seabed organisms to survive extreme temperatures (thermophiles and 
hyperthermofiles), high pressure (barophiles) and other extreme conditions 
(extremophiles) makes their genes of great interest to science and industry.5
So far, only few States and private entities have access to the financial means 
and sophisticated technologies needed to reach the deep seabed and to take 
samples of organisms found there, in order to study and isolating in laborato-
ries genetic material deriving from such organisms. The result of this kind of 
activity could be the patenting of commercially valuable products to put them 
on the market.
Neither the UNCLOS, nor the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
provide any specific regulatory framework for the genetic resources of the sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction. This could be considered as an evident gap 
in international law of the sea.6
5   See chapter 2 of this book, E. Ramirez-Llodra, ‘Deep-Sea ecosystems: biodiversity and anthro-
pogenic impacts’.
6   On this question see L. Glowka, ‘The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine 
Scientific Research, and the Area’, in (eds.) Ocean Yearbook (Brill, 1996) at p. 156; T. Scovazzi, 
‘Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bioprospecting: Some 
Considerations on the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority’ (2004) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 383; S. Arico and C. Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic 
Resources in the Deep Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy Aspects (United Nations University, 
2005); D.K. Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea (Brill Nijhoff, 
2006); A.G. Oude Elferink, ‘The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of 
the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High Seas’ (2007) International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law at p. 143; F. Millicay, ‘A Legal Regime for the Biodiversity of the 
Area’, in Nordquist, Long, Heider and Moore (eds.), Law, Science and Ocean Management 
(Brill, 2007), p. 739; de La Fayette, ‘A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use 
of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction’ 
Vol. 24:2 (2009) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, p. 221; F. Armas-Pfirter, 
How Can Life in the Deep Seabed Be Protected? (2009) ibidem, p. 281; L. Ridweway, ‘Marine 
Genetic Resources: Outcomes of the United Nations Informal Consultative Process’, (2009) 
ibidem, p. 309; R. Barnes, ‘Entitlement to Marine Living Resources in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’, in A.G. Oude Elferink& E.J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Legal Regime of 
Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments(Brill, Leiden, 2010), 
p. 83; T. Scovazzi, ‘The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: General and 
Institutional Aspects’, ibidem, p. 43; A. Jørem and M. Walløe Tvedt, ‘Bioprospecting in the 
High Seas: Existing Rights and Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction’29 (2014:2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
p. 321; L. Glowka, ‘Marine Genetic Resources within and beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Existing and Emerging International 
Legal Framework and Processes’, in M.C. Ribeiro (ed.), 30 Years after the Signature of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Coimbra, 2014) p. 251; J. Wehrli and T. Cottier, 
‘Towards a Treaty Instrument on Marine Genetic Resources’, ibidem, p. 517.
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In 2006, the subject of the international regime for such resources began to 
be discussed within the already mentioned Working Group. Opposite views 
were put forward by the States concerned. Several States, especially within the 
group of developing countries, took the position that the UNCLOS principle 
of common heritage of mankind applies also to marine genetic resources and 
that the mandate of the ISBA should cover also such resources. Other States, in 
particular some developed countries, relied on the principle of freedom of the 
high seas, which would imply freedom of access to, and unrestricted exploita-
tion of, deep seabed genetic resources.
This basic difference of views persists. On 18 December 2015 the chairperson 
of the Prepcom invited delegations who wished to do so to submit papers with 
their views on the elements of a future legally binding instrument.7
On the one hand, according to the views expressed on 9 September 2016 by 
the United States,
there is no legal gap in regard to marine genetic resources in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. Rather, these resources fall under the high seas 
regime of international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC). Marine genetic resources (MGR) in areas beyond national juris-
diction are not covered by the provisions pertaining to the International 
Seabed Authority or the Area (Part XI), except as part of the marine 
environment that must be protected in connection with ‘activities in the 
Area’ (which are defined as activities of exploration for and exploitation 
of the resources of the Area; in the context of the Area, ‘resources’ are 
expressly defined to include only mineral resources).
We support application of the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind to mineral resources in the Area, as is clearly articulated in the 
Law of the Sea Convention. However, we do not support the applica-
tion of this concept beyond that, and in particular, we oppose any appli-
cation of the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’ to marine genetic 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. […]
In the high seas regime under international law, no State nor any other 
entity has sovereign rights over MGR in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion. Anyone can freely access such MGR in accordance with interna-
tional law. […]
7   The papers are available on the website of the United Nations.
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MGR in areas beyond national jurisdiction fall under the high seas 
regime of the law of the sea, and we do not want to see restrictions placed 
on those resources.8
On the other hand, according to the paper by Costa Rica, the principle of com-
mon heritage of mankind has a broad content that goes beyond the mineral 
resources of the Area:
Common heritage of mankind is a principle of international law that 
states that the cosmos, defined territorial areas and elements of human-
ity’s common heritage (cultural and natural) are common to humankind. 
The principle states that areas of Antarctica, the sea bed, and outer space 
cannot be monopolized for the benefit of one state or group of states 
alone, for they are to be used for the benefit of all mankind.9
Besides relying on the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution 2749 
(XXV),10 Costa Rica also points out that Art. 137 UNCLOS
contemplates a general provision that encompasses all resources of the 
Area (‘All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a 
whole’), and a specific one for mineral resources (‘The minerals recov-
ered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with 
this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority’).
In this regard all other resources from ‘the Area’ are also common heri-
tage of mankind.
This is the case of the marine genetic resources of the Area and any 
other resources that may be discovered in the future.11
Also in the view of the Federated States of Micronesia (paper of 14 March 2016),
the living resources of ABNJs [= areas beyond national jurisdiction] are the 
common heritage of humankind, deserving of coordinated conservation 
and sustainable use by the international community lest the resources are 
forever depleted. This designation extends to marine genetic resources 
of ABNJs, in light of their potential for providing important benefits for 
8    Paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 1.
9    Paper by Costa Rica (supra, n 7), p. 5.
10   Supra, para. 2.
11   Paper by Costa Rica (supra, n 7), p. 6.
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the health and livelihoods of all humankind for generations to come if 
properly studied and sustainably exploited. The sole exception to this 
designation among the living resources of ABNJs is fish, but only to the 
extent that existing international, regional, and subregional instruments, 
institutions, and other regulatory entities do not currently allow for such 
a designation to attach to the fish stocks they regulate.12
In the already mentioned document containing his overview of the second 
session of the Prepcom,13 the chairperson remarked that
discussions will need to intensify to identify ways to bridge the divergent 
views of delegations regarding the application of the high seas freedom 
and the common heritage of mankind in relation to marine genetic 
resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, including questions on 
the sharing of benefits.
It may be asked whether the common heritage of mankind and the freedom of 
the high seas are mutually exclusive or could apply concurrently in an interna-
tional instrument. In the already mentioned “President’s aid to negotiations” 
paper14 the following alternatives are provided:
“Common heritage of mankind;
No text;
Freedom of the high seas;
The freedom of the high seas shall govern the provisions for access to 
marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, while the 
common heritage of mankind shall govern their exploitation”.
4 Some Considerations on the Conflicting Views
Both the conflicting views move from the frequently repeated assumption that 
the UNCLOS is the legal framework for all activities taking place in marine 
spaces. For instance, General Assembly Resolution 73/124 of 11 December 2018 
on “Oceans and the Law of the Sea”, following several previous resolutions 
on the same subject, emphasizes in the preamble “the universal and unified 
12   Paper by Micronesia (supra, n 7), para. 5.
13   Supra, n 1.
14   Supra, n 2.
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character” of the UNCLOS and reaffirms that it “sets out the legal framework 
within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out”.
However, such an assumption is not completely true.15 There is no doubt that 
the UNCLOS is a cornerstone in the field of codification of international law. 
It has been rightly qualified as a “constitution for the oceans,” “a monumental 
achievement in the international community,” “the first comprehensive treaty 
dealing with practically every aspect of the uses and resources of the seas and 
the oceans,” an instrument which “has successfully accommodated the com-
peting interests of all nations.”16 Nevertheless, the UNCLOS, as any legal text, 
is linked to the time when it was negotiated and adopted (from 1973 to 1982). 
Being itself a product of time, the UNCLOS cannot stop the passing of time. 
While it provides a solid basis for the regulation of many matters, it would be 
illusory to think that the UNCLOS is the end of legal regulation. International 
law of the sea is subject to a process of natural evolution and progressive devel-
opment which involves also the UNCLOS.
In particular, the UNCLOS cannot work the miracle of regulating those 
activities that were not foreseeable in the period when it was being negotiated. 
At this time, very little was known about the uses of the genetic properties 
of marine organisms. For evident chronological reasons, the economic value of 
this kind of uses was not taken in consideration by the UNCLOS negotiators. 
When dealing with the special regime of the Area and its resources, they had 
only mineral resources in mind. This is evident from the plain text of the 
UNCLOS, in which the expressions “genetic resources” and “bioprospecting” 
do not appear anywhere. By regulating today genetic resources no pre-existing 
balance could be altered for the simple reason that genetic resources were not 
included in any UNCLOS balance.
It is a matter of fact that the term “activities” in the Area is defined as “all 
activities of exploration for, and exploitation of the resources of the Area” 
(Art. 1, para. 1) and that the term “resources” of the Area is defined as “all solid, 
liquid or gaseous mineral resources in-situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-
bed, including polymetallic nodules” (Art. 133, a). This means that the present 
UNCLOS regime of common heritage of mankind does not include the non-
mineral resources of the Area and that the rules conceived for the exploration 
15   See T. Scovazzi, ‘Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All 
Activities in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting’, in D. Vidas (ed.), Law, Technology and 
Science for Oceans in Globalisation, (Brill Leiden, 2010), p. 309.
16   T. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in U.N., The Law of the Sea – Official Text of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, New York, 1983, p. xxiii.
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and exploitation of mineral resources cannot be extended to other resources 
located therein.
However, this does not prevent States from extending the most innovat-
ing principle of common heritage of mankind to newly discovered resources 
not covered by the UNCLOS, if they wished to do so. Yet, such an extension 
would be a natural evolution within the spirit of the UNCLOS, a treaty based on 
General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV)17 and aiming at contributing “to the 
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes 
into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particu-
lar the special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or 
land-locked” (UNCLOS preamble).
The scope of the regime of the Area is already today broader than it may 
be believed at first sight. Under the UNCLOS, the legal condition of the Area 
as common heritage of mankind has an influence also on the regulation of 
activities that, although different from mining activities, are located in this 
space. The regime of the Area encompasses subjects which are more or less 
directly related to mining activities, such as marine scientific research (see Art. 
143, para. 1), the preservation of the marine environment (see Art. 145) and the 
protection of underwater cultural heritage (see Art. 149). As far as the first two 
subjects are concerned, it is difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between 
what takes place on the seabed and what in the super-jacent waters.
An interesting remark is that bioprospecting, an activity that is currently 
understood as the search for commercially valuable genetic resources, can 
already be considered as falling under the UNCLOS regime of marine scientific 
research. While the UNCLOS does not provide any definition of “marine sci-
entific research”, Art. 246, which applies to the EEZ and the continental shelf, 
makes a distinction between two kinds of marine scientific research projects, 
namely those carried out “to increase scientific knowledge of the marine 
environment for the benefit of all mankind” (Art. 246, para. 3) and those “of 
direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, 
whether living or non-living” (Art. 246, para. 5, a). This distinction supports 
the view that, under the UNCLOS logic, research activities of direct signifi-
cance for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources also 
fall under the general label of “marine scientific research”. It follows that bio-
prospecting is also covered by Art. 143, para. 1, UNCLOS, which sets forth the 
rule that “marine scientific research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively 
17   Supra, para. 2. Under this resolution, all the resources of the seabed beyond national juris-
diction fall under the common heritage of mankind regime.
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for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”18 This pro-
vision refers to any kind of marine scientific research and is not limited to 
research on mineral resources. Yet, the reading of Art. 143 UNCLOS in combina-
tion with Art. 246 UNLOS contradicts the assumption that there is an absolute 
freedom to carry out bioprospecting in the Area.19 States which are active in 
bioprospecting in this space are already bound to contribute to the benefit of 
mankind as a whole.20 There is an inextricable link between marine scientific 
research and bioprospecting. A research endeavour organised with the intent 
to increase human knowledge may well result in the discovery of commercially 
valuable information on genetic resources.
While a specific regime for genetic resources is lacking, the aim of shar-
ing the benefits among all States, which was the main aspect of the seminal 
proposal made by Mr. Pardo, can still be seen as a basic objective embodied 
in the UNCLOS spirit. Also in the field of genetic resources, the application of 
the principle of freedom of the sea, that is based on a “first-come-first-served” 
or “freedom-of-fishing-for-resources” approach, leads to inequitable conse-
quences. New cooperative schemes, based on provisions on access and sharing 
of benefits, should be envisaged as the basis of a future regime for marine 
genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction. This would also be in full con-
formity with the principle of fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources, set forth by Art. 1 of the CBD and 
18   Art. 241 UNCLOS is also relevant in the discussion on the legal condition of the genetic 
resources of the deep seabed. It provides that “marine scientific research activities shall 
not constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its 
resources”.
19   Art. 143, para. 3, UNCLOS grants the States the right to carry out scientific research in 
the Area, but obliges them to cooperate with other States and the ISBA in various fields, 
including the dissemination of results. Also this provision refers to any kind of marine 
scientific research in the Area.
20   As stated by F. Francioni, ‘Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The 
International Legal Framework’, in F. Francioni (ed.), Biotechnologies and International 
Human Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 14, “the principle of common heritage in its 
substantive aspect is, like any norm of international law, capable of being applied in a 
decentralised manner by states. Even in the absence of ad hoc institutions every state is 
under an obligation to respect and fulfil the principle of the common heritage by ensur-
ing that subjects within its jurisdiction do not act contrary to its object and purpose. This 
would be the case if a state authorised or negligently failed to prevent biotechnological 
activities in common spaces that had the effect of causing severe and irreversible damage 
to the unique biodiversity of that space. Similarly, a state would fail the common heritage 
if it authorised exclusive appropriation of genetic resources without requiring equitable 
sharing of pertinent scientific knowledge and without ensuring that a fair portion of eco-
nomic benefits accruing from their exploitation be devoted to the conservation and sus-
tainable development of such common resources”.
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by Art. 10 of the Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (Nagoya, 2010).21
The major conceptual, but also practical, obstacle to be addressed by the 
ongoing negotiations on marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdic-
tion is to be found in the ghost of a contradiction. On the one hand, it may 
not seem politically expedient to rely on the concept of common heritage of 
mankind, because this could since the beginning prevent many hopes to reach 
consensus among all the States involved in the negotiations. On the other, to 
meet evident requirements of equity, any future regime on genetic resources 
located in a “common” space could hardly result in the granting of all the ben-
efits therefrom only to a few developed States. This brings into the picture the 
need for a regulation of access and sharing of benefits, which are the two typi-
cal elements of the principle of common heritage of mankind.
5 Other Relevant Questions
Besides the basic dilemma between a heritage-based or a freedom-based 
approach, progress on the way for the drafting of a new regime for marine 
genetic resources is also linked to the capacity of States to address and solve a 
number of specific issues which are far from being trivial.
In the already mentioned document containing his overview of the second 
session of the Prepcom,22 the chairperson listed the following possible areas of 
convergence of views on marine genetic resources:
– “Usefulness of agreeing on working definitions of marine genetic resources 
and other key concepts at the preliminary stage;
21   Hereinafter: Nagoya Protocol. According to Art. 10, “Parties shall consider the need for 
and the modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in transboundary 
situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent. The 
benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of 
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally”. While the Nagoya 
Protocol does not apply to areas beyond national jurisdiction, it could become a source of 
inspiration for a future regime applying to resources located in such areas. Another source 
of inspiration could be the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (Rome, 2001), concluded under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). On this treaty, see C. Chiarolla, Intellectual 
Property, Agriculture and Global Food Security (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011).
22   Supra, n 1.
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– Usefulness of drawing on definitions contained in existing instruments;
– Guiding principles and approaches constitute a cross-cutting issue;
– Benefit-sharing for non-monetary benefits;
– The rights of coastal States over their continental shelf should be respected;
– Benefit-sharing should/should also/could contribute to conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction;
– Benefit-sharing should be beneficial to current and future generations, 
build capacity to access marine genetic resources of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, and not be detrimental to research and development”.
This list does not seem to reflect much convergence. A convergence to define 
key concepts at a preliminary stage does not mean that agreement on the con-
tent of the definitions has already been reached.23 Moreover, any convergence 
on specific aspects of benefit-sharing seems conditional on an agreement on 
“whether to have a benefit-sharing mechanism” itself, which instead is listed 
among the issues requiring further discussions. Notable is that convergence 
exists on the assumption that the rights of coastal States over their continental 
shelf should be respected. This should be understood in the sense that the new 
regime will not affect coastal States’ rights over the genetic resources found in 
the so-called extended continental shelf, that is in the seabed beyond the 200 
n.m. and up to the limit of the continental margin (see the definition of conti-
nental shelf given by Art. 76 UNCLOS).24
Among the still pending issues related to genetic resources, the following 
seem particularly important.
5.1 Access and Benefit Sharing Regimes
In the already mentioned document containing the Prepcom chairperson’s 
overview of the second session of the Prepcom,25 the issues on “whether to 
regulate access to marine genetic resources of areas beyond national juris-
diction or not”, “whether to have a benefit-sharing mechanism”, “whether to 
include monetary benefits or not” and “whether access to resources ex situ / 
resources in silico / genetic sequence data should be included in an access and 
23   According to the restrictive position taken by the United States, “marine genetic resources 
should be limited to material from living organisms containing functional genetic units of 
heredity. The definition should not include material such as enzymes or other proteins or 
information generated from MGR [= marine genetic resources] such as genetic sequence 
data”: paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 1.
24   Under Art. 82 UNCLOS, the coastal States’ obligation to make payments or contributions 
in kind in respect of the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is 
limited to the exploitation of the “non-living resources” of the extended continental shelf.
25   Supra, n 1.
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benefit-sharing regime” are listed among those requiring further discussions. 
The four issues are closely connected.
According to the United States, no access regime should be put in place 
at the international level, as it would be contrary to the principle of freedom 
of the high seas:
In the high seas regime under international law, no State nor any other 
entity has sovereign rights over MGR [= marine genetic resources] in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction. Anyone can freely access such MGR 
in accordance with international law.26
In the United States’ view, any future regime should not put in question the 
right of ownership over marine genetic resources. Access itself to genetic 
resources, in the sense of capacity building for those States that need it, should 
be considered as the main, if not the only, benefit that could be shared:
As we do not have to discuss issues of ownership of MGR, we are instead 
free to share ideas on how sharing benefits might allow us to best achieve 
our overarching conservation objectives, and how such benefit sharing 
arrangements might work. Benefit sharing must be considered in the 
context of how any benefit sharing might allow us to achieve our conser-
vation objectives. We do not want to advance any benefit sharing condi-
tions that might create operational inefficiencies or otherwise obstruct 
beneficial research or development activities. In our view, especially 
given the difficulty for many to even access MGR, access to MGR in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction could itself be considered a benefit, and it 
is important for this group to discuss how we might be able to advance 
access as a benefit.27
MGR in areas beyond national jurisdiction fall under the high seas 
regime of the law of the sea, and we do not want to see restrictions 
placed on those resources. If, however, a new instrument were to include 
a benefit-sharing regime, the benefits should focus on capacity build-
ing and conservation. At the last Prepcom session we heard compelling 
descriptions of the difficulties some scientists, particularly from devel-
oping countries, face in terms of having access to BBNJ [= biodiversity 
26   Paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 2.
27   Ibidem, p. 2.
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beyond national jurisdiction]. Increased access to BBNJ, in ways accept-
able to States, could be an example of positive benefit-sharing.28
A different view, based on strong access and benefit sharing regimes that pre-
suppose an international machinery, is put forward by those States that are in 
favour of the principle of common heritage of mankind. As stated in the paper 
by Micronesia,
it is the FSM’s [Federated States of Micronesia’s] view that marine genetic 
resources (MGRs) – being the common heritage of humankind and 
a key component of the marine biological diversity to be regulated by 
the BBNJ instrument – must be subject to an access and benefit sharing 
(ABS) regime that is robust, equitable, and properly attuned to the needs 
and interests of developing countries. The sharing of benefits accruing 
from access to and exploitation of MGRs of ABNJs is essential to ensur-
ing that the BBNJ instrument will be acceptable for SIDS [Small Island 
Developing States] like the FSM with longstanding historical and cultural 
connections to and reliance on the Ocean’s bounty.29
In Micronesia’s view, the ABS machinery should play in favour of develop-
ing States and could include the establishment of an international fund and 
the prohibition of activities not complying with the future international 
instrument:
For example, the BBNJ instrument can allow developed country Parties 
to sponsor exploration and exploitation of MGRs of ABNJs by private 
contractors – similar to the exploration and exploitation of non-living 
resources in the Area – in exchange for financial contributions by those 
Parties and/or contractors to an ABS fund, which will then be disbursed 
in an equitable manner to BBNJ States Parties. The BBNJ instrument can 
also encourage developing country Parties to sponsor private contrac-
tors as well, in exchange for granting those developing country Parties 
preferential access to the ABS fund. The sizes of financial contributions 
from developed country Parties may be based on a flat rate, or be pro-
portionate to the geographical scope of the ABNJs to be explored and/
or exploited by the private entities they contract. The BBNJ instrument 
can prohibit access to MGRs – including any benefits that accrue from 
28   Ibidem, p. 3.
29   Paper by Micronesia (supra, n 7), para. 6.
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their exploration and exploitation – that does not comply with this ABS 
regime.30
What kinds of benefits, if any, should be shared is another difficult ques-
tion linked to the previous one. The Nagoya Protocol provides in an annex a 
detailed list of monetary and non-monetary benefits.31 But it is open to discus-
sion, especially in the case of monetary benefits, which among them could 
be relevant, mutatis mutandis, also for the future instrument being discussed 
in the present negotiations on marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.
According to the paper submitted on 29 August 2016 by Nauru on behalf of 
the group of twelve Pacific Small Island Developing States, the following forms 
of benefit sharing could be considered in the future implementing agreement:
30   Ibidem.
31   Pursuant to the Annex: “1. Monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to: 
(a) Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired; (b) Up-front payments; 
(c) Milestone payments; (d) Payment of royalties; (e) Licence fees in case of commercial-
ization; (f) Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustain-
able use of biodiversity; (g) Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed; (h) 
Research funding; (i) Joint ventures; (j) Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property 
rights. 2. Non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to: (a) Sharing of research 
and development results; (b) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific 
research and development programmes, particularly biotechnological research activi-
ties, where possible in the Party providing genetic resources; (c) Participation in product 
development; (d) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in education and training; 
(e) Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases; (f) Transfer to 
the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology under fair and most 
favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms where agreed, in par-
ticular, knowledge and technology that make use of genetic resources, including biotech-
nology, or that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological 
diversity; (g) Strengthening capacities for technology transfer; (h) Institutional capacity-
building; (i) Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the admin-
istration and enforcement of access regulations; (j) Training related to genetic resources 
with the full participation of countries providing genetic resources, and where possible, 
in such countries; (k) Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity, including biological inventories and taxonomic stud-
ies; (l) Contributions to the local economy; (m) Research directed towards priority needs, 
such as health and food security, taking into account domestic uses of genetic resources 
in the Party providing genetic resources; (n) Institutional and professional relationships 
that can arise from an access and benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collabora-
tive activities; (o) Food and livelihood security benefits; (p) Social recognition; (q) Joint 
ownership of relevant intellectual property rights”.
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Monetary:
A trust fund could be created to fund capacity building initiatives for 
developing countries, in particular SIDS [= Small Island Developing 
States]. Given our special circumstances, this trust fund could provide a 
special allocation to SIDS.
This trust fund could be funded by both:
Royalties or milestones payments from the exploitation of MGRs could 
be transferred to a trust fund. Not all MGR-related research lead to 
lucrative outcomes. Therefore, a system focusing solely on royalties or 
milestones payments will not suffice.
Mandatory fees: Proponents of MGR related activities could be 
required to financially contribute to a trust fund.
Non-monetary:
Technology transfer refers to instruments, equipment, vessels, processes 
and methodologies to produce and use knowledge to improve study and 
understanding of ocean/coastal nature/resources:
Proponents of MGR related activities could be required to transfer spe-
cific technology.
In the SAMOA Pathway it was agreed that Marine technology transfer 
should consist of appropriate, reliable, affordable, modern and environ-
mentally sound technologies (including software and equipment) and 
know-how (based on SAMOA Pathway, para. 111).
Knowledge sharing and access to information: Possible consideration 
for a clearinghouse mechanism.
Capacity building: Proponents of MGR related activities could be 
required to provide capacity building to SIDS. Elements of capacity build-
ing could include as an initial matter:
– the provision of education/training in science and technologies, pol-
icy and governance, including through joint research efforts supported 
through the establishment of a global scholarship fund, and enhanced 
through collaboration in research and development on marine genetic 
resources;
– support for and development of regional centres of excellence (such 
as the University of South Pacific) to address regional needs and provide 
long-term education and training.32
32   Paper by Nauru (supra, note 7), p. 6.
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The definition to be chosen for marine genetic resources has also an influ-
ence on the question of the access and benefit sharing regimes. According to 
the United States,
it is best to limit the definition of marine genetic resources to in situ col-
lection. Including ex situ samples and procedures in the definition of 
MGR would introduce a range of complex variables, such as how mate-
rials are collected, transported, and stored. These would dramatically 
complicate the operation of BBNJ benefit-sharing and move us farther 
away from achieving our objectives.33
However, the Pacific Small Island Developing States stress the importance of 
being provided access also to ex situ marine genetic resources:
(…) special consideration for developing countries, in particular SIDS, 
in the access to MGRs activities is important. This requires capacity to 
undertake such research and prospecting activity or research ex-situ. It 
also requires appropriate technology. Furthermore, access to the data 
gathered from accessing these resources should also be provided. This 
requires capacity to understand and use the data. Therefore, the con-
cepts of transparency and traceability of MGRs are important.34
The already mentioned “President’s aid to negotiations” paper35 shows that the 
alternative between both kinds of benefits (monetary and non-monetary), on 
the one hand, and only non-monetary benefits, on the other, is a crucial ques-
tion that still needs to be settled:
For the purposes of this Part, the term ‘benefits’ shall mean monetary and 
non-monetary benefits;
33   Paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 2. As regards the so-called in silico genetic 
resources, the United States makes the following remarks: “Indeed, for purposes of clar-
ity, we should refer to information taken from MGR by its proper name: genetic sequence 
data, or GSD, and not use the term in silico. GSD is information and its sharing can pro-
mote uses of GSD in research and development. If GSD is included, and a decision were 
made to attempt to trace the downloading and use of such information, how would that 
work? We struggle to envision a scenario that could be workable. How could we manage 
benefit-sharing (and promote compliance) if data, something that is freely and openly 
shared as part of research best-practices, were included in it?” (ibidem).
34   Paper by Nauru (supra, n 7), p. 6.
35   Supra, n 2.
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For the purposes of this Part, the term ‘benefits’ shall mean non-
monetary benefits. It includes but is not limited to capacity-building, the 
exchange and public availability of information and scientific knowl-
edge, access to samples and sample collections, access to technology and 
technical knowledge and transfer of technology.
Benefits arising from the use of marine genetic resources of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction may be shared on a voluntary basis.
The last option could be seen as very disappointing for all those who believe in 
the principle of common heritage of mankind.
If a strong access and benefit sharing mechanism is put in place, the ques-
tion should be asked about the role of the ISBA within the future regime for 
marine genetic resources. It would be logical to involve an international orga-
nization that has already acquired knowledge and experience in activities on 
the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and in the protection of 
its unique environment. Yet, the mandate of the ISBA deserves close scrutiny, 
especially if it is to be understood not only as an entity involved in marine min-
ing activities in competition with others, but as the international organisation 
which bears the main responsibility to realize a just and equitable economic 
order of the oceans and seas. Nothing prevents States from expanding the 
responsibility of the ISBA and granting it some management competences also 
in the field of genetic resources.
5.2 Intellectual Property Rights
Another issue requiring further discussions is whether to address intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) in the future international instrument.
It is a matter of fact that only few States and private entities have the financial 
means and sophisticated technologies needed not only to reach the genetic 
resources of the deep seabed, but also to develop commercially valuable prod-
ucts therefrom. Already in 2005, a document issued by the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of the CBD pointed 
out that
reaching deep seabed extreme environments and maintaining alive the 
sampled organisms, as well as culturing them, requires sophisticated and 
expensive technologies. (…) Typically, the technology associated with 
research on deep seabed genetic resources involves: oceanographic ves-
sels equipped with sonar technology, manned or unmanned submersible 
vehicles; in situ sampling tools; technology related to culture methods; 
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molecular biology technology and techniques; and technology associated 
with the different steps of the commercialization process of derivatives 
of deep seabed genetic resources. With the exception of basic molecu-
lar biology techniques, most of the technology necessary for accessing 
the deep seabed and studying and isolating its organisms is owned by 
research institutions, both public and private. To date, only very few 
countries have access to these technologies.36
The prospects for commercial application of marine bioprospecting activi-
ties are quite promising, especially in the pharmaceutical sector. However, 
the IPRs legislation of several States does not compel the applicant for a pat-
ent to disclose the origin of the genetic materials used. This may prevent the 
establishment of an international regime which would provide for the joint 
ownership over, or other form of benefit sharing from, IPRs related to genetic 
resources found in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.
It is not surprising that those States that support the application of the prin-
ciple of common heritage of mankind also envisage substantive changes in the 
present regime of IPRs. As stated by Micronesia,
the study of MGRs is a cutting edge field, and as such, it is subject to com-
peting and complex intellectual property (IP) considerations. It is the 
FSM’s view that the Ocean must be an open source for research innova-
tion and solutions for the ills and challenges of humankind, particularly 
the living resources of ABNJs. Although discoveries and commercial inno-
vations are encouraged with regard to MGRs of ABNJs, such innovation 
should not cater exclusively to profit motives, but should instead respect 
the common interest of humankind in benefitting from the sustainable 
use of such MGRs. Discoveries among living resources of ABNJs that are 
useful for the further preservation of biodiversity and MGRs should not 
be beholden to exclusive rights of discrete private entities or individuals. 
IP rights should not be applied with such rigidity in pursuit of exclu-
sively commercial ends that they preclude the use of the targeted living 
resources to ameliorate some of the common concerns of humankind. 
Thus, it is the FSM’s view that any IP rights that attach to MGRs of ABNJs 
under the BBNJ instrument must be secondary to the entitlements of the 
36   Status and Trends of, and Threats to, Deep Seabed Genetic Resources beyond National 
Jurisdiction, and Identification of Technical Options for their Conservation and Sustainable 
Use, doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/11/11 of 22 July 2005, paras. 12 and 13.
234 Scovazzi
international community that flow from the designation of MGRs as the 
common heritage of humankind. An ABS regime for MGRs of ABNJs must 
reflect this treatment of IP rights.37
Any proposals of innovations in rules regarding IPRs have proved to be a major 
subject of discussion in the ongoing negotiations. The already mentioned 
“President’s aid to negotiations” paper38 under the heading “intellectual prop-
erty rights” lists options ranging from compulsory disclosure of the origin of 
marine genetic resources involved in patents to “no text”.
5.3 Genetic Resources of the Water Column
The United States puts forward that MGRs found in the high seas water column 
above the seabed should not be included in any benefit sharing arrangement. 
They rely on the precedent established by Art. 77, para. 4, UNCLOS, where 
species on the seabed (sedentary species) are treated differently from species 
found in the super-jacent waters.39
Other States take the position that the future regime should be the same 
and should apply to all marine spaces beyond national jurisdiction, irrespec-
tive of whether the genetic resources are found in the waters or on the seabed.
In the Prepcom chairperson’s overview, the issue of “whether to include 
marine genetic resources of the water column beyond areas of national juris-
diction in a benefit-sharing regime” is listed among the issues requiring further 
discussions. Conflicting options appear also in the “President’s aid to negotia-
tions” paper.
5.4 Role of Traditional Knowledge
The view has been expressed that those indigenous coastal communities who 
possess special knowledge about living resources in marine areas beyond 
national jurisdiction should be afforded special consideration under the future 
regime. According to Micronesia,
the ancestors of the current indigenous inhabitants of the islands and 
atolls of the FSM navigated the wide expanse of the Pacific Ocean using, 
among other things, the creatures of the Ocean as guides and sources 
of sustenance, based on ancient knowledge about their behavior pat-
terns and nutritional values. In ABS regimes under the Nagoya Protocol 
37   Paper by Micronesia (supra, n 7), p. 2.
38   Supra, n 2.
39   Paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 3.
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[…]to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), entities wishing to 
access biological diversity under the jurisdiction of a CBD Contracting 
Party must first secure the informed consent of indigenous communi-
ties in the jurisdiction who are considered custodians of that biological 
diversity. Similarly, for the BBNJ instrument, it is the FSM’s view that an 
entity wishing to study, explore, and/or exploit MGRs in a particular ABNJ 
must at the very least consult the indigenous communities of the coastal 
States whose EEZs abut that ABNJ prior to commencing their engage-
ment with the MGRs. The ABS regime for the MGRs can also prioritize 
those indigenous communities in terms of receiving benefits from the 
regime, including benefits from the aforementioned ABS fund.40
In the Prepcom Chairperson’s overview, the issue of the “role of traditional 
knowledge in the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction” is listed among the issues requiring further 
discussions. The question is still open, at least insofar it is linked to agreement 
on the access and benefit sharing regimes.
5.5 The Double Nature of Fish
While listed in the Prepcom chairperson’s overview as an issue requiring fur-
ther discussions, “whether to take into account the distinction between fish 
used for its genetic properties and fish used as commodity when developing a 
definition” should not become a major point of contention. Even though dif-
ferent options are listed, the “President’s aid to negotiations” paper goes in the 
direction that the future instrument will not apply to fish used as a commodity.
A distinction between fishing and the exploitation of marine genetic 
resources is needed and is conceptually clear enough. Both fishing and the 
exploitation of marine genetic resources presuppose the taking of living 
resources from the sea. However, what is important for the fishermen is the 
whole body of the exploited resource or tangible parts of it, in order to har-
vest it for consumption. Fishing activities aim at exploiting large quantities 
of given living resources to produce the maximum yield from the target spe-
cies. The purpose of those who look for genetic resources is different. Here 
the bodies are considered mainly as receptacles of genes. The objective is to 
seize the functional units of heredity to determine whether and how they can 
be used or stored waiting for a future use. For this kind of activity there is no 
need of large quantities of living resources, as quality and difference are much 
more significant than quantity and similarity. Unlike the case of fisheries, the 
40   Paper by Micronesia (supra, note 7), para. 8.
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added value of the use of genetic material is tremendous and questions of pat-
ents and protection of intellectual property can easily arise. Although genetic 
resources could be extracted also from fish or other marine living resources 
normally used as commodities, it would be completely illogical to apply to 
activities directed at marine genetic resources the rules of the UNCLOS relat-
ing to conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas 
(for example, the determination of the total allowable catch). It would equally 
be illogical to transform the future implementation agreement into a treaty 
devoted to the management and allocation of fish resources.
As remarked by the United States,
(…) if marine genetic resources from a fish are used for their genetic prop-
erties, they should be treated as other MGR under any new instrument. 
There would be no reason to treat a gene from a fish differently than a 
gene from any other marine organism. If, however, fish are used as a com-
modity, then many would fall under existing regimes, including regional 
fisheries management organizations, and should not be addressed here.41
5.6 The “Straddling” Genetic Resources
The already mentioned Nagoya Protocol, which applies to the components of 
biological diversity found in areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction 
(see Art. 4, b, CBD) grants a number of rights to the country of origin of genetic 
resources, intended as “the country which possesses those genetic resources 
in in-situ conditions” (Art. 2 CBD). As areas of deep waters can also be located 
within the EEZ, depending on the broad or reduced extension of the conti-
nental margin of a given coastal State, it may happen that the same genetic 
resource is found both within and beyond areas of national jurisdiction. It 
would potentially fall under two different regimes, namely those of the Nagoya 
Protocol and the future implementation agreement. The problem would 
get worse if the implementation agreement were to cover also the genetic 
resources of high seas waters.
The “President’s aid to negotiations” paper includes, as an option, a detailed 
provision addressing the thorny question of “straddling” genetic resources:
Activities with respect to marine genetic resources of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction that are also found in areas within national juris-
diction shall be conducted with due regard to the rights and legitimate 
interests of any coastal State under the jurisdiction of which such 
41   Paper by the United States (supra, n 7), p. 2.
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resources are found. Consultations, including a system of prior noti-
fication, shall be undertaken with the State concerned, with a view to 
avoiding infringement of such rights and interests. In cases where activi-
ties with respect to marine genetic resources of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction may result in the exploitation of marine genetic resources 
which are found in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction, 
the prior consent of the coastal State concerned shall be required.
6 Conclusive Remark
The work for a third UNCLOS implementation agreement is ongoing.42 If the 
agreement will ever be adopted, it could lead to a major improvement in 
international law of the sea and to a more equitable system of exploitation 
of marine resources. Given the difficulties and intricacies of many among the 
issues under discussion, the work needs to be pursued by the States involved 
in a spirit of moderation and through an effort constructive imagination. Such 
qualities have not yet sufficiently materialized. Time will tell about the future 
meetings.
42   See T. Scovazzi, ‘The Negotiations for a Binding Instrument on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond National Jurisdiction’, Vol. 70 
(2016) Marine Policy, p. 188.
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chapter 11
Marine Genetic Resources: a Practical Legal 




In September 2018, the negotiation of a new international legally binding 
instrument (ILBI) for the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) took 
the first really concrete steps under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS1).2 Prior to the General Assembly establishing this 
Intergovernmental Committee there have been meetings in a Preparatory 
Committee and Ad Hoc Working group, dating back more than a decade.3 The 
second meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee spent, at its meeting in 
March–April 2019, two and a half days discussing the role of marine genetic 
resources (MGR). In the working document ‘Chair’s streamlined non-paper on 
elements of a draft text of an international legally-binding instrument’ that 
might be the first textual step towards what might be a protocol to UNCLOS, 
MGR are allocated six pages drawing on experiences of other regulations of 
genetic resources.4
There are a number of special regulatory and factual features for marine 
genetic resources that cannot be copy-pasted from any of the existing regimes 
*   The research behind this chapter is conducted under the project BiosPolar funded by the 
Norwegian Research Council “Legal frameworks for bioprospecting and bio-innovation in 
Polar Regions (BiosPolar)” (Project number 257631/E10).
1   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, adopted on 10 December 1982.
2   According to the General Assembly resolution 72/249 of 24 December 2017.
3   The Ad Hoc was established by resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea (A/RES/59/24, 2004). For more information about the early steps, see 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/biodiversityworkinggroup.htm.
4   https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/Chairs_streamlined_non-paper_
to_delegations.pdf Leary focuses on the many topics on which there is yet no consensus, 
in Leary, D. (2019) Agreeing to disagree on what we have or have not agreed on: The current 
state of play of the BBNJ negotiations on the status of marine genetic resources in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, Marine Policy. Volume 99, pp. 21–29.
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on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS).5 The ABS system of Convention of 
Biological Diversity (CBD) or its Nagoya Protocol (NP)6 does not apply directly 
to ABNJ.7 One obvious feature is the lack of a state with sovereign rights to and 
jurisdiction over marine genetic resources. Consequently, there are no existing 
institutions to grant access, provide a prior informed consent and be the coun-
terpart in a contract.
Even if the ‘Chair’s non-paper’ from 2019 is built on definitions and concepts 
from existing ABS regimes, they are not legally binding in the ABNJ. Thus, a 
new instrument in the ABNJ can choose other approaches. The UNCLOS itself 
takes both a resource approach and an activity approach in its regulation.8 The 
resource approach appears in the regulation of ‘living resources’. The concept 
of ‘living resources’ focuses rather on bulk harvest and is not geared towards 
‘marine genetic resources’. Rules concerning ‘marine scientific research’ consti-
tute the most relevant activity for the topic here. There is some overlap between 
MRS and bioprospecting as both cover types of scientific research, whereas 
bioprospecting is broader.9 Since neither the marine genetic resources nor the 
activity bioprospecting are regulated for the high seas and deep seabed, it must 
be concluded that there is regulatory room for the negotiations.
5   The EU suggested in 2008 taking the multilateral mechanism under the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2400 UNTS 303, adopted on 3 November 2001) 
as a reference point for the discussions. Though most Parties welcomed the proposal 
(Broggiato, A. (2008) ‘Marine Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, 
Environmental Law and Policy, 38(4), 182–188, at p. 186) the Plant Treaty is made for facili-
tating plant breeding which a different technical field. Differences are also highlighted by 
Leary, explaining that regime is tailored for mineral resource exploitation and does not 
answer how benefit sharing would be done when inventions are patent protected (Leary, D. 
(2009) ‘International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea’, in Vidas, D. (ed.) Law, 
Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, 
Outer Continental shelf. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp. 353–69, at p. 366).
6   Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79, adopted on 5 June 1992, article 15. Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted on 
29 October 2010.
7   Its provisions apply in relation to each contracting party to areas within national jurisdiction 
and may only be extended to ABNJ as a result of flag state jurisdiction. See ibid., article 4(a) 
and (b). See as well Chapter 11 of this book, Tullio Scovazzi, ‘The Rights to Genetic Resources 
beyond National Jurisdiction: Challenges for the ongoing Negotiations at the United Nations’.
8   Jørem, A. and M.W. Tvedt (2014). “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights and 
Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.” 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29: 321–343, at p. 324 sig.
9   Jørem and Tvedt conducts a thorough study of these concepts, see ibid., pp. 327–333.
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The basic idea of introducing regulation of any aspects of marine genetic 
resources is to change the behaviour of researchers and commercial firms using 
the resources or conducting the activities. Meanwhile, Parties to UNCLOS are 
states. If an international legally binding instrument is to have any potential to 
bind private parties, it is not enough to address the questions in international 
law; the content of a new instrument must be designed in a manner possible 
to be implemented by and enforced on private legal persons. One goal of this 
chapter is to explore options for how to make an ABS system for ABNJ legally 
binding on users. This means that all suggestions are tested against whether 
it would be possible to oblige private parties to a system of both access and 
benefit sharing.
The ultimate objective of this chapter is to identify the legal elements 
required for a functional model of a binding access and benefit sharing system 
that also promotes global research and development based on marine genetic 
resources.
This chapter contributes to the debate by identifying the legal solutions to 
the system being proposed (Section 2). After having looked at the practical 
system, Section 3 reviews the legal tools that are already available without 
amending the UNCLOS, and, based on a review of the bioprospecting activities 
envisaged (Section 4), review the set of key obligations related to registering 
of samples and depository in a repository (Section 5). The chapter ends with 
a discussion of the necessary institutional framework (Section 6), before sum-
marizing the solution proposed (Section 7).
2 Short Description of the Proposed ‘Realistic and Functional’ 
System for ABS
There seems to be a growing consensus among legal scholars that an ABS 
regime needs to include States without capacity to conduct cruises themselves 
by making samples and information available to a broader audience than to 
the collector alone.10 This approach to a regulatory system also draws moral 
legitimacy from distributive theories, as the Theory of Justice.11 The essence of 
10   For one of the most recent proposals: Broggiato, A. (2018), Mare Geneticum: Balancing 
Governance of Marine Genetic Resources in International Waters, The International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 33, doi 10.1163/15718085–13310030, pp. 3–33, about the rationale 
at pp. 10–12 and 14–16.
11   This could be based on a morally based fairness argument; however, it has been concep-
tualized in different ways. Fairness, a core perspective, is that of Rawls’s, as described 
in A Theory of Justice (Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Belknapp 
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this conception of fairness is that any new legal tool must contribute at least so 
that the worse off be put in a slightly better position.
Increasingly, it is suggested making samples available by storing them in 
ex situ conservation conditions sites.12 Accessible collections can ensure sus-
tainable use,13 encourage research,14 and lead to the development of commer-
cially interesting products or processes.15 The establishment of just one global 
repository would not be a practical solution since it will by necessity be very far 
from at least some of the oceans where collections take place. Therefore, a dis-
tributed global system repositories with branches bound together in a global 
network is probably the only practical solution.
One practical idea for governing MGR including both monetary and 
non-monetary benefit-sharing was developed by Tvedt and Jørem in 2013.16 In 
Press, Cambridge (MA)). Although Rawls did not himself apply his theory to interna-
tional issues without modification (Rawls, J. (1993) ‘The Law of the Peoples’, Critical 
Inquiry, 20(1), 36–68, pp. 36–68; Rawls, 1999, pp. 331–5). UNCLOS, preamble, paragraph 5. 
On the justice of using genetic resources, see also D. Schroeder, and T. Pogge, ‘Justice and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity’, Ethics and International Affairs, (2009) 23(3), 
267–80. The link to fairness has been contested, see R.D. Simpson, ‘Biodiversity 
Prospecting: Shopping the Wild Is Not the Key to Conservation’, Resources, (1997) 126, 
12–5.
12   CBD, Article 2, paragraph 13 defines in situ conservation as “the conservation of ecosys-
tems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of 
species in their natural surroundings […]”. Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 8: Ex situ conser-
vation is the “conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural 
habitats”.
13   Drawing the lines back to sustainable development understood as “limitations imposed 
by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs.” in World Commission on Environment and Development, 
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future 
(Annex to document A/42/427, 1987), part IV, paragraph 1. See also P. Sands, Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p. 253.
14   This is a utilitarian argument of taking advantage of biological material. See e.g. Ad Hoc 
Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of 
the Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation 
of Marine Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction to the President of 
the General Assembly (A/63/79), paragraphs 6 and 10. See also Harden-Davies, H. (2017) 
Deep-sea genetic resources: New frontiers for science and stewardship in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography. Volume 
137. March 2017, pp. 504–513. On the effects of the economic downturn for biotechnology, 
see G. Giovannetti, and G. Jaggi, Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2012, (Ernst 
& Young, 2012), n.p., pp. 25–39.
15   Tiller, R. et al., (2019), The once and future treaty: Towards a new regime for biodiversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, Marine Policy. Volume 99, pp. 239–242.
16   Tvedt, Morten Walløe and Ane E. Jørem. “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Regulatory 
Options for Benefit Sharing” in Journal of World Intellectual Property 16 (2013) 3–4. 
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the 2018 article Mare Geneticum, similar ideas were described by Broggiato and 
Vanagt et al.17 The remainder of this chapter will scrutinize the legal require-
ments and possibilities of such a factual system that strike the balance between 
open access and commercial interests in marine genetic resources.
Such an ABS system builds on the successive steps of access, deposit, utilisa-
tion and then creation of benefit sharing. Broggiato et al. elaborate further on 
the manner to address those successive steps and suggest a list of eight actions, 
as described below. Their analysis is very normative in arguing how the sys-
tem should be set up. Although this list has the benefit of providing an outline 
of how an ABS system could set up in the ABNJ, it remains vague in terms of 
legally enforceable elements. They merely mention that ‘these conditions will 
need to be encoded into legal obligations’ suggesting a clickwrap.18 Given that 
each of these steps entails different legal challenges, for each of the actions 
identified, the present author has indicated in the second column the related 
legal aspects that will need to be addressed.
The elements in the right column will be further developed in the next sec-
tions, with the aim of transposing the different actions on the list into legally 
pp. 150–167 and presentation by Tvedt at FNI side-event 23th August 2013.
17   Broggiato, A. (2018), Mare Geneticum: Balancing Governance of Marine Genetic Resources 
in International Waters, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33, doi 
10.1163/15718085–13310030, pp. 3–33.
18   Ibid. at p. 22.
Table 11.1 
Proposed steps in Broggiato et al. Required legal action
Submit and register plans for research 
or bioprospecting (at pp. 17–18)
To be binding on the users, this needs to be 
an obligation in national law based on flag 
State jurisdiction
Register the material sampled in the 
“OPEN” system
Can be imposed either in national law or in 
a contract entered into at an earlier point of 
time (otherwise voluntary)
Deposit samples of what has been 
collected (at p. 22)
The flag State can set this as a criterion 
before a cruise, for this to be binding after 
the cruise/collection has ended, it would 
have to have been translated into a contrac-
tual obligation. 
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Proposed steps in Broggiato et al. Required legal action
Research according to the plans sub-
mitted initially (at pp. 17–18)
Any submitted plans are non-binding unless 
that are made binding by a contract.
Update information in the data base 
when transferring to subsequent user
Theoretically possible to regulate in a con-
tract, but there are considerable enforce-
ment challenges.
Embargo period for others or the pay-
ment of exclusivity fee (at p. 22)
The collection could regulate the criteria 
for when others can use the material in its 
criteria for receiving material. 
Commercialisation (at pp. 22–24) Other types of legislation than that of 
bioprospecting, like patent law or that of 
product approval, come into play. A contract 
must set these rules before bioprospecting 
starts.
Benefit sharing as a percentage of the 
gross sales of a product (at pp. 22–24 
and 28–29)
A national law of users imposing an obliga-
tion of payment or a contractual obligation.
Table 11.1 (cont.)
binding obligations. Indeed, in their discussion, Broggiato et al. presuppose 
legally binding criteria, without discussing the legal tools for making the respec-
tive steps binding on the user. If these steps are not turned into binding obliga-
tions on the users (and not only in international law) then the system will end 
up becoming voluntary on the users. To ensure users change their behaviour, 
however, the question of how to make obligations legally binding and enforce-
able must be answered. Any lack of means to enforce obligations renders the 
system to be voluntary and therefore not legally functional19 and enforceable.20 
This chapter takes the body of proposals as a point of departure and discusses 
what would be required to make their proposals into a legally workable system.
A central contribution with the present chapter is to reflect on the legal 
tools that could introduce regulation on marine genetic resources in the ABNJ, 
19   Functionality of ABS is discussed by Tvedt (2017) in Beyond Nagoya: Towards a Legally 
Functional System of Access and Benefit-sharing in Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol. Edited by Sebastian 
Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal. New York, Routledge, 2014. pp. 158–178.
20   Young, T., & Tvedt, M. (2017). “Preface”. In Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-sharing 
Contracts. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff.
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without creating heavy regulatory burdens or bureaucratic procedures for the 
users. Broggiato et al. set out as an overall virtues: “[t]o reduce the transaction 
costs and to maximize predictability, which are necessary to attract invest-
ments from the private sector, a fixed percentage would be preferable over a 
case-by-case negotiation.”21 It is a general criticism against CBD and NP that 
the ABS system does not meet these criteria. The concept of benefit sharing is 
inspired by the CBD and NP. MGR-issues in the ABNJ do not necessarily need to 
be resolved in an identical manner, since there is no sovereign rights of states 
beyond the national jurisdiction. A major challenge is to embed a system in 
existing rules for the ABNJ while avoiding general ABS challenges.
3 Legal Tools Available without Amending the UNCLOS
Since amending an existing international treaty or convention is a challenging 
task, this chapter is taking a pragmatic approach by rather proposing legally 
binding tools and elements that do not require the existing text of UNCLOS to 
be changed. This chapter takes the existing international law for granted and 
rather identifies how the Intergovernmental Committee can adapt new tools 
supplementing the existing ones.
There is an underlying tension between the freedoms of the high seas and 
the competence of the flag state to apply regulations. One approach to impose 
obligation on private persons is by using the flag state jurisdiction combined 
with a contractual obligation on the users of MGR at the point of time of 
accessing the material.
There are some articles in UNCLOS that are particularly relevant to bear 
in mind in this discussion: Article 118 of UNCLOS deals with the Cooperation 
of States in the conservation and management of living resources. It reads as 
follows:
States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and man-
agement of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose 
nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living resources 
in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the 
21   Broggiato, A. et al. (2018), Mare Geneticum, at p. 10. It is interesting to observe that their 
proposal and the general guideline for their discussion was proposed by some countries in 
Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 30 June 2011 from the Co-Chairs 
of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly 
(A/66/119, 2011), paragraph 6.
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measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources con-
cerned. […]
Article 118 establishes an obligation to collaborate for conservation and man-
agement of living resources. Flag State jurisdiction can be used as a legal tool 
in the UNCLOS in order to implement obligations on the users. The system for 
making samples available can be seen as a way different countries can work 
together.
Another relevant provisions is UNCLOS Article 263 on “Responsibility 
and liability”, which establishes responsibility on States for their nationals. 
Article 263 provides as follows:
1. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible 
for ensuring that marine scientific research, whether undertaken by them 
or on their behalf, is conducted in accordance with this Convention.
2. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible 
and liable for the easures they take in contravention of this Convention 
in respect of marine scientific research conducted by other States, their 
natural or juridical persons or by competent international organizations, 
and shall provide compensation for damage resulting from such 
measures.
3. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible 
and liable pursuant to article 235 for damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment arising out of marine scientific research undertaken 
by them or on their behalf.
The responsibility of States to control ‘marine scientific research’ can be 
used as a model for them also to control their national when conducting bio-
prospecting. Drawing on this obligation, the possibility of regulating in greater 
detail how governments must apply their flag state jurisdiction, is not a new 
idea when it comes to changing the behaviour of their citizens.
4 Bioprospecting Activities on the High Seas and in the Area
Bioprospecting is defined as the search for new and useful biological and genetic 
resources. Activities are taking place both on the high seas and potentially 
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in the deep seabed. The research for and exploitation of MGR in the Area22 
have generated more debate and a more substantial body of literature23 than 
those on the high seas. Expeditions for bioprospecting are often referred to as 
“cruises”, fulfilling a range of different purposes, including population studies, 
taxonomic mapping of species occurrence, commercially oriented exploration 
and systematic collection of samples. One first step in a potential ABS system 
is to monitor and register the activities. In that context, the central question 
is to establish how a legally binding regime could make a register mandatory.
In that respect, and because the concept of “genetic resources” is not defined 
in UNCLOS, it could be useful to look at how the Convention deals with other 
related activities. Two main activities in the area which are declared as free-
doms are “fishing” (Art. 87.1.e, UNCLOS) and “marine scientific research” (Art. 
256 and 257, UNCLOS). Fishing has a very different purpose than bioprospect-
ing and the rules regulating fishing are not suited to be applied directly; espe-
cially since fishing has large quantities of one or specific species as a goal, 
whereas bioprospecting generally requires small quantities.24
To answer the question make a register mandatory under the Convention, 
it is necessary to look at the link between an obligation to register and the 
existing right in the High Seas or the deep seabed. According to respectively 
Articles 256 and 257 of UNCLOS, which both deal with marine scientific 
research, “[a]ll States, irrespective of their geographical location, and com-
petent international organizations have the right, in conformity with this 
Convention, to conduct marine scientific research in the water column beyond 
the limits of the exclusive economic zone.” Article 257 refers instead to Part XI 
of the Convention and to the Area.
22   The Area is the “seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond national juris-
diction”. UNCLOS, article 1(1).
23   See e.g. L. Glowka, ‘The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research, 
and the Area’ (1996) Ocean Yearbook, 12, 154–78; A.G. Oude Elferink, ‘The Regime of 
the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of the Common Heritage Principle 
and Freedom of the High Seas’, (2007) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, 22(1), 143–75; N. Matz-Lück, ‘The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’, 
in E.J. Molenaar, and A.G. Oude Elferink, (eds) The International Legal Regime of Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2010), pp. 61–75; T. Scovazzi, ‘The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: 
General and Institutional Aspects’, in Oude Elferink, A.G. and Molenaar, E.J. (eds) The 
International Legal Regime of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Current and Future 
Developments (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010), pp. 43–60.
24   See Jørem, A. and M.W. Tvedt (2014). “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights and 
Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.” 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29: 321–343, at pp. 325–327.
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The detailed meaning of ‘marine scientific research’ as referred to in those 
articles is not defined in the Convention.25 Because it is unlikely that the word-
ing of Articles 256 and 257 will be modified and because this chapter intends 
to avoid the need for amendment, a possible solution would be to subsume the 
obligation to register under these rules. These articles allocate rights to States 
and not directly to private parties. The wording here does not include any obli-
gation to register, nor does it include an obligation to register ‘marine scientific 
research’ in a clearing-house register for control purposes.
To compare, the argument has often been raised in CBD-related discussions 
that ‘non-commercial’ uses shall be left unregulated and that the regulatory 
obligation only kicks in when use turns ‘commercial’. This dichotomy depends 
on the intention of the user at the point of time of initiating a cruise, which 
may be difficult to assess. The objectively manifest activity, however, is “collect-
ing samples” both for non-commercial and commercial purposes. It is not pos-
sible to establish externally verifiable criteria to assess whether the intention is 
non-commercial or commercial, and therefore this dichotomy cannot be used 
as a legal criterion triggering different sets of obligations.
Regulating bioprospecting in the ABNJ will be less bureaucratic and create 
more legal certainty if the activity of ‘collecting samples’ is regulated regard-
less of the subjective intentions of the collector. The proposal here is that the 
actors at this point in time sign a standard contract. Such a contract needs 
to regulate scenarios for both non-commercial activities along with commer-
cial ones. From the user-perspective, it is less bureaucratic to sign one con-
tract regardless of what he has in mind when carrying out the collection. The 
counter-argument would be that such a contract would include a number of 
obligations that do not kick in since the trigger-point is never reached. This is 
not a unique situation in bioprospecting, since e.g. software contracts set out a 
large number of clauses that are not even observed. The rest of this article will 
show solutions for a one-size-fits-all standard contract and outline different 
aspects to be included in it to safeguard the different elements from collection, 
through research and utilisation to the creation of economic gains, identifying 
needs from the legislative level and need for preparing institutions.
To implement a rule requiring registration by users would require flag States 
to impose an obligation on their research vessels (and vessels in general since 
they could be potential bioprospectors) to register their activities. Since it is 
not unusual for researchers from different nations to participate on a cruise 
25   See Jørem, A. and M.W. Tvedt (2014). “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights 
and Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas beyond National 
Jurisdiction.” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29: 321–343., pp. 327.
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and in one vessel, the regulatory requirement must be put on the flag State 
responsible for all activities on board regardless of the nationality of the indi-
vidual researchers on board. To make such an obligation binding the interna-
tional regime will have to establish an obligation on the flag States targeting 
how they regulate the participants in the cruises on vessels sailing their flag. 
Thus, an international regime needs to oblige the contracting states to require 
the user to enter into the standard contract, foreseeing and providing solutions 
for all most relevant potential scenarios.
5 Obligation to Register the Samples and Depositing in a Repository
During and after the collecting activities have ended, two actions should be 
required: first, to register the sample taken and, second, deposit a duplicate or 
copy-sample of the biological material in a global repository system.
Grieber suggested as recently as 2011 that “One approach to non-monetary 
benefit sharing would be to establish a common pool of biological material 
retrieved from the high seas.”26 Further, Tvedt and Jørem noted that: “Such 
a common pool collection model for samples from the high seas would entail a 
continuum of marine resources being open to all.”27 The basic idea behind this 
option is to spur innovation by maintaining the material available for research 
and development for a greater scientific and perhaps also commercial audi-
ence than those with the financial resources to bioprospect in the high seas.28 
An example of ex situ conservation is keeping reproductive material in collec-
tions as a resource for research, or for reintroduction of endangered species 
26   Greiber, 2011, pp. 36, 46–7. On the development of the open source movement, see e.g. 
Mandrusiak, L. (2010) ‘Balancing Open Source Paradigms and Traditional Intellectual 
Property Models to Optimize Innovation’, Maine Law Review, 63(1), pp. 313–6. See 
e.g. E.C. Kamau, and G. Winter, (eds) Common Pools of Genetic Resources: Equity 
and Innovation in International Biodiversity Law, (Routledge, London, 2013). See e.g. 
A. Broggiato, ‘Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction – Coordination 
and Harmonisation of Governance Regimes’, Environmental Policy and Law, (2011) 41(1), 
p. 36; also D. Leary, ‘International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea’, in 
Vidas, D. (ed.) Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil 
Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental shelf. (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009) p. 362.
27   Jørem, A. and M.W. Tvedt (2014). “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights and 
Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.” 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29: 321–343.
28   Jørem, A. and M.W. Tvedt (2014). “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights and 
Obligations in View of a New Legal Regime for Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.” 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29: 321–343.
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into the wild. Other rational for repositories is to make the samples available 
for research and product-development by a broader audience.29
Establishing a common pool of MGR makes it necessary to discuss and clar-
ify legal questions related to the pool itself and the degree of commonness 
of the material therein. Tvedt and Schei have identified five legal and prac-
tical topics to clarify for repositories.30 The following sections develop three 
topics from a practical-legal perspective: the subject matter to be included in 
such a common pool (Section 5.1); the conditions for exclusivity for the deposi-
tory (Section 5.2); and, the definition of the access rights to the material in 
the respository and limitations to such rights by others (Section 5.3). A final 
issue deals with the possibility of imposing obligations related to transfer 
(Section 5.4).
5.1 The Subject Matter Deposited in the Repository
Concerning the subject matter to be included at the repository there is a lim-
ited number of possibilities. Examples of biological material that can be kept 
in a duplicate collection are living specimens from micro-organisms to higher 
organisms; biological material that is not living but still intact as an organism; 
biological material in alternate form; or, any type of dried material. This ranges 
from aquarium-style living samples to highly prepared laboratory samples of 
biological material. These different biological conditions or formats of the 
material will require different forms for storage capacity and will open for dif-
ferent types of uses.
The most relevant point of time to ask for these samples/accessions to the 
repository is when the cruise comes to an end. At that moment, a legal regula-
tion is likely to have less effect since a private person has the material in hand. 
If then no strings were attached to the material when it was collected, it is dif-
ficult to attach new legal regulations to the material. A contract entered into 
at the moment of entering upon the cruise could require duplicates in any of 
these conditions along with passport data to be left with the repository.
29   For a comparison of impacts of seabed mining and fossil fuel extraction compared to bio-
prospecting, see E., Ramirez-Llodra, P.A., Tyler, M.C., Baker, O.A. Bergstad, and M.A. Clark, 
‘Man and the Last Great Wilderness: Human Impact on the Deep Sea’, (2011) PLoS One, 
6(7), pp. 11–5.
30   Tvedt, M and Schei, P.J., 2009, The legal status for MARBANK and other marine biobanks 
in Norway, FNI Report 6/2009 identify the following legal questions: defining the mate-
rial or information included in the pool; regulate the legal position of the depositor; 
the management of the pool itself; the legal position of the user of material taken out 
of the pool; and finally questions regarding ownership of the collection itself.
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From any of these biological samples, different new expressions of the bio-
logical material can be produced: taxonomic information; ready-made assays; 
biochemical composition; DNA sequencing; digital sequence data; screening 
of the entire genome; developing metagenome and synthesized new mol-
ecules copying those found in nature. Typically, these new abstractions from 
the original samples are steps in research and development activities. A con-
tract agreed to at the point of leaving for a cruise of collection needs also to 
regulate aspects relating to any information, knowledge or use of these bio-
logical subject matters.31 Later than prior to collection, a user has no incentive 
to enter into a contract or undertake any obligations restricting the right to 
the sampled material. Any contractual obligation that is not included into the 
initial contract becomes voluntary. This situation is parallel to the Plant Treaty 
that establishes a system for access to plant genetic resources on the terms 
and conditions set out in its Standard Material Transfer Agreement. (There 
are weaknesses with the SMTA and it is currently undergoing a renegotiation.) 
Common for the two situations is that any obligation that is not included in 
the contract tends to be voluntary for the user. A first lesson to be drawn here 
is that all aspects must be regulated in the first contract.
A next important lesson is that since the UNCLOS is not using the termi-
nology ‘genetic resources’, the new international legally binding instrument 
can be regulating the subject matter (res) of the obligations in a more precise 
manner. The term ‘genetic resources’ as it is defined in the CBD entails consid-
erable difficulties for a contract.32 If the ILBI copies those definitions rather 
than being more specific in what a contract regulates, the same lack of clarity 
as we see in the CBD/NP today will be reproduced for marine resources. The 
ILBI needs to ensure it is does not become outdated even before its signing, 
and could be more technology-neutral is it leaves flexibility to the standard 
contract to define the subject matters regulated by the contractual obligations. 
The important lesson to learn from contract law concerning the obligation to 
share any sample, information or knowledge is that the contract needs to be 
precise and that the language in the CBD/NP is not necessarily suited for the 
purpose of contract language.
31   I.e. “describing biological processes or experiments that are simulated by a computer pro-
gram”, A Dictionary of Biology Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.
32   Young, T., & Tvedt, M. (2017). “Preface”. In Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-sharing 
Contracts. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, in Chapter 5, at p. 113 sig.
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5.2 Degree of Exclusivity for the Collector
Making samples available is a trade-off versus the rights of the collector. Tvedt 
and Jørem noted “three main alternatives [to exclusivity]: samples are held in 
trust on behalf of the depositor; samples are given without restriction; sam-
ples are pooled under certain specific conditions.”33 Broggiato et al. call this 
an “embargo period” where the access by others is restricted for a longer or 
shorter period of time.34
Seemingly the most attractive option from the perspective of incentives 
to invention is to provide the depositor a period of exclusivity as a main 
trade-off in accepting an obligation to deposit the samples and other subject 
matter in the global marine repository. This is a crucial point where the con-
tract with the depositor could open for individually adapted solutions; either 
by leaving parts open for negotiations or leaving the contract with two or 
three standard options. Practically, the contract could stipulate three binding 
options for the depositor to choose from at a later stage. The most important 
observation is that if these questions are not resolved in the contract prior 
to collection, it is virtually impossible to impose any obligation on the user 
when having the material in hand, except from those imposed by national acts. 
CBD implementation has shown a reluctance by countries to impose a general 
benefit-sharing obligation in the acts.
In setting up the information-sharing parts of the repositories the system 
must be designed in a manner that is compatible to other legal systems han-
dling information. The system must reserve publication to a point of time 
agreed by the depositors. Publication of academic articles is based on a prin-
ciple of contributing to the state of knowledge. Material or information must 
be made available to the public in a manner and at a time securing publication 
possibilities. Patenting a new invention based on the material or information 
is also assessed from the perspective of the technical patent-law definition 
of ‘prior art’ – which means that state of publications that the patent is mea-
sured against. Prior art is the baseline against which novelty and inventiveness 
are assessed. Making a sequence available or publishing sequence data can 
be regarded as ‘prior art’ and probably prevent a patent from being granted. 
This relationship between the system of repositories and other legal systems 
needs to be clarified.35 If the system fails to secure the secrecy until any rights 
33   Tvedt, M. and Jørem, A. “Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Regulatory Options for Benefit 
Sharing” in Journal of World Intellectual Property 16 (2013) 3–4. pp. 150–167, at p. 157.
34   Broggiato et al. 2018, p. 21–22.
35   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, adopted on 
15 April 1994, article 27(1). There are different understandings of the “novelty” require-
ment, ranging from an absolute novelty requirement to a local novelty requirement, see 
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are secured it would undermine the incentive to deposit material, reduce the 
incentive to do research or innovation based on the material or information.
5.3 Conditions for the Use by Others
The objective of deposits in repositories is to make samples available for other. 
This does not mean that the material shall be without restrictions on the sec-
ond users. From the perspective of the collector the conditions for the second 
user needs to be predictable and take his interests into account. Technically 
legally, it is not as urgent to set these criteria and conditions in the first con-
tract with the collector before the cruise. However, to strike a balance and 
ensure the rights of the collector, at least the core topics should preferably be 
outlined in the first contract.
To compare again with the plant sector, the whole idea of the International 
Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) for plants and the whole ratio-
nale for the Plant Treaty is that parties other than the depositor shall have 
access. In this system, the interest of the collector is seldom reflected in the 
conditions set on the second user. The collections of plant have been instru-
mental in promoting plant breeding.36 The importance to make material avail-
able and conserved is the main rationals – less attention has been given to 
make monetary benefits back to the provider. For the global society to get a 
similar effect on innovation based on marine biological material, repositories 
can play a similarly important role. Therefore, the contract needs to clarify and 
specify the conditions whereby others may use the material. Unlike the plant 
sector, the collector needs to have incentives in making the samples available 
through this system. The manner in which the conditions on the second user 
is formulated has potential to create positive incentives.
The rights of others to apply for patent protection also needs to be speci-
fied. Other users need to know the conditions on which they invest in research 
on these samples. In the case where the second user arrives at a patentable 
P.W. Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: Fundamentals of 
Global Law, Practice and Strategy, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), pp. 54–8.
36   On the history and functioning of the CGIAR, see C. Fowler, and P. Mooney, Shattering: 
Food, Policies and the Loss of Genetic Diversity, (University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1990) 
pp. 150–1; FAO (1997) The State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
FAO, Rome, p. 253; S. Louafi, ‘Collective Action Challenges in the Implementation of the 
Multilateral System of the International Treaty: What Roles for the CGIAR Centres?’, in 
Halewood, M., Noriega, I.L. and Louafi, S. (eds) Crop Plant Genetic Resources As a Global 
Commons: Challenges in International Law and Governance. (Earthscan, Abington, 2013) 
pp. 310–28.
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invention, the principle of sharing part benefits of the invention with the origi-
nal pool would be imperative for an open access system to work. To create a 
positive incentive for the collector to deposit samples, one could consider to 
impose a condition on the second user that the collector has a right to a licence 
of the patented invention when the new invention is based on “his” material. 
An alternative could be that a small portion of the turnover created by the pat-
ent finds it ways back to the collector.
Both mechanisms could be specified in the collection contract as well in the 
later contract between the collection and the new user. Since these conditions 
potentially only gives rights to the collector, it is not as urgent that all details 
are spelled out in the original contract.
5.4 On the Possibility of Imposing Obligations on Transfer
A central topic for ABS contracts is the transfer to third parties of any of the 
material, information or knowledge.37 Solutions to this complex contract law 
question must be resolved in the original contract. Ideally, each of the subject 
matter elements described in the section above should have its tailor-made 
transfer solution. In first generation ABS contract, this question was set on hold 
since it was perceived too complex and the initial agreement postpones how 
this question shall be regulated till later. However, this approach is not recom-
mendable as at this later stage the negotiation positions are different at the 
point of time of leaving for a cruise and the situation when a final product has 
been developed and is ready to be transferred.
6 Institutional Options
In this model for access and benefit sharing two institutions are needed: 
(i) the repositories where accessions and other subject matter are kept; and 
(ii) the institute with competence to represent the common interest in the 
negotiation of the contract.
As mentioned above the repositories needs to be a global system, but also to 
be geographically distributed. Since the infrastructure is expensive and much 
more advanced than for plants building on the existing repositories is probably 
the only viable solution. For plants a freezer with stable electricity is sufficient 
to maintain a good part of seed samples. For living organisms, often collected 
37   Young, T., & Tvedt, M. (2017). “Preface”. In Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-sharing 
Contracts. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff., Chapter 6 is devoted to third party 
transfer in ABS contracts.
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in deep seas, it is far more difficult and costly to conserve the genetic base. 
Seeds can also be stored for a long time with high percentage of germination. 
The regeneration of higher organisms is a much more technically complex 
process. Also bacteria and viri raises their particular challenges.
Here again the flag State jurisdiction can be triggered. The flag State could 
be required to enter into the contract on behalf of the public and common 
interest.38 Since the nation-state has limited interest in invoking obligations 
on its own citizens, there must be an obligation in the implementing agree-
ment for them to take the common interest into the negotiations. A contract-
based system has its benefits in the flexibility. The same flexibility there is a 
risk of lessening the burdens for the flag State’s own collectors, so there is a 
clear role for a global body.
Perhaps regional fisheries management organisations or frameworks like 
the OSPAR Convention39 may serve as contracting partners. Nevertheless, the 
body responsible for the contracts needs standardised templates with a level of 
discretion to adapt to the individual situation.
7 Summary of Suggested Solution to the ABS-System
This chapter suggests the use of two main regulatory instruments as tools for 
making a marine genetic resources pool possible: first, regulating the flag State 
principle and, second, drafting a comprehensive and clear contract that should 
be entered into before collection starts. In developing a contract, the terms and 
conditions should learn from contract law analysis and observe that the SMTA 
for the Plant Treaty has not succeeded. The contract (or SMTA) must be a valid, 
binding, implementable and enforceable document. The details in how such a 
contract could look like is a too comprehensive task for this chapter.
38   UNCLOS, article 92(1), and Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 91 there must nonetheless be a 
“genuine link between the State and the ship”.
39   Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
2354 UNTS 67, adopted on 22 September 1992.
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chapter 12
Deep-Sea Bottom Fisheries and the Protection 




Of the myriad industrial activities currently undertaken in the marine envi-
ronment, fisheries have progressively emerged as ‘the most widespread source 
of anthropogenic physical disturbance to global seabed habitats’.1 Demersal 
fisheries (i.e., those targeting benthic and benthopelagic species, whose core 
habitats comprise the seabed or areas in very close proximity to it) have been 
conducted for centuries and are of enduring commercial and nutritional 
importance to many States. However, as with numerous other fishing practices, 
technological advances have dramatically transformed demersal fisheries over 
the past half-century.2 While seabed fisheries were historically concentrated in 
coastal and inshore locations, the steady depletion of shallow-water stocks has 
subsequently forced many fishers to pursue offshore and deep-sea alternatives.3 
Consequently, the mean depth of global fisheries has expanded four-fold since 
the mid-1960s,4 as industrial fleets have increasingly targeted new deep-water 
opportunities, notably those located within areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ). Although fishing is by no means a new use of the seabed, the poorly 
regulated proliferation of fisheries into unprecedented depths has neverthe-
less generated novel environmental and management concerns, with worrying 
implications for the enduring health and integrity of benthic ecosystems.
1   J.G. Hiddink et al., ‘Global Analysis of Depletion and Recovery of Seabed Biota After Bottom 
Trawling Disturbance’ (2017) 114 PNAS 8301, 8301. Even in regions noted for an extensive off-
shore industrial presence, the impact of fisheries on seabed ecosystems often outweighs that 
of all other anthropogenic activities combined: A.R. Benn et al., ‘Human Activities on the 
Deep Seafloor in the North East Atlantic: An Assessment of Spatial Extent’ (2010) 5 PLoS One 
e12730.
2   W. Swartz et al., ‘The Spatial Expansion and Ecological Footprint of Fisheries (1950 to 
Present)’ (2010) 5 PLoS One e15143.
3   T. Morato et al., ‘Fishing Down The Deep’ (2006) 7 Fish and Fisheries 24, 31.
4   E.A. Norse et al., ‘Sustainability of Deep-Sea Fisheries’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy, 307, 308.
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Demersal fisheries deploy an array of gear to catch their respective target 
species, all of which involve at least some contact with the seabed, thereby 
posing varying degrees of collateral risk to the benthic environment.5 Some 
equipment – such as traps and pots – ultimately exert a superficial impact upon 
marine ecosystems.6 Others – notably gillnets and longlines – inflict little phys-
ical damage to the seabed itself, but have provoked rather different regulatory 
anxieties due to their propensity for incidental catches of non-target species, 
particularly marine mammals.7 Instead, bottom fisheries8 – especially those 
engaged in bottom trawling,9 involving the dragging of weighted nets over the 
seabed – are by some distance the most ecologically injurious forms of demer-
sal fishing. They also remain among the most prevalent, with approximately 
20–25% of all current global seafood landings attributed to bottom trawling.10
The advent of bottom trawling can be traced back to the late fourteenth 
century,11 although historical objections to its impacts were often confined to 
overfishing and the displacement of small-scale fishers by industrial fleets.12 
Nevertheless, even by the 1860s, regular complaints were raised over the 
‘scouring’ of the seabed by trawl nets.13 More recent ecological vexations over 
bottom trawling have concerned the scraping of vulnerable benthic sediments,14 
5    M.J. Kaiser et al., ‘Prioritization of Knowledge-Needs to Achieve Best Practices for Bottom 
Trawling in Relation to Seabed Habitats’ (2016) 17 Fish and Fisheries 637, 639.
6    F. Stephenson et al., ‘Experimental Potting Impacts on Common UK Reef Habitats 
in Areas of High and Low Fishing Pressure’ (2017) 74 ICES Journal of Marine Science 
1648, 1657.
7    A.J. Reid, ‘The Looming Crisis: Interactions between Marine Mammals and Fisheries’ 
(2008) 89 Journal of Mammalogy 541, 542–543.
8    Bottom fisheries are defined by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as any 
fishery that uses gear ‘that either contact or are likely to contact the sea floor during the 
course of the fishing operation’: A. Bensch et al., Worldwide Review of Bottom Fisheries in 
the High Seas (FAO: Rome, 2009), 2.
9    Bottom trawling is an umbrella term for the use of a variety of gear, each of which uses 
variations that encapsulate weighted features with the capacity to impact both hard- and 
soft-bottom benthic ecosystems: see further J.W. Valdermansen, T. Jørgensen and A. Engås, 
Options to Mitigate Bottom Habitat Impact of Dragged Gears (FAO: Rome, 2007), 5–18.
10   Hiddink (n.1), 8301 (extrapolating global catch data collated by the FAO since 2009).
11   C. Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea (Island Press: Washington DC, 2007), 131–2.
12   T.K. Kerby, W.W.L. Cheung and G.H. Engelhard, ‘The United Kingdom’s Role in North Sea 
Demersal Fisheries: A Hundred Year Perspective’ (2012) 22 Reviews in Fish Biology and 
Fisheries 621, 629.
13   R.H. Thurstan, J.P. Hawkins and C.M. Roberts, ‘Origins of the Bottom Trawling Controversy 
in the British Isles: 19th Century Witness Testimonies Reveal Evidence of Early Fishery 
Declines’ (2014) 15 Fish and Fisheries 506, 515.
14   F.G. O’Neill and A. Ivanović, ‘The Physical Impact of Towed Demersal Fishing Gears on 
Soft Sediments’ (2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 5, 12.
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damage to submarine features,15 the removal of habitat-forming species16 and 
the disturbance of complex benthic ecosystems which may in turn further 
compromise fish productivity.17 Moreover, while bottom trawling may inflict 
specific localised impacts upon the seabed, these fisheries also represent a sig-
nificant contribution to the cumulative footprint of anthropogenic activities 
in the global oceans, hence their effects may be exacerbated in tandem with 
those of other industries.18 Seabed ecosystems are slow to recover from such 
impacts: although data are currently limited, full regeneration appears likely to 
be a multi-decadal process and one fraught with scientific uncertainty.19
The prospective impact of bottom trawling is amplified in the case of 
deep-sea fisheries. In order to facilitate fishing at advanced depths, larger and 
heavier equipment is required to ensure the effective operation of the trawl, 
hence these activities are often significantly more destructive to the seabed 
than trawling undertaken in shallower waters.20 Likewise, trawling is often 
conducted repeatedly and intensively in particular locations, notably in the 
vicinity of seamounts and other fragile submarine features due to habit-
ual aggregation of fish in many such areas,21 thereby representing a serious 
threat to the integrity of seabed ecosystems.22 Such fisheries also pose con-
siderable risks to long-term sustainability of their target species. Indeed, 
in order to survive at advanced depths, in an environment characterised by 
cold temperatures, little light and limited productivity, deep-sea fish typically 
15   M.R. Clark et al., ‘The Impacts of Deep-Sea Fisheries on Benthic Communities: A Review’ 
(2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 51, 52.
16   S.F. Thrush, K.E. Ellingsen and K. Davis, ‘Implications of Fisheries Impacts to Seabed 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem-Based Management’ (2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 44, 45.
17   J. Collie et al., ‘Indirect Effects of Bottom Fishing on the Productivity of Marine Fish’ (2017) 
18 Fish and Fisheries 619, 634.
18   Thrush (n.16), 45–46. Nor are benthic ecosystems the only fragile features at risk – 
concerns have also been raised over the impacts of trawling upon underwater cultural 
heritage: M.L. Brennan et al., ‘Quantification of Bottom Trawl Fishing Damage to Ancient 
Shipwreck Sites’ (2016) 371 Marine Geology 82.
19   M.R. Clark et al., ‘Little Evidence of Benthic Community Resilience to Bottom Trawling on 
Seamounts After 15 Years’ (2019) 6 Frontiers in Marine Science 1, 13.
20   Clark (n.15), 52.
21   Although a definitive accounting remains elusive for all fish species for which seamounts 
form an essential habitat, current projections indicate that approximately 800 sepa-
rate species of fish may be considered seamount species, while a considerable array of 
additional species aggregate around such features at some stage during their life cycles: 
T. Morato, W.W.L. Cheung and T.J. Pitcher, ‘Vulnerability of Seamount Fish to Fishing: 
Fuzzy Analysis of Life History Attributes’ (2006) 68 Journal of Fish Biology 209.
22   A. Pusceddu et al., ‘Chronic and Intensive Bottom Trawling Impairs Deep-Sea Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Functioning’ (2014) 111 PNAS 8861, 8861.
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exhibit delayed sexual maturity, slow growth and a high maximum age, hence 
stocks may become rapidly depleted with little scope to regenerate swiftly.23 
Compounding these concerns, catches from deep-sea trawling provide a neg-
ligible contribution to current nutritional needs, accounting for less than 0.5% 
of global landings,24 while causing significant long-term damage to the seabed 
in the process. Moreover, deep-sea fishing in ABNJ is conducted by relatively 
few national fleets, thereby inflicting a strikingly disproportionate degree of 
harm upon the global commons relative to its numerical participants.
Despite these concerns, until the turn of the present century, many bottom 
fisheries were subject to surprisingly minimal regulation, as regional fisher-
ies management organisations (RFMOs) either lacked an express mandate to 
address benthic ecosystems or had yet to be established in respect of signifi-
cant portions of the global oceans, while little provision had been made for 
seabed fishing within the overarching legal framework provided by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.25 This has since been addressed 
through the graduated development of a distinct tier of regulation for seabed 
ecosystems, which has emerged largely ab initio over the course of the past two 
decades. The contemporary oversight of deep-sea bottom fisheries accordingly 
represents an intriguing case-study of the development of regulatory standards 
concerning the seabed. In this regard, regulatory momentum has been primar-
ily channelled through the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which 
has adopted a series of highly influential Resolutions calling for the protection 
of vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) on the seabed. The political impetus 
provided by multiple UNGA Resolutions has in turn prompted the adoption 
of complementary conservation and management measures by RFMOs, flag 
states and other pertinent actors. As this Chapter will demonstrate, consid-
erable progress has since been made towards the development of uniform 
standards for bottom fishing, although the implementation of this framework 
remains far from complete. Such shortcomings will accordingly need to be fur-
ther addressed in order to operationalise the commitments established under 
this collective of UNGA Resolutions, and thus to fully protect benthic ecosys-
tems from the adverse impacts of fishing activities.
To this end, this Chapter first outlines the emergence of global standards 
towards the protection of VMEs, examining the limits of global instruments 
and tracing the development of the pertinent UNGA commitments (Section 2). 
23   Norse (n.4), 317.
24   L. Victorero et al., ‘Out of Sight, but Within Reach: A Global History of Bottom-Trawled 
Deep-Sea Fisheries from >400m Depth’ (2018) 5 Frontiers in Marine Ecology 1, 4.
25   1883 UNTS 396 [hereinafter ‘LOSC’].
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The Chapter then examines the extent to which these commitments have been 
implemented by RFMOs and other pertinent actors (Section 3), before advanc-
ing a series of conclusions as to the future regulatory landscape concerning 
bottom fisheries (Section 4).
2 The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Deep-Sea 
Bottom Fisheries
2.1 Fisheries, the Seabed and the Limitations of the LOSC
Until the early twenty-first century, deep-sea bottom fisheries were largely 
overlooked by international law. Even as deep-sea trawling began to expand 
on an unprecedented scale from the mid-1970s, such practices remained 
largely inured from regulatory scrutiny as the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ nature 
of bottom fishing in remote locations ensured that there was little popular 
appreciation of its deleterious impacts upon the seabed. Instead, multilateral 
fisheries regulation continued to focus primarily on the management of staple 
pelagic stocks, such as salmon or tuna. This is perhaps unsurprising, since deep-
sea fish have not traditionally constituted an attractive cohort of target species, 
either physically or economically. However, by the 1980s a number of deep-
sea species had undergone something of a gastronomic renaissance. Having 
initially been taken – and often discarded – as undesirable by-catch, promi-
nent seafood chefs began to appreciate that their versatile flavour and texture 
allowed for considerable culinary creativity.26 This subsequently created an 
unprecedented demand for particular fish that had rarely been pursued – or 
regulated – as a target stock. Coupled with the tactical rebranding of many 
species to render their previous sobriquets rather more palatable to discern-
ing diners – for instance, ‘slimehead’ and ‘toothfish’ have been rechristened 
as ‘orange roughy’ and ‘Chilean seabass’ respectively27 – distant water deep-
sea fishing was swiftly transformed into a highly lucrative undertaking. At the 
same time, however, this unexpectedly elevated demand starkly exposed acute 
governance gaps in the international framework for the regulation of fisheries 
and seabed ecosystems.28
26   G.B. Knecht, Hooked: A True Story of Pirates, Poaching and the Perfect Fish (Allen & Unwin: 
Sydney, 2006), 81–86.
27   For a sobering account of the extent of this practice see J.L. Jacquet and D. Pauly, ‘Trade 
Secrets: Renaming and Mislabeling of Seafood’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 309, 311–313.
28   K.M. Gjerde and D. Freestone, ‘Unfinished Business: Deep-Sea Fisheries and the 
Conservation of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2004) 19 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 209, 209.
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A ‘perfect storm’ of three regulatory lacunae can be seen to have engen-
dered a rapacious frontier mentality towards deep-sea demersal fish. Firstly, 
RFMOs had yet to be established for substantial geographical portions of the 
global oceans, meaning that there were few pre-existing governance structures 
through which such fisheries could be regulated. Secondly, of the compara-
tively small number of RFMOs that were in existence at the material time, most 
had been established to regulate a single species and had no express compe-
tence over deep-sea stocks. And thirdly, of the four regulators that in principle 
held a mandate over deep-sea fish,29 these powers were seemingly limited to 
setting stock allocations rather than addressing the wider ecosystem impacts 
of bottom fisheries. Although (as considered further below) these bodies have 
tended to interpret their powers proactively in order to advance protective 
measures for deep-sea ecosystems, arguably only CCAMLR possessed undis-
puted competence over both the stocks and their surrounding environment.30 
This effective regulatory vacuum duly facilitated a ‘gold rush’ among certain 
fleets, which invested heavily in new technology in order to exploit seabed fish-
eries resources before meaningful management actions could be elaborated.31 
Consequently, by the late 1990s leading estimates suggested that an area of up 
to half the size of the global continental shelf was being trawled annually,32 
facilitated by a dearth of regulation that ensured that ‘people trawl almost any-
where they want, and the sea’s equivalents of ancient forests are becoming 
cattle pastures by default, not by design’.33
Little overt guidance towards the responsible pursuit of demersal fisheries 
was forthcoming from the LOSC. The LOSC elaborates a broad framework for 
fisheries competences, under which states may utilise fisheries resources on 
the high seas34 and in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs),35 sub-
ject to obligations concerning the conservation and management of the stocks 
29   Namely the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean 
(GFCM) and the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR).
30   E.J. Molenaar, ‘Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries’ (2005) 20 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 533, 538.
31   A. Merrie et al., ‘An Ocean of Surprises – Trends in Human Use, Unexpected Dynamics 
and Governance Challenges in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2014) 27 Global 
Environmental Change 19, 26.
32   L. Wattling and E.A. Norse, ‘Disturbance of the Seabed by Mobile Fishing Gear: A 
Comparison to Forest Clearcutting’ (1998) 12 Conservation Biology 1180, 1180.
33   Ibid., 1193.
34   Articles 87(1)(a) and 116.
35   Article 62.
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in question.36 Nevertheless, these provisions of the Convention merely estab-
lish generalised requirements for the conduct of fisheries: within the EEZ, 
stocks must be managed in a way that consistently allows for harvest at maxi-
mum sustainable yield and that overfishing does not occur as a result, while 
also taking into consideration the inter-dependence of fish stocks,37 with high 
seas fishing conducted subject to the more ambiguous obligation to exercise 
‘due regard’ towards the interests of others.38
Nor were demersal fisheries considered in Part VI of the LOSC, which 
addresses the continental shelf. Indeed, proposals to specifically regulate ben-
thic and benthopelagic species within the ambit of these provisions – given 
that they are ‘intimately associated with the seabed’ – were expressly rejected 
during the negotiation of the Convention.39 Instead, fisheries entitlements on 
the continental shelf under the LOSC are restricted to the exercise of sovereign 
rights over sedentary species.40 Such species are defined as ‘organisms which, 
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are 
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the 
subsoil’.41 This has created sporadic controversy over the status of particular 
stocks of crustaceans and molluscs, whose biological attributes and behav-
iour do not always neatly align with the legal understanding of a ‘sedentary’ 
species, while also raising questions over the limits of RFMO competences 
towards certain seabed species.42 In any event, the demersal fish targeted by 
trawling clearly do not meet the Article 77 criteria and thereby lie outside the 
ambit of Part VI. Such fisheries instead remain subject to the general position 
36   Articles 61 (EEZ) and 117–119 (high seas).
37   Article 61.
38   Article 87(2).
39   S. Borg, Conservation on the High Seas: Harmonizing International Regimes for the 
Sustainable Use of Marine Resources (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham: 2012) 151.
40   Article 77(1).
41   Article 77(4).
42   As recently considered by the Norwegian courts where, in two separate prosecutions 
against Latvian-flagged crabbing vessels, Norway has sought to enforce its sovereign rights 
over snow crabs as a lucrative sedentary species: see further I. Dahl and E. Johansen, The 
Norwegian Snow Crab Regime and Foreign Vessels – A Commentary on the Juras Vilkas Decision 
of the Øst-Finnmark District Court; available on-line at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/03/29/
the -norwegian- snow- crab -regime -and-foreign-vessels -a- commentary- on 
-the-juras-vilkas-decision-of-the-ost-finnmark-district-court/ and T. Henriksen, The 
Senator Case – A New Turn in Norway’s Dealings with Foreign Vessels Operating in 




prescribed in relation to the EEZ, since ‘[t]he rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters’.43
Similarly, the LOSC made no direct provision for the regulation of fishing in 
those areas of the seabed that lie outside the confines of national jurisdiction 
(the ‘Area’). The provisions of Part XI, which pertain to the Area, clarify that the 
concept of ‘resources’ in this context is restricted to minerals.44 As with the con-
tinental shelf regime, trawl fishing in the Area is thus subject to the provisions 
governing the high seas.45
A more intriguing position arises where the coastal state has exercised 
its right under Article 76 of the LOSC to extend its continental shelf beyond 
the orthodox 200 nautical mile limit. This may lead to conflicts between the 
interests of the coastal state in protecting the seabed environment in this 
area – either for its own intrinsic value or to safeguard a lucrative aggregation 
of sedentary species – and those of another state intending to undertake bot-
tom trawling by exercising its long-established rights to fish on the high seas, 
as guaranteed under Article 87(2). A coastal state cannot unilaterally impose a 
blanket ban on trawling across the entirety of its outer continental shelf, since 
Article 78(2) specifies that ‘[t]he exercise of the rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interfer-
ence with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided 
for in this Convention’. Instead, this raises the possibility that more localised 
restrictions could represent a justifiable interference with the exercise of high 
seas freedoms. Indeed, a sense of coexistence between states has long been 
considered necessary where there are bifurcated entitlements applicable to 
overlapping areas of maritime jurisdiction: as confirmed by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, 
‘the legal regime of the continental shelf has always coexisted with another 
legal regime in the same area … each coastal State must exercise its rights and 
perform its duties with due regard to the rights and duties of the other’.46 By 
analogy to practice in other industries, Mossop suggests that a coastal state 
could prospectively introduce limited restrictions on bottom trawling in these 
43   Article 78(1).
44   Article 133.
45   Article 135.
46   Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar); Judgment of 14 March 2012: 
para 475.
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areas, provided that interference with legitimate high seas freedoms is mini-
mal and appropriate consultations have been undertaken.47
Nevertheless, given the limited ability of the coastal state to control activi-
ties in the superjacent water column of the high seas, such restrictions are 
likely to be markedly strengthened where they operate in tandem with those of 
a multilateral body, such as an RFMO or a Regional Seas Organisation (RSO) – 
and are arguably weakened where such collaboration is not forthcoming. For 
instance, an RSO may implement a marine protected area (MPA) or an RFMO 
may establish concurrent restrictions on fishing in areas of the high seas that 
overlay locations of the outer continental shelf for which a coastal state has 
sought to curtail bottom fisheries. As noted below, given that ABNJ are pri-
marily regulated on a sectoral basis, the optimal solution for seabed locations 
of particular ecological sensitivity would be for each of these designations to 
operate in tandem. In a limited number of cases, such designations have been 
successfully aligned: most notably in the context of the Altair and Antialtair 
Seamounts located on the outer continental shelf of Portugal, which have been 
protected from trawling by the Portuguese authorities, with parallel fishing 
restrictions imposed in the superjacent water column by the pertinent RFMO, 
NEAFC, alongside an overlapping MPA designation under the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic,48 which 
has thus secured the highest possible degree of protection for these features.49 
This is not the case for all such features purportedly protected by states on their 
outer continental shelves, however, as other Portuguese designations attest.50
This is not to suggest that delicate seabed features are devoid of legal protec-
tion under the LOSC. Indeed, benthic ecosystems are more directly regulated 
under Part XII of the LOSC, addressing the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, with Articles 192 and 194 of particular relevance. Both 
provisions have been subject to extensive judicial consideration in recent years 
to clarify their application and scope. Article 192 rather concisely provides 
that ‘[s]tates have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment’. In a fisheries context it has been recently acknowledged that Article 192 
‘extends to the prevention of harms that would affect depleted, threatened, or 
47   J. Mossop, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016), 195.
48   2354 UNTS 67 [hereinafter ‘OSPAR Convention’].
49   See further Mossop (n.47), 218–220.
50   Ibid., 220.
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endangered species indirectly through the destruction of their habitat’,51 which 
not only provides a basis to protect seabed ecosystems, but also imposes an 
obligation of due diligence upon flag states to ensure that nationally-registered 
vessels adhere to relevant conservation and management measures in the con-
duct of fishing activities.52
Similarly, Article 194(5) provides that measures undertaken pursuant to 
Part XII of the LOSC ‘shall include those necessary to protect and preserve 
rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and other forms of marine life’. In the South China Sea 
Arbitration, it was considered that the general obligation to protect the marine 
environment advanced in Article 192 is ‘given particular shape in the context 
of fragile ecosystems by Article 194(5)’.53 Although this did not concern bot-
tom fishing per se, the Tribunal nonetheless declared that if a state is deemed 
to have knowledge that its vessels are conducting destructive fishing activities, 
a failure to enforce such measures may constitute a breach of the obligation 
of due diligence.54 Like Article 192, recent jurisprudence has clarified that 
Article 194 is also to be viewed expansively, and is ‘not limited to measures 
aimed strictly at controlling pollution and extends to measures focussed 
primarily on conservation and the preservation of ecosystems’.55 As with 
Article 78(2), when exercising the obligations prescribed under Article 194, 
states ‘shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out 
by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in 
conformity with this Convention’.56 The concept of unjustifiable interference 
has been recently considered to be ‘functionally equivalent’ to the obligations 
to give ‘due regard’ under Article 56(2) and of good faith under Article 2(3) of 
the LOSC.57 The extent of the obligation under Article 194(4) remains essen-
tially context-dependant, although the Arbitral Panel considered that due 
regard as applied under Article 56(2) will depend upon the nature of the rights 
held, their importance, the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature 
and importance of the activities and the availability of alternative approaches 
51   South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. Peoples’ Republic of China), 
Award of 12 July 2016; para 959.
52   Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC); paras 118–140.
53   South China Sea Arbitration (n.51), para 959.
54   Ibid., paras 964–966.
55   Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. UK ), Award of 18 March 2015; para 
538.
56   Article 194(4).
57   Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (n.55), para 540.
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and will involve ‘at least some consultation’.58 Provided this broad balancing 
act is undertaken, the possibility for the legitimate interference with fishing 
rights otherwise guaranteed under the LOSC was pointedly left open in the 
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, although this would require ‘signifi-
cant engagement … to explain the need for the measure and to explore less 
restrictive alternatives’. Accordingly, Article 194 provides a prospective basis 
for restricting bottom fishing in areas of known sensitivity, albeit based on 
meaningful consultations and with the possibility that intended activities 
may still proceed to a lesser extent in the intended location or be displaced to 
another area of the seabed.
2.2 The Evolving UNGA Commitments and the Emergence of the VME 
Concept
Notwithstanding the ongoing elaboration of obligations under Part XII of the 
LOSC, the protection of benthic ecosystems from the damaging impacts of bot-
tom fisheries has been primarily driven by a series of key UNGA Resolutions 
adopted over the course of the past fifteen years, which have subsequently 
proved influential in the adoption of unified standards and policies by RFMOs, 
flag states and other actors. By the late 1990s, concerns began to mount over the 
proliferation of bottom fisheries and the effective lack of regulation for many 
demersal species. In some cases, regulation was largely localised and bilateral, 
as exemplified by the pioneering arrangement between Australia and New 
Zealand to set allocations for orange roughy in the South Tasman rise.59 While 
such arrangements were predominantly focused on catch limits, allocations 
and stock analysis, they also introduced localised prohibitions on trawling and 
demersal fishing in particular locations, albeit that bottom fishing could still 
proceed with the express authorisation of the parties.60 Such initiatives were 
however few and far between, leading to increased calls for a more globalised 
tier of regulation over deep-sea bottom fisheries.
58   Ibid., para 518.
59   See further E.J. Molenaar, ‘The South Tasman Rise Arrangement and Other Initiatives 
on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy’ (2001) 16 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 77. As Molenaar observes, a series of orange roughy fisheries in 
the Southern Hemisphere provided a strong test for international fisheries regulation 
in the interim period between the adoption and entry into force of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.
60   Arrangement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
for the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise 2000; 
reproduced in Molenaar, ibid.
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Despite an emerging degree of support for the improved governance of 
demersal fisheries, there were strong divergences of opinion over which insti-
tution would be best placed to institute effective regulation and whether these 
activities were best addressed through binding or non-binding means.61 In 
this respect, the UNGA offers particular advantages in providing both a suit-
ably global platform for such discussions, while also avoiding the more loaded 
issue of whether such standards should be legally binding and thereby trigger 
substantive consequences if they are not fully implemented. Although UNGA 
Resolutions are not technically binding,62 in recent years they have never-
theless had considerable traction as a regulatory spur to address destructive 
fishing practices.63 This proved to be particularly true in the context of large-
scale driftnet fishing on the high seas, with a series of UNGA Resolutions in 
the early 1990s providing a compelling stimulus for specific regulatory activity 
by RFMOs and other actors,64 to the extent to which commentators have sug-
gested that these standards now represent customary international law.65
The UNGA driftnet Resolutions provided a helpful regulatory template to 
promote policies to address the impacts of bottom fishing on seabed ecosys-
tems. In 2002, the UNGA recognised for the first time the need to consider ‘the 
management of risks to marine biodiversity of seamounts and certain other 
underwater features’.66 This precipitated a protracted and circular series of 
discussions within a variety of different multilateral bodies as to the most 
61   See D.A. Balton and D.C. Zbicz, ‘Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions’ 
(2004) 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 247, 252–255.
62   As Harrison observes, UNGA Resolutions are not law-making tools but have had a more 
nuanced influence on state practice as ‘a means of drawing attention to the current 
threats to fish stocks and encouraging international efforts taking place in other institu-
tions to address them’: J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development 
of International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013), 204.
63   See further R. Caddell, ‘International Fisheries Law and Interactions with Global Regimes 
and Processes’ in R. Caddell and E.J. Molenaar, Strengthening International Fisheries Law 
in an Era of Changing Oceans (Hart: Oxford, 2019) 133, 135–137.
64   On the elaboration of these provisions see D.R. Rothwell, ‘The General Assembly Ban on 
Driftnet Fishing’ in D. Shelton (ed.) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), 121,126–
131, W.T. Burke, M. Freeberg and E.L. Miles, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet 
Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management’ 
(1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 127, 137–144 and R. Caddell, ‘Caught in 
the Net: Driftnet Fishing Restrictions and the European Court of Justice’ (2010) 22 Journal 
of Environmental Law 301, 301–304.
65   G.J. Hewison, ‘The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas 
Driftnet Fishing’ (1994) 25 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 557, 578–580.
66   Resolution 57/141 of 12 December 2002, para 56.
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appropriate forum through which bottom fishing concerns might be directed.67 
Since 2003, the UNGA has amalgamated its previously fragmented pronounce-
ments on fisheries matters into a specific – and often hard-fought – annual 
Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries. In 2004 the protection of the seabed was 
addressed for the first time in the UNGA Sustainable Fisheries Resolution.68 
In four core paragraphs, Resolution 59/25 lamented a general lack of regula-
tory competence over particular marine ecosystems, calling upon States to 
apply the precautionary approach to prohibit ‘destructive fishing practices, 
including bottom trawling that has adverse impacts on vulnerable marine eco-
systems’, until appropriate conservation and management measures have been 
adopted.69
This represents the first – albeit undefined – use of the term ‘vulnerable 
marine ecosystem’ which has subsequently become a notable addition to the 
lexicon of global marine governance. The commitment to seek the interim 
prohibition of ‘destructive fishing practices’ on a case-by-case basis nonethe-
less fell short of the full moratorium on trawl fisheries in ABNJ that had been 
sought by activists – and had indeed been initially present in earlier drafts 
of the Resolution.70 Resolution 59/25 called upon those RFMOs with compe-
tence over bottom fisheries to ‘urgently’ adopt conservation and management 
measures in accordance with international law to address destructive fishing 
practices, those inflicting adverse impacts on VMEs and to ensure compliance 
with such measures. In particular, RFMOs that lacked these competences were 
requested to extend their pre-existing mandates to regulate bottom fisheries,71 
while the international community was urged to cooperate in the creation 
of new RFMOs for unregulated areas of the global oceans, which would be 
endowed with these powers ab initio and thereby be able to address deep-sea 
fishing as an immediate operative priority upon their inception.
In 2006, a further and arguably more influential Resolution was adopted by 
the UNGA, expressing dissatisfaction with the rate of progress since 2004 and 
calling for steps to be taken ‘immediately’ to sustainably manage deep-sea fish 
67   See further L.A. Kimball, ‘Deep-Sea Fisheries of the High Seas: The Management Impasse’ 
(2004) 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 259, 263–272.
68   Resolution 59/25 of 17 November 2004.
69   Para 66.
70   Y. Takei, Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries: Discrete High Seas Fish Stocks, 
Deep-Sea Fisheries and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston: 
2013) 112. The rather vague wording of the Resolution also suggests that, while politically 
prompted by the excesses of trawl fisheries, its application was not confined to such 
activities.
71   Para 68.
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stocks and VMEs.72 In a notable departure, paragraph 83 of Resolution 61/105 
listed for the first time a series of targeted action points for RFMOs to com-
plete, notably an assessment of whether individual bottom fishing activities 
have significant adverse impacts on VMEs, and to ensure that if so they are 
managed to prevent such impacts, or not authorized to proceed; to identify 
VMEs and determine whether bottom fishing activities would cause significant 
adverse impacts to such ecosystems; to close such areas to bottom fishing and 
ensure that such activities do not proceed unless conservation and manage-
ment measures have been established to prevent significant adverse impacts; 
and to require RFMOs to cease bottom fishing where VMEs are encountered.
Resolution 61/105 therefore represents a more nuanced series of restric-
tions upon bottom fisheries, whereby such commitments are triggered only 
where there is a threat of a significant adverse impact (SAI) on VMEs. The 
onus is therefore placed upon identifying locations within which VMEs are 
present and in establishing a precautionary requirement for vessels to cease 
fishing upon encountering such features, or to ensure that these areas are pre-
emptively closed to bottom fishing until it may be established that no such 
encounters are likely to result. In principle, this allows for the co-existence of 
fisheries and environmental restrictions in locations that have been identified 
as susceptible to the adverse impacts of deep-sea bottom fishing if not man-
aged proactively.
However, Resolution 61/105 also raised immediate interpretive difficulties, 
since the threshold by which a marine ecosystem may be considered ‘vulner-
able’ and an adverse impact deemed ‘significant’ – and, moreover, the precise 
circumstances under which an ‘encounter’ may be considered to have occurred 
in the first place – was not defined, hence the FAO was called upon to elaborate 
detailed practical guidance on these issues.73 As with previous pronounce-
ments, Resolution 61/105 also recommended the expedited development of 
interim measures to address locations without operational RFMO coverage.74 
In a novel departure, Resolution 61/105 also directed specific action points to 
states in areas for which no competent authority was in existence, with flag 
states requested to cease the national authorisation of fishing vessels in ABNJ 
without a competent RFMO or to unilaterally introduce measures applicable 
to nationally-registered ships to implement the broad commitments advanced 
therein.75
72   UNGA Resolution 61/105 of 8 December 2006, para 80.
73   Para 89.
74   Para 85.
75   Para 86.
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In 2008, following an extensive technical consultation process, the FAO 
adopted an influential set of international Guidelines to frame the practical 
implementation of the relevant UNGA Resolutions for fisheries exploiting 
deep-sea species ‘in a targeted or incidental manner’.76 The Guidelines have an 
express application to the high seas – although states are also encouraged to 
adopt these approaches where appropriate within their national waters – and 
are applicable to fisheries for which the total catch includes species that can 
only sustain low exploitation rates and the fishing gear used in this process 
is likely to contact the seafloor during the course of fishing operations.77 The 
overarching objectives of the Guidelines are therefore to ensure the long-term 
and sustainable use of marine living resources in the deep-sea and to prevent 
significant adverse impacts upon VMEs in the process.78 Reinforcing the earlier 
UNGA commitments, states and RFMOs are also requested to adopt and imple-
ment measures consistent with the precautionary and ecosystem approaches 
to fisheries management to identify areas in which VMEs are known or likely to 
occur and to take action using the best available information.79 Nevertheless, 
the Guidelines are expressly non-binding in nature,80 and their regulatory 
effect instead is considered to have been promoted through the due diligence 
obligation incumbent upon flag states.81
The Guidelines were swiftly endorsed in turn by the UNGA, which called 
upon states to act to secure their implementation ‘immediately, indi-
vidually and through regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements’.82 Nevertheless it was observed that the operative paragraphs of 
the previous UNGA Resolutions had ‘not been sufficiently implemented in all 
cases’.83 Accordingly, Resolution 64/72 reiterated the action points called for 
in Resolution 61/105, adding a further commitment to promote the adoption 
of conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sustain-
ability of deep-sea stocks and associated species, particularly through setting 
76   International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas (FAO, 
Rome: 2008), para 5. For an extensive discussion of the formulation of the Guidelines 
and their prospective legal effect see L. Korseberg, ‘The Law-Making Effects of the FAO 
Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
801.
77   Para 8. The total catch is defined herein as ‘everything brought up by the gear’, reinforcing 
the notion that the Guidelines ought to be applied even where deep-sea species are taken 
incidentally.
78   Para 11.
79   Para 12.
80   Abstract to the Guidelines.
81   Korseberg (n.76), 830.
82   Resolution 64/72 of 4 December 2009, para 113.
83   Para 118.
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appropriate levels for fishing effort, capacity and catch limits.84 This was rein-
forced in 2011, wherein the UNGA observed that ‘despite the progress made, the 
urgent actions called for in the relevant paragraphs of resolutions 61/105 and 
64/72 have not been fully implemented in all cases’.85 In a notable departure to 
the previous instruments, Resolution 66/68 further called for the strengthen-
ing of assessment procedures so as ‘to take into account individual, collective 
and cumulative impacts, and for making the assessments publicly available, 
recognizing that doing so can support transparency and capacity-building 
globally’.86
Since 2011, these commitments have been regularly affirmed and endorsed, 
most notably in 2016, where the UNGA called upon states and RFMOs to use 
the full set of criteria in the FAO Guidelines to identify VMEs and to assess 
SAIs, to ensure that impact assessments are reviewed periodically and updated 
where there is a ‘substantial change in the fishery’ or where there is relevant 
new information and that conservation and management measures are based 
upon best available science, especially with regard to improving the effective 
implementation of thresholds and move-on rules.87
3 Bottom Fisheries and Benthic Ecosystems: Assessing the Impact of 
the UNGA VME Commitments
Thus far, eight bodies have established competence over bottom fishing 
of deep-sea stocks, each of which has adopted a series of measures for the 
regulation of these fisheries. These are the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), 
the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), the Southern Indian 
Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(NPFC), the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), the 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and 
the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR). This cohort is also complemented by the European Union (EU), 
which has also developed standards for bottom fishing in respect of its Member 
States fishing in ABNJ.
Despite an expanding degree of regulation for deep-sea bottom fisheries in 
ABNJ, the work of these bodies rather defies neat comparative analysis. Each 
84   Para 119(d).
85   Resolution 66/68 of 6 December 2011, para 129.
86   Para 129(a).
87   Resolution 71/123 of 13 February 2017, para 180.
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RFMO presides over a unique set of ecological conditions (and thereby dif-
fering volumes of VMEs to manage), different fishing industries and varying 
political, material and financial resources and priorities. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing section examines progress towards three key cumulative requirements 
of the various UNGA Resolutions, namely the need to identify VMEs and to 
regulate encounters, the establishment of fishing footprints and the elabora-
tion of area closures, and the rectification of problematic governance gaps in 
respect of bottom fisheries and sensitive seabed ecosystems.
3.1 VMEs Designations and Encounter Management
The primary commitment established across the various UNGA Resolutions 
is the need to identify VMEs and to institute appropriate precautionary man-
agement measures in order to protect such areas from significant adverse 
impacts of bottom fishing. As noted above, these commitments have been 
given practical voice through the FAO’s Deep-sea Fisheries Guidelines. A pri-
mary stage in protecting an individual seabed site is therefore to identify it as 
‘vulnerable’, a notion considered by the Guidelines to be
related to the likelihood that a population, community, or habitat will 
experience substantial alteration from short-term or chronic distur-
bance, and the likelihood that it would recover and in what time frame … 
The most vulnerable ecosystems are those that are both easily disturbed 
and very slow to recover, or may never recover.88
Accordingly, the Guidelines acknowledge that this is itself a variable concept. 
Features that are ‘physically fragile or inherently rare’ may be vulnerable to 
most impacts, while locations may be more resilient and therefore not nec-
essarily ‘vulnerable’ in particular contexts.89 At the heart of this distinction 
appears to lie an inherent tension between advocates of blanket preserva-
tion, and those states with a vested socio-economic interest in bottom fishing. 
Indeed, as Korseberg observes, there was a relatively limited attendance at the 
FAO’s Technical Consultation in 2008 at which the Guidelines were adopted, 
but those states that did attend were prominent fishing nations.90 A number of 
states have also strenuously observed that bottom fishing does not necessarily 
result in catastrophic benthic damage, especially in largely featureless areas 
of the global seabed, and (perhaps less convincingly in the ABNJ context) that 
88   Para 14.
89   Para 15.
90   Korseberg (n.76), 824.
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such fisheries continue represent a significant source of global food security.91 
In this regard, fishing states have largely managed to stave off the threat of 
blanket closures: the Guidelines expressly provide that the risks to a marine 
ecosystem are to be measured ‘by its vulnerability, the probability of a threat 
occurring and the mitigation means applied to the threat’.92
The Guidelines also elaborate a series of representative characteristics 
that should be used as criteria in identifying VMEs, namely the uniqueness or 
rarity of an area or ecosystem; the functional significance of the habitat; the 
fragility of the area; the life history traits of component species that would 
make recovery difficult (as exhibited in many species of deep-sea fish); and the 
structural complexity of an ecosystem.93 Although a further, non-exhaustive, 
series of examples are listed in an Annex to the Guidelines, the individual 
geological conditions of each region mean that the ultimate decision as to 
whether a particular site or ecosystem constitutes a VME is made by the RFMO 
in question. The practice of RFMOs has thus been to develop extensive indi-
vidual lists of indicator species and ecosystems in order to assess its unique 
regulatory priorities.
In this respect, there has been a strong emphasis upon sharing examples 
of best practice between RFMOs, as mandated both by successive UNGA 
Resolutions and the Guidelines themselves.94 This was initially problematic, 
leading to complaints that support tools were initially limited95 and that there 
were few opportunities for institutional learning between RFMOs.96 With 
91   Impacts of fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems: Actions taken by States and regional 
fisheries management organizations and arrangements to give effect to paragraphs 66 to 
69 of General Assembly resolution 59/25 on sustainable fisheries, regarding the impacts of 
fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems. Report of the Secretary-General; UN Document 
A/61/154, para 59.
92   Para 16.
93   Para 42.
94   Guidelines, para 29.
95   Actions taken by States and regional fisheries management organizations and arrange-
ments to give effect to paragraphs 83 to 90 of General Assembly resolution 61/105 on sus-
tainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relat-
ing to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, and related instruments: Report of the Secretary-General; UN Document 
A/64/305, para 202.
96   Actions taken by States and regional fisheries management organizations and arrange-
ments in response to paragraphs 80 and 83 to 87 of General Assembly resolution 61/105 
and paragraphs 113 to 117 and 119 to 127 of General Assembly resolution 64/72 on sustain-
able fisheries, addressing the impacts of bottom fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems 
and the long-term sustainability of deep-sea fish stocks: Report of the Secretary-General; UN 
Document A/66/307, para 207.
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regard to the former concern, considerable progress has been made by the FAO 
in developing a distinct VME database, which has consolidated a map of areas 
that are both restricted and open for fishing, as well as maintaining a central 
repository of information concerning indicator lists for VMEs by individual 
RFMOs.97 Attempts to improve coordination between the various RFMOs with 
competences over the deep-sea environment have, however, proved arguably 
less productive. Notwithstanding some initial optimism that these RFMOs 
could develop collaborative practices akin to the Kobe process of Cooperation 
to streamline regulatory and administrative activities on issues of common 
concern, which has proved to be of significant utility to streamlining the work 
of tuna RFMOs,98 only one such meeting has been convened to date.99
Where VMEs have been identified, the Guidelines also outline the circum-
stances under which a SAI may be deemed to have occurred. Such an encounter 
involves ecosystem integrity being compromised in a manner that ‘(i) impairs 
the ability of affected populations to replace themselves; (ii) degrades the 
long-term natural productivity of habitats; or (iii) causes, on more than a tem-
porary basis, significant loss of species richness, habitat or community types. 
Impacts should be evaluated individually, in combination and cumulatively’.100 
The risk of a significant adverse impact therefore triggers further mitigation 
strategies, primarily in the form of the ‘move-on’ rule that requires a vessel to 
retreat to a particular distance away from the VME in question. To this end, a 
number of RFMOs have developed encounter protocols, which are predomi-
nantly based upon the incidental catch of indicator species above threshold 
levels.101
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the thresholds established by 
a number of RFMOs are contingent upon a certain volume of live by-catch. 
This, for instance, has been the approach of NAFO, NEAFC and SEAFO, yet it 
is considered a poor tool to identify an encounter since the equipment used is 
designed exclusively to catch fish and is therefore not conducive to the effec-
tive sampling of benthic areas.102 Similarly, given that cold-water reefs (which 
represent a substantial proportion of current VMEs) habitually comprise a 
97   For the most recent consolidated version, see http://www.fao.org/in-action/
vulnerable-marine-ecosystems/vme-indicators/en/.
98   See J. Harrison, ‘Key Challenges Relating to the Governance of Regional Fisheries’ in 
R. Caddell and E.J. Molenaar (eds), Strengthening International Fisheries Law in an Era of 
Changing Oceans (Hart: Oxford, 2019) 79, 99.
99   Record of the Meeting of the Deep-Sea Secretariats Contact Group, June 2016, 4.
100   Para 16.
101   See for example, SEAFO CM 30/5 and CCAMLR CM 22–07.
102   P.J. Auster et al., ‘Definition and Detection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems on the High 
Seas: Problems with the “Move-On” Rule’ (2011) 68 ICES Journal of Marine Science 254, 258.
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framework of primarily dead coral, significant damage may be legitimately 
inflicted upon a VME without triggering the ‘move-on rule’.103 There is also a 
risk that evidence of an encounter may be lost during the retrieval of a net, 
hence otherwise responsible fishers may be oblivious to an impact, while a 
longstanding objection to ‘move-on’ approaches remains the tacit toleration of 
a documented degree of environmental harm incumbent in the process.
Ultimately, definitively establishing the existence of a VME or whether a SAI 
has occurred is a complex task, and one that will be subject to constant revi-
sion in the light of on-going data-collection requirements. This is especially 
true given the very limited baseline knowledge of remote seabed areas. The 
capacity of parties to RFMOs to constantly monitor such ecosystems – even 
within the areas in which significant research activities have been conducted, 
let alone those that are currently unfished and largely unexplored – is highly 
variable, while assessing whether such areas might be sufficiently resilient 
to prospectively support a degree of fishing is also an exceptionally difficult 
undertaking. Consequently, while the Guidelines have provided a pathway 
through which prospective VMEs may be identified and made subject to 
avoidance techniques, calls for institutional restraint are prevalent and there 
remains a vocal constituency of advocates for a moratorium on bottom fishing, 
especially in ABNJ.104
3.2 Fishing Footprints and Protected Areas
Once VMEs have been identified and appropriate encounter protocols and 
mitigation strategies have been advanced by RFMOs, a further commitment 
established within the multiple UNGA Resolutions is to prevent fishing activi-
ties where they may have a SAI upon such sites. In this respect, RFMOs can be 
seen to have advanced two core strategies towards addressing the impacts of 
fishing in the areas under their jurisdiction. In the first instance, participants 
have been required to identify their existing fishing footprints – i.e. those loca-
tions in which some fishing activity has previously been conducted – wherein 
fishing is intended to be focused for the foreseeable future. In this manner, the 
unfished area is to be largely left alone, unless a participant wishes to expand 
its footprint by initiating an exploratory fishery. If so, any such endeavours are 
to be subject to prior approval and conducted under strict controls. The second 
response is the institution of a more traditional area closure, in which fishing is 
prohibited in order to protect VMEs.
103   UN Document A/66/307 (n.96), para 46.
104   Norse (n.4), 317.
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Since the adoption of the UNGA Resolutions, RFMOs have engaged in a 
process of mapping the current extent of fished areas with their jurisdictional 
purviews. In this manner, one key policy has been to seek to confine fisher-
ies within their current locations, while managing VMEs within these areas 
through encounter protocols and, if necessary, fisheries closures. Within the 
residue of these unfished areas, bottom fishing is prima facie constrained, 
although parties may apply to extend their fishing footprints and establish 
spatially and temporally restricted exploratory fisheries in these locations. 
Exploratory fisheries are fundamentally different to commercial fisheries and 
are primarily characterised by an emphasis on low-effort fishing, stringent 
observer coverage, extensive data-collection commitments and a requirement 
that activities may not proceed without the express prior approval of the man-
agement body.
The process is exemplified by the practice of NEAFC, which in 2008 adopted 
an Interim Exploratory Bottom Fishing Protocol for New Bottom Fishing Areas.105 
Under these arrangements NEAFC, in consultation with the International 
Council on Exploration of the Sea (ICES), maintains a full itinerary of such 
areas in an Annex to the Recommendation which establishes a definitive, yet 
adjustable, list of existing fishing footprints. These footprints can be extended, 
but any activities conducted therein remain classed as ‘exploratory’ and subject 
to prior approval, based on the submission of a Notice of Intent to fish, along-
side a harvesting plan, mitigation plan and a ‘sufficient system’ to record data.106 
Similar systems have been established by SEAFO,107 the NFPC,108 SPRFMO,109 
and, especially, CCAMLR,110 on whose pioneering system of exploratory fisher-
ies such procedures have been largely modelled.111
A more traditional policy response to the problem of the degradation of 
particular seabed ecosystems on the part of RFMOs has been the designation 
of restricted areas for bottom fishing, or the outright prohibition of this equip-
ment. In this respect, significant area closures have been instituted by NEAFC, 
105   Recommendation XVI:2008.
106   Articles 6 and 7 of Recommendation 9:2015; see Consolidated Text of all NEAFC 
Recommendations on Regulating Bottom Fishing, available on-line at www.neafc.org.
107   CM 30/15.
108   CMM 2016–05: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in 
the Northeast Pacific Ocean and CMM 2016–06: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of 
Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the North-western Pacific Ocean.
109   CMM 03–2014 (Management of Bottom Fishing in the SPRFMO Convention Area).
110   CM 22–06: Bottom Fishing in the Convention Area.
111   See further R. Caddell, ‘Precautionary Management and the Development of Future 
Fishing Opportunities: The International Regulation of New and Exploratory Fisheries 
(2018) 33 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 199, 212–234.
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NAFO, SEAFO and CCAMLR.112 Moreover, the GFCM has established three sepa-
rate Fisheries Restricted Areas (FRAs) for a more modest volume of territory. 
Most emphatically, bottom trawling has been prohibited by the GFCM in any 
area below 1000 metres,113 while CCAMLR has banned the use of all commercial 
bottom trawling in the high seas areas under its purview.114 Nevertheless, con-
cerns have been raised that mid-water trawling, where nets are piloted through 
the water column as opposed to being dragged across the seabed, retains con-
siderable scope to damage fragile submarine features, especially seamounts. 
One notable regulatory departure in this regard is the approach adopted by 
SPRFMO, which has defined bottom-trawling as including mid-water trawling 
on seamounts, given the propensity for contact with seabed features even at 
this comparatively more elevated depth.115 This remains a minority view, how-
ever, although similar policies were considered by NAFO in 2015, which failed 
to find consensus on the issue but instead imposed particular restrictions on 
the design and deployment of mid-water trawl gear.116
Beyond the closures initiated under the auspices of RFMOs, an intriguing 
recent development has been the elaboration of a new sub-species of area clo-
sure led by the fishing industry itself. Such closures have been most closely 
associated on an international level within the Southern Indian Ocean, while 
on a national level, extensive seabed areas have also been closed to dredging 
and bottom trawling within the EEZ of New Zealand. In the context of the 
Indian Ocean, SIOFA entered into effect in June 2012, although early meet-
ings failed to engender confidence that this new organisation would be able to 
address VMEs swiftly and effectively. Despite a strong recognition of the need 
to implement the UNGA VME commitments, the parties were unable to agree 
on substantive conservation and management measures to address bottom 
fisheries and instead came to the bland agreement that individual participants 
should ‘endeavour’ to limit deep-sea trawling.117 Prior to the inauguration of 
SIOFA, in 2006 the main deep-sea fishing operators established the Southern 
112   For a full inventory, see http://www.fao.org/in-action/vulnerable-marine-ecosystems/
vme-indicators/en/.
113   REC29/2005/1.
114   CM 22-05: Restrictions on the use of bottom trawling gear in high-seas areas of the 
Convention Area. Under this provision, bottom trawling could prospectively be deployed 
for scientific purposes.
115   Report of the Second Scientific Committee Meeting, at p. 15.
116   D Diz, ‘The Seamounts of the Sargasso Sea: Adequately Protected?’ (2016) 31(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 359, 366–67.
117   G. Wright et al., ‘Advancing Marine Biodiversity Protection through Regional Fisheries 
Management: A Review of Bottom Fisheries Closures in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ (2015) 61 Marine Policy 134, 144.
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Indian Ocean Deepsea Fishers Association (SIODFA) and voluntarily des-
ignated eleven individual sites as Benthic Protected Areas, albeit with some 
criticism that these locations were arguably too deep for a viable commercial 
fishery.118 Additional sites within more orthodox fishing grounds were desig-
nated as Benthic Protected Areas in 2013. Although these sites remain voluntary 
in nature – and as an industry initiative they do not carry the prohibitive value 
of RFMO authority – they have nevertheless had considerable traction within 
the region, since the benefits of membership of SIODFA are contingent upon 
compliance with these measures, while individual states have also made this a 
formal condition for vessel licensing,119 suggesting that commercial incentives 
can be at least as effective as the traditional command-and-control approach 
adopted by RFMOs.
Similarly, on a national level, an extensive series of Benthic Protection 
Areas covering over 1.1 million km² was designated throughout the EEZ of New 
Zealand in 2007 in which trawling and dredging is precluded, a measure that 
was also, to the surprise of many domestic commentators, proposed by the 
national fishing industry.120 In a manner reminiscent of the designation of 
fishing footprints collated by RFMOs, these sites are currently located in areas 
in which no fishing activities occur, with their prospective value considered to 
be in curtailing the future expansion of trawling. This approach has also been 
adopted in neighbouring Australia, were approximately 58% of the national 
EEZ is also closed to bottom trawling – albeit encompassing significant 
locations in which no trawling occurs.121 Nevertheless, in New Zealand the pro-
ponents of these measures were not entirely motivated by ecological altruism 
and the initial proposal came with heavy strings attached, with the Deepwater 
Group seeking an indefinite moratorium on future fisheries closures in the 
national EEZ.122 Eventually, this quid pro quo was restricted to an agreement 
not to create further marine protected areas until 2013.123 Moreover, the sites 
are confined to the seabed itself, with mid-water trawls permitted in the water 
118   Ibid. (noting however that this could be a useful designation if fishing activities seek to 
move deeper in future years).
119   G. Wright and J. Rochette, ‘Regional Management of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 
in the Western Indian Ocean: State of Play and Possible Ways Forward’ (2017) 32 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 765, 777–778.
120   J. Helson et al., ‘Private Rights, Public Benefits: Industry-Driven Seabed Protection’ (2010) 
34 Marine Policy 557, 559–563.
121   T.K. Mazor et al., ‘Trawl Exposure and Protection of Seabed Fauna at Large Spatial Scales’ 
(2017) 23 Diversity and Distributions 1280, 1280.
122   Helson (n120), 560.
123   T.D. Eddy, ‘On the Need for Meaningful Marine Protected Area (MPA) Standards’ (2013) 23 
Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 481, 482.
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column, although considerable monitoring restrictions were placed upon any 
fishing activities taking place in these areas.124 Critics of this approach have 
argued that these areas are not true MPAs as they merely restrain specific activ-
ities yet leave open the possibility of further industrial activities in superjacent 
waters.125 Indeed, the national authorities have long been accused of using 
these designations as a means of inflating the volume of national MPA cov-
erage, culminating in a rather contrite declaration in April 2019 that Benthic 
Protection Areas would no longer be counted within the domestic inventory 
of MPAs.126
A further issue of considerable significance in seeking to ensure that holis-
tic protection is applied to sensitive seabed ecosystems is the extent to which 
fisheries closures are able to dovetail effectively with the management policies 
of other sectoral regulators. As noted above, seabed features are best protected 
where both the bethos and the overlaying water column are subject to com-
plementary conservation measures. One striking example of this approach 
is the pioneering arrangements between NEAFC and OSPAR, whose respec-
tive jurisdictional areas intersect within the north-east Atlantic region. The 
legal mandate of NEAFC is confined to fisheries management, while OSPAR’s 
competence to address “non-polluting human activities” strictly excludes any 
consideration of fisheries.127 In discharging this mandate, OSPAR has placed 
considerable emphasis upon establishing a network of MPAs and has a com-
paratively lengthy history of promoting interactions with other organisations 
in this capacity.128
In 2008, a MOU was concluded between NEAFC and OSPAR129 to explore 
areas of mutual interest and formalise a basis for potential future collabora-
tion, for which the most significant outcome was the adoption in 2014 of a 
Collective Arrangement on cooperation on MPAs in ABNJ. In 2009, NEAFC 
had closed a series of areas to bottom fishing that broadly corresponded to 
the designations within the OSPAR MPA network, notably within the Charlie 
124   Helson (n.120) 564.
125   T.D. Eddy, ‘One Hundred-Fold Difference between Perceived and Actual Levels of Marine 
Protection in New Zealand’ (2014) 46 Marine Policy 61, 64–66.
126   ‘Conservationists Win Battle Over Government’s “Fishing Whoppers”’ https://www 
.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/111766497/conservationists-win-battle-over-govern 
ments-fishing-whoppers.
127   Article 4 of Annex V to the OSPAR Convention, added in 1998.
128   See further E.J. Molenaar and A.G. Oude Elferink, ‘Marine Protected Areas in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction: The Pioneering Efforts under the OSPAR Convention’ 
(2009) 5 Utrecht Law Review 5, 16.
129   Reproduced on-line at http://www.ospar.org/about/international-cooperation/memo 
randa-of-understanding.
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Gibbs and Mid-Atlantic Ridge MPAs. The Collaborative Arrangement there-
fore addresses specific locations of mutual interest within the region, which 
are outlined in Annex I and are jointly maintained by both organisations. 
While not exclusively focused on area-based management – promising lines of 
cooperation have also emerged for marine litter and shark conservation – the 
Collaborative Arrangement provides a platform for data exchange and updates 
on amendments to the respective restricted areas, with annual meetings hav-
ing been convened since 2015 to promote these objectives further.
The OSPAR/NEAFC arrangements illustrate both the opportunities 
and the complexities facing purported collaborative exchanges of this nature. 
The Collaborative Arrangement seeks to include other pertinent global and 
regional actors to minimise potential interference with Annex I areas.130 OSPAR 
and NEAFC have thus encouraged the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) and International Seabed Authority (ISA) – which both have the capac-
ity to advance sectoral management tools – to participate in this process, albeit 
with little success. As with many synergistic endeavours between multilateral 
bodies, incompatible meeting schedules have inhibited interactions with the 
IMO.131 More significantly, however, such initiatives have met with internal 
resistance from IMO participants that are geographically and economically 
removed from shipping activities in the region opposed to devoting time and 
resources on matters of more localised concern.132 Meanwhile, the ISA has con-
sidered its participation to be ‘premature’ in the absence of a clearly defined 
project-based role in the region.133 Wariness about open-ended collaborative 
demands has also been expressed internally within the OSPAR Commission, 
with some participants concerned that cross-sectoral management represents 
a significant but small aspect of an extensive portfolio of activities that could 
impede the pursuit of more immediate regulatory priorities.134
130   The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is also 
identified as a potential partner, given its application to tuna fisheries in the region. 
Similarly, OSPAR has developed a rather more concise MOU with the North Atlantic 
Salmon Conservation Organisation (NASCO), although it is more ambiguous and pre-
scribes few action points.
131   Aide Memoire and Key Actions Resulting from the First Meeting under the Collective 
Agreement, para 2.7.
132   Aide Memoire and Key Actions Resulting from the Second Meeting under the Collective 
Agreement, para 3.6.
133   Ibid.
134   D. Freestone et al., ‘Can Existing Institutions Protect Biodiversity in Areas beyond National 
Jurisdiction? Experiences from Two On-Going Processes’ (2014) 49 Marine Policy 167, 173.
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3.3 Governance Gaps
A further issue of strong concern within the various UNGA Resolutions has 
been the need to close the significant governance gaps that were exposed by 
initial attempts to regulate deep-sea fisheries. As observed above, bottom fish-
eries have long been deceptively under-regulated on an international basis. 
Many RFMO apply only to single species, while until relatively recently large 
swathes of the global oceans were not subject to any management coverage. 
Moreover, as observed above, those RFMOs that did technically exercise a 
mandate over deep-sea stocks generally lacked the legal competence to fully 
protect seabed ecosystems. In this respect, closing gaps in regulatory coverage 
has been an important, and largely successful, element of the commitments 
established under the UNGA Resolution.
Since the turn of the current century, a suite of new RFMOs – notably SIOFA, 
SEAFO, SPRFMO and the NPFC – have been inaugurated and have expressly 
established the protection of VMEs as a central tenet of the mandates of their 
constituent bodies. This is most clearly illustrated by the NPFC, for which the 
preamble to its constituent treaty expressly references the relevant UNGA 
Resolutions, while the prevention of significant adverse impacts from fisher-
ies upon VMEs is established as a ‘general principle’ for this body.135 Similarly, 
consideration of VMEs is established as a specific aspect of the mandate of 
the scientific fora of SPRFMO.136 More significantly, perhaps, the conclusion of 
these instruments was preceded by a series of interim arrangements focused 
on the regulation of bottom fishing in these areas.
Allied to this, more longstanding RFMOs have been prepared to interpret 
their mandates – and, indeed, reformulate their constituent provisions – in 
a broad manner so as to establish a clear degree of management control over 
bottom fisheries. This is exemplified by the practice of NEAFC, which closed 
three deep-sea sites to bottom trawling and fishing with static gear, includ-
ing gillnets and bottom longlines effective from 2005 onwards.137 This was a 
very far-sighted development at the material time, preceding the seminal 
UNGA Resolution 59/25 by some months, with NEAFC therefore operating 
in uncharted waters with no global guidance in place. Moreover, it might be 
questioned whether stricto sensu NEAFC possessed the requisite regulatory 
135   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the 
North Pacific Ocean (Seoul, 1 April 2012, in force 19 July 2015); preamble and Article 3(e).
136   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the 
South Pacific Ocean (Auckland, 14 November 2009, in force 24 August 2012) [2012] ATS 28; 
Article 11.
137   Recommendation 05–2005: Recommendation for the Protection of Vulnerable 
Deep-Water Habitats.
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competence to do so, which necessitated a very broad interpretation of the 
Commission’s powers on the part of its constituent Members in approving 
these closures.138
More fundamentally, older structures have undertaken a process of con-
siderable reform in recent years to allow them to more centrally address the 
environmental issues associated with deep-sea fisheries. In this respect, a 
series of provisions have been ‘retro-fitted’ into the NAFO Convention, through 
extensive textual revisions adopted in 2007 in order to promote an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management, which eventually entered into effect on 
18 May 2017.139 Notwithstanding the recent formalisation of these arrange-
ments, many of these obligations had been applied provisionally throughout 
this interim period,140 which enabled NAFO to adopt a series of measures to 
promote the protection of VMEs. A similar approach has been adopted by the 
International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
again largely motivated to advance additional protection for VMEs as pro-
moted through the relevant UNGA commitments.141
A further important factor has been the role of flag states, which had also 
been requested to take action to ensure that their vessels fish in a manner that 
is sympathetic to the benthic environment. In this respect, particular states 
and entities have been prepared to adopt unilateral standards where their 
vessels operate in areas lacking RFMO coverage. A particular example is the 
South-West Atlantic, whereby political complications have precluded the likely 
establishment of a RFMO for these waters for the foreseeable future. A volume 
of deep-sea fishing has been conducted in the region, predominantly by Spain, 
for which a series of voluntary closures have been instituted. More broadly, 
in 2008, in seeking to implement the pertinent UNGA Resolutions, the EU 
adopted a Regulation specifically addressing the actions of its Member States 
in ABNJ for which no RFMO has been established or interim measures have 
not yet been agreed for the protection of VMEs.142 Under this provision, such 
138   Molenaar (n.30), 538–39.
139   Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries (Ottawa, 24 October 1978, 
in force 1 January 1979) 1135 UNTS 369 (Article I(h)). The consolidated version of this 
instrument, incorporating the 2017 amendments, is available on-line at https://www.nafo 
.int/Portals/0/PDFs/key-publications/NAFOConvention-2017.pdf.
140   Resolution 1/08 of 26 September 2008 on the Interpretation and Implementation of the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
141   See further Z. Scanlon, ‘The Art of “Not Undermining”: Possibilities within Existing 
Architecture to Improve Environmental Protections in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ 
(2018) 75 ICES Journal of Marine Science 405–416, 410.
142   Council Regulation (EC) No 735/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the protection of vulnerable 
marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts of bottom fishing gears 
[2008] Official Journal L201/8.
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activities may only be conducted pursuant to a special permit143 and the use 
of bottom gear is prohibited in areas ‘where no proper scientific assessment 
has been carried out and made available’.144 A permit may only be issued upon 
submission of a detailed fishing plan involving an assessment of the potential 
impacts of fishing in the area,145 for which any breach is considered a ‘serious 
infringement’ of the Common Fisheries Policy.146 In response, Spain has thus 
far closed nine separate areas to deep-sea bottom fishing by its vessels. In 2017, 
a further Regulation entered into force banning deep-sea fishing by EU vessels 
in the North-east Atlantic at depths of 800 metres,147 although the unilateral 
policies introduced by the EU for this region has generated some disquiet that 
such measures might exercise an undue influence over the future trajectory of 
the regulation of VMEs within NEAFC.148
4 Conclusions
While little appreciated in the popular perception of risks to the benthic 
environment, bottom fisheries have quietly emerged as the most pressing cur-
rent threat to seabed ecosystems. Although trawl fisheries have constituted a 
source of regulatory discontent for over six hundred years, meaningful stan-
dards to address the increasingly insidious impacts of such activities on the 
global seabed have only systematically emerged over the course of the pres-
ent century. Bottom fisheries have proved to be an ecologically expensive food 
source, inflicting damage with a multi-decadal recovery timescale, while also 
decimating stocks of deep-sea fish that have often proved manifestly ill-suited 
to the scale and impact of commercial fishing. Such activities have also, for the 
most part, been conducted in an effective regulatory vacuum, with deep-sea 
fisheries representing not only a particularly striking example of the ‘tragedy 
143   Article 1(1).
144   Article 6(1).
145   Article 3.
146   Article 10.
147   Regulation (EU) No. 2016/2336 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December 2016 establishing specific conditions for fishing for deep-sea stocks in the 
north-east Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the north-east 
Atlantic and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 2347/2002 [2016] Official Journal 
354/1; On the development of this provision see further G.A. Oanta, ‘The European 
Union’s Reform of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the North East Atlantic’ (2017) 32 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 589.
148   G.A. Oanta, ‘International Organisations and Deep-Sea Fisheries: Current Status and 
Future Prospects’ (2018) 87 Marine Policy 51, 57.
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of the commons’, but also serving as a stark metaphor for the failure of inter-
national legal frameworks to respond effectively to the challenges of depleted 
fisheries and damaged oceanic ecosystems.149
The response to the challenges presented by deep-sea bottom fishing repre-
sents an intriguing case study of the development of regulatory standards for 
the seabed. In this respect, conservation and management policies have been 
largely driven through the UNGA, which has in turn designated RFMOs as the 
primary vehicles through which this problem is to be addressed. Consequently, 
since 2004 a growing suite of commitments has quietly emerged, which have 
been implemented by a variety of actors over the past decade. To this end, a 
series of positive outcomes have been achieved. Governance gaps have been 
noticeably closed, with new RFMOs having emerged in recent years, many of 
which feature a specific and unprecedented commitment towards protecting 
VMEs. Other structures have used the regulatory impetus provided by the UNGA 
to undertake significant reforms, placing ecosystem considerations more cen-
trally within their revised mandates. Where regulatory lacunae persist, flag 
states have demonstrated a willingness to step into the breach and promote 
standards that are rapidly becoming recognised as universal examples of best 
practice towards threatened seabed environments.
Nevertheless, particular challenges remain and, despite this laudable prog-
ress, the commitments elaborated by the relevant UNGA Resolutions have 
still not been fully realised. Notwithstanding the value of the FAO Guidelines, 
bottom fisheries may still legitimately wreak considerable damage to the sea-
bed before environmental obligations are engaged. The relevant instruments 
remain replete with opaque trigger-points for action, the identification of 
VMEs on a global basis is very much a work in progress and the ‘move-on’ rule 
remains a blunt instrument for addressing seabed conservation. Meanwhile 
the knowledge base concerning seabed ecology – both within, but espe-
cially outside – current areas of fishing activity remains extremely patchy. 
Considerable efforts have been made to elaborate area-based management 
tools, although a strong emphasis has been placed on developing closures in 
locations in which fishing does not occur and is unlikely to advance for many 
years. Regulatory innovations have emerged, particularly those led by industry, 
although in key instances a primary motivation has been to stave off stron-
ger protective standards. Similarly, despite some notable successes in the 
North Atlantic region, it has proved difficult to align area-based management 
149   K.M. Gjerde, ‘High Seas Fisheries Management under the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 281, 295.
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tools so as to provide holistic protection to the seabed from multiple sources 
of anthropogenic activity. With the prevailing legal framework having point-
edly bifurcated the regulation of the seabed and that of the water column, 
the experience of deep-sea bottom fisheries reinforces the need for joined-up 
management of benthic locations and the superjacent water column in a man-
ner that has proceeded to a regrettably limited degree to date.
part 5
Principles Applicable to Sovereign States 
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chapter 13
Review of National Legislations Applicable to 
Seabed Mineral Resources Exploitation
Saul Roux and Catherine Horsfield
1 Introduction
In parallel to growing interest for seabed exploration and mining in the high 
seas, there has been increased interest for seabed mining activities within the 
national jurisdictions of coastal states. Seabed mining in the high seas and 
within national jurisdictions is not unconnected. Seabed mining in the high 
seas provides a good indication of the nature, status quo and future of sea-
bed mining in national jurisdictions and vice versa. Notably, the direction of 
seabed mining in the high seas will influence the policy directions of nation 
states.1
This chapter seeks to provide a broad overview of seabed mining within 
the national jurisdictions of sovereign coastal states. Section 2 provides a brief 
outline of international legal and governance instruments that are intended 
to provide a framework for national policy and decision-making on seabed 
mining.
Section 3 seeks to provide a comparative analysis of legal and policy 
approaches adopted by various countries in relation to seabed exploration and 
exploitation. This aims to offer insights into legal principles and mechanisms 
that have been used in response to seabed mining. This comparative analy-
sis focuses on seabed mining, in respect of both exploration and exploitation, 
within the exclusive economic zones of five coastal states namely: New Zealand, 
Australia, Namibia, Mexico and Papua New Guinea. These cases are assessed 
primarily due to the fact that seabed mining proposals have been concen-
trated in these coastal states. Furthermore, they represent a diversity of policy 
approaches and regulatory regimes. These approaches have been diverse, due 
1   Lawson, T (2015). Global Opposition Is Mounting Against the Latest Environmental Abuse – 
Deep Sea Mining. Truthout <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/34206-global-opposition 
-is-mounting-against-the-latest-environmental-abuse-deep-sea-mining?
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to different legal and governance regimes operating in these countries, ranging 
from permanent bans, moratoria, strategic environmental assessments, assess-
ments by environmental agencies and preparation for exploitation.
Section 4 provides a more in-depth case study of South Africa, focusing on 
marine phosphate prospecting. The South African case provides strong insights 
into the potential risks of seabed mining applications in jurisdictions with lim-
ited regulatory and governance capacity. Issues such as socio-economic and 
environmental risks related to marine phosphate extraction and legal and gov-
ernance challenges for South Africa are discussed in this section.
Section 5 provides a brief synthesis of approaches adopted by other 
countries and the legal and governance principles that underpinned these 
approaches. Overall, this seeks to provide a structure for decision-making on 
seabed mining in the national jurisdictions of coastal States.
2 Seabed Mining in the High-Seas or National Jurisdictions
It is important to differentiate between seabed mining within the exclusive 
economic zones of coastal States and seabed mining in the high seas or ‘the 
Area’ that lies beyond national jurisdictions. In the case of the high seas, seabed 
mining is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and associated Mining Codes, and regulated by the International 
Seabed Authority.2 Seabed mining applications that fall within a country’s 
exclusive economic zone (within national jurisdiction) are regulated by that 
country’s domestic law. The international deep seabed area (the Area), regu-
lated by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) comprises about 260-million 
square kilometres. A total of 85-million square kilometres of ocean falls within 
exclusive economic zones.3
National jurisdictions usually extend to 200 nautical miles (370 km) sea-
ward from baselines running along the shore. However, countries may submit 
Continental Shelf Extension claims (See Chapter Brekke). The International 
Seabed Authority has no role in determining these claims. This is decided by 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, also established by 
UNCLOS. Maritime boundaries between states are generally decided by bilat-
eral negotiation, sometimes with the aid of independent judicial bodies.
2   See Chapter 7 of this book, J. Dingwall, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework.’
3   www.isa.org.jm.
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2.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) confers coastal 
states with a broad range of sovereign rights and duties in relation to their 
exclusive economic zones. Such rights and duties relate to utilisation of liv-
ing resources, fisheries management, species management, enforcement and 
compliance, exploitation of non-living resource, marine scientific research, the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment and any other activi-
ties related to economic exploitation and exploration, such as the production 
of energy from the water, currents and winds.4 This includes the seabed, sub-
soil and water column.
Articles 76–855 outline the rights and duties of coastal States over 
the continental shelf. These rights relate primarily for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting natural resources. These natural resources consist 
of mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together 
with living organisms belonging to sedentary species (immobile). In brief, the 
powers vested in coastal states over their continental shelves only relate to 
exploitation of specific resources.
In terms of Article 192 of UNCLOS, signatory States have a general obliga-
tion to protect and preserve the marine environment within and outside their 
jurisdiction. Article 194(1) directs signatory States to take all measures neces-
sary ‘to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from 
any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal’. 
States are also required to take all measures necessary to ensure activities 
within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to other States and their envi-
ronment. This duty is important in the case of seabed mining, where the 
impacts may extend to the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of neighbouring 
states. In particular, the impact on fishery resources and migratory fish stocks 
are important.
In terms of Article 194(2) measures should be put in place to minimise, to 
the fullest possible extent ‘pollution from installations and devices used in 
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and sub-
soil’. These should, in particular, include measures to regulate the design, 
construction and operation of such installations or devices. These measures 
must ‘protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life’.
The legal obligation of signatory States in respect of seabed mining has been 
determined and outlined by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
4   Article 55–Article 75.
5   Part VI of UNCLOS.
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.6 This determination requires State laws and 
regulations governing seabed mining to be ‘no less effective than international 
rules, regulations and procedures’. Thus State laws cannot be less effective 
than the International Seabed Authority Mining Code. The Seabed Disputes 
Chamber further determines that:
States have a direct obligation under international law to ensure that sea-
bed mining activities are governed in accordance with the precautionary 
approach, employing best environmental practice and conducting prior 
environmental impact assessment.
In other words ‘an effective state response to these obligations ultimately 
requires an appropriate national legislative framework’ to regulate seabed 
mining.7 Granting seabed mining rights in the absence of such a legislative 
framework would accordingly be contrary to UNCLOS.
2.2 Other International and Regional Agreements
There is a wide range of other international agreements that are of relevance 
to seabed mining in national jurisdictions, if the nation in questions is sig-
natory to these. These include the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention), 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Furthermore, there are a number of regional treaties that govern marine 
activities between signatory nations.8 For example, Angola, Namibia and 
South Africa are signatories to the Benguela Current Convention (BCC). 
6   Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect 
to Activities in the Area – Advisory Opinion’, 1 February 2011, list of cases: no. 17 para. 214: 
UNCLOS Articles 208(3) and 209(2) 01.
7   Benkenstein, A. (2014). Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience. SAIIA.
8   Including Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Environment of: West and Central African Region (1981); Mediterranean Sea 
(1976); Wider Caribbean Region, (1983); Eastern African Region (1985); South-east Pacific 
(1981); North-east Atlantic OSPAR Convention (1992); South Pacific Region (1986); Baltic Sea 
Area (1992); Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Caspian Sea; Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution (1978); Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden Environment (1982).
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The BCC provides a good example of the interaction between seabed mining 
and regional agreements, as Namibia and South Africa have existing proposals 
for marine phosphate mining and prospecting respectively.
The BCC aims to facilitate cooperation and mutual responsibility of the three 
signatory nations in respect the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem. 
The BCC seeks to ensure environmentally responsible industrial development 
and cooperation between the three nations in order to protect biodiversity, 
maintain ecological integrity and minimise risk of long-term or irreversible 
impacts caused by human activities. The Preamble states that a priority of 
the BCC is to minimise pollution from marine mining. A further priority is to 
ensure that policies, laws and regulations of the three signatory nations are 
harmonised so that ‘industrial activities in one country [do] not impact the 
coastal or marine environment of another country’ (ibid).
Relevant Articles of the BCC related to seabed mining include Article 4 which 
outlines ‘General Principles’ to be followed by signatory nations. These include:
a) The cooperation, collaboration and sovereign equality principle;
b) sustainable use and management of the marine resources;
c) the precautionary principle;
d) prevention, avoidance and mitigation of pollution;
e) the polluter pays principle; and
f) protection of biodiversity in the marine environment and conservation 
of the marine ecosystem.
In order to give effect to the objective of the BCC and the principles above, 
signatory parties are required to:
1) take all possible steps to prevent, abate and minimise pollution and take 
the necessary measures to protect the marine ecosystem against any 
adverse impacts;
2) undertake environmental impact assessments for proposed activities that 
are likely to cause adverse impacts on marine and coastal environments;
3) apply management measures based on the best scientific evidence 
available;
4) where possible, reverse and prevent habitat alteration and destruction; 
and
5) protect vulnerable species and biological diversity.
The BCC requires signatory states to ‘agree on, where necessary, measures to 
prevent, abate and minimise pollution caused by or resulting from explora-
tion and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil’. 
Article 8 further requires the Commission agree on conservation and man-
agement measures concerning transboundary marine resources and the 
environment’.
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The BCC thus would require a cooperative approach to seabed mining to 
ensure that ‘activities in one country do not impact on the marine environ-
ment of another country’. Such regional treaties are particularly important 
where signatory nations share marine and fishery resources where a seabed 
mining activity of one nation would negatively impact on the marine envi-
ronment, fishery resources and ocean economy activities of a neighbouring 
country.9
3 Seabed Mining in National Jurisdictions
This section aims to provide a comparative analysis of legal and policy 
approaches adopted by other countries in relation to seabed exploration and 
exploitation. It offers insights into legal mechanisms and principles that have 
been used in response to seabed mining. Proposals for seabed mining, for both 
exploration and exploitation, within the exclusive economic zones of coastal 
States have been concentrated on six nations or areas, namely New Zealand, 
Australia, Namibia, South Africa, Mexico and the Pacific Islands (including Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Cook Islands).10 This 
section will review each of these in turn.
In brief, there has been considerable resistance to seabed extraction pro-
posals in all of these cases and in most cases governments have opted for a 
cautious approach to seabed mining in the form of moratoria, permanent bans 
or refusal of project proposals. Whereas Namibia and the Northern Territory of 
Australia placed a moratorium on phosphate mining and bulk seabed mining 
respectively, New Zealand’s Environmental Protection Agency refused its first 
application for consent to undertake marine phosphate mining and Mexico’s 
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) denied envi-
ronmental authorisation for its first marine phosphate mine proposal. Several 
other jurisdictions have also established moratoria on oil and gas exploration 
and production in their exclusive economic zones. Papua New Guinea has 
approved an exploitation right for seabed mining. However, actual seabed 
mining operations have not yet commenced.
3.1 Namibia: Moratorium on Marine Phosphate Mining
Namibia’s environmental management framework was established by the 
Environmental Management Act, 2007 (EMA). The EMA sets out a range of 
9    Ministerial meetings of the Benguela Current Commission (BCC, 2013).
10   REPRISK (2015). Deep Sea Extractive Activities: Seabed Mining and Deep Sea Drilling.
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environmental principles intended to mitigate and avoid adverse impacts of 
activities. Regulations developed in terms of EMA list certain activities that 
may not be undertaken without an environmental clearance certificate.
The Act lists ‘resource removal, including natural living resources’ as an 
activity that requires an environmental clearance. The Regulations moreover 
specifically refer to ‘mining and quarrying’ activities including ‘resource extrac-
tion, manipulation and forms of mining or extraction of any natural resources 
whether regulated by law or not.’
Mining licenses in Namibia are granted under the Minerals (Prospecting 
and Mining) Act, 1992 with the application process set out in s.91. The Minerals 
Act provides for attaching environmental conditions in issuing mining licenses 
and requires
An estimate of the effect which the proposed prospecting operations and 
mining operations may have on the environment and the proposed steps 
to be taken in order to minimize or prevent any such effect.
Furthermore, before mining may commence, the environmental commis-
sioner must decide on whether the activity requires an environmental impact 
assessment.
In 2011 the Ministry of Mines and Energy granted mining licences to two 
companies, Namibian Marine Phosphate and LL Namibia Phosphates, for 
the exploitation of phosphate deposits off the coast of Namibia.11 The min-
ing licences were granted subject to the approval of an Environmental Impact 
Assessment. In January 2012 Namibian Marine Phosphate submitted a draft 
Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan 
for the proposed Sandpiper Phosphate Mining Project (The Sandpiper Project).
The Sandpiper Project would involve dredging the seabed in Namibia’s 
exclusive economic zone at depths of 3m and removing large volumes of sedi-
ment, up to 5.5 million tonnes annually. The operations expected an annual 
production of up to 3 million tonnes of phosphate rocks. Sediment would be 
stored on the vessels and thereafter transferred to land for processing which 
involves separation of phosphate from other marine sediment.12
11   Benkenstein, A. (2014). Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience. SAIIA.
12   Midgley, J., 2012. Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the Marine Component. 
Sandpiper Project. Proposed recovery of phosphate enriched sediment from the marine 
Mining Liscence Area No. 170 off Walvis Bay Namibia – Environmental Scoping Report 
(Final Report, April 2012).
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As part of the Environmental Impact Assessment, specialist studies were 
undertaken that included potential impacts on seabirds and marine mam-
mals, fish and fisheries, water column dynamics, macrobenthos and jellyfish.13
There was considerable opposition to the Sandpiper Project. A number of 
civil society organisations (both local and international)14 and fishery indus-
try associations15 strongly opposed the granting of rights and campaigned for 
a review of the decision.16 Furthermore, independent scientists raised strong 
objections against the Sandpiper Project and the EIA based on environmental 
impacts. These included the direct destruction to benthic habitats; release of 
hydrogen sulphide concentrations; release of heavy metals and bioaccumula-
tion in the food chain in turn impacting on fisheries; reduced phosphorous 
content in the seabed which results in oxygen depletion and toxicity of pro-
cessing plants on shore near Walvis Bay.17
In response to that opposition and the potential impacts on Namibia’s fish-
ing industry, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources took steps to 
establish a moratorium on marine phosphate mining. This led to a cabinet 
decision in September 2013 to establish an 18 month moratorium on marine 
phosphate mining. The decision outlined a number of concerns from the 
Namibian Government:
Government is concerned that the removal of soft sediment from the sea-
bed along with living organisms and the suspension of fine sediment in 
the seawater may affect the functioning of the marine ecosystem nega-
tively. The ministry is further concerned that any contamination or sus-
pended particles from mining activities may have adverse effects on the 
fish larvae and their development and thus [we] need to investigate 
the breeding and nursing areas, breeding patterns of the commercially 
13   Benkenstein, A. (2014). Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience. SAIIA.
14   Including Earth Organisation Namibia, the Deep Sea Mining Campaign and 
Swartkopmund Matters.
15   Including the Namibian Hake Fishing Industry Association and the Confederation of 
Namibian Fishing Associations.
16   Komnenic, A. (2013). Namibia imposes moratorium on coastal phosphate mining. Mining.
com <http://www.mining.com/namibia-imposes-moratorium-on-coastal-phosphate-min 
ing-41520/> Accessed April 2016.
17   Currie, B. (2014). Investigation of cumulative impacts on the marine ecosystem from 
mining of phosphorites off the Namibian coast; Solbakken, et al. (2014). Preparing for 
an Assessment of Environmental Impacts from Onshore and Offshore Phosphate Mining 
Activities in Namibia.
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important species in relation to the mining activities, as well as the cur-
rent dynamics.18
A major rationale for the moratorium was lack of knowledge on the potential 
impacts of marine phosphate mining on the marine environment and fish-
eries resources. The Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources announced 
that ‘information collected during the moratorium would provide an indi-
cation as to whether marine phosphate mining and the fishing industry can 
co-exist.’ The Minister further stated that:
The Namibian government is committed to ensure that proper scientific 
investigations are carried out that will allow it to make an informed deci-
sion about the future of phosphate mining in Namibia.19
Accordingly, the Namibian government subsequently commissioned an inde-
pendent study and environmental impact assessment of the impacts of marine 
phosphate mining aligned to broader strategic environmental assessments on 
the Namibian marine environment. The Fisheries and Aquaculture section 
of the Norwegian-based Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(SINTEF) and the Institute for Marine Research were commissioned to con-
duct these studies.20
In 2017 Namibia’s Environmental Commissioner issued an environmen-
tal clearance certificate for the Sandpiper Project. This led to a public outcry 
resulting in the Minister of Environment and Tourism cancelling the envi-
ronmental clearance certificate. Uncertainty and contestation related to the 
Sandpiper Project is on-going and the issue is highly politicised.
3.2 New Zealand: Refusal of Marine Phosphate Mining Application
On 14 May 2014 Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited (Chatham Rock) applied 
to the Environment Protection Authority for marine consent21 to mine phos-
phate in Chatham Rise, located 400 km east of Christchurch. The application 
18   Namibian Government Cabinet Moratorium, 2013.
19   Haufiku, M. (2014). Moratorium on phosphate mining remains. New Era https://www 
.newera.com.na/2014/04/11/moratorium-phosphate-mining-remains/ Accessed May 2016.
20   Draft reports related to the overall plan for the Strategic Environmental Assessments 
have been completed by SINTEF (Solbakken, et al. (2014). Preparing for an Assessment 
of Environmental Impacts from Onshore and Offshore Phosphate Mining Activities in 
Namibia).
21   In terms of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) 
Act 2012 (the EEZ Act).
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sought consent to commence operations over a 10 192 km2 area for a 35 year 
period. Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited later withdrew the application for 
operations in an Eastern mining block on 1 August 2014 reducing the total area 
to 5 207 km2. In its application Chatham Rock sought a mining permit (MPL 
55549) to mine a total area of 1 052 km2 over 35 years.22 The application sought 
to mine three 10km2 each year at depths between 250m and 450m with an 
expected annual production of up to 1.5 million tonnes.23 In the first five years 
of operations a mining area restricted to 820 km2 was proposed. Chatham Rock 
provided a description of the proposed mining operation to be undertaken:
The mining was to be carried out by a specially built or modified ves-
sel using a mining system designed by Royal Boskalis Westminster nv 
(Boskalis). Phosphorite-bearing material was to be retrieved from the 
seabed by means of a trailing suction drag-head and mechanically pro-
cessed on board the vessel. Phosphorite nodules greater than 2 mm 
would be separated from other material using sieves and logwashers and 
stored on the vessel. Waste material would then be released close to the 
seabed, using a discharge (sinker) pipe with a diffuser.24
A Decision-Making Committee (DMC) was appointed by the Environment 
Protection Authority to decide on the application. The application by Chatham 
Rock drew widespread public attention, with over 294 submissions and large 
public hearings held by the DMC in Wellington, Hamilton and the Chatham 
Islands.25 On 10 February 2015 the DMC completed deliberations and refused 
consent.
New Zealand has a comprehensive legal regime on governing seabed min-
ing, which deserves attention. The legislative framework on determining 
marine consents for marine mining is provided for in its Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (the EEZ Act). 
A large number of provisions in the EEZ Act were considered in the Chatham 
Rock Phosphate application.26
22   Currie, D. (2015). Decision on marine consent application: Chatham Rock Phosphate 
Limited to mine phosphorite nodules on the Chatham Rise.
23   Ibid.
24   Chatham Rock Phosphate, 2014.
25   Currie, D. (2015). Decision on marine consent application: Chatham Rock Phosphate 
Limited to mine phosphorite nodules on the Chatham Rise.
26   Environmental Protection Authority, 2015.
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Section 10(1) outlines the purpose of the Act, which is ‘to promote the sus-
tainable management of the natural resources of the exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf.’27
Section 10(2) defines sustainable management as ‘managing the use, devel-
opment and protection of natural resources in a way, or at a rate, that enables 
people to provide for their economic wellbeing while—
(a) sustaining the potential of natural resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonable needs of future generations; and
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of the environment; and
(c) avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment.
Section 10(3) states that to fulfil the purposes of the Act, decision-makers must 
consider decision-making criteria relevant to a particular application28 and 
apply information principles29 set out in the Act.
Section 20 lists activities that may only be undertaken in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone with marine consent. Activities requiring marine consent in 
terms of Section 20 include:
the removal of non-living natural material from the seabed or subsoil; the 
disturbance of the seabed or subsoil in a manner likely to have an adverse 
effect on the seabed or subsoil; the deposit of anything or organism in, on 
or under the seabed; and the destruction, damage or disturbance of the 
seabed or subsoil in a manner that is likely to have an adverse effect on 
marine species or their habitat.
Section 59(2) sets out the criteria that need to be considered in the determina-
tion of an application for a marine consent. Relevant criteria that the EPA must 
consider include:
(a) any effects on the environment or existing interests of allowing the activ-
ity, including—
 (i) cumulative effects; and
 (ii) effects that may occur in New Zealand or in the waters above or 
beyond the continental shelf beyond the outer limits of the exclusive 
economic zone;
27   Section 10(1).
28   In this case s59.
29   s61.
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(b) the effects on the environment or existing interests of other activi-
ties undertaken in the area covered by the application or in its vicinity, 
including—
 (ii) effects that may occur in New Zealand or in the waters above or 
beyond the continental shelf beyond the outer limits of the exclusive 
economic zone; and
(c) the effects on human health;
(d) the importance of protecting the biological diversity and integrity of 
marine species, ecosystems, and processes;
(e) the importance of protecting rare and vulnerable ecosystems and the 
habitats of threatened species;
(f) the economic benefit to New Zealand of allowing the application;
(g) the efficient use and development of natural resources;
(h) the nature and effect of other marine management regimes; and
(i) best practice in relation to an industry or activity; and
(j) the extent to which imposing conditions under section 63 might avoid, 
remedy, or mitigate the adverse effects of the activity; and
In addition, the EPA must have regard to any advice received from the Māori 
Advisory Committee30 and regard to the value of the investment in the activity 
of the existing consent holder.31 In terms of the Act, the decision-maker must 
also consider the effects of the proposed activities on existing rights. Existing 
rights may include:
an interest a person has in any lawfully established existing activity such 
as rights of access, navigation and fishing; the settlement of historical 
claims under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975; the settlement of a con-
temporary claim under the Treaty of Waitangi as provided for in an Act, 
including the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992; 
and a protected customary right or customary marine title recognised 
under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 201132
Section 61 outlines information principles that a decision-maker must apply 
to the determination of a marine consent application. Section 61 requires 
decision-makers to make decisions on the best available information and must 
consider inadequacy and uncertainty of information in its decision. Section 
61 directs that ‘when the information available in relation to an application 
30   S.59(2)(d).
31   S59(3).
32   Definition of existing interest, Section 4 of the EEZ Act.
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is uncertain or inadequate, decision-makers must favour caution and envi-
ronmental protection.’ The Act further requires decision-makers to use their 
powers to gain as much information as possible by requesting information 
from the applicant, obtaining advice or commissioning reviews or reports.
Section 62(2) states:
For the avoidance of doubt, the application may be refused if the 
decision-makers consider that they do not have adequate information to 
determine the application.
In reaching its decision the Decision Making Committee considered the fol-
lowing effects on the environment:
a) The significant and permanent adverse effects on the benthic 
environment.
b) The effects of the return of waste material to the seabed following pro-
cessing aboard the vessel.
c) Effects on the trophic web (including primary production, microbes and 
zooplankton), fish and other pelagic fauna, rock lobsters, water quality 
and seabirds.
d) The effects of mining related noise, including on marine mammals; and 
the risks to biosecurity and human health.
The Decision Making Committee further considered the following threats to 
existing interests:
a) Interests arising from Treaty of Waitangi settlements.
b) Commercial fishing; marine eco-tourism; customary fishing; and other 
vessels traversing the area.
c) Effects of the proposal on other marine management regimes, including 
the Mid Chatham Rise Benthic Protection Area.
d) Interests of Chatham Islanders and the effects of the proposal on Māori 
and Moriori cultural interests (Currie, 2015).
In summary, the Decision Making Committee refused the application on four 
grounds:
1. Environmental impact: The Decision Making Committee firstly found 
that the impacts of the drag head on benthic fauna would be highly 
destructive. These effects could not be ‘avoided, remedied or mitigated’. 
The mining would take place in the Mid Chatham Rise Benthic Protection 
Area, an area protected from trawling and dredging. The mining opera-
tions would destroy stony coral communities which were regarded by 
the Decision Making Committee as rare and vulnerable ecosystems. The 
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damage would be irreversible’ altering the habitat permanently to soft 
sediment habitats. Furthermore, waste material and effluent returned 
to the seabed would have considerable effects on benthic habitats both 
within the mining blocks and the wider environment.33
2. Lack of knowledge: There was a lack of information to enable certainty 
on the impacts on the environment and existing interests. This was 
attributed to a lack of scientific knowledge of the receiving environment 
and of the proposed mining operations, regarded as ‘the first seabed 
mining project ever undertaken at such depths anywhere in the world’. 
With a lack of available knowledge, the Decision Making Committee was 
accordingly required to ‘favour caution and environmental protection’.34
3. Socio-economic impacts: The Decision Making Committee considered 
economic factors and the ‘likely economic benefit to New Zealand of the 
proposal’. In this consideration the Decision Making Committee deter-
mined the following:
‘It was not persuaded that the proposal’s economic benefit to New 
Zealand would be of the significance argued by the applicant, or that reli-
ance could be placed on economic benefits as a potential offsetting 
factor’.
It found that ‘seabed mining would be unlikely to generate more than a 
modest economic benefit to New Zealand and the quantum and distribu-
tion of that benefit remained uncertain. This had to be weighed against 
the significant and permanent adverse effects on the benthic environ-
ment’ and on other existing interests, particularly the fishing industry.
4. Mitigating impacts: The Decision Making Committee considered 
whether specific conditions that could be applied to the mining proposal 
could ‘avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects of the activity.’ In this 
consideration it found that impacts ‘could not be mitigated by any set 
of conditions or adaptive management regime that might reasonably be 
imposed’.
After weighing up factors prescribed to make a decision the Decision Making 
Committee found that the ‘application could not be approved either in part or 
in whole’. The application for marine consent was accordingly refused.35
33   Currie, D. (2015). Decision on marine consent application: Chatham Rock Phosphate 
Limited to mine phosphorite nodules on the Chatham Rise.
34   Ibid.
35   Ibid.
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3.3 Northern Territory Australia: Moratorium on Seabed Mining
In Northern Territory Australia a number of seabed mining proposals and 
preliminary exploration rights were granted for manganese exploitation in 
the shallow waters of Groote Eylandt. Mining companies involved included 
Northern Manganese Limited, Groote Resources Limited and Groote Eylandt 
Mining Company.36
Northern Manganese Limited sought environmental approval to conduct 
exploratory activities in 2012. It applied for 7 mineral exploration licenses, cov-
ering an approximately of 3 856km2 in the shallow offshore Northern Territory. 
This was known as the Blue Mud Bay Project. Northern Manganese Limited 
also holds exploration rights for eight tenements (1 723 km2) of shallow marine 
terrain and two islands near Groote Eylandt. This project is known as the 
Groote Eylandt Project.37
The granting of exploration rights generated widespread public concern. In 
response, the Northern Territory government placed a moratorium on seabed 
mining.38 The Policy Statement of the Moratorium stated that seabed mining 
is a new and evolving worldwide industry with a minimum number of gen-
erally accepted practice standards. The methods applied in seabed mining 
operations are rapidly changing and there is limited information available on:
a) actual or potential impacts on environment and other resource indus-
tries; and
b) methods for managing impacts
This lack of available information decreases the ability of decision-makers to:
a) accurately assess appropriate methodology for management of industry, 
its development, and sustainability;
b) develop appropriate conditions and authorisations.
The moratorium covered both granting titles permitting exploration for min-
erals or mining and on issuing authorisations within the coastal waters of the 
Northern Territory until a review of actual or potential impacts is undertaken.39 
The review was intended to form the basis for an assessment of possible future 
development and sustainability of industry. The review was required to:
a) examine practices adopted internationally and in Australia to identify 
environmental best practices;
36   EPA Northern Territory (2012). Interim Report: Seabed Mining in the Northern Territory.
37   Ibid.
38   Northern Territory Government. (2012). Moratorium on exploration and mining in coastal 
waters of the Northern Territory until 2015.
39   Ibid.
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b) identify likely impacts (direct and associated) of seabed mining on the 
environment and other resources, including commercial and recre-
ational fishing;
c) examine mitigation strategies to manage impacts of exploration and 
mining;
d) consider advice from Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority – measures 
to avoid and protect sacred sites.
The overall aim of the review was to:
a) Identify appropriate standards for the Territory which adequately address 
needs of the community in respect of industry “best practice”, protection 
of the environment, protection of social and cultural impacts, mitigation 
strategies and community involvement.
b) permit development of regulations and guidelines for assessment of 
applications to ensure consistency.
The Environmental Protection Agency of Australia produced an Interim Report 
(2012) which recommended a highly cautious approach to seabed mining and 
the extension of the moratorium until better knowledge of impacts is avail-
able. The moratorium was initially put in place for a period of three years, from 
March 2012 to March 2015. However, following the lapse of the moratorium 
period, the Northern Territory extended the moratorium period for a further 
three years and placed a complete ban on seabed mining in Groote Eylandt.
3.4 Mexico: Refusal of Environmental Authorisation of a Marine 
Phosphate Mine
In September 2014, Odyssey Marine Explorations (an American company) 
submitted an environmental impact assessment for its planned ‘Don Diego’ 
marine phosphate mine in Baja, California’s San Ignacio lagoon, near Ulloa 
Bay.40
The project intended to mine 225,000 acres of seabed in five work sites. 
It was planned that each site would be exploited for 10 years, resulting in a 
50-year long project. Overall, the project planned to extract 350 million tons of 
phosphate sand from the seabed.41
The project was opposed by many stakeholders including the Interamerican 
Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), San Juanico residents, the 
40   Exploraciones Oceanicas, S. de R.L de C.V. (2014) ‘Environmental Impact Assessment 
Non-Technical Executive Summary’. Available online: http://www.dondiego.mx/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2014/06/DD_EIA-Non-Technical-Summary.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2016.
41   Moguel, S. (2016). Mexico protects loggerhead turtles from the Don Diego mine. AIDA. 
http://www.aida-americas.org/release/mexico-protects-loggerhead-turtles-don-diego 
-mine Accessed June 2016.
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Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (CEMDA), local fishing cooperatives, 
BCS Noticias, WildCoast and Save the Waves Coalition. Civil society raised 
several concerns including potential impacts on Gray whales, Blue wales, 
Humpback wales and Loggerhead turtles as a result of noise, disturbance and 
radioactive releases from marine phosphate mining.42
In 2016, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) 
denied environmental authorisation for the Don Diego marine phosphate 
mining project. The environmental authority found that measures presented 
by the company for protecting Loggerhead turtles were based on inconsistent 
information. Furthermore, the authority found that the economic bene-
fits of the project could not prevail over the protection of the natural resources 
of Ulloa Bay, particularly in relation to threatened species subject to strict stan-
dards of protection.43
3.5 Pacific Islands: Seabed Mining Applications
A number of Pacific Island Nations, namely; Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands have granted permits for deep 
sea mining exploration. The Solwara 1 Project was the most advanced. In 2009 
Nautilus Minerals (a Canadian seabed mining company) was granted a min-
ing right for the Solwara 1 Project, for seabed mining in the Bismarck Sea.44 
It appears that Papua New Guinea government’s rationale for granting these 
rights relates to the potential revenue that could stem from royalties.45
There has been significant opposition to the Solwara 1 Project from local 
communities and not for profit organisations related to the impacts on marine 
and coastal ecosystems and communities. Recently, the World Bank (2016) 
published a report titled ‘Precautionary Management of Deep Sea Mining 
Potential in Pacific Island Countries’.46 The report recommended that Pacific 
Island countries that are supporting or considering deep sea mining activities 
should ‘proceed with a high degree of caution to avoid irreversible damage to 
42   Ibid.
43   Ibid.
44   Steiner, R. (2009). Independent Review of the Environmental Impact Statement for 
the proposed Nautilus Minerals Solwara 1 Seabed Mining Project, Papua New Guinea. 
Conducted for the Bismarck-Solomon Seas Indigenous Peoples Council, Madang, Papua 
New Guinea.
45   Rosenbaum, H. (2011). Out of our depth! Mining the Ocean Floor in Papua New Guinea.
46   World Bank (2016). Pacific Possible: Precautionary Management of Deep Sea Mining 
Potential in Pacific Island Countries.
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their ecosystems’. The report further stresses the need for strong governance 
arrangements to ensure that appropriate social and environmental safeguards 
are in place.
More recently, Nautilus Minerals has run into financial difficulties, and 0n 
21 February 2019, the company filed for protection from creditors under the 
Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).
3.6 Bristol Bay: Moratorium on Oil and Gas Activities47
Oil and gas leasing was first allowed in Bristol Bay in 1986 when the U.S. federal 
government set aside 5.6 million acres of the southern region of Bristol Bay 
for oil and gas leasing.48 The decision was opposed widely by fishing industry, 
indigenous communities (Alaska Native Tribes), environmental organisations, 
the State of Alaska, conservation organisations, recreational users and local 
seafood and tourism businesses, organised in a coalition called the Fish Basket 
Coalition.49 The Trustees for Alaska and other conservation groups, indigenous 
communities and the State of Alaska initiated court proceedings to stop the 
lease sale. The court case was unsuccessful and oil and gas leases were issued.50
Potential impacts to fishery resources and marine habitats, cited in inde-
pendent impact assessments included ‘seismic testing, air pollution from ship 
traffic and the ever-present risk of oil spills’. In particular, impact studies stated 
that ‘the area’s harsh weather, rough seas, ice and strong currents would make 
cleanup and containment of an oil spill difficult, if not impossible’.51
In 2010 the Obama Administration cancelled the lease sale and provided 
temporary protection to Bristol Bay by withdrawing the area for consideration 
for oil and gas development until 2017. This was followed by steps to perma-
nently protect Bristol Bay. On 16 December 2014, the Obama Administration 
announced an indefinite Presidential Moratorium on oil and gas drilling in 
Bristol Bay using powers conferred under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (1953).52
47   A further example of a moratorium on offshore oil and gas is Antarctica. Since 1961, the 
continent has been administered under the Antarctic Treaty, an international agreement 
to preserve the continent for peaceful scientific study. In 1991 the Madrid Protocol placed 
a moratorium on mining in Antarctica for fifty years. [Please give details.] This was ratified 
by all treaty nations by 1998. There is a strong international campaign aimed at establish-
ing a moratorium on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic Sea.




52   The White House (2014). President Obama Protects Alaska’s Bristol Bay From Future Oil 
and Gas Drilling. Press release. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/16/
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The basis for the moratorium was partly socio-economic considerations. 
Bristol Bay supports a $2 billion annual fishing industry, regarded as one of 
the world’s most valuable fisheries and provides up to 40% of America’s wild 
caught seafood. It supports indigenous fishing communities and subsistence 
fishers throughout Alaska and Pacific Northwest. It is home to Native American 
sacred lands. The area provides considerable tourism opportunities and rev-
enue, up to $100 million in annual recreational fishing and tourism activities.53
4 Marine Phosphate Mining in South Africa
This section provides an in-depth case study into seabed mining in South 
Africa. The South African case provides strong insights into the potential risks 
of seabed mining applications in jurisdictions with limited regulatory and gov-
ernance capacity.
In 2012 and 2014, South Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources granted 
three prospecting rights for marine phosphate to Green Flash Trading 251 (Pty) 
Ltd (GFT 251), Green Flash Trading 257 (Pty) Ltd (GFT 257) and Diamond Fields 
International Ltd (DFI Ltd) respectively.
The rights extend over a considerable portion of South Africa’s marine 
environment, together covering more than 150 000 km2 or 10% of its exclu-
sive economic zone. The GFT 251 and GFT 257 prospecting rights cover an 
area approximately 63 637 km2 and 44 389 km2 respectively, located off South 
Africa’s West Coast and Southwest Coast. The DFI Ltd prospecting right extends 
over 47 468 km2 within South Africa’s Outeniqua Basin.54
These prospecting rights have lapsed, and representatives of GFT 251 and 
GFT 257 have publicly announced, in November 2016, that marine phos-
phate mining in South Africa would not be financially feasible based on their 
assessments. Nevertheless, these areas have been earmarked by South Africa’s 
government for seabed mining, despite the fact that they coincide with sev-
eral existing fishery footprints, critically endangered ecosystems and a number 
president-obama-protects-alaska-s-bristol-bay-future-oil-and-gas-drilling.
53   WWF International (2011). The value of commercial fisheries near Bristol Bay, Alaska.
54   Diamond Fields International. (2013). Environmental Management Plan for the proposed 
Marine Phosphate Prospecting by Diamond Fields International Ltd in the Outeniqua 
West Licence Area on the Eastern Agulhas, Offshore Mossel Bay.
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of recently proclaimed offshore marine protected areas. Some of the benthic 
habitat types that coincide with the proposed seabed mining areas don’t exist 
anywhere else in the world.55
The next section details issues that need consideration in regulating and 
governing seabed mining in South Africa. Regulatory approaches adopted in 
other countries may shed light into some of the regulatory and governance 
challenges seabed mining poses to South Africa.
4.1 Environmental Impacts
There is relatively limited knowledge of the impacts of seabed mining on 
marine environments. However, preliminary assessments outline considerable 
and irreversible impacts on marine ecosystems and fishery resources, signify-
ing the need for longer term investigations.56 These studies recommend that 
potentially considerable impacts coupled with the lack of knowledge available 
on seabed mining, warrants regulatory caution.
WWF-South Africa commissioned a report on potential impacts of marine 
sediment mining in the west and south coasts of the Western Cape, South 
Africa.57 The report found that seabed mining in existing prospecting areas 
would have severe and potentially irreversible impacts on seabed habitats. The 
destruction and permanent alteration of marine habitats would be inevitable 
in light of the type of mining proposed.58
The report found that seabed mining could cause significant and irrevers-
ible impacts to biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and fishery resources. 
In particular, the prospecting rights for marine phosphate mining directly 
overlap with critically endangered ecosystems, ecologically and biologically 
significant areas and areas earmarked for protection in terms of an Operation 
55   Green Flash Trading. (2012a). Environmental Management Plan in the ocean off Cape 
Columbine and Cape Infanta, Western Cape Province. Green Flash Trading 257 (Pty) Ltd; 
Green Flash Trading. (2012b). Environmental Management Plan in the ocean off Adam 
Se Baai and the area to the south towards Table Bay, Western Cape Province. Green Flash 
Trading 251 (Pty) Ltd.
56   See Currie, D. 2015; NT Australia EPA, 2012; Rosenbaum, 2011.
57   Currie, J. (2013). Brief Overview of Potential Ecosystem Impacts of Marine Phosphate 
Mining in the Western Cape, South Africa.
58   Ibid.
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Phakisa59 initiative to establish a network of marine protected areas.60 Some 
of the benthic habitat types that coincide with the prospecting areas don’t 
exist anywhere else in the world.
There is also limited knowledge of the ecological importance of seabed eco-
systems. It is known that benthic habitats provide habitat, feeding, spawning 
and breeding areas for a staggering variety of marine species, many of which 
are commercially important.61 However, there are considerable gaps in knowl-
edge on the relationship between the seabed and critical ecosystem services.
4.2 Socio-Economic Impacts
As seabed mining would have negative impacts on fish stocks it would also 
impact on revenue, jobs and livelihoods associated with the fishing industry. It 
is thus important that the socio-economic contributions of fishing are under-
stood and considered in decision-making on seabed mining.
South Africa’s commercial fishing industry employs approximately 27 000 
people directly and 100 000 people indirectly.62 In the Western Cape, where the 
prospecting rights are concentrated, the fishing industry contributes approxi-
mately 2% to Gross Geographic Product.63
As mentioned, the marine phosphate prospecting areas directly overlap 
with fishing footprints of several fisheries including hake longline, tuna pole, 
west coast rock lobster, small pelagics and chokka squid sector. Together, these 
five fishing sectors provide up to 23 000 jobs.64 Notably, the prospecting rights 
coincide with South Africa’s only Marine Stewardship Council accredited fish-
ery, which employs 12 000 people and generates approximately R4 billion in 
revenue annually.65
59   Operation Phakisa is a South African government initiative that seeks to rapidly unlock 
the economic potential of South Africa’s oceans, through fast tracking development of 
five growth areas, namely: Marine Transport and Manufacturing; Offshore Oil and Gas; 
Aquaculture; Marine Protection Services and Ocean Governance; and Coastal Tourism.
60   Operation Phakisa. (2014). Marine Protection Services and Governance Final Lab Report.
61   Sink, K. and Attwood, C. (2008). Guidelines for Offshore Marine Protected Areas in South 
Africa. SANBI Biodiversity Series 9. South African National Biodiversity Institute, Pretoria.
62   Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, (2010). Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Integrated Growth and Development Plan (GDP), DAFF Sector GDP.
63   Ibid.
64   Brick, K. and Hasson, R. (2016). Valuing the socio-economic contribution of fisheries and 
other marine uses in South Africa: A socio-economic assessment in the context of marine 
phosphate mining.
65   Blaine, S. (2012). Miner’s marine phosphate plans could harm MSC-accredited fishery. 
<http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/07/20/miner-s-marine-phosphate-plans-could 
-harm-msc-accredited-fishery> Business Day Live Accessed July 2016; Lallemand, P., 
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Furthermore, latest estimates suggest that there are approximately 8 078 
small-scale fishers in South Africa, with the Western Cape home to approxi-
mately 1 667 small scale fishers.66 Small scale fishers directly rely on heathy 
marine ecosystems for livelihood, nutrition, food security and income. Small 
scale fishing plays a critical role in providing employment and access to pro-
tein in coastal communities. There are approximately 44 coastal communities 
dotted along the coastline of the Western Cape.67
Seabed mining would likely have detrimental impacts on tourism, par-
ticularly coastal and marine tourism. Bulk marine sediment mining requires 
additional coastal developments that have associated impacts. These include 
desalination plants, beneficiations facilities and processing plants as well as 
increased shipping. In relation to the Sandpiper Project, residents of Walvis 
Bay were highly ‘concerned about the potential release of toxic elements in the 
land-based phosphate processing phase’.68
Thus, decision-making, policy and regulation related to seabed mining 
would need to consider potential negative impacts on existing users and if 
impacts cannot be avoided, regulatory mechanisms for compensation would 
need to be devised. With regards to the latter, there is potential difficulty in 
assessing appropriate compensation for users from renewable industries 
where their economic benefit is potentially indefinite?
4.3 South Africa’s Legal and Governance Framework
South Africa’s legal and governance framework was not designed to deal with 
seabed mining. Without specific regulation relevant to seabed mining, appli-
cations would tend to be dealt with through existing terrestrial mineral and 
environmental management legislation. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA) and National Environmental Management 
Act, 1998 (NEMA), South Africa’s existing legislation, are inadequate to govern 
seabed mining.
Bergh, M., Hansen, M., Purves, M., (2016). Estimating the economic benefits of MSC certi-
fication for the South African hake trawl fishery.
66   Isaacs, M. and Hara, M. (2015). Backing small-scale fishers: Opportunities and challenges 
in transforming the fish sector. Published by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian 
Studies.
67   Ibid.
68   Benkenstein, A. (2014). Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience. SAIIA.
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4.3.1 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 
(MPRDA)
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act does not deal explic-
itly with seabed prospecting and mining. Many provisions (particularly related 
to consultation and environmental impact) in the MPRDA are difficult to apply 
or translate to seabed mining. For instance, legal requirements to consult 
with landowners, neighbours, community members and other interested and 
affected parties act as a check and balance against inappropriate prospecting 
and mining licensing decisions. The importance of a lively civil society has 
repeatedly been acknowledged by South Africa’s Constitutional Court. This 
check and balance will not be as strong for marine environments where there 
are no landowners, neighbours or community members.
Marine prospecting applications are accepted or refused by Regional 
Managers. However, South Africa’s exclusive economic zone has not been 
divided along regional Department of Mineral Resources’ administrative 
lines and functions. Furthermore, the Department of Mineral Resources has 
no overarching strategy or policy on seabed prospecting and mining.69 There 
are no specific regulatory instruments or guidelines that provide assistance to 
decision-makers in respect of seabed mining. Nor is there any national and 
regional database of seabed prospecting and mining or other resource com-
piled to facilitate the Department of Mineral Resources’ consideration of 
applications.
The Department of Mineral Resources has limited capacity for compliance 
monitoring and enforcement (CME) of terrestrial operations. In some cases, 
environmental CME is entirely absent. Accordingly, South Africa’s department 
responsible for environmental management of mineral resource extraction 
has limited capacity for, or experience, guidance and knowledge of monitoring 
and enforcing compliance with environmental management plans or pro-
grammes and conditions of environmental authorisations in respect of seabed 
prospecting and mining.
Similarly, mineral authorities across the globe face significant governance 
and regulatory challenges with terrestrial prospecting and mining related to, 
amongst other challenges; environmental and social impact; consultation; 
access to information; rehabilitation and an inability to close operations. 
These challenges would, in all probability, be magnified in respect of seabed 
prospecting and mining.
69   In terms of s.3(3) of the MPRDA ‘the Minister must ensure the sustainable development of 
South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources within a framework of national environ-
mental policy, norms and standards while promoting economic and social development’.
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Notably, seabed mining poses significant challenges related to rehabilita-
tion. For example, in terms of s.24(2N)(f) an environmental management 
programme must as ‘far as reasonably practicable’ include ‘measures to reha-
bilitate the environment affected to its natural or predetermined state’. Under 
s.24(P)(1) ‘an applicant for an environmental authorisation, relating to pros-
pecting, exploration, mining or production’ must provide financial provision 
for rehabilitation. Based on environmental assessments in other countries, 
rehabilitation in respect of seabed mining seems unlikely, as the ‘resultant 
ecosystem changes in such mined areas could be considered permanent, as 
recovery to pre-disturbed sediment structures (and hence similar habitat) 
would occur on geological time scales’.70
4.3.2 National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (NEMA)
Seabed mining would potentially fail to comply with a number of provisions 
in NEMA and similar environmental management legislative frameworks in 
other countries. Firstly, there is a lack of knowledge of impacts of seabed min-
ing. In such circumstances, NEMA requires a precautionary approach which 
takes into account the ‘limits of current knowledge about the consequences 
of decisions and actions’.71 Seabed mining thus potentially conflicts with the 
precautionary principle.
Secondly, NEMA requires development to avoid, minimise or remedy distur-
bance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity. In view of independent 
impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments undertaken in 
relation to seabed mining, it seems that seabed mining would fail to comply 
with principles of avoiding, minimising or remedying impact.
Thirdly, NEMA and environmental management legislative frameworks in 
other countries are usually underpinned by a sustainable development princi-
ple, which requires a balancing of social, economic and environmental factors. 
In South Africa, NEMA requires that development applications should be con-
sidered, assessed and evaluated with due regard to the ‘social, economic and 
environmental impacts of activities, including disadvantages and benefits’. 
Fulfilment of this principle is threatened by the potential socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of seabed mining.
70   Currie, B. (2014). Investigation of cumulative impacts on the marine ecosystem from 
mining of phosphorites off the Namibian coast.; Levin, L.; Le, J.T; and Carson, R. (2016). 
‘Incorporating ecosystem services into environmental management of deep-seabed min-
ing’. Deep-Sea Research.
71   Section 2(4)(vii).
311Review of National Legislations
In sum, there are concerns in South Africa’s legal, governance and institu-
tional frameworks in relation to seabed mining. Whilst there are gaps in the 
MPRDA, NEMA has principles that cannot be upheld if seabed mining were to 
proceed. This would see a seabed mining industry that is unregulated and not 
subject to state monitoring or enforcement of its compliance with licences and 
environmental laws. This in turn could facilitate severe and irreversible dam-
age to marine environments and fisheries resources.
5 Conclusion: Legal Principles and Frameworks for Seabed Mining
The approach, policy positions or decisions adopted by coastal States in 
relation to seabed mining within their jurisdictions has generally been cau-
tious, with due regard to the precautionary principle. These decisions and 
approaches have been underpinned by a number of principles, including: lack 
of knowledge on impacts of seabed mining alongside lack of knowledge of 
benthic ecosystems (information principle); considerable environmental and 
socio-economic risks (precautionary principle and sustainability principle); 
insufficient regulatory, legal, policy, institutional frameworks to cope with 
seabed mining (governance principle); potential impacts on communities par-
ticularly small-scale, traditional and subsistence fishing (fairness principle).
In Namibia and Northern Territory Australia’s case, a time-based morato-
rium has been established, alongside commitments to undertake long-term 
research and reviews on issues such as: potential environmental impacts; 
potential impacts on existing marine users, particularly fishing industry (in the 
form of socio-economic impact assessments or cost-benefit analysis); reviews 
of potential management regimes to mitigate or reduce impacts; review of 
potential conditions, permissions and authorisations to regulate seabed min-
ing; and reviews in view of developing potential legislative, regulatory, policy 
and institutional frameworks in relation to seabed mining.
The rationale for these moratoria and decisions and the cases above can be 
distilled into a number of prerequisites that these national jurisdictions have 
committed to before allowing seabed mining to proceed. These are:
1. The undertaking of a strategic environmental assessment: This was a 
central criteria and tool in Namibia’s decision to establish a moratorium 
on seabed mining. A Strategic Environmental Assessment allows for 
a long-term and detailed study on potential and actual environmental 
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impacts72 and on the socio-economic benefits and drawbacks of devel-
oping this industry. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) appears 
to be an inadequate mechanism to deal with risks posed by seabed min-
ing. An EIA only investigates the environmental implications of a single 
development, at a project level. It does not consider cumulative impacts 
and assumes that a broader policy decision has already been made, to 
allow a specific type of development to occur. An activity such as sea-
bed mining, on the other hand, requires a proactive, higher level policy 
decision on whether it is appropriate or not to allow seabed mining in 
a specific context in the first place. Such a decision can be guided by a 
Strategic Environmental Assessment.
2. Socio-economic assessments and cost-benefits analysis: 
Decision-making on seabed mining further requires proper analysis of 
potential socio-economic impacts of seabed mining on existing indus-
tries and associated jobs and livelihoods – many of which are renewable, 
unlike seabed mining.73 This requires that costs and benefits are weighed 
up, so that trade-offs are properly informed. In particular, it requires con-
siderations of impacts on commercial and small-scale fishing and associ-
ated jobs and livelihoods. Socio-economic assessments and cost-benefits 
analysis may be part of a strategic environmental assessment, however, 
in the case of New Zealand and Australia Northern Territory, socio – eco-
nomic considerations were assessed separately and guided decisions 
accordingly.
3. Open deliberation on alternatives to seabed mining in respect of 
resource requirements: An argument asserted in applications for marine 
phosphate mining in New Zealand, South Africa, Mexico and Namibia 
is that phosphate is critical for food security and terrestrial phosphate 
supplies are dwindling whilst demand is increasing74 . These justifica-
tions require further interrogation in decision-making and policy related 
to seabed mining. Decision-making should be informed by assessments 
on on the overall desirability of allowing seabed mining in view of 
72   Such an SEA can also provide for the collection and management of adequate baseline 
information in areas where seabed mining is proposed.
73   See Brick and Hasson (2016) for a valuation of South African fishing industry in the con-
text of marine phosphate mining.
74   Diamond Fields International. (2013). Environmental Management Plan for the proposed 
Marine Phosphate Prospecting by Diamond Fields International Ltd in the Outeniqua 
West Licence Area on the Eastern Agulhas, Offshore Mossel Bay; Green Flash Trading. 
(2012a). Environmental Management Plan in the ocean off Cape Columbine and Cape 
Infanta, Western Cape Province. Green Flash Trading 257 (Pty) Ltd.
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alternative sustainable supply strategies, based on an understanding 
of market dynamics, use profiles, options for resource recovery and 
improved management.
4. The development and implementation of appropriate policies, strate-
gies, laws and regulations in relation to seabed mining:75 This entails 
developing a comprehensive framework to guide decision-making, envi-
ronmental management and compliance monitoring and enforcement. 
It requires decision-makers to proactively determine the suitability of 
seabed mining, before development proposals are invested in and con-
sidered. This moreover requires considerable institutional and human 
resource capacity development.76 This was an approach adopted by 
Northern Territory Australia, which provided for a review to ‘identify 
the appropriate standards’ and the ‘development of regulations, guide-
lines, or both, for the assessment of applications to ensure consistency 
of assessment procedures and appropriate determinations’. Developing 
a regulatory framework for seabed mining should include proper consid-
eration and alignment of regional commitments in respect of potential 
impacts of seabed mining on neighbouring coastal countries.
5. Establishment of networks of marine protected areas, no-go-areas and 
fisheries management areas which prohibit and restrict seabed min-
ing, in order to ensure benthic habitats and marine ecosystems receive 
adequate protection and fishery resources are secured. In many jurisdic-
tions marine protected areas prohibit or provide restrictions on seabed 
mining in line with provisions on the purposes of marine protection. For 
example, South Africa’s National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Amendment Act, 2014 (NEMPAAA) explicitly provides for the 
restriction or prohibition of any activities in a marine protected area that 
may have adverse effects on the purposes of declaring such a marine pro-
tected area in the first place.77 Section 48(1) explicitly states:
Despite other legislation, no person may conduct commercial prospect-
ing or mining, exploration, production or related activities (in a marine 
protected area).
75   This should include the promulgation of proper technical standards and industry guide-
lines to minimise damage of operations.
76   This should include proper regulatory provision for seabed mining in national marine 
spatial planning processes and ocean economic development strategies.
77   s.22A(g).
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In particular, where the purpose of declaring an MPA relates to the con-
servation and protection of benthic ecosystems, species and habitats, the 
argument for restricting mining, prospecting, exploration and produc-
tion activities is heightened.
6. The establishment of legal provisions to ensure liability for environmen-
tal damage is assigned to mining operators through appropriate assess-
ment, strict collection and ring-fenced. This is in line with the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle entrenched in international law and environmental man-
agement regimes of many countries, whereby ‘national authorities should 
endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the 
use of economic instruments, taking into the account that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution’.78 This should include the 
establishment of legal mechanisms for compensation to existing marine 
users for negative impacts stemming from seabed mining.
7. Establishment of legal mechanisms to facilitate proper consultation and 
stakeholder engagement. This is particularly necessary in view of the 
fact that checks and balances in the form of legal obligations to consult 
with landowners, neighbours, community members and other interested 
and affected parties, are not as robust in relation to marine environments.
These provide a robust set of guidelines or recommendations, based on com-
parative approaches and processes adopted by other countries, for policy 
positions and regulatory frameworks for sovereign coastal states to ensure that 
seabed mining does not disproportionately impact on marine and coastal eco-
systems and marine based industries that depend on functioning ecosystems, 
and associated jobs and livelihoods.
78   Principle 16, Rio Declaration, 1992.
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chapter 14
European Union Law and the Seabed
Finn Arnesen, Rosa Greaves, and Alla Pozdnakova
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization established under 
international law. Nevertheless, over several decades, it has evolved into a 
suis generis international entity with its own legal order, significant compe-
tences and an effective enforcement mechanism. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which under the Treaty has exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret EU law and to review the legality of any EU secondary legislation,1 
has emphasised the unique nature of the EU.2 The EU Member States did not 
delegate but transferred some sovereign rights to the EU meaning that only the 
EU has competence to act, either internally or externally, in a number of fields 
of activity. Furthermore, the transfer of sovereignty has not only occurred by 
expressed provision in the EU Treaties but also by the EU adopting extensive 
secondary legislation and thus occupying the field.3 This latter process means 
that for some activities, the initial shared competence to act has been replaced 
by exclusive EU competence.
In this chapter the focus is on the extent to which the EU has competence to 
regulate the seabed under the sovereign jurisdiction of the EU Member States 
and the manner in which the competence has been exercised. The chapter will 
explain first the extent of the EU’s competence in respect of the relevant seabed 
(Section 2). Then, the chapter will, by way of illustration of the level of policy and 
legislative activity, consider two areas affecting the seabed: the EU’s policy in 
respect of seabed mining and the application of EU environmental protection 
and liability legislation to the seabed (Section 3). In neither area has there been 
EU legislation adopted specifically in respect of the seabed. However, several 
policy papers have been published by the European Commission on seabed 
mining which demonstrates the Commission’s intention for the EU to be an 
1   Article 263 TFEU.
2   E.g. Van Gen den Loos, 26/62 [1963] ECR 1.
3   When the EU and the EU Member States share a competence, the latter lose their ‘compe-
tence’ (power to take decisions) when the EU decides to regulate in that area. The EU is said 
to ‘occupy the field’ meaning that the EU Member States no longer have the right to legislate 
in the covered area. Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA Case) ECLI:EU:C:1971:32.
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active player in exploiting the seabed such as deep seabed mining. Similarly, 
current environmental protection legislative measures can be interpreted so 
as to extend their scope to the seabed. The last part of the chapter will provide 
some concluding observations (Section 4).
2 EU Competences in Respect of the Seabed
According to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU com-
petences are governed by the principle of conferral. This has two implications 
worth noticing in the context of the issues discussed in this chapter. First, the 
EU may only act within the limits conferred upon it by the TEU or the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Secondly, these compe-
tences may only be used to achieve the objectives set out in those treaties. 
Thus, competences not transferred to the EU, remain with the Member States. 
Competences conferred, may either become an exclusive EU competence, 
or a competence shared with the Member States.4 In matters concerning the 
use of the seabed, the competence is shared – with a possible caveat for mea-
sures affecting the use of the seabed taken under the common fisheries policy. 
However, the EU does not have competence relating to the continental shelf 
and the seabed unless the Member States have such competence under public 
international law.
The TEU and TFEU are – for the time being – a last step in the develop-
ment of what is now known as the European Union. Today the competence 
conferred on the EU to regulate matters pertaining to the market place is 
supplemented by TFEU part Three, Titles XX and XXI – on environment and 
energy respectively.
In order to comprehend fully the impact of EU law on matters pertaining 
to the use, and non-use, of the seabed, one has to acknowledge the effects of 
the general provisions of the TFEU on the four freedoms, i.e. free movement 
of goods, services people and capital, competition between undertakings and 
state aid on activities relating to the seabed. These effects are, to the extent 
EU law is applicable, independent of any legislative acts adopted by the EU 
addressing seabed use.
Article 191 TFEU provides that EU policy on the environment shall con-
tribute to the pursuit of four objectives. Among these we find traditional 
environmental aims such as the preservation, protection and improvement of 
4  Articles 2 to 6 TFEU.
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the quality of the environment, but also prudent and rational utilization of 
natural resources. Article 192 TFEU provides the legal basis for legislative acts 
implementing EU’s policy on the environment. These measures are to be 
adopted by majority voting according to the ordinary legislative procedure 
provided for in Article 114 TFEU. However, according to Article 192 (2) TFEU, 
some decisions nevertheless require unanimity. Among these are measures 
affecting ‘land use’ and measures ‘significantly affecting a Member State’s 
choice between different energy sources’. Whether ‘land use’ also cover use of 
the seabed, may be open to debate.
Article 194 provides for an EU policy on energy, and a legal basis for mea-
sures implementing this policy. The measures taken according to Article 194 
TFEU may, ‘without prejudice to Article 192(2), however not affect a Member 
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its 
choice between different energy resources and its general structure of energy 
supply.
As a legal topic, the EU and the use of the seabed have two dimensions. 
One dimension being the external, i.e. issues pertaining to the powers of EU 
institutions in interaction with third states – both within the framework of 
conventions to which EU is a party, like the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), and in relation to conventions where only (some) of the 
Member States are parties. As a matter of EU law, the EU has exclusive com-
petence in certain areas covered by the Convention, and shared competence 
in others. Pursuant to Article 5(1) of Annex IX to the Convention, a declaration 
specifying these areas has been given.
The other dimension is the internal dimension, i.e. issues pertaining to 
EU competence to regulate activities taking place outside the territories of 
the Member States. This internal dimension gives rise to two discussions. 
The first being to what extent EU law applies to measures taken by Member 
States that relate to activities taking place outside their territory but under 
their jurisdiction. The other being to what extent the EU has competence to 
oblige the Member States to undertake certain activities, for instance explore 
for natural resources, make certain uses of the seabed, lay (or allow) cables and 
pipelines, etc.
In public international law, terms like ‘territory’, ‘continental shelf ’, and 
‘economic zone’ are used to define the sovereignty and jurisdiction of states. 
Turning to Article 52 TEU, we see that this provision proclaims that the EU 
Treaties apply to the Member States, and that the territorial scope of the trea-
ties is specified in Article 355 TFEU. Article 355 TFEU does however not shed 
much light on the application of EU law outside the territories of the Member 
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States. It is nevertheless established through CJEU case-law that EU law 
applies where Member States have sovereign powers. This can be illustrated by 
Salemink,5 where the CJEU held:
Since a Member State has sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent 
to it – albeit functional and limited sovereignty (see, to that effect, Case 
C-111/05 Aktiebolaget NN [2007] ECR I-2697, paragraph 59) – work carried 
out on fixed or floating installations positioned on the continental shelf, 
in the context of the prospecting and/or exploitation of natural resources, 
is to be regarded as work carried out in the territory of that State for the 
purposes of applying EU law (see, to that effect, Case C-37/00 Weber 
[2002] ECR I-2013, paragraph 36, and Case C-6/04 Commission v United 
Kingdom [2005] ECR I-9017, paragraph 117).
A Member State which takes advantage of the economic rights to pros-
pect and/or exploit natural resources on that part of the continental shelf 
which is adjacent to it cannot avoid the application of the EU law provi-
sions designed to ensure the freedom of movement of persons working 
on such installations.6
The case concerned the application of EU law on the free movement of per-
sons, but the same applies to other fields of EU law, national sovereignty carries 
EU law on its back, not unlike the snail carries its shell. Thus, the applicability 
of EU law to issues relating to geographical areas outside the territories of the 
Member States has to be decided on the basis of an interpretation of the rel-
evant EU legal act and the Member States’ jurisdiction over the issue and the 
area, and then made subject to possible functional caveats.
As a matter of comparison, under the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (EEA Agreement), this may be different, as Article 126 EEA uses the term 
’territory’, and expressly proclaims that the agreement is applicable to territo-
ries of the EFTA States and the territories to which EU law applies. Thus, the 
position of Norway is that the EEA Agreement, and thus EEA law, does not 
apply to matters concerning the Norwegian continental shelf, as these do not 
take place on Norwegian territory. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has 
voiced a different opinion.7
5   Case C-347/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:17.
6   Case C-347/10 Salemink, paras 35 and 36.
7  Finn Arnesen, comments on Art. 126 EEA, in F. Arnesen, H.H. Fredriksen, H.P. Graver, 
O. Mestad and C. Vedder (eds.) Agreement on the European Economic Area – A Commentary, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2018. The EEA Agreement and activities off-shore, 
SIMPLY [2010] p. 17.
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Whether the EU may adopt measures obliging the Member States to 
undertake certain activities, depends on the powers conferred on the EU by 
the Member States, and the prerequisites for executing those powers. As far 
as environmental issues are concerned, we have seen that measures affecting 
land use require unanimity, as do measures affecting a Member State’s choice 
between energy resources,8 while EU measures shall not affect a Member 
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources.9
3 The Exercise of EU Competences with Respect of the Seabed
Two areas in respect of the seabed have been selected to illustrate the extent of 
the EU’s competence to regulate the seabed and the manner in which it seeks 
to play a significant role internationally. Seabed mining, meaning the extrac-
tion of minerals10 from the seabed from a depth of more than 200 metres, is 
an economic activity at an embryonic stage but with immense potential to 
develop into a major industrial activity. It is therefore not surprising that the 
EU has expressed interest in playing a major role in shaping its governance.11 
It is therefore appropriate to explore how the EU will achieve its objective 
(Section 3.1). Environmental protection and liability, on the other hand, is an 
area where the EU has already adopted a number of significant legal instru-
ments, some of which have had impact on marine and maritime activities. 
In this section of the chapter, the extent to which the legislation on environ-
mental protection and liability applies to the seabed will also be considered 
(Section 3.2).
3.1 Seabed Mining (Minerals)
The first thing to be remembered about seabed mining is that it has not yet 
taken place anywhere in the world on a commercial basis. However, the idea of 
mining the seabed for the extraction of minerals and rare earth elements is not 
8   Article 192 TFEU.
9    Article 194(2) second paragraph.
10   Extraction of marine aggregates such as sand and gravel are excluded. Minerals are to be 
understood as raw materials found on or under the seabed.
11   Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, entitled ‘International ocean 
governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’ JOIN(2016)49 final of 10 November 2016.
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new. The main reasons that have prevented the growth of this new industry are 
environmental issues and costs.12
As far as the EU is concerned seabed mining is an economic activity with 
huge potential for EU undertakings engaged in seabed mining activities 
such as technology providers who are rapidly expanding the capabilities of 
underwater technology.13 Thus the EU, within the limits of its competence as 
discussed in Section 2, is certainly ensuring that it has a role to play in shaping 
this industry as part of its general industrial policy. The European Commission 
is thus engaged in commissioning a variety of studies and providing funding 
for projects14 that will reduce knowledge gaps associated with seabed mining 
as well as identifying the benefits and drawbacks of seabed mining operations. 
In addition, the Commission has issued a number of policy documents, ‘com-
munications’ with relevance to seabed mining.15
UNCLOS, to which both the EU and the EU Member States are parties, pro-
vides that each coastal State may regulate seabed mining in maritime areas 
under its national jurisdiction but it does not provide any legal framework 
as to how the task should be exercised. As far as seabed mining is concerned 
beyond the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of States, the so-called ‘Area’, 
UNCLOS, supplemented by Part XI Implementation Agreement, provides an 
incomplete legal framework for seabed mining.16
Although UNCLOS governs the use of the oceans and their resources, sectoral 
activities such as seabed mining are the responsibility of an international insti-
tution, the International Seabed Authority (ISA).17 In its Joint Communication 
12   For example, a Canadian company, Nautilus Minerals, was granted a 20 year lease by the 
Papua New Guinean government to mine offshore but soon terminated their project due 
mainly to costs.
13   E.g. vacuum pumps and remotely operated vehicles.
14   E.g. Managing Impacts of Deep-seA reSource exploitation (MIDAS) project – a multi-
disciplinary research programme investigating the environmental impacts of extracting 
mineral and energy resources from the deep-sea environment. It is funded under the 
European Commission’s Framework 7 programme and was started in 2013 for a period 
of 3 years <http://www.eu-midas.net/>; Study on deep sea mining <https://webgate 
.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/en/node/3617>; Blue Mining project also funded under the 
Framework 7 programme <http://www.bluemining.eu>.
15   E.g. Communication of the Commission: Blue Growth opportunities for marine and mari-
time sustainable growth COM(2012)49 final.
16   For a discussion of the international legal framework, see Chapter 7 of this book, 
J. Dingwall, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework’.
17   Ibid, for details of competences, powers and actions.
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on international ocean governance published in November 2016,18 the 
European Commission stresses that the current international framework is 
not adequate to make sure that management of the oceans is sustained. The 
Communication highlights that ISA has not yet adopted a mining code set-
ting out rules and procedures to govern seabed mining.19 In addition, the 
Commission expresses concern at the lack of coordination between the vari-
ous international organisations with sector specific responsibilities for the 
oceans.20
The importance of this Commission document should not be underes-
timated. The strategy, namely the publication of policy papers identifying 
inefficiencies in international frameworks and setting out a number of pro-
posed actions is not an uncommon practice before the Commission goes on, at 
a future date, to make legislative proposals for action and promote their adop-
tion by the European Council and the European Parliament. Indeed in this 
Joint Communication, the Commission emphasises its experience of ocean 
management21 to claim that the EU is ‘well placed to shape international 
ocean governance’.22
The Joint Communication specifies a number of actions that are to be initi-
ated. In the context of seabed mining the relevant action (Action 1) relates 
to filing the gaps in the international ocean governance framework. The 
Commission commits to producing guidance ‘on the exploration and exploita-
tion of natural resources on the seabed areas under national jurisdiction, [in 
order] to assist coastal Member States to respect their duty under UNCLOS to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.’23
As to the internal dimension, it is clear from CJEU case law24 that EU law 
applies to maritime areas over which EU Member States have jurisdiction. 
Given that UNCLOS provides that each coastal State may regulate seabed min-
ing in maritime areas under its national jurisdiction then it follows that the 
national law of the relevant EU Member States and EU law apply to seabed 
mining operations within those maritime areas. It is also clear that no EU 
18   Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘International ocean 
governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans, JOIN(2016)49 final.
19   Such a code is being prepared.
20   (n18), p. 3.
21   Marine Strategy Framework Directive; Maritime Spatial Planning Directive; reformed 
Common Fisheries Policy; and its maritime transport policy.
22   (n18), p. 4.
23   (n18), p. 6.
24   Case 61/77 Commission v Ireland [1978] 417, paras 45 to 51.
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legislation has been adopted specifically to govern exploration or extraction 
and exploitation of seabed mining either within maritime areas under the 
national jurisdiction of EU Member States25 or beyond. Thus, until the EU 
occupies this field by adopting specific legislation, the EU Member States have 
competence to act.
There is no doubt that the EU legislative measures, which are the most 
likely to have a potential significant impact on seabed mining activities, are 
the directives that have been adopted to protect the environment.26 A discus-
sion of the application of these directives to seabed mining will be provided 
in the second section of this part of the chapter. However, given the fact that 
seabed mining is an economic activity, it is highly likely that a whole range of 
other secondary legislation, which has been adopted to regulate market opera-
tors in their economic activities, will also be applicable. There are, for example, 
EU directives which impose reporting obligations on undertakings, such as the 
obligation on large and listed companies to publish information on payments 
made to governments.27
One major concern that is worth noting is the following. There are no inter-
national standards for seabed mining at present so the coastal states may 
adopt their own legislation accordingly which may give rise to a risk of differ-
ent standards being applied. If this were to happen in respect of EU Member 
States it is highly likely that the EU would act under the competence granted 
under Article 114 TFEU28 and adopt legislation on the basis that harmonisa-
tion of national laws in respect of seabed mining was necessary to safeguard 
the EU’s internal market objective. An alternative softer approach may be to 
promote the adoption of EU standards for seabed mining operations. This 
could, of course, also be problematic as you could have a different standard 
for the Area (ISA’s responsibility) from that being applied to maritime areas 
under the jurisdiction of EU Member States for the same activity.
By way of summary the EU’s position as far as its competence and policy 
on seabed mining is concerned is reasonably clear. EU law applies to mari-
time areas under the jurisdiction of EU Member States. Seabed mining is an 
25   These include not only ‘the territorial sea’ (i.e. 12 nautical miles from the baseline) but 
also the exclusive economic zone, the ‘EEZ’ (up to 200 nautical miles) and adjacent ‘conti-
nental shelf ’ which comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond the 
territorial sea.
26   See the 2015 Study to investigate the state of knowledge of deep sea mining by ECORYS 
and MRAS – <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/en/node/373>.
27   Accounting Directive, Directive 2013/34, OJ 2013 L182, on annual financial statements.
28   This Treaty provision provides the legal base for the adoption of EU approximation mea-
sures whose objective is the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
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economic activity and will be treated like any other economic activity within 
the internal market. Where necessary, the European Commission is likely to 
propose legislation to ensure that the seabed mining activity, within the juris-
diction of the EU Member States, is regulated and thus to ensure that the 
objectives of the internal market are achieved: no discrimination; free move-
ment of goods, services people and capital, competition between undertakings 
and state aid.
Given that the EU and the EU Member States are party to UNCLOS and 
UNCLOS is an integral part of the EU legal order, the EU will respect interna-
tional norms adopted under its auspices. Thus, as far as seabed mining activities 
in the Area are concerned, any activity will be governed by international law 
and the EU Member States will be encouraged by the European Commission 
to adopt the necessary laws under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.
Nevertheless, in its latest Communication,29 the European Commission has 
made it clear that it will not wait for ISA’s mining code before adopting its own 
guidelines to regulate seabed mining activities in maritime areas under the 
national jurisdiction of the EU Member States.
3.2 Environmental Regulation of Seabed Activities
In the discussion above we have examined EU competence to regulate activi-
ties on the seabed and concluded that this competence is, generally, shared but 
to-date has not been exercised. However, by contrast to measures related to the 
seabed mining, several environmental measures relevant to the offshore sector 
have been adopted by the EU.
This section focuses on how the EU has exercised its competence to protect 
the environment from the pollution caused by seabed activities of the Member 
States and considers whether EU measures are adequate to address the envi-
ronmental issues posed by the new uses of the seabed.
It is debatable whether environmental protection in the offshore sector 
should be achieved by the EU rather than by the Member States. Even in the 
absence of EU action some steps have been taken by EU Member States at 
national level to counteract risks of environmental damage which may result 
from offshore operations. In particular, this is achieved through a system of 
authorization of offshore activities, which require undertakings, amongst 
other obligations, to obtain licences and meet other requirements (as the case 
may be) prior to starting offshore operations.
29   Above (n18).
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Moreover, the State’s duty to protect the environment from the pollution 
caused by offshore activities is set out in the international instruments. First, 
a general duty is imposed in UNCLOS30 on States to prevent, reduce and con-
trol pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with 
seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction. Secondly, two regional agree-
ments, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention)31 and the Offshore Protocol of 
Barcelona Convention,32 do regulate important environmental aspects of off-
shore activities in the North East Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea. By 
virtue of EU’s accession to these agreements, their provisions are part of the 
EU’s legal order and, therefore, binding on the EU and its Member States.
It is outside the scope of this chapter to give a detailed account of 
the national and international environmental safety rules applicable to the 
activities on the seabed within Member States’ jurisdiction. It is sufficient to 
submit briefly that, in spite of the existence of some international and national 
safety regulations in this sector, important gaps and inconsistencies still exist. 
Importantly, the national approaches to risk management and safety culture 
in the offshore sector have been found to vary significantly among the EU 
Member States.33 Given the gaps and diversity of approach to risk manage-
ment, the EU may play an important role in contributing to the improvement 
in the level of protection of the seabed environment across the EU by adopting 
secondary legislation harmonizing the national approaches and thus ensure 
that a minimum standard of safety applies in all EU Member States active in 
the offshore sector.
As mentioned previously, Article 191(2) TFEU sets out the following princi-
ples for EU environmental action which are also highly relevant to the offshore 
sector: the precautionary principle; the principle that preventive action should 
30   Article 208 UNCLOS. Council Decision 98/392/EC, OJ 1998 L179/1, of 23 March 1998 con-
cerning the conclusion by the European Community of the United Nations Convention 
of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea; the Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the 
implementation of Part XI thereof.
31   Council Decision 98/249/EC, OJ 1998 L104/1, of 7 October 1997 on the conclusion of the 
Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic.
32   Council Decision 2013/5/EU, OJ 2013 L4/13, of 17 December 2012 on the accession of the 
European Union to the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pol-
lution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed 
and its subsoil.
33   SEC(2011) 1293 final, Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment Accompanying 
the document Proposal for the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities, 
COM(2011) 688 final.
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be taken; the principle that rectification of environmental damage at source is 
a priority; and the principle that the polluter should pay. If not all, then at least 
some of these principles have counterparts in international law, and there-
fore are relevant (although not necessarily binding) on EU Member States.34 
However, the scope and contents of the principles (and their legal effect) is 
unclear in international law and EU Member States’ approaches to them may 
differ significantly.35 EU measures may, therefore, provide precise content and 
effect to the principles.
A Common EU Action must be able to raise to an acceptable level the safety 
legislation of those EU Member States which fall below and to overcome 
divergences in the national approaches to the offshore safety culture and pol-
lution preparedness among Member States. It is also important when drawing 
up a Common Action to take into consideration the probable transboundary 
impact of an offshore pollution incident in Member States’ waters.
These ambitious aims can only be achieved if EU measures are adopted in a 
timely and effective manner which may not necessarily be possible due to the 
legislative procedures described in Section II above.36 Furthermore, the obli-
gations set out in the EU legislative measure should be formulated precisely 
and in sufficient detail.37 Thus, in making the choice between a regulation or 
a directive the European Commission is likely to prefer a regulation which is 
directly applicable38 and does not require (or allow) any national implement-
ing measures, while at the same time giving a possibility for EU legislators to 
envisage adoption of implementing legal acts where necessary.
However, the objectives of Article 191 TFEU are to be achieved by the 
adoption of harmonisation measures which means directives. Directives, by 
contrast to regulations, do not have direct effect and are only binding upon 
the EU Member States as to the result to be achieved, leaving to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods of implementation.39 Accordingly, 
34   See generally Nicolas de Sadeleer. Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal 
Rules, OUP, 2002, p. 91 et seq. Note that Article 191 is only binding on EU, not Member 
States.
35   See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, ‘Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle,’ at pp. 381–391 in 
D.D. Caron and H.N. Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters, 2004, Koninklijke 
Brill N.V.
36   Kramer (2015), p. 55.
37   Ibid.
38   Direct applicability means that the EU regulation is incorporated into of the national legal 
orders of the EU Member States on publication in the EU’s Official Journal. Regulations 
also have ‘direct effect’ meaning that individuals can rely on provisions of EU regulations 
before national courts.
39   Article 288(3) TFEU.
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the obligations and responsibilities of the offshore actors provided in the 
relevant EU directives and examined in more detail below must be properly 
transposed in the national laws of Member States before they become appli-
cable to these actors.40
Over time, the EU adopted several secondary legislative measures which 
give effect to the principles laid down in Article 191 TFEU in respect of the 
protection of the marine environment. It is important to note that EU’s pro-
visions regulating environmental issues in the offshore sector are found in 
a range of directives. Some of these measures have general application and 
regulate all sectors, including the offshore sector, unless expressly excluded 
from their scope. The relevant directives41 are: the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive;42 the Environmental Liability Directive;43 the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive;44 Directive on the conservation of natural habitats and 
of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive).45
Initially, EU legislation adopted specifically for the offshore sector 
addressed only access to the markets of the EU Member States. For example, 
the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbon Directive (1994)46 
mentions briefly the protection of the environment and biological resources as 
one of the grounds for a Member State to impose conditions and requirements 
on the activities regulated by the Directive.47
This Directive does not set out any specific criteria for Member States’ deci-
sion to rely on the protection of the environment. However, the authorization 
40   Above (n36), p. 55.
41   It is outside the scope of this section to address all these general directives in detail.
42   Directive 2008/56/EC, OJ 2008 L164/19, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine 
environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive).
43   Directive 2004/35/CE, OJ 2004 L143/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive).
44   Directive 2014/52/EU, OJ 2014 L124/1, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment (Impact Assessment Directive).
45   Council Directive 92/43/EEC, OJ 1992 L206/7, of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natu-
ral habitats and of wild fauna and flora (The Habitats Directive).
46   Directive 94/22/EC, OJ 1994 L164/3, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, 
exploration and production of hydrocarbons.
47   Ibid, Article 6(2). See also Finn Arnesen, “The Adoption of the Production Licence 
Directive”, in Peter-Christian Műller-Graff, Erling Selvig (eds) The European Economic 
Area –Norway’s Basic Status in the Legal Construction of Europe, Berlin Verlag, Tano 
Aschehoug, 1997, pp. 81–96.
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system of Member States (endorsed in the Directive) is one of the tools to give 
effect to the preventive measures and the Directive is closely linked to the 
Offshore Safety Directive and other relevant directives.
The timeline of the EU environmental measures in the offshore sector 
shows that the adoption of the sector-specific measures were significantly 
speeded up after the Macondo blow out (Deepwater Horizon) in 2009. Such 
a major accident at an offshore installation is obviously capable of damaging 
the environment to such a significant extent that, in the absence of sufficiently 
effective rules, the objective of achieving ’good environmental status’ would be 
seriously compromised.48
After the Macondo, in 2012, the EU acceded to the Barcelona Offshore 
Protocol.49 The next step was the adoption of the Offshore Safety Directive 
(OSD) in 2013.50 Both instruments are concerned particularly (but not limited 
to) with transboundary pollution damage.
The OSD addresses only major offshore accidents and has a general geo-
graphic application. The Directive recognizes that major accidents are likely 
to have devastating and irreversible consequences on the marine and coastal 
environment.51 ‘Major environmental incidents’ are included in the scope of 
the Directive only to the extent they result from such incidents and result, or 
are likely to result, in ‘significant adverse’ effects on the environment in accor-
dance with the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD).
While the OSD aims at preventing major accidents in the oil and gas sec-
tor, or minimizing risks of such accidents, it does not include more subtle 
but systematic pollution arising from normal offshore operations. A detailed 
discussion of the issues relating to the EU rules on protection from such pollu-
tion is outwith the scope of this chapter. Regular discharges can be addressed 
through the emissions regulation.52 It should be noted in this respect, however, 
that the two regional instruments mentioned earlier – Barcelona Offshore 
48   It should be noted that, while environmental concerns are important, the Offshore Safety 
Directive is not designed to deal exclusively with the environmental effects of an acci-
dent; it includes all aspects including safety of life, health etc.
49   Above (n31).
50   Directive 2013/30/EU, OJ 2013 L178/66, of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC.
51   A ’major’ accident is defined in Article 2(1) as a very serious incident in relation to the 
installations and connected infrastructure.
52   Directive 2010/75/EU, OJ 2010 L334/17, on industrial emissions (integrated pollution 
prevention and control). Only one provision specifically excludes offshore sector (see 
Article 28).
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Protocol and OSPAR Convention – contain a framework for addressing pollu-
tion in a broader meaning than the OSD.53
Furthermore, the OSD only applies to oil and gas (hydrocarbon) activities, 
and thereby excludes activities aimed at exploring and extracting other seabed 
minerals.54 The Directive applies only to activities within the limits of Member 
State’s continental shelf.55
The preamble of the OSD expressly confirms the obligation for the EU envi-
ronmental action to be supported by the high level of protection based on 
the principles referred to in Article 192 TFEU.56 The Directive does not define 
these principles for the purposes of the offshore sector, but rather gives them 
practical effect through the provisions envisaging specific obligations for the 
offshore sector players and authorities. Member States are free to introduce 
more stringent requirements than those envisaged in the Directive.57
The common feature of the EU environmental regulation is the focus on 
incidents which may cause ‘significant adverse’ effects to the environment. 
These are determined in line with the criteria provided for in the Environmental 
Liability Directive (ELD).58 However, the ELD criteria are open as they do not 
establish any standards or thresholds above which adverse effects on the envi-
ronment become significant. Only damage with a proven effect on human 
health must be always classified as significant damage.59
The main rationale for limiting the scope of the OSD to major accidents 
with serious impact is based on the cost efficiency considerations inherent in 
the risk prevention and management strategies imposed by the Directive: pre-
ventive measures must be practicable and economically feasible, ’suitable’ to 
prevent or limit consequences for human health and for the environment of 
major accidents in offshore oil and gas operations.60 This approach takes into 
consideration the realities faced by those entities that have the main responsi-
bility for the safety of the offshore operations, i.e. operators.
53   Offshore Protocol regulates pollution within the meaning of UNCLOS Article 208, includ-
ing wastes and harmful and noxious substances.
54   Article 1(1) and 2(3) of the Directive. Cf. Seveso-III Directive which excludes offshore 
sector from its application scope: Article 2(2)(f) of Directive 2012/18/EU, OJ 2012 L197/1, 
of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 
amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC.
55   Article 2(3) of the Offshore Safety Directive.
56   Above Section 1.
57   OSD is a minimum harmonization directive (Article 1).
58   See Annex I and Article 2 of ELD.
59   See Annex I.
60   Article 3(1); Recital 26 and Article 3(3) ; Article 2(6).
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The approach based on ‘suitability’ criterion reflects the idea of the preven-
tive principle generally: measures to be taken to prevent certain, identifiable 
risks should be limited by the ‘feasibility’ threshold. A very high level of envi-
ronmental protection envisaged may not be feasible to maintain, but it is 
better to have realistic, workable standards instead of declaratory high ones.
Whereas some risks brought about by the offshore activities are certain and 
thereby require specific (i.e. ‘suitable’) measures, it is much more difficult to 
determine what measures are appropriate to address uncertain, scientifically 
yet unidentified, risks. It is unclear how much effort one should invest to avoid 
these unknown risks, but the precautionary principle requires that at least 
some proportionate efforts are undertaken to this end. At the same time this 
also means that we need to tolerate some level of uncertainty in the environ-
mental risks if we want to benefit from the natural resources of the seabed.
While admitting that ‘risks relating to major offshore accidents are signifi-
cant’, OSD is aimed at risk minimization, not elimination.61 OSD introduces 
the concept of ‘acceptable risk’ which means that the operators should 
reduce the risk of a major accident as low as reasonably practicable, to 
the point where the cost of risk reduction would be grossly disproportionate 
to the benefits of such reduction.62
OSD is important because it imposes quite specific duties on Member States 
to introduce risk management and prevention requirements in the national 
laws. The OSD applies the standard of ‘best practice’ to determine the accept-
able risk levels and to the accident prevention systems.63 The OSD accepts 
that the concept of a ‘best’ practice is dynamic and must evolve in the light 
of new knowledge, invention and technology developments.64 An important 
quality of ‘the best’ practice for major accident prevention in offshore is the 
goal-setting approach based on the risk assessment and reliable management 
system. This will particularly benefit Member States with poorly developed off-
shore safety culture.65
In addition, a Major Hazard Report must be elaborated and kept up-to-date 
by the operators in order to meet the requirements of OSD relating to the pre-
paring and carrying out offshore oil and gas operations.66 OSD facilitates the 
61   Recital 6. The OSD defines risk as ’the combination of the probability of an event and the 
consequences of that event.’ Article 2(4).
62   Article 3(4). See also Sadeleer at p. 91 et seq.
63   Article 2(8).
64   Recital 30.
65   The North Sea States are often given as a good example to follow (see Impact Assessment).
66   Article 11(1).
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application of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive to the offshore 
sector-specific challenges.67
In addition to the operator’s own control based on the risk management 
and emergency response systems (which is also subject to independent veri-
fication), OSD requires that these two tasks are performed by different public 
bodies to ensure that the competent authority controlling offshore operations 
is independent from the licensing authority.68
The main task of the licensing authorities is to make sure that the applicants 
for such licences are capable of meeting the requirements for the correspond-
ing offshore activities.69 The OSD establishes an important connection to 
Directive 94/22/EC (the Hydrocarbons Directive) clarifying the considerations 
to be taken into account by the licensing authority when assessing the techni-
cal and financial risks of the offshore operations. The licensing authority must 
consider the operator’s ability to ensure ‘continued safe and effective opera-
tions under all foreseeable conditions.’70
One of the principles set out in Article 191(2) TFEU is the polluter-pays 
principle. The principle addresses situations when environmental damage 
has already been caused. The costs resulting therefrom, including the costs of 
restoring the environment, must be borne by the polluter.71
The polluter-pays principle was incorporated into the EU law in the 
Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) which establishes the framework of 
the environmental liability based on the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent 
and remedy environmental damage. OSD refers consistently to the polluter-
pays principle and to the ELD throughout the preamble and the main text, 
removing any doubt as to the applicability of environmental liability to dam-
age caused by offshore activities (in the sector specified by OSD and ELD).72
The OSD has introduced several important adjustments to the ELD regime, 
making it stronger to deal with remedial issues in the offshore sector.
67   Recital 5 of the EIA Directive.
68   To strengthen control over offshore activities, the OSD also envisages public participation 
in the decision-making processes (EIA Directive) and public access to the supervision of 
offshore operations with potentially significant effects on the environment: see Recitals 
15, 16 and Articles 5, 8(4), 9.d and 24.
69   Article 4 (OSD).
70   Article 4(2) specifying the aspects which the authority must take into consideration when 
making such assessment.
71   See generally, David Langlet and Said Mahmoudi, EU Environmental Law and Policy, OUP, 
2016, p. 55.
72   ‘Environmental damage’ includes damage to protected species and habitats and water 
damage (Article 2(1), but excludes damage caused by pollution of diffuse character 
(Article 4(5)).
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First, the essential improvement in the liability regime for environmental 
damage caused by offshore accidents introduced in the OSD is the extension 
of the territorial scope of liability for water damage under the ELD. This is now 
brought in line with the definition of ‘marine waters’ in the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and stretches to the outmost reach of the area where a 
Member State has and/or exercises jurisdictional rights, in accordance with 
UNCLOS, namely, the continental shelf.73 Considering that offshore opera-
tions occur mostly outside territorial sea limits, such an extension was very 
necessary.
Secondly, OSD ensures that the responsible entity is clearly identifiable 
and accessible, something which is identified as a problem in the ELD.74 With 
respect to the accessibility, the OSD assigns the main responsibility to the 
licensee, irrespective of whether operations are carried out by the licensee 
or, or on behalf of, the licensee or the operator. However, the operator is also 
assigned a central role and must always be the entity with the primary respon-
sibility for safety of operations, to ensure that the environmental liability 
regime is functioning properly.75
Importantly, Member States must ensure that the licensees are financially 
capable to remedy the damage caused by an offshore accident. OSD emphasizes 
in a number of provisions that the ability to provide financial compensation 
for damage is an essential requirement which Member States must impose on 
licensees and operators before granting the licence.76 As to the licensee’s finan-
cial ability to remedy the potential or real damage, Member States are required 
to ensure that the licensee is financially liable for the prevention and remedia-
tion of environmental damage, caused by offshore oil and gas operations.
Thus the OSD contributes to a more adequate and comprehensive mecha-
nism for the application of the polluter-pays principle in the offshore sector. 
However, ELD and consequently OSD apply only to pure ecological damage 
and do not regulate the civil liability or affect rights of compensation for tradi-
tional damage granted under any relevant international agreement regulating 
73   Article 7(1)(b)(ii) OSD and Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2008/56/EC cited in fn. 41. Before 
the OSD was adopted, a significant ‘limitation had followed from the restricted definition 
of ‘water damage’ of Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ 2000 L327/1, (Water Damage Directive) 
applicable only to territorial waters within 12 nautical miles. This definition excluded the 
larger areas of the continental shelf with most offshore activities.
74   Also C-188/07 Mesquer [2008] ECR I-4501 (holders or previous holders of waste).
75   Article 2(5) and Article 3(2) and Recital 13 OSD. OSD defines the operator as ‘the entity 
appointed by the licensee or licensing authority to conduct offshore oil and gas opera-
tions, including planning and executing a well operation or managing and controlling the 
functions of a production installation’. (Note that ELD refers to the ’operator’ generally).
76   Article 4(3).
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civil liability.77 So, by contrast to shipping, where there exist liability mecha-
nisms allowing for financial compensation for damage caused by the pollution 
from ships, no equivalent mechanisms at the EU (or international) level exist 
for pollution damage resulting from offshore activities.
4 Conclusions and Challenges Ahead
There are several general conclusions that are clear as far as the application 
of EU law to the seabed is concerned. First, EU law applies to the seabed only 
where EU member States have sovereignty in accordance with international 
law. Secondly, EU policy papers in respect of seabed mining indicate that the 
EU clearly intends to play a role in shaping seabed mining as such activity is 
perceived as economically important for the EU market. Thirdly, even though 
several EU environmental legislative measures may be applied to seabed activ-
ities, uncertainty remains as to whether it is the EU, the EU Member States, 
or both that have responsibility for environment protection given that the EU 
Member States have individually assumed obligations under international law. 
Finally, although general principles of environmental protection are embed-
ded in international law, the EU provides more precise context and has an 
effective enforcement mechanism to ensure adherence by the EU Member 
States.
As far as the application of EU law is concerned, it is submitted that in the 
context of the EEA, EEA law applies only to the territory of the parties to that 
agreement and therefore the position may be different from the one under 
EU law. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the EU has competence to adapt 
measures requiring EU Member States to act, for example, by requiring them 
to carry out seabed activities or imposing specific conditions as to how EU 
Member States decide to exploit the seabed over which they have international 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, should coastal EU Member States adopt national 
legislative measures which may give rise to different national standards, then 
the challenge for the EU is to decide whether the risk to the internal market 
warrants legislation to be adopted under Article 114 TFEU on the basis of neces-
sity to safeguard the integrity of the internal market.
77   ELD also excludes personal injury, damage to private property or to any economic loss; it 
does not affect any right regarding these types of damages and it does not give private par-
ties a right to compensation as a consequence of environmental damage or of an immi-
nent threat of such damage (Article 3(3)).
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As to the regulation of seabed mining activities, the EU considers that 
international institutions have not delivered and that it is well paced to play 
a significant role in management of the seabed. Already, where EU Member 
States have jurisdiction to regulate seabed mining activities under the UNCLOS 
regime, general principles of EU law apply78 and general EU rules adopted 
to regulate the activities of market operators, such as reporting obligations 
imposed on undertakings, will be applied equally to operators seeking mining 
licences. A problematic scenario may arise if the EU decides not to wait for 
the international community to act and adopts specific legislation to regulate 
seabed mining activities carried out within the jurisdiction of the EU Member 
States. Should such a situation arise, then there is a great risk that the EU may 
adopt its own standards for seabed mining operations ahead of the inter-
national regime.79 The challenges will then be to establish an international 
regime, as well as to ensure that one regime prevails.
Similarly, as far as environmental protection of the seabed is concerned, 
there are clearly gaps and inconsistencies which the EU, irrespective of 
whether its competence is exclusive or shared, is willing to act and impose a 
minimum standard of safety in all activities in the offshore sector. The OSD has 
strengthened ELD in the oil and gas sector but it would be an advantage for 
some further action in respect of compensation and risk pooling arrangements 
as suggested in Recital 63 of the OSD.
There is no doubt that disposal and management of waste produced as a 
result of exploration and extraction of minerals of the seabed as well as dump-
ing of de-commissioned installations, is a serious challenge. A comprehensive 
framework for the safe management of waste from extractive industries at 
EU level is laid down in the 2006 Mining Waste Directive.80 However, waste 
resulting from the offshore prospecting, extraction and treatment of mineral 
resources is excluded from the scope of this Directive.81 To the extent of this 
78   E.g. the principle of no discrimination on the grounds of nationality, origin and 
destination.
79   A similar situation arose in 2003 concerning the thickness of the hull of oil tankers. 
The slowness of the international IMO regime to take a decision to amend MARPOL 
(International Convention on Prevention of Pollution from Ship) and phase-in double 
hull oil tankers, led the EU to take unilateral action and adopt Regulation 1726/2003, OJ 
2003 L249/1, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 amending 
Regulation 417/2002/EC on accelerated phasing-in of double hull oil tankers. At the end 
of 2003, IMO took the decision to amend MARPOL.
80   Directive 2006/21/EC, OJ 2006 L102/15, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC.
81   Ibid, Article 2(2)(b).
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exclusion, the general Waste Directive applies to waste produced on offshore 
installations and brought on shore,82 leaving the operator with the responsibil-
ity to have the waste treated properly in accordance with the requirements of 
the Directive.
It seems fair to conclude the endeavours of the EU with regard to seabed 
mining in many respects resembles a voyage into unchartered waters, and that 
it is called for the vigilance required when sailing in such waters.
82   By virtue of Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste (Waste Framework Directive).
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chapter 15
China’s Domestic Law on the Exploration and 
Development of Resources in Deep Seabed Areas
Chelsea Zhaoxi Chen
1 Introduction
The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Exploration for and Exploitation 
of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area” (the law, or the Deep Seabed Law) was 
adopted on 26 February 2016 and went into force on 1 May 2016.1 This repre-
sents China’s first special law dealing with the exploration for and exploita-
tion of deep seabed resources. “Resources” here however was not defined. It 
is speculated that currently the definition only refers to non-living resources 
such as minerals but is intentionally silent regarding living seabed resources. 
This limitation to non-living resources in China’s Deep Seabed Law is inferred 
from the limitation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS, or the Convention), and the definition given thereunder for the 
term “resources”.2
In addition, the law applies to activities conducted by Chinese entities in 
the Area. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the UNCLOS, “Area” means the seabed and 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In 
other words, the applicable area of the Deep Seabed Law is not the traditional 
“within the territory of the People’s Republic of China and other sea areas under 
the jurisdiction of China”.3 Instead, it aims to effectively govern the behaviour 
of Chinese citizens, legal persons or organisations from territories outside the 
1   Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shenhai Haidi Quyu Ziyuan Kantan Kaifa Fa (中华人民
共和国深海海底区域资源勘探开发法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Exploration and Development of Resources in Deep Seabed Areas] (promulgated by 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, February 26, 2016, effective May 1, 
2016) (Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter Deep Seabed Law], https://isa.org.jm/nld/china.
2   Article 133 of UNCLOS states, ‘For the purposes of this Part: (a) “resources” means all solid, liq-
uid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including poly-
metallic nodules; (b) resources, when recovered from the Area, are referred to as “minerals”.’
3   Article 2 of Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和
国海洋环境保护法)[Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Aug. 23, 1982, amended Dec. 25, 
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jurisdiction of China and other countries, i.e. a law governing extraterritorial 
issues.
Prior to the adoption of the Deep Seabed Law, China had already adopted 
laws, rules and regulations regarding the exploration for, and development 
of, oceanic mineral resources located within marine areas under its national 
jurisdiction:
– The Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 
15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s 
Congress on 19 March 1986, and revised on 29 August 1996;
– Rules for Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, promulgated by Decree No. 152 of the State Council on 
26 March 1994, and effective as of the date of promulgation;
– Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
adopted at the twenty-fourth session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress on 23 August 1982, effective as of 1 March 1983, 
and further revised on 25 December 1999;
– Administrative Regulation on the Prevention and Treatment of the Pollution 
and Damage to the Marine Environment by Marine Engineering Construction 
Projects, promulgated by the State Council on 25 March 2010 and entered 
into force on the same day.
Inter alia, the laws and regulations mentioned above govern only waters under 
Chinese jurisdictions. Therefore, the Deep Seabed Law is an innovative piece 
of legislation which completes China’s legal system governing deep-sea mining 
activities.
This chapter intends to demonstrate how China has complied with the 
UNCLOS by the enactment of the Deep Seabed Law. It also aims to review how 
the law regulates deep-sea mining activities outside the territorial waters of 
any nation. In the following parts, Section 2 begins by introducing the favour-
able national circumstances leading towards its enactment. Section 3 then pro-
ceeds to answer two questions: why does China need this law and why in 2016. 
The main part of this chapter compares China’s Deep Seabed Law with laws of 
other countries with respect to (a) application scope, (b) competent national 
authority, (c) State sponsorship scheme, (d) rights and obligations of contrac-
tors, (e) environmental protection mechanism and (f) information sharing 
and cooperation respectively (Section 4). Section 5 comments on the three 
core legislative intents of the law, namely to control deep-sea mining activi-
ties, to protect lawful rights and interests, and to prepare for greater capability. 
1999), English translation available at: http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-04/15/content_24562 
836.htm.
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Section 6 examines the significance of the Law, while Section 7 concludes by 
evaluating its implementation and impact on China’s other areas of law.
2 National Circumstances Paving the Way for the Enactment 
of the Deep Seabed Law
Being consistent with Chinese legislative tradition, the Deep Seabed Law is a 
short but concise piece of legislation consisting of 7 chapters with 29 articles. 
It is the first law governing activities of exploration and exploitation of the 
seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of China’s national 
jurisdiction. Preliminary research work for the drafting of the law has been 
conducted since 2011, and upon completion of the preparatory phase, the gov-
ernment proceeded with the legislative protocol straight away.4 During the two 
rounds of voting at the National People’s Congress (NPC), the NPC Standing 
Committee deliberated on the first draft of the law in its bimonthly session in 
October 2015, which contained 32 articles. The draft was then further revised 
and submitted to the 19th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth 
National People’s Congress for a second reading in February 2016.5 This led to 
the law being adopted on 26 February 2016, and only 3 articles were deleted 
for its final version, which indicated that the law had been well received and 
4   Legislative procedure of the National People’s Congress (NPC) involves three stages: (1) intro-
duction of Bills; (2) deliberations of Bills; (3) passage and promulgation of laws. Bills spon-
sored by the NPC Standing Committee, State Council, and/or the NPC special committees 
such as the NPC Environmental and Resources Special Committee which in this case spon-
sored the Deep Seabed Law, usually are introduced through the Presidium and are able get 
to the NPC legislation agenda automatically. A formal deliberation begins with an introduc-
tion to the bill at a NPC plenary session. Either the NPC Standing Committee or the sponsor 
explains the bill to the full session of the NPC.
5   Upon being introduced, the bill was to receive examination by the deputations, relevant spe-
cial committees, the Legislative Work Committee respectively. Deputations’ consideration 
of the bill submitted to the Standing Committee is the basic form of deliberation. The spon-
sor’s representatives are expected to be present at the deputation meetings, to listen to their 
opinions and respond to inquiries about the bill. It is intended to let examiners and sponsors 
communicate directly. The Legislative Work Committee views the bill unitarily on the basis 
of the result of deputation and special committee examinations. A report on the delibera-
tion, along with a revised draft, then goes back to the Presidium. The report is expected to 
include a description of major controversies, an assessment on the maturity and feasibility 
of the legislation, and an explanation to the amendments if there is any. The report and the 
revised draft, after viewed by the Presidium, will be printed and distributed for another round 
of deputations’ consideration. The Legislative Work Committee would revise the draft again 
according to the deputations’ suggestions. The output is then submitted by the Presidium to 
a plenary vote. It would be passed to become a law if the majority goes for it.
338 Chen
did not face any major controversies; thus, few changes had been made to the 
original proposal. Several favourable national circumstances have contributed 
to its smooth and speedy passing.
2.1 Support from Top Leadership
China is a coastal state with 2.997 million square kilometres of ocean area.6 
However, China is not yet viewed as a strong maritime power. The national 
strategy of marine development began on 8 November 2012 when Hu Jintao, 
the then general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) and Chinese president, delivered a work report to the 18th 
CPC National Congress.7 The report vowed to develop China into a “mari-
time power”: “We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, 
develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, reso­
lutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a 
maritime power.” In addition, the current Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has 
also stressed the importance of marine power development and of establish-
ing China’s marine economy as a new growth point in his speech addressing 
the 8th Group Study for the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
CPC in 2013.8 Thus, with firm support from the top leadership, the Twelfth 
National People’s Congress efficiently moved to adopt the Deep Seabed Law.
2.2 Four Exploration Contracts from the ISA
A second factor that facilitated the passing of the Deep Seabed Law was that 
China is becoming increasingly active with international seabed mining 
activities. The China Ocean Mineral Resource R&D Association (COMRA) was 
established in 1990 and has since been instrumental in spearheading China’s 
ambitions for deep seabed development. COMRA is a governmental organ-
isation directly under the guidance of the Ministry of Natural Resources.9 It 
6  中国的海洋国土面积有多大[How big is China’s Ocean Area],ChinaIRN.com, Oct 18, 2018, 
http://www.chinairn.com/news/20181018/141721227.shtml.
7  中国共产党十八大报告全文 [Full Report to the 18th CPC Congress], China Daily, 
August 01, 2013, http://www.mj.org.cn/zsjs/wsxy/201211/t20121126_145927.htm.
8   Sheng Yueyue (沈跃跃), Renzhen Xuexi Quanmian Shishi Shenhai Haidi QUyu Ziyuan 
Kantn Kaifa Fa (认真学习全面实施深海海底区域资源勘探开发法) [Study and Imple­
mentation of the law on Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area], 
People’s Congress of China Journal (中国人大) 8 (May 2016); 关于“海洋”十九大报告提到
这些内容[Highlights of the19th CPC Congress Report in relation to marine industry with full 
text attached], Sohu News, https://www.sohu.com/a/198905707_726570.
9   COMRA used to be under the guidance of the State Oceanic Administration which is now a 
part of the Ministry of Natural Resources. China’s Ministry of Natural Resources was newly 
formed in March 2018.
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undertakes both research and commercial activities related to exploration 
and exploitation in the Area, in accordance with the applicable provisions 
of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of 
Part XI of UNCLOS (the Implementation Agreement). COMRA was registered 
as one of the seven pioneer investors for the preparatory committee for the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA, the Authority) and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 1991.
Via COMRA, China signed its first exploration contract for polymetallic 
nodules with the ISA in 2001, and has since acquired the exclusive exploration 
rights as well as preferential rights for exploitation with respect to those miner-
als in the contracted seabed area. In 2011 and 2014, COMRA signed additional 
exploration contracts for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanga-
nese crusts with the Authority, respectively.
Meanwhile, Chinese scientists have predicted that China is facing a severe 
problem related to a major mineral shortage. By 2020, 39 out of 45 major types 
of minerals produced within the nation could be inadequate for meeting 
China’s domestic demand.10 In order to supply the country’s rising demand 
for copper, cobalt, gold and the rare-earth elements that are vital in the man-
ufacturing of smartphones and other high-tech products, China Minmetals 
Corporation, a state-owned company and now the country’s largest metals 
trader,11 has also delved into deep-sea mining research and development. In 
2015, the ISA authorised an exploration contract, a 72,745 square kilometre 
(28,087 sq. mile) permit in the Pacific Ocean, to China Minmetals. Then on 
12 May 2017, a contract for exploration for polymetallic nodules between the 
ISA and China Minmetals Corporation was signed on 17 May 2017. Together 
with the COMRA contracts, China is now a Party State which sponsors the larg-
est number of seabed exploration contracts issued by the Authority covering 
all three types of deep-sea minerals (i.e., polymetallic nodules, polymetallic 
sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts).
The exploration and exploitation of resources in the Area are considered a 
difficult, risky, pioneering, and comprehensive project. It is also an international 
undertaking of tremendous political, economic, and strategic significance. 
10   Zhang Xianglan & Ye Quan (张湘兰&叶泉), Zhongguo Guoji Haidi Quyu Kaifa Lifa Tanxi 
(中国国际海底区域开发立法探析) [An Analysis on China’s Legislation on Internationl 
Seabed Area], 8 Law Science Magazine (法学杂志) 73 (2012).
11   China Minmetals Corporation is China’s biggest metal ore mining company and metallur-
gical engineering service provider. China Minmetals is born out of the strategic merger of 
the former China Minmetals Limited Company (founded in 1950) and the Metallurgical 
Construction Corporation of China (MCC Group, founded in 1982) in 2015. Both were 
state-owned and Fortune Global 500 companies.
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With the perspective that more national entities would assume a part in the 
project, and more ISA contracts would be signed in the future, China’s central 
government was in need of a competent legal tool to strengthen its supervision 
and management of activities conducted in the Area, as well as to ensure com-
pliance of entities operating in the Area. The promulgation of the Deep Seabed 
Law fulfils China’s sponsoring State obligations and protects the legal interests 
of the sponsored contractors.
2.3 Technological Advancement
Thirdly, China has seen remarkable achievements in deep-sea exploration 
technology. For example, the successful launch of the “Three Dragons” equip-
ment system symbolised China’s ambition to make full use of the deep seabed 
areas.
Representing a technological milestone and an important part of the 
national marine strategy, the “Three Dragons System” consists of:
– Human Occupied Vehicles (HOVs) known as “Jiaolong”;
– Autonomous/Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) called the “Qianlong” 
series;12 and
– Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) designated the “Sea Dragon” series.13
Benefiting from a variety of technological advancements, China has under-
taken over 50 ocean voyages to conduct comprehensive surveys and scientific 
research on the deep sea environment and has acquired valuable first-hand 
knowledge in relation to mining activities in the Area.14 The latest 52nd ocean 
voyage set sail from Qingdao on 10 December 2018 and finished on 25 July 2019. 
Equipped with the most advanced “Jiaolong”, “Qianlong No. 3” and “Sea Dragon 
No. 3”, this voyage was an important task and a major part of China’s marine 
development project under the 13th Five-Year Plan for economic and social 
development (2016–2020). The voyage was designed in two parts consisting of 
a total of 228 days. Part A was 150 days, covering the Indian Ocean and Atlantic 
Ocean, conducting surveys of the marine environment, prospecting biologi-
cal genetic resources, and collecting environmental baseline data and samples 
in the surveyed area. Part B was 78 days, mainly conducting a comprehensive 
investigation of polymetallic sulphides in the southwest Indian Ocean in order 
12   According to COMRA website information, China now has ‘Qianlong No. 1’, ‘Qianlong No. 2’ 
and ‘Qianlong No. 3’ in operation. http://www.comra.org/2019-02/11/content_40660825 
.htm.
13   Ibid. ‘Sea Dragon No. 1’, ‘Sea Dragon No. 2’ and ‘Sea Dragon No. 3’.
14   See “大洋一号”起航执行中国大洋52航次科考任务 [“Ocean No. 1” sets sail to carry out 
China’s 52nd oceanic voyage for scientific research mission], People’s Daily, December 11, 
2018, http://www.comra.org/2018-12/11/content_40608711.htm.
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to collect samples and information to further comprehend the resources and 
environmental status.15
Above all, technological developments have provided a solid foundation for 
expanded research and served as important precondition for China’s legisla-
tion concerning the exploration and development of resources located in the 
international seabed area.
3 The Need for a Deep Seabed Law
3.1 Why Does China Need the Deep Seabed Law?
The most important reason for China to pass the Deep Seabed Law was to pro-
actively fulfil its obligations under international laws. China ratified UNCLOS 
in 1996 that consisted of three layers of obligations of which China is required 
to comply under the Convention: as a State Party, as a sponsoring State, and as 
a responsible member of the international community.
First, the Deep Seabed Law fulfils China’s responsibilities as a State Party. 
This originates from Article 139, paragraph 1 of UNCLOS, which establishes 
the obligations of States Parties. Pursuant to that Article, States Parties shall 
have the responsibility to ensure that activities carried out by their spon-
sored contractors in the Area shall be in conformity with Part XI of UNCLOS.16 
Additionally, Article 153, paragraph 4 of Part XI provides that the obligation of 
the States Parties in accordance with Article 139 entails “taking all measures 
necessary” to ensure compliance by the sponsored contractor, and Annex III, 
Article 4, paragraph 4 of UNCLOS further states that such sponsoring States 
have the “responsibility to ensure” that “laws and regulations” should be 
adopted “within their legal systems”.17 The purpose of these provisions is to 
achieve a result where the obligations set out in the Convention, a treaty under 
international law which binds only States Parties thereto, are fully complied 
with by entities that are subjects of domestic legal systems.
The process of how international agreements become a part of domestic 
laws of a sovereign state varies from State to State. Some States follow a monist 
15  利器加持:中国大洋第52航次启航[Equipped with powerful tools, the 52rd ocean 
voyage embarks], Science and Technology Daily, December 11, 2018, http://www.comra 
.org/2018-12/11/content_40608572.htm.
16   Part XI entitled ‘the Area’ containing Articles 133–191 of the UNCLOS, governs all activi-
ties taking place in the Area, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree 
ments/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm.
17   Annex III of UNCLOS, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree 
ments/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm.
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system where treaties can become domestic law without incorporation, such 
as the Netherlands and France. Moreover, domestic courts in these countries 
could directly apply self-executing treaties if the provisions are considered 
sufficiently self-explanatory and these countries generally have constitutional 
provisions to provide legitimacy. In contrast, dualist states such as the United 
Kingdom require all treaties to go through a process of incorporation of inter-
national law before treaties can have any domestic legal effects.
China’s constitution is silent concerning the relationship between interna-
tional treaties and domestic laws. However, Judicial practice has demonstrated 
that China follows a treaty ratification method somewhere between these 
two extremes. Automatic incorporating takes place only when the domestic 
law contains specific provisions. For example, Article 142 of China’s General 
Principles of the Civil Law has indicated that “If any international treaty con­
cluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provisions differ­
ing from those in the civil laws of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions 
of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which 
the People’s Republic of China has announced reservations.”18 Therefore, with 
respect to civil laws, when international treaties contradict domestic laws, 
international laws prevail. In other cases, China incorporates international 
treaties by passing a law that gives effect to that treaty at the domestic level, 
such as in the case of incorporating UNCLOS. The enactment of the Deep 
Seabed Law is China’s response to its “responsibility to ensure” in order to com-
ply with its requirements as a State Party.
Second, the enactment of the Deep Seabed Law aims to relieve China from 
its liability as a sponsoring State, namely, the consequences of a breach of the 
sponsoring State’s primary obligations. In practical terms, as pointed out by 
Ximena Hinrichs Oyarce, the issue to be considered is whether, in the event 
of a single incident causing damage to the Area or its resources, the liability 
either of the sponsoring State or of the sponsored contractor would arise. (See 
Ximena Hinrichs Oyarce, Sponsoring States in the Area: Obligations, Liability 
and the Role Development States, Marine Policy 95 (2018) 317–323) The spe-
cial advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS in 2011 (the 
Advisory Opinion) has given clarification to that point. The Advisory Opinion 
indicates that the failure of a sponsoring State to carry out its obligations gives 
rise to liability only when such failure results in damage by the contractor. The 
sponsoring State is absolved from liability if it has taken the necessary and 
appropriate measures.
18   General Principles of the Civil Law, available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Law/2007-12/12/content_1383941.htm.
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However, this exemption does not apply automatically, as the “responsibil-
ity to ensure” is an obligation of “due diligence”. For it to apply, the sponsoring 
State must have taken “all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effec-
tive compliance” by the sponsored contractor with its obligations,19 while the 
exception does not apply to the failure of the sponsoring State to carry out its 
direct obligations.20
China is a sponsoring State for four ISA contracts. The promulgation of the 
Deep Seabed Law and the implementation of administrative control with 
regard to the exploration and exploitation of deep seabed resources therefore 
serves two functions. It is a measure not only through which Chinese govern-
ment could ensure compliance by its sponsored contractors (currently COMRA 
and China Minmetals) with their obligations under the relevant contracts and 
UNCLOS, but also an indispensable conditions that China must satisfy if it 
intends to be exempted from liability for damage.
Third, the Deep Seabed Law reflects China’s pledge to protect the marine 
environment as a rule-abiding and responsible member of the international 
community. Both UNCLOS Part XII and the Authority’s three regulations gov-
erning mineral-related exploration activities have provided special emphasis 
on protecting the marine environment from any harmful effects arising from 
mining and exploration activities.21 The Area and its resources are the com-
mon heritage of mankind; thus, all rights associated with the resources of the 
19   Responsibilities and Obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory 
Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports, 2011 (hereinafter Responsibilities and obligations 
of States), pp. 60–61, para. 186.
20   Id. Responsibilities and obligations of States, p. 65, para. 207. The Advisory Opinion 
also indicates that the most important direct obligations of sponsoring States are: 1) the 
obligation to assist the ISA in the task of controlling activities in the Area pursuant to 
article 153(4) of UNCLOS; 2) the precautionary approach based on Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration, requiring actions where scientific evidence is insufficient but “where there 
are plausible indications of potential risk”; 3) best environmental practices (i.e., more 
than just best available technology); 4) the obligation to take measures to ensure the 
provision of guarantees in the event of an emergency order by the ISA for protection 
of the marine environment; 4) requirements to provide recourse for compensation; and 
5) the obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment. These “direct obliga-
tions” exist independently of the obligation “to ensure”. The “obligation of ensuring com-
pliance” (Article 139 of UNCLOS) is a duty of “due diligence”. Compliance with these direct 
obligations can be considered a relevant factor in determining whether a State has acted 
with due diligence. Responsibilities and obligations of States, p. 44, para. 122.
21   To date, the ISA has issued Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules in the Area (adopted 13 July 2000) which was later updated and adopted 
25 July 2013; the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides 
in the Area (adopted 7 May 2010) and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Cobalt-Rich Crusts (adopted 27 July 2012).
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Area are vested in mankind as a whole. Therefore, protecting the marine envi-
ronment of the Area is essentially for the benefit of all mankind and future 
generations. Adopting the Deep Seabed Law reflects the strong commitment 
and effort that China is making in order to maintain the international seabed 
order, to promote the sustainable and healthy development of the marine 
industry, and to advocate for the peaceful exploitation of deep-sea resources.
3.2 Why Was It Promulgated in 2016?
While China has become an active State Party to UNCLOS, it was not among 
the first few countries to pass national legislation to incorporate UNCLOS 
requirements. Prior to the enactment of the Deep Seabed Law in March 2016, 
16 countries throughout the world had already adopted legislation (Act or Law) 
governing their engagement in seabed mineral activities undertaken in the 
Area. Consistent with the timing of their promulgation and against the bench-
mark event of UNCLOS entering into effect, the legislation may be divided into 
two specific groups (see table below).
One could say that the promulgation of the Deep Seabed Law represented 
a way for China to follow the regulatory trend. However, a crucial reason for 
the enactment of the Deep Seabed Law in 2016 was based primarily on the fact 
that one of China’s exploration contracts was due to expire.
Among the twenty-nine 15-year contracts the ISA has entered into for explo-
ration for polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferro-
manganese crusts in the deep seabed, China has acquired the following four 
contracts:
– 2001, COMRA, polymetallic nodules, 75,000 km2 of the North-east Pacific 
Ocean;
– 2011, COMRA, polymetallic sulphides, 10000 km2 of the South-west Indian 
Ocean;
– 2014, COMRA, cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, 3000 km2 of the North-east 
Pacific Ocean;
– 2017, China Minmetals, polymetallic nodules, 72,745 km2 of the East Pacific 
Ocean
As provided for in Regulation 26 of the 2000 Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (amended and adopted 
25 July 2013), the duration of a plan of work for an exploration contract is 
for 15 years. Upon expiration of that period, the contractor shall apply for a 
plan of work for exploitation, unless the contractor has already done so, or 
has obtained an extension for the plan of work for exploration, or decides to 
renounce its rights in the area covered by the plan of work for exploration.
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22    Ordinance No. 2016–1687 of 8 December 2016 relating to the maritime areas under the 
sovereign-ty or jurisdiction of the Republic of France.
23    The Act provides for the regulations of mining activities by Japanese person in the Area. 
The Act is implemented by the Ordinance for Enforcement, which was enacted also in 
1982 and last amended in 2013.
Specific national legislation  
enacted after UNCLOS
1. Australia (The Commonwealth Offshore Minerals Act 
1994),
2. Belgium (Act on prospecting and exploration for, and 
exploitation of, resources of the seabed and ocean floor 
and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, adopted on 17 August 2013),
3. Cook Islands (Seabed Minerals Act 2009, Amended in 
2015; Seabed Minerals (Prospecting an Exploration) 
Regulations 2015),
4. Czech Republic (Act No. 158/2000 of 18 May 2000 on 
Prospecting, Exploration for and Exploitation of Mineral 
Resources from the Seabed beyond Limits of National 
Jurisdiction 2000),
5. Fiji (International Seabed Mineral Management Decree 
(Decree No. 21, 12 July 2013),
6. Germany (Seabed Mining Act of 6 June 1995 (the Act), 
Amended by article 74 of the Act of 8 December 2010),
7. Nauru (International Seabed Minerals Act 2015),
8. New Zealand (United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea Act 1996),
9. The Russian Federation
(Decree of the President of 22 November 1994 No. 
2099 “About activities of the Russian physical and legal 
entities for exploration and development of mineral 
resources of the seabed outside the continental shelf”;
10. Singapore (Deep Seabed Mining Act 2015),
11. Tonga (Seabed Minerals Act 2014),
12. Tuvalu (Seabed Minerals Act 2014),
13. the United Kingdom (Deep Sea Mining (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1981, amended by the Deep Sea Mining 
Act 2014).
Table 15.1 
Specific national legislation 
enacted before UNCLOS
1. France
(Law on the 
Exploration and 
Exploitation of Mineral 
Resources of the Deep 
Seabed 1981;
In addition, France 
incorporated an article 
in an ordinance relat-
ing more generally to 
all maritime spaces 
under its sovereignty or 
jurisdiction.22)
2. Japan
(Act on Interim 
Measures for Deep 
Seabed Mining 1982)23
3. the United States
(Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources Act 
1980)
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China’s first exploration contract signed in 2001 was due to expire in 2016. 
Thus, if the commercial development conditions are ripe, the contract may 
need to be transferred to the development stage. However, the current domes-
tic laws, such as the “Mineral Resources Law”, as mentioned above, were not 
sufficient for this purpose. Not only did the application scope of domestic 
laws not cover international seabed areas beyond the limits of national juris-
diction, but the legal language was also incompetent to govern increasingly 
active and complex activities conducted in the Area, which now involve huge 
investments, a long contractual period and high risks. Therefore, China’s Deep 
Seabed Law was a necessary measure to follow up on current activities con-
ducted in the Area.
4 The Deep Seabed Law Compared with Laws of Other Countries
The Deep Seabed Law has a total of 29 articles and divided into 7 chapters.24 
Chapter I on General Provisions is the most extensive part of the law and com-
prised of 6 articles, which state the purposes and objectives, the scope of the 
application, as well as the general principles under which the mining activities 
should be conducted.
China’s Deep Seabed Law was developed to serve five specific purposes: 
(a) regulating the exploration and development of resources in the Area; 
(b) promoting deep sea scientific and technological research and resource 
investigation; (c) protecting the marine environment; (d) promoting the sus-
tainable utilization of resources in deep seabed areas; and (e) protecting the 
common interests of mankind. The law also states that the exploration and 
development of resources in deep seabed areas shall be conducted under the 
principles of peaceful utilisation, cooperation and sharing, environmental 
protection, and the protection of the common interests of mankind. Other 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu have also rec-
ognised the principle of the “common heritage of mankind” in their respective 
national laws.
The law was adopted at the 19th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Twelfth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 
26 February 2016 and came into force on 1 May 2016. Whereas Chapter VII 
addresses the terms and interpretation of the law, Chapters II through VI 
establish five primary mechanisms regulating different aspects of the mining 
activities in the Area:
24   Deep Seabed Law, supra note 1.
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1) a licensing procedure with a dual-track approval mechanism for explora-
tion and development activities;
2) a marine environmental protection mechanism;
3) a sharing and cooperation mechanism for scientific and technological 
research and resource investigation;
4) a supervision and administration mechanism; and
5) a legal liability mechanism.
4.1 Scope of Application
The scope of the application contains three general aspects: eligible subjects; 
applicable activities; and applicable area.
4.1.1 Eligible Subjects
Pursuant to Article 2, the eligible subjects of the law apply to Chinese citizens, 
legal persons or organisations of the People’s Republic of China. Article 153, 
paragraph 2 (b) of UNCLOS requires all persons interested in carrying out 
activities in the Area – whether natural or juridical – to possess the nationality 
of States Parties or be under the effective control of them or their nationals. 
Therefore, China and other countries such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Fiji, 
Japan, Nauru, New Zealand, Singapore, Tonga and Tuvalu have all adopted this 
criterion of nationality or registration/residence within the domestic jurisdic-
tion as a necessary requirement to be entitled to apply for State sponsorship.
Second, thus far, COMRA and China Minmetals are the only two Contractors 
sponsored by the Chinese government. However, law here clearly suggests that 
the identity of a Contractor is not restricted to state-owned enterprises, and 
any Chinese individual or organisation that passes the qualification screening 
would be eligible. Essentially, the government is opening the door for private 
enterprises and individuals to participate in deep seabed exploration in the 
future, stating that the applicant can qualify if “the application is in the national 
interest and the applicant has funds, technologies, equipment and other capa­
bilities and conditions.” Thus, the qualification requirements of an applicant 
is rather low and wide-ranging under China’s Deep Seabed Law. Some other 
countries such as Japan and Fiji have stipulated more stringent rules govern-
ing the identity and qualification of the applicant. For example, Japan has a 
requirement regarding criminal records and the applicant is not eligible to 
apply for State sponsorship within two years after serving a sentence for crimi-
nal offences.
4.1.2 Applicable Activities
In relation to the range of activities it governs, Article 2 states that the law shall 
apply to activities in relation to the exploration and development of resources, 
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environmental protection, scientific and technological research, and resource 
investigation. China defines “resources investigation” as “the searching for 
resources in deep seabed areas, including estimates of the components, quan-
tity, distribution and economic value of resources”, which is arguably equiva-
lent to prospecting activities. However, there is no explanation as to what 
constitutes “resources” in the Deep Seabed Law, although it is speculated 
that “resources” should be interpreted in a generic way but only refers to non-
living resources. The legal status of living resources, such as marine or genetic 
resources, is a complex issue that prompts an international legal response. 
Therefore, the Chinese legislators may be of the opinion that the law should 
be intentionally silent on the definition of “resources” and that the adoption 
of rules dedicated to living resources should first be discussed at the interna-
tional level.
When compared with the other 16 countries which have passed domestic 
laws relating to deep seabed mining ahead of China, China’s Deep Seabed Law 
offers the broadest range of applicable activities, including environmental 
protection.25 The laws of Germany, the Czech Republic, and Belgium regulate 
prospecting, exploration, and development activities, while the laws of the 
United Kingdom and Japan primarily regulate exploration and development 
activities. Other countries such as the United States and Fiji focus more on 
the exploitation/development phase than the exploration/prospecting phase, 
without establishing any requirements for prospecting in their laws.
4.1.3 Applicable Area
Whereas the scope of the subject in other Chinese national laws concerning 
marine activities is generally connected to “territories”, or governs activities in 
accordance with where they take place, the Deep Seabed Law, on the other 
hand, revolves around “one’s activities”, i.e., what the eligible subject actually 
does. Thus, it regulates the behaviour of the entity undertaking exploration 
and development activities within the Area. Moreover, it is the first extra-
territorial law passed in China’s legal history that governs activities outside its 
territorial waters.
With respect to the applicable area, the term “deep seabed area” is used in 
the law, instead of the term “the Area” as used in UNCLOS. For the purpose of 
the Deep Seabed Law, “deep seabed areas” means seabed, ocean floor, and the 
subsoil outside the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China and other 
25   Arguably the applicable activities do not include prospecting activities, although the defi-
nition given to “resource investigation” almost covers all prospecting activities.
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countries, which is exactly the same definition of “the Area” as defined by 
UNCLOS.26
4.2 Competent National Authority
Article 5 of the Deep Seabed Law establishes China’s competent national 
authority for mining activities in the Area by stating, “the oceanic administra­
tion of the State Council is responsible for the supervision and administration 
of the exploration, development, and investigation of resources in deep seabed 
areas. Other relevant departments of the State Council shall be responsible for 
the relevant administration, according to the functions prescribed by the State 
Council”.
Although not explicitly provided for, the “oceanic administration of the 
State Council” at large refers to China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA). 
However, it should be noted that the functions and responsibilities of the 
SOA have now been divided and separated into two different, newly established 
ministries. Pursuant to the “Institutional Reform Plan of the State Council” 
which was approved at the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress 
in March 2018, oceanic administration functions of the SOA now falls under 
the regime of the new Ministry of Natural Resources. Meanwhile, the marine 
environmental protection responsibilities of the SOA are now integrated into 
the regime of the new Ministry of Ecology and Environment. Although for 
convenience reason the Ministry of Natural Resources still retains the brand 
of State Oceanic Administration for the public, the SOA is now officially an 
office/a subordinate department within the Ministry of Natural Resources. 
The SOA/Ministry of Natural Resources functions as the inspection and regula-
tory body of the Deep Seabed Law and is responsible for the supervision and 
administration of activities conducted by Chinese nationals in relation to the 
exploration, development, and investigation of resources in deep seabed areas. 
the Ministry of Ecology and Environment is involved with respect to marine 
environmental protection issues. However, in practice, COMRA has a direct 
operational role in the implementation of the Deep Seabed Law as well as gen-
eral oceanic administration affairs. For example, at the media conference for 
the promulgation of first implementing regulation of the Deep Seabed Law, it 
was the Secretary-General of COMRA, Mr. Liu Feng, rather than any govern-
ment officials from the SOA to address the public in relation to the regulation.
Ideally, the institutional structure of governance should include the follow-
ing: a legislative body, an executive branch, a regulatory and monitoring agency, 
as well as an oversight or appeal committee for agency decision-making. The 
26   Art. 2, Deep Seabed Law, supra note 1.
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National People’s Congress is the legislative body. The SOA plays the role of 
regulatory and monitoring agency but without a supervision entity for its 
decision-making. COMRA is both the regulatory and monitoring agency and 
a sponsored contractor. Responsibilities of the SOA and the COMRA are not 
defined, while COMRA is both an athlete and a referee. Arguably, procedural 
fairness cannot be guaranteed and this institutional arrangement should be 
improved in the future.
4.3 Procedural Mechanism for Licensing
Except for France and the Russian Federation, 14 out of the 16 countries which 
have enacted national laws to incorporate UNCLOS have established a proce-
dural mechanism to control and grant a license or State sponsorship for min-
ing activities in the Area. All of them grant a license/certificate of sponsorship 
based on the application.
Their respective regulatory approach can be roughly grouped into four 
types:27
a) A certificate of sponsorship without reference to a license/approval/
permit (the Czech Republic, Fiji and Nauru)
The national law provides that a certificate of sponsorship is to be 
entered into by the sponsoring State and the sponsored applicant. 
Obtaining State sponsorship is a pre-condition for a contract applica-
tion to the ISA. The Czech Republic requires an applicant to get a cer-
tificate of sponsorship before negotiations with the Authority; 
however, there is no reference to a licensing mechanism in the law. 
This approach is followed by countries such as Fiji, Nauru, and the 
Czech Republic.
b) A license (approval or permit) for seabed mining activities within 
national jurisdiction and a certificate of sponsorship for activities in the 
Area (Tonga and Tuvalu)
Both the States’ sponsorship scheme and the licensing procedure are 
provided in detail via the domestic laws, such as can be seen in Tonga 
and Tuvalu.
27   Wang Lan (王岚), Guoji Haidi Quyu Kaifa Zhongde Guojia Danbao Zhiadu Yanjiu (国际海
底区域开发中的国家担保制度研究 – 中国国家担保制度立法回应) [Research on 
the National Guarantee System for International Seabed Area Development], 223 Xue Shu 
Jie (学术界) [Academics] 209 (2016); and ISA, Comparative Study of the Existing National 
Legislation on Deep Seabed Mining (2017), [hereinafter ISA comparative study].
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c) A certificate of sponsorship is to be issued after a license has been 
granted (Singapore)
Singapore’s State sponsorship scheme is only lightly touched upon in 
the Deep Seabed Mining Act 2015, with great emphasis attached to the 
licensing procedure. Thus, Singapore fulfils its sponsoring State obliga-
tions mainly through the licensing mechanism.
d) A license (approval or permit) without explicit reference to the certifi-
cate of sponsorship (Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom), but in 
practice, a certificate of sponsorship is issued for sponsored contractors.
No direct State sponsorship scheme is addressed in the domestic 
law; however, the sponsoring State commitment is integrated into 
the licensing system under the specific Deep Seabed Law. Such an 
approach is found in Germany and the UK.
China adopts the last approach. A licensing scheme is detailed in the Deep 
Seabed Law without explicit reference to the certificate of sponsorship. In 
accordance with Articles 7 and 8, before any Chinese citizen, legal person or 
organisation can apply to the ISA for an exploration and development contract, 
the entity shall first file an application with the SOA. The SOA will then exam-
ine the application materials submitted and conduct a qualification review. 
If successful, the SOA will grant a permit to the applicant within 60 working 
days. After obtaining the permit, the entity is then eligible to enter into an 
exploration and development contract with the ISA and become a Contractor. 
A duplicate copy of the ISA contract must be submitted to the SOA for record 
purposes no more than 30 days from the date of the signature.
In essence, China’s Deep Seabed Law has established a dual-track approval 
mechanism for exploration and development activities in the Area, namely, a 
valid license (approval or permit) issued by the SOA under domestic law, and 
a valid contract signed with the Authority under international law, prior to the 
applicant commencing activities in the Area. A similar practice can be seen in 
other countries such as the Czech Republic, Fiji, Germany, Japan, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the United Kingdom, which similarly 
provides a general prohibition on deep seabed mining activities in the Area 
unless the applicant holds a valid national license/State sponsorship. China 
further requires a valid contract with the Authority for activities in the Area.
This dual-track (national and international) approval procedure means that 
sponsored contractors are bound by Chinese domestic laws, as well as contrac-
tual terms with the ISA. The former domestic procedure is the prerequisite for 
the latter. The SOA validates and approves the qualification of the applicant 
and provides its consent for the applicant to enter into contracts with the ISA. 
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Details of the contractual terms still depend on the negotiations between the 
contractor and the ISA. If a contract is not successfully concluded with the ISA 
within 3 years after the grant of the license, the license automatically expires.28 
In addition, the effective period of the license spans from the date of grant to 
the expiry date of the ISA contract.29 If the ISA contract requires an extension, 
before the contractor files an extension application to the ISA, the contractor 
should first apply for an extension of the license with the SOA. The SOA has 60 
working days to make a decision whether or not to allow the extension of the 
license and each extension period is no more than 5 years.30 Essentially, the 
SOA could unilaterally withdraw State sponsorship and terminate the ISA con-
tract if it refuses to extend the license. This type of governance system is new 
to Chinese authorities, which requires the SOA to fully consider the relevant 
international rules, while understanding the limits of their functions and pow-
ers. In that respect, the interaction between international laws and the provi-
sions of the Deep Seabed Law affecting the rights and duties of the contractors 
may stress some areas of conflict and, thus, represent a challenge for Chinese 
judicial authorities in the future. The implementation impact of this practice 
is yet to be seen.
4.3.1 Application Documentation
With respect to the application documentation, Article 7 of the Deep Seabed 
Law provides that an application with the SOA must be in writing, and should 
include the following:
a) Basic information about the applicant, such as nationality, residency, and 
company registration information;
b) An explanation regarding the location and area of the region that the 
applicant intends to explore and develop, and the categories of minerals;
c) Certificates of financial status and investment ability, and an explanation 
concerning technical capability;
d) An exploration and development work plan, including the materials 
relating to the possible impact of exploration and development activities 
on the marine environment, and an emergency response plan for serious 
damage to the marine environment, among others; and
e) Other materials required by the oceanic administration of the State 
Council.
28   2017 Implementing Regulation on Licensing, Infra note 30, Art.11.
29   Id.
30   2017 Implementing Regulation on Licensing, Infra note 30, Art.15.
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Whereas “materials on the possible impact of exploration and development 
activities on the marine environment” is vaguely mentioned in the Deep Seabed 
Law, the implementing regulation on licensing issued by the SOA in 2017 spe-
cifically requires an environmental impact assessment to be produced and an 
establishment of environmental baseline data.31
4.3.2 Criteria for Granting a License
In China, a number of eligibility criteria are required prior to the SOA grant-
ing the license: the application must be in the national or public interest; and 
the applicant must have sufficient funds and possess competent technical and 
technological capabilities. Although not manifested in the Deep Seabed Law, 
the implementing regulation on licensing further requires an assessment of 
the credibility and integrity of the applicant, and that the applicant is equally 
satisfying the eligibility criteria established by the ISA regarding the explora-
tion and development of marine resources.32
4.3.3 Scope of the License
China’s Deep Seabed Law foresees the scope of a national license covering 
two stages of deep-sea mining activities, namely exploration and develop-
ment. Article 27 of the Deep Seabed Law defines “Exploration” as “the search­
ing and analysis of resources in deep seabed areas, use and testing of resource 
collection systems and equipment, processing facilities and transport systems, as 
well as the research on environment, technologies, economy, commerce and other 
relevant factors that shall be considered at the time of development.” Moreover, 
“Development” is defined as “the recovery and selection of resources in deep 
seabed areas for business purposes, including the construction and operation of 
collection, processing and transport systems serving the production and sale of 
resources.”
Other countries such as Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
the United Kingdom may grant two types of licenses/certificates regarding 
exploration and exploitation, respectively.33 For example, Singapore’s license 
must specify whether they are for exploration or exploitation, the type of 
31   Shenhai Haidi Quyu Ziyuan Kantan Kaifa Xuke Guanli Banfa (深海海底区域资源
勘探开发许可管理办法) [Measures for the Management of Permits on Exploration 
for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area] (promulgated by the State 
Oceanic Administration, Apr. 27, 2017, effective Apr. 27, 2017) Art.6(6) [hereinafter 2017 
Implementing regulation on licensing], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2017/con 
tent_5227831.htm.
32   Id. Art.8.
33   Permits for exploration activities and mining activities in the case of Japan.
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resource, and the part of the Area and the license must relate to only one type 
of resource.34 In the Cook Islands, four types of certificates are issued: a pros-
pecting permit, an exploration license, a mining license, and a retention lease.35
4.3.4 Transfer, Variation, Revocation, Termination of License/Certificate of 
Sponsorship/the ISA Contracts
The Deep Seabed Law allows a contractor to transfer, modify, and terminate 
the ISA contract as long as it informs the SOA for approval. The contractor 
shall, within 30 days of the transfer, modification or termination of the explo-
ration and development contract, report the issue to the SOA for recordation.36 
A major modification to the license is allowed, but is governed by the imple-
menting regulation on licensing instead. Under the circumstances of a 
major modification to the exploration and development work plan, a major 
modification or revision of the ISA contract, or a transfer (all or partly) of the 
obligations under the ISA contract, a modification or reissuance of the license 
may be approved. However, whereas ISA contracts can be transferred under 
the Deep Seabed Law, the implementing regulation is not clear with respect 
to whether a license could be transferred equally. As a comparison, in its 2010 
Seabed Exploration Act, Germany does not allow a contractor to transfer its 
rights and obligation under an approval (license).
Moreover, many States have provided in their national law for the compe-
tent national authority to vary, suspend or revoke the license/certificate of 
sponsorship in certain cases. For example, the corresponding contract with 
the Authority has been suspended for any reason or it is in the national interest 
to suspend or revoke the license (Singapore), and to avoid a conflict with any 
obligation of the sponsoring State arising out of any international agreement 
or instrument in force (Nauru, Tonga and the United Kingdom).
Although not provided in the Deep Seabed Law, the 2017 implementing 
regulation on licensing has established situations under which the SOA may 
revoke or terminate the license if the licensed:
a) Provided false or misleading information to obtain the license 
(Article 23(1));
34   ISA comparative study, supra note 27, at para.40.
35   Zhang Zitai & Sheng Hao (张梓太&沈灏), 深海海底区域资源勘探开发立法研究 – 
域外经验与中国策略 [Research on Laws Governing Exploration and Development of 
Deep Seabed Resources – Foreign Experience and China’ Strategy] conference paper in 
National Symposium on Environmental and Resource Law, edited by Chinese Society of 
Environmental and Resource Law, 700, Guangzhou, 2014.
36   Deep Seabed Law, Supra note 22, Art.10.
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b) Failed to perform the ISA’s contractual obligations or perform obliga-
tions in any manner other than complying with the terms of the contract 
(Article 23(2));
c) Has transferred or significantly modified the rights and obligations under 
the ISA contract without the SOA’s approval (Article 23(3));
d) Does not apply for an extension upon expiry of the license (Article 24(1));
e) No longer meets the qualification criteria for the exploration and devel-
opment of deep seabed marine resources (Article 24(2));
f) Upon the bankruptcy, insolvency or receivership of, or ceasing to exist as 
a legal entity of, the sponsored party (Articles 24(3) and 24(4)); and
g) Under other situations where the license is lawfully terminated 
(Articles 24(5) and 24(6)).
4.4 Rights, Obligations and Liabilities of a Sponsored Contractor
The rights, obligations and responsibilities of the licensee/sponsored con-
tractor are directly set out in Articles 9–11 of China’s Deep Seabed Law. Some 
other countries such as Singapore and the United Kingdom provide for 
rights and obligations of the licensee under the terms and conditions of the 
license, which may have the inconvenience of having a lower legislative rank-
ing and which may have less constraint on the contractors.
With respect to rights, Article 9 of the Deep Seabed Law affirms that a con-
tractor has the exclusive rights to explore and develop specific resources within 
the region specified in the exploration and development contract. “Resources” 
here was not defined in the legislation. However, as the Deep Seabed Law 
directly incorporates the UNCLOS, it can be inferred from Article 133 of the 
UNCLOS that “resources” means all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources 
in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed.37
With respect to obligations of the sponsored contractor, they amount to a 
comprehensive list in the Deep Seabed Law and may be classified into the fol-
lowing categories:
a) to perform obligations under the exploration and development contract;
b) to guarantee the personal safety of employed operation persons subject 
to Chinese laws and the administrative regulations on work safety and 
labour protection;
c) to ensure the safety of the vessels, installation, equipment and opera-
tions in the Area;
d) to protect the marine environment, among others, including taking nec-
essary measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecological systems 
37   Art. 133(a), Part XI, UNCLOS.
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and the living environment of weakened, threatened or endangered spe-
cies and other marine organisms;
e) to safeguard the objects of archaeological and historical nature in the 
Area;
f) to periodically update the Authority and the SOA on the performance of 
exploration and development contracts; and
g) to assist and cooperate in the supervision and inspection conducted by 
the SOA.
On the other hand, countries such as Fiji, Tonga and Tuvalu have provided in 
their national laws a number of responsibilities of the sponsoring State for the 
benefits of the sponsored contractor. These responsibilities, among others, 
include communicating and providing any assistance to the Authority to give 
effect to the State’s sponsorship and not imposing unnecessary and dispro-
portionate regulatory burdens on sponsored parties. China however limits its 
role and responsibilities of sponsoring States only to review and approve the 
transfer of license/ISA contracts and keep corresponding records. Even though 
Article 3 of the Deep Seabed Law unequivocally states that the State shall pro-
tect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal persons or other 
organisations that conduct the exploration, development and investigation of 
resources in the Area, the effectiveness of that is doubtful.
4.4.1 Supervision and Inspection
Like the Czech Republic, Fiji, Germany, Japan, Nauru, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu 
and the United Kingdom, China has established a monitoring, supervision and 
inspection mechanism by the competent national authority in Chapter V of 
the Deep Seabed Law.
The measures include sending an inspector and obtaining access to the con-
tractor’s vessels, facilities and equipment; examining relevant documentation, 
including logbooks, records and data; requiring the contractor to report regu-
larly on the implementation of the exploration and development contract; and 
ensuring the contractor provides assistance and cooperate with the inspection 
team.
4.4.2 Legal Liabilities
Except for France and Russia, all countries which have domestic laws in place 
for mining activities in the Area have explicitly stipulate sanctions in case of 
a breach of contractors’ obligations. Chapter VI of China’s Deep Seabed Law 
defines a sanction regime in the form of contractors’ legal liabilities in case 
of non-compliance. In most cases, a non-compliance situation will result in 
fines, orders to take corrective actions or the revocation of the license by the 
SOA. The contractor may be exposed to criminal liabilities only for acts which 
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cause pollution or damage to the marine environment or to the cultural relics 
and paving things within the operation area. If any crime is constituted, it shall 
be subject to criminal liability in accordance with the law.38 This again has 
demonstrated China’s firm commitment to marine environmental protection.
Other countries have also established financial penalty mechanisms in 
their respective national laws. The amounts of the fines depend on the type 
of offence, but the severity of the sanctions in relation to offences varies from 
one country to another. The Czech Republic, for instance, sanctions the acts of 
undertaking seabed mining activities without State sponsorship or without a 
contract for over 4 million USD, while Tonga’s fines for an equivalent offence 
can be up to 1 million USD. In comparison, China imposes a fine of not less 
than 500,000 yuan but not more than 1 million yuan (around 148,000 USD) for 
even its most serious type of offence. China can also confiscate, in addition to 
the fines, the gains and products derived from the illegal mining activities. It is 
speculated that China’s sponsored contractors often have close ties to the cen-
tral government or directly under the control of the government; hence, a low 
penalty scheme is sufficient to serve as deterrence for non-compliance. With 
the increasing cohort of private entities sponsored by States Parties, China’s 
penalty mechanism might be revised in the future.
4.5 Environmental Protection Mechanism
Unlike the sponsorship requirement which only the State Parties willing to 
cooperate with the ISA will implement into domestic laws, the protection 
of the marine environment with respect to deep seabed mining activities 
has received global consensus. Many countries, including the United States 
which currently is an observer to the ISA and a non-party to the UNCLOS, have 
adopted a compensation and penalty mechanism for pollution and damage 
to marine environments. Some States set the element of marine environmen-
tal protection as one of criteria for granting a license/certificate of sponsor-
ship (Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu and the United Kingdom), while others set out in 
national laws the general or specific obligations of the licensee/contractor to 
protect the marine environment (Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Japan and the United Kingdom).39
China has prioritised marine environment protection and made it a full part 
of the country’s marine strategy. This priority focus is reflected in the Deep 
Seabed Law, where the word “environment” is mentioned 20 times and the law 
dedicates a whole chapter (Chapter III) to environmental protection. As to 
38   However, the law refers to the applicability of criminal law without specifying minimum 
or maximum imprisonment time.
39   ISA comparative study, supra note 26, at para.57.
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the content of the requirements, Chapter III provides that a contractor shall 
apply the available advanced technologies and take necessary measures as far 
as reasonably practical: (i) to investigate and conduct research on the oceanic 
conditions; (ii) to establish environmental baselines and assess the possible 
impacts of mining activities; and (iii) to make and implement an environmen-
tal monitoring plan in order to prevent, reduce and control pollution and other 
damage to the marine environment caused by activities in the exploration and 
development area.
The Deep Seabed Law also addresses emergency situations by providing an 
emergency response plan. If an accident causing serious damage to the marine 
environment occurs or may occur, the contractor shall immediately sound an 
alarm, report to the SOA, and initiate the emergency response plan in accor-
dance with Article 11. Similarly, the Acts of Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu also 
contain contingency plans of “incident” reporting, response and inquiry pro-
cesses. Such environmental contingency plans are triggered by situations of 
pollution or serious harm to the environment.
In addition, Chapter I on General Provisions and Chapter II on Exploration 
and Development contain supplementary provisions related to marine envi-
ronmental protection:
a) Article 1 stipulates that one of the objectives of the law is to protect the 
marine environment;
b) Article 3 requires that the exploration and development of resources in 
deep seabed areas shall be conducted in accordance with the principles 
of, inter alia, environmental protection and protection of the common 
interests of mankind;
c) Article 4 requires the State to adopt economic and technical policies 
and measures to enhance the capability of the protection of the marine 
environment;
d) Article 6 states that the government should encourage and support inter-
national cooperation in relation to environmental protection, scientific 
and technological research, education and training, among others;
e) Article 7 requires that the exploration and development plan submitted 
to the SOA for permit application should include background materials 
on the possible impact of exploration and development activities on the 
marine environment, including an emergency response plan for serious 
damage to the marine environment; and
f) Article 9 provides that the contractor shall perform the exploration and 
development contract under the obligation, inter alia, to protect the 
marine environment.
Compared to the other 15 countries which have passed domestic laws to regu-
late the deep seabed mining activities, China has demonstrated a high degree 
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of commitment, and probably it is the only country prioritising the issue of 
marine environmental protection in its domestic law.
Besides national requirements, the three ISA Regulations have set out six 
environmental protection measures.40 Some of them provide the basis for the 
national provisions mentioned above:
a) The contractor should “take necessary measures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution and other hazards to the marine environment … as far as 
reasonably possible using the best technology available to it …”, and “apply 
a precautionary approach, as reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 
and best environmental practices”;41
b) The contractor should establish and implement programs for monitor-
ing and evaluating the impacts of deep seabed mining on the marine 
environment;42
c) The contractor should gather environmental baseline data and establish 
environmental baselines;43
d) Prior to the commencement of its programme of activities, the contrac-
tor should submit a contingency plan to the Secretary-General to respond 
effectively to incidents that are likely to cause serious harm or constitute 
serious threats to the marine environment when performing contractor’s 
activities;44
e) The contractor shall promptly report to the Secretary-General any inci-
dent arising from its activities that has caused, is causing or poses a threat 
of serious harm to the marine environment;45 and
f) The contractor should comply with emergency orders issued 
by the Council of the ISA, as well as the immediate measures issued by the 
Secretary-General, to prevent, contain, minimise or repair serious harm 
or the threat of serious harm to the marine environment. This may 
40   Namely, the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the 
Area (adopted 13 July 2000, updated and adopted 25 July 2013) [hereinafter Polymetallic 
Nodules Regulations]; Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic 
Sulphides in the Area (adopted 7 May 2010) [hereinafter Polymetallic Sulphides 
Regulations]; and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Crusts 
(adopted 27 July 2012) [hereinafter Cobalt-rich Crusts Regulatons], https://www.isa.org 
.jm/mining-code.
41   For example, Polymetallic Sulphides Regulations, https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa 
.org.jm/s3fs-public/files/documents/isba-16a-12rev1_0.pdf, similar provisions are also pro-
vided in other two regulations.
42   Id. Part 5, Regulation 33, para.6.
43   Id. Annex4, section 5.3.
44   Id. Annex4, section 6.1.
45   Id. Annex 4, section 6.2.
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include orders to the contractor to immediately suspend or adjust any 
activities in the exploration area.46
Some States emphasise the application of the precautionary approach and 
best environmental practice (Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu), while oth-
ers implicitly include these principles in the national laws by endorsing the 
Authority’s rules, regulations and procedures.47 China has fully incorporated 
these measures into its Deep Seabed Law and sets out standards, which are 
no less stringent than the requirements of ISA Regulations. In addition, the 
preservation of the ecosystem, the protection of endangered marine species, 
the preservation of marine biodiversity, and the sustainable use of marine 
resources required under Article 14 of the law also embody the principles of 
the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at RIO+20 on 
27 July 2012.48
Moreover, other Chinese laws and regulations have also provided a solid 
legal foundation for marine environmental protection. Domestic laws such as 
the “Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
and the “Administrative Regulation on the Prevention and Treatment of the 
Pollution and Damage to the Marine Environment by Marine Engineering 
Construction Projects” address environmental pollution and ecological dam-
age caused by the exploitation and use of marine resources. Nevertheless, 
these laws only govern activities taking place in areas within China’s jurisdic-
tion. The promulgation of the Deep Seabed Law further complements and 
strengthens the legal system for marine environmental protection in China.
However, although it is applauded that China’s Deep Seabed Law emphasises 
the ultimate importance of marine environment protection, relevant provi-
sions in the law are quite vague and general. For instance, specific rules regu-
lating environment impact assessment are still found wanting. Supplementary 
laws and administrative regulations shall be rolled out in the future to pro-
vide details and clarification. According to news report, the SOA previously 
had plan for four implementing regulations to be issued in 2017. The first three 
have already been promulgated in April 2017, December 2017, with the last 
“Measures for the Environmental Investigation and Assessment of Resources 
in Deep Seabed Areas” still in the pipeline.
46   Id. Annex 4, section 6.3.
47   ISA comparative study, supra note 27, para.58.
48   The Future We Want, UNGA Res. 66/288, para. 158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288 (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E.
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4.6 Information Sharing and Cooperation
Few countries have stressed the importance of the sharing and cooperation 
mechanism contained in their respective national laws. As a general rule, 
Belgium, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu and the United Kingdom regard data and 
information received as confidential or to be held with appropriate confidenti-
ality, with only a few prescribed exceptions specified under their laws.49 China, 
on the other hand, requires the SOA to register and retain the information and 
samples submitted by the persons or entities that conduct deep sea mining 
activities, and make such information and samples available for public use 
pursuant to relative rules. In fact, China takes this step further by stipulating 
in the Deep Seabed Law that it supports the construction and operation of a 
“deep sea public platform” for the purpose of sharing the benefits arising from 
its research as related to deep sea technology and the exploration for deep sea 
resources. Again, this tends to further demonstrate China’s commitment to the 
peaceful and sustainable utilization of deep-sea resources for the benefit of all 
mankind.
5 Comments on the Core Legislative Intent of the Law
At its core, China’s Deep Seabed Law is about controlling, securing and prepar-
ing, as will be elaborated below.
First, the main theme of the law is to regulate and pursue an effective 
control mechanism for the activities in the Area. The very first sentence of 
Article 1 has stipulated that this law, among others, is developed for the pur-
pose of regulating the exploration and development of resources in deep 
seabed areas. This stipulation fully reflects the law’s basic value judgement 
as a tool to command and control. Chapter II then dedicates a whole chap-
ter on exploration and development regulation, and it includes a licensing 
mechanism, eligibility criteria for applicants, comprehensive obligations for 
sponsored contractors and stringent restriction on modification and transfer of 
the contracts. Chapter III also dedicates a whole chapter on regulating explo-
ration and development activities; however, it does this via a different angle 
of imposing marine environment protection obligations. To reinforce the con-
trol mechanism, Chapter V grants the SOA supervision and inspection rights 
with respect of mining activities conducted in the Area, and it is an obligation 
for contractors to assist and cooperate with the inspection team. Moreover, 
49   ISA comparative study, supra note 27, at para.64.
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the non-compliance of a contractor’s obligations under the law attracts a 
financial penalty or even criminal imprisonment as detailed in Chapter VI. In 
summary, the law is devised more for the benefit of the government to carry 
out the State’s “responsibility to ensure”. Therefore, it is understandable that 
the reciprocal obligations of sponsoring States are not emphasised.
Second, the law is to secure and protect the lawful rights and interests 
of citizens, legal persons or other organizations of the People’s Republic of 
China that conduct mining activities in the Area, as enshrined in Article 3 of 
the law. Since its launch in 1994, the ISA has issued twenty-nine (29) 15-year 
contracts for the exploration of deep sea minerals, with China holding four 
of them. In the future, China is expected to continue more intensive engage-
ment and cooperation with the ISA. The provisions of the Deep Seabed Law 
are largely rooted in the provisions of the UNCLOS and ISA Regulations, which 
demonstrates China’s support for the international legal regime of the Area, 
thus consolidating ISA’s function further. China’s promulgation of the Deep 
Seabed Law contributes to its own discourse power and discourse rights within 
the Council of ISA; hence this measure ensures effective protection of Chinese 
citizens’ rights in the Area. However, it is arguable whether the law per se 
could effectively protect rights of sponsored contractors with only one Article 
(Article 9) stipulating vaguely and generally that “a contractor shall enjoy 
corresponding exclusive rights to explore and develop specific resources 
within the region specified in the exploration and development contract”.50 
Moreover, the responsibilities of China as a sponsoring State were only 
restricted to review and approve the transfer of license/ISA contracts and keep 
corresponding records. The law also lacks provisions regarding the rights of 
relief and the rights of appeal if a contractor’s rights are infringed by the spon-
soring State under the law. Given the legal uncertainty, further implementing 
regulations or judicial interpretations relevant to securing contractors’ rights 
should be supplemented to the Deep Seabed Law.
Third, to prepare China for greater capability in relation to deep seabed 
mining activities in the Area, with reference to Articles 15–17, a number of 
incentive measures have been put in place to advance China’s deep-sea scien-
tific and technological research and to facilitate China’s capacity-building for 
mining activities in the Area. Encompassing these measures, Chapter IV of the 
Deep Seabed Law dedicates a whole chapter on “Scientific and Technological 
Research and Resource Investigation”.51
50   Deep Seabed Law, supra note 1, Art.9.
51   ‘Resource investigation’ is defined under the Deep Seabed Law as the search for resources 
in deep seabed areas, including the estimates of the components, quantity, distribution 
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a) The State supports the training of professional talents and encourages 
research cooperation between relevant industries;
b) The State lists deep-sea science and technology among the priority fields 
of scientific and technological development, meaning that more govern-
ment spending would be devoted to this Area;
c) The State encourages private enterprises to carry out deep-sea scientific 
research and marine technology equipment research, essentially open-
ing doors for a diversity of participants;
d) The State supports the construction and operation of a “deep-sea pub-
lic platform”, which is a mechanism to promote information exchange, 
cooperation and result sharing;
e) The State encourages entities and individuals to conduct deep-sea sci-
ence popularization activities such as opening vessels for exhibitions, 
holding seminars and providing relevant consultation services; and
f) The State shares with the public the physical samples and relevant 
materials obtained by contractors from investigation, exploration and 
development activities in accordance with relevant provisions.
China is the only country that promotes resources investigation and marine 
scientific research as one of its legislative objectives under the law. Chinese 
legislators are of the opinion that capacity-building is the foundation of the 
preceding two objectives mentioned previously. A State does not even possess 
the competent ability to conduct deep sea mining activities let alone to effec-
tively regulate its sponsored contractors and to protect their legal rights and 
interests. Competent ability relates to the technology, the equipment and the 
qualified personnel. By stipulating such content of national policy/strategy in 
its national law on deep seabed mining, China is preparing itself to move onto 
the next stage of commercialization of deep seabed resources once the condi-
tions are matured.
6 Significance of the Law
With the enactment of China’s Deep Seabed Law in 2016, it is worth assessing 
its significance and the influence it may have on the international regulations 
governing deep seabed resources. Three main points can be made.
and economic value of resources. Arguably, it is similar to the definition of prospecting 
under the Mining Code.
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6.1 A Regulatory Blueprint for Other National Legislation
First, the law could be viewed as an effective precedent for countries who are 
yet to pass domestic legislation governing international seabed activities.
The Deep Seabed Law, in many ways, is a direct incorporation of the con-
tents and requirements of the relevant international rules. Many provisions 
under the Deep Seabed Law are resonant with the legal wording formu-
lated under the UNCLOS and other supplementary legal instruments (together 
referred as the “Mining Code”).52 For example, the definition of “deep seabed 
areas” established under the Deep Seabed Law has similar wording as the 
“Area” as defined under UNCLOS Article 1.
On the other hand, the law contains some additional requirements that 
are not covered by the Mining Code, such as the protection of marine biodi-
versity and relevant financial arrangements with respect to the development 
of resources in deep seabed areas. The Deep Seabed Law also emphasises the 
importance of international cooperation as well as the peaceful exploitation 
and certain human rights protection issues, which mirrors the principles 
established in the Rio+20 UN Resolutions and the Mining Code.
Moreover, words and terms are carefully crafted in China’s Deep Seabed Law 
and many represent legal innovations from Chinese legislators. For example, 
unlike other definitions, the Deep Seabed Law does not directly transplant 
the term “common heritage of mankind” as prescribed in Article 136 of the 
UNCLOS, but rather has adopted the term “common interests of mankind” 
derived from the term or concept of “benefit of mankind as a whole” as pre-
scribed in Articles 140(1), 143(1), 149 and 150(i) of the Convention. Article 136, 
Part XI of the UNCLOS stipulates “the Area and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind”, whereas Article 140(1) and 150(i) of the UNCLOS state 
that “Activities in the Area shall … be carried out for the benefit of mankind 
as a whole”. It, therefore, signifies that the term “common heritage of man-
kind” is closely linked with “the Area and its resources”, while the concept of 
“benefit of mankind as a whole” governs “activities” in the Area. As Article 2 
of the Deep Seabed Law provides that the law shall apply to “activities” con-
ducted by Chinese entities in the Area, it is more appropriate to use the term 
of “common interests” rather than “common heritage”, while not frustrating 
52   The “Mining Code” refers to the whole of the comprehensive set of rules, regulations and 
procedures issued by the International Seabed Authority to regulate prospecting, explo-
ration and exploitation of marine minerals in the international seabed Area (defined as 
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction). At its core, it includes 
the UNCLOS, the Implementation Agreement and the three ISA Regulations, among oth-
ers. See Chapter 7 of this book, J. Dingwall, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep 
Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework’.
365China’s Domestic Law on the Exploration OF RESOURCES
the well-established international legal status of “the Area and its resources”. 
However, although “common heritage of mankind” is not specifically articu-
lated in the Deep Seabed Law, the principle of “protection of the common 
interests of mankind” does not deviate from the common heritage principle 
under the UNCLOS and is precisely in-line with the Convention. At the same 
time, it allows more flexibility in applying the Chinese law to more Area activi-
ties in the future, such as the sharing and cooperation mechanism of the unde-
fined “deep seabed public platform”.53
Another example is the definitions of “exploration” and “exploitation” 
(“development” as in the Deep Seabed Law). China’s Deep Seabed Law largely 
directly incorporates the two definitions given under the ISA Regulations. The 
only nuanced difference between the two is that the latter has specifically des-
ignated the resources as the three kinds of minerals in the Area,54 whereas 
China’s Deep Seabed Law uses a more generic meaning of “resources”.55 The 
intentionally undefined term “resources” has thus left room for further inter-
pretation and clarification, which also provides the law with some flexibility 
for application.
In summary, this law has enshrined the fundamental spirit of international 
laws in relation to the exploration and exploitation activities in the Area, and 
at the same time preserved a flexibility to cater to national circumstances. In 
view of the growing interest in the development of marine minerals in the 
53   G. Zhang & P. Zheng, A new step forward: Review of China’s 2016 legislation on international 
seabed area exploration and exploitation, 73 Marine Policy 251 (2016).
54   Supra note 40. For the purposes of these Regulations: (a) “exploitation” means the 
recovery for commercial purposes of polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and 
cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Area and the extraction of minerals therefrom, 
including the construction and operation of mining, processing and transportation sys-
tems, for the production and marketing of metals; (b) “exploration” means searching for 
deposits of polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese 
crusts in the Area with exclusive rights, the analysis of such deposits, the testing of col-
lecting systems and equipment, processing facilities and transportation systems, and the 
carrying out of studies of the environmental, technical, economic, commercial and other 
appropriate factors that must be taken into account in exploitation.
55   Deep Seabed Law, supra note 1, Article 27(1) and (2): “Development” means the recov-
ery and selection of resources in deep seabed areas for business purposes, including 
the construction and operation of collection, processing and transport systems serving 
the production and sale of resources. “Exploration” means the searching and analysis of 
resources in deep seabed areas, use and testing of resource collection systems and equip-
ment, processing facilities and transport systems, as well as the research on environment, 
technologies, economy, commerce and other relevant factors that shall be considered at 
the time of development. It should be noted that the English translation of China’s Deep 
Seabed Law may not be accurate and therefore may not be the exactly same wording as 
the ISA Regulations definitions.
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deep seabed, both within the limits of a national jurisdiction and in the Area, 
China’s Deep Seabed Law could serve as an appropriate reference for the 
follow-up legislative work of other States Parties.
6.2 A Contribution to the Development of International Rules
Second, the law facilitates the legislative work at an international level. The 
international community is increasingly discussing matters related to the 
Area, and with a particular focus related to the establishment of supplemen-
tary legal rules to UNCLOS. As the 5th pioneer investor of the ISA, China is a 
major participant in all ISA meetings and is an important opinion leader for 
the ISA Assembly resolutions. In the past, Chinese delegates have proposed 
numerous insightful and productive opinions which have helped to shape the 
overall legal regime of the international law of the sea. It was a major short-
coming that China previously lacked a domestic legislation in relation to deep 
seabed issues. Therefore, the introduction of the Deep Seabed Law has had 
immeasurable and far-reaching significance to strengthen China’s discourse in 
vying for the influence on other countries.
In addition, with its first set of 15-year exploration contracts ending in 
2016–2017, there is an urgent need for the ISA to make progress on the devel-
opment of an appropriate fiscal and legal regime that would allow those 
contractors, including Chinese contractors, to proceed toward commercial 
development, while at the same time safeguarding the interests of the mem-
bers of the Authority as a whole. China’s domestic Deep Seabed Law includes 
not only the content governing exploration activities, but also establishes 
the rules relating to developmental activities. These provisions could essen-
tially provide further references for the ISA, and contribute to the relevant 
rule-making relating to the commercial recovery of mineral resources from 
the Area.
6.3 Regulating a Sphere of Intense Competition between States
Third, the law evidenced China as a rule-abiding international community 
member. Most notably, China is now in a position to mediate various con-
flicting interests between industrialized states and developing countries for 
the exploration and development of deep seabed resources. China is not the 
first country with high ambitions in the Area and the deep seabed in general. 
Since the 1960s, industrialized states such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Russia have been conducting regular deep-
sea surveys of marine resources. By the early 1980s, the Pacific Ocean deep 
seabed area, which had the most commercial potential consisting of nearly 
2.8 million square kilometres, had almost been divided among these countries 
who regard their active presence as a legitimate exercise of high seas freedom. 
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In order to challenge excessive maritime claims, the UNCLOS and the 1994 
Implementation Agreement have since been ratified by 168 states.
As a developing country, China was granted the largest number of explo-
ration contracts by the ISA. On the other hand, China’s marine technology is 
rapidly improving and fast approaching the technological level of developed 
countries. Nevertheless, with China’s rising international influence and its 
increasing activities in the Area in recent years, it has attracted some criticism 
voiced as the “deep-sea threat from China”. For example, when COMRA signed 
the second exploration contract with the ISA in 2011, other developing coun-
tries such as India reacted with fierce criticism. Thus, there might be some 
elements of competition between States with respect to these reactions. The 
Deep Seabed Law, especially Article 16, has, therefore, addressed the conflict 
by stating that China supports the construction and operation of a “deep sea 
public platform” for the purpose of sharing the benefits and knowledge gener-
ated from its research focusing on deep sea technology and the exploration of 
marine resources.
Meanwhile, there is always a fragile balance of interests to accommodate 
national ambitions to access deep seabed resources and common interests 
surrounding the exploitation and protection of those marine areas. By adopt-
ing the Deep Seabed Law, China pledges its commitment to the peaceful and 
sustainable utilisation of deep-sea resources with the associated goal of moti-
vating more countries to ratify the UNCLOS agreement and cooperate with the 
ISA. Moreover, it reinforces China’s stance that all activities in the Area shall be 
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, while taking into particular 
consideration the interests and needs of developing States.
7 Conclusion: Looking Ahead towards Implementation
Although a relatively comprehensive and intricately crafted law, the Deep 
Seabed Law is not without its limitations.
The first limitation relates to the lack of an adequate definition for 
“prospecting”.56 In other words, China’s Deep Seabed Law does not distinguish 
the “prospecting” stage from the “exploration” stage, although prospecting is a 
56   Arguable, the term “Resource investigation” used in the Deep Seabed Law equals to 
“Prospecting” but is not given the rights as tended to “Prospecting” under the ISA 
Regulations. “Prospecting” under the ISA Regulations refers to “the search for depos­
its of polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides, cobalt­rich ferromanganese crusts in 
the Area, including estimation of the composition, sizes and distributions of deposits and 
their economic values, without any exclusive rights”. “Resource investigation” is defined in 
Article 27(3) of China’s Deep Seabed Law as “the searching of resources in deep seabed 
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separate preparation stage of exploration and is entirely different from explo-
ration in nature. Meanwhile, the legal importance of distinguishing prospect-
ing from exploration is that the rights and obligations of “prospecting” under 
international laws are quite different from that of “exploration”. Pursuant to the 
ISA Regulations,57 there are no regional and time restrictions on prospecting, 
and the prospector is not required to sign a contract with the ISA.58 Although 
no exclusive property rights are granted to the prospector, a prospector has the 
right to recover “a reasonable quantity of minerals”, as long as the quantity is 
necessary for testing and is not collected for commercial use. China is actively 
engaged in prospecting activities in the Area; thus, the absence of rules pre-
scribed to prospecting may lead to confusion and create legal uncertainty for 
Chinese contractors. Therefore, the formulation of relevant implementing reg-
ulations or judicial interpretations is essential to clarify this issue.
Second, except for the relevant liability and penalty rules as prescribed in 
Article 26, the law does not establish financial arrangements for compensation 
or remediation as a result of the contractor’s failure to perform certain obli-
gations. All national laws studied here, including the Deep Seabed Law, have 
required a sponsored contractor to provide evidence or written undertaking 
as to the financial capacity at the application stage. Some countries expressly 
include their capacity for adequate compensation for any environmental dam-
age related to this requirement. Several countries (Singapore, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga 
and Tuvalu) follow this through with required financial guarantees or security 
after licence/sponsorship has been granted, so as to address potential damage 
or take measures toward rectifying the contractor’s potential failure to fulfil 
its obligations.59 Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu may require a sponsored party 
to deposit a security as a guarantee of performance concerning its obligations 
or rectify any damage or loss caused as a result of failure to perform certain 
obligations.60 Tonga and Tuvalu further specify that the security may be used 
for clean-up or compensation costs in respect of any damage caused by pollu-
tion or other incidents occurring as a result of seabed mineral activities.61 The 
absence of the funds and security provisions in China’s Deep Seabed Law may, 
therefore, render the controlling function of the law less effective or enforce-
able. Similar inadequacies also exist in other provisions of the law such as the 
areas, including estimates of the components, quantity, distribution and economic value of 
resources”.
57   ISA Regulations, supra note 40.
58   Polymetallic Sulphides Regulations, supra note 41, at Regulation 2.
59   ISA comparative study, supra 27, at para.71.
60   Id.
61   Id.
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elaboration on “deep sea public platform”, and the uncertainty as to whether 
foreign investment is allowed to engage in China’s deep seabed activities in 
the Area. All of these should be supplemented by more specific and detailed 
implementing regulations, administrative orders or judicial interpretations in 
the future.
The Deep Seabed Law was effective from 1 May 2016 and has only been in force 
for a few years. Thus far, it has been implemented by three administrative regu-
lations pertaining to licensing, sample management, and data and information 
management, respectively. The first implementing regulation, “Measures for 
the Management of Permits on the Exploration and Development of Resources in 
Deep Seabed Areas”, was promulgated on 27 April 2017.62 The “Interim Measures 
for the Management of Marine Samples from Exploration and Development of 
Resources in Deep Seabed Areas”,63 as well as the “Interim Measures for the 
Management of Data on the Exploration and Development of Resources in Deep 
Seabed Areas” were issued by the SOA on 29 December 2017,64 as two further 
supplementary regulations to the Deep Seabed Law. Moreover, a national pol-
icy paper, the “13th Five-Year Plan for Exploration and Development of Deep 
Seabed Resources” was jointly issued by the State Oceanic Administration, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry 
of Land and Resources on 16 April 2017. The paper stipulates that, during the 
13th Five-Year Plan period (2016–2020), deep-sea ocean development work 
shall be guided by the goal of “building a maritime power”; it shall actively 
promote major engineering projects; and it shall further enhance China’s capa-
bilities in relation to resources investigation, exploration, development, and 
environmental protection. As one of the four major engineering projects in 
the marine field, “Jiaolong Exploration of the Sea” (蛟龙探海) is of significant 
importance toward advancing China’s scientific and technological ability, and 
safeguarding Chinese entities’ rights and interests in the deep-sea areas.
62  海洋局关于印发《深海海底区域资源勘探开发许可管理办法》的通知 
[Announcement from the SOA on the issuance of the 2017 Implementing Regulation on 
Licensing], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2017/content_5227831.htm.
63   海洋局关于印发《深海海底区域资源勘探开发样品管理暂行办法》的通知 
[Announcement from the SOA on the issuance of the 2017 Implementing Regulation 
on Management of Marine Samples], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/con 
tent_5299621.htm.
64   海洋局关于印发《深海海底区域资源勘探开发资料管理暂行办法》的通知
[Announcement from the SOA on the issuance of the 2017 Implementing Regulation on 
Management of Data], http://www.comra.org/2018-01/04/content_40131061.htm.
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The forth implementing regulation, “Measures for the Environmental 
Investigation and Assessment of Resources in Deep Seabed Areas”, is still in the 
pipeline and plans to be rolled out in 2020. Thus, it is yet to be determined 
what impact the Deep Seabed Law and its implementing regulations might 
have on China’s domestic legal system, especially in relation to issues of envi-
ronmental protection.
Moreover, China is a State committed to contributing to the international 
legal order by adhering to the rules of international law. The dual-track 
licensing approval mechanism means a contractor benefiting from China’s 
State sponsorship is subject to both international and national rules. Using 
a domestic law to govern activities of Chinese citizens, juridical persons or 
organisations in an area outside the territorial waters of any nation describes 
an approach that is new to the Chinese administration. It remains to be seen 
how this arrangement will actually impact the behaviour of the industry, given 
the SOA and Chinese judicial authorities need to fully consider the relevant 
international rules, cooperate with the ISA, and understand the limits of their 
functions and powers.
Nevertheless, the Deep Seabed Law, in many aspects, represents a legal 
innovation by Chinese legislators and may serve as a guiding reference for 
other States wishing to engage in mining activities in the Area. China’s Deep 
Seabed Law is an indispensable part of the overall comprehensive legal regime 
concerning the world’s oceans and seas. It enshrines the notion that all prob-
lems related to ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed 
in a holistic manner.
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chapter 16
Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations 




The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC)1 contains 
an obscure, unprecedented and unique provision in international law con-
cerning equitable sharing of ocean resources, as follows:
Article 82
Payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continen-
tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
1. The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in 
respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The payments and contributions shall be made annually with 
respect to all production at a site after the first five years of production at 
that site. For the sixth year, the rate of payment or contribution shall be 
1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate shall 
increase by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and 
shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. Production does not include 
resources used in connection with exploitation.
3. A developing State which is a net importer of a mineral resource 
produced from its continental shelf is exempt from making such pay-
ments or contributions in respect of that mineral resource.
4. The payments or contributions shall be made through the Authority, 
which shall distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the 
basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and 
1   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 (adopted 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 3 [hereinafter LOSC].
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needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-
locked among them.2
After its adoption at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea in 1973–82 (UNCLOS III) the provision hardly received further attention. 
This was possibly because the prospects of technological and commercial fea-
sibility of deep sea drilling were remote at the time and the inconvenience 
it entailed for domestic revenue generation regimes. It is unprecedented 
because it was the first provision in a multilateral treaty to introduce an inter-
national royalty on natural resource production within national jurisdiction. 
The discourse on equitable sharing of ocean resources was a dominant theme 
at UNCLOS III and in subsequent instruments of international environmen-
tal law, and currently in the discourse on the conservation of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.3 Article 82 stands out in the discourse on international 
equity as it sets out a novel framework for equitable sharing of production 
from non-living resources within national jurisdiction.
The literature on the diplomatic history of Article 82 explains how this pro-
vision secured a key compromise in the UNCLOS III package deal and needs 
no revisit.4 Articles 82 and 76 constituted a quid pro quo.5 There would have 
been no agreement on key aspects of Article 76 concerning the extended 
continental shelf, i.e., that part of the shelf defined in the LOSC as extend-
ing beyond the limits of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and reaching out 
seaward to the outer limits of the continental margin, without a counterpart 
2   Ibid, Art 82.
3   Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, UN General Assembly Resolution 
292 (LXIX), 19 June 2015, available at < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N15/187/55/PDF/N1518755.pdf?OpenElement>.
4   SN Nandan & S Rosenne, vol. eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), commentary on Part VI, Article 82, at 930–947 
[hereinafter Nandan & Rosenne]; RJ Dupuy & D Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the 
Sea (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1991), 375–381; A Chircop & B Marchand, ‘International Royalty and 
Continental Shelf Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,’ (2003) 26 Dalhousie 
Law Journal 273 at 283–293; A Chircop, ‘Operationalizing Article 82 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A New Role for the International Seabed Authority?’ 
(2004) 18 Ocean Yearbook (2004) 395 at 395–412; Issues Associated with the Implementation 
of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Technical Study 
no. 4 (Kingston, Jamaica: International Seabed Authority, 2009) [hereinafter Chatham House 
Report].
5   Ibid, Nandan & Rosenne, 932.
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agreement on the equitable sharing of non-living resources of the extended 
shelf. The compromise was difficult because States enjoying broad margins 
(known as margineers) were confronted by land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged States who felt that the margineers’ negotiating position was 
being advanced at the expense of the International Seabed Area (the Area). 
An earlier United Nations General Assembly resolution had declared the Area 
as common heritage of mankind, a unique legal status for the global commons 
and not susceptible to appropriation by any State.6 In the event that a natural 
resource deposit straddles the extended continental shelf and the Area, fur-
ther issues arise in the implementation of Article 82.7
Although not a beneficiary of Article 82, the International Seabed Authority 
(the Authority), a new intergovernmental organization established by the 
LOSC, is a stakeholder of the provision because it is tasked with receiving pay-
ments and contributions in kind, developing equitable criteria for distribution 
to beneficiaries, and the administration of the funds. The Authority cannot 
perform its distributive tasks unless extended continental shelf States perform 
their respective responsibilities. Moreover, as the organization with the exclu-
sive mandate for the administration of deep sea mining activities in the Area, 
the Authority could conceivably be engaged in dialogue with the coastal State 
over resource production and management of non-living resources that strad-
dle the outer limits of the continental shelf and the Area.
Although the deep water market for offshore hydrocarbons is depressed by 
prolonged low oil prices, investments are still substantial and driven predomi-
nantly by expenditures in Africa and the Americas.8 There are relatively few 
activities in the deep waters of extended continental shelves and these include 
Angola, Brazil, eastern Canada, northern Norway and the United States’ Gulf 
of Mexico. Most activities are prospecting or exploratory in nature. The United 
States is not a State Party to the LOSC and to date has not issued discovery 
licenses on the extended continental shelf. However, it was the first State to 
implement Article 82 in the calls to tender in the Central Gulf of Mexico, by 
6   Declaration on Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 
(XXV), 17 December 1970, available at < http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2749.htm>. The 
principle was subsequently codified in LOSC, n 1, Art 137.
7   A Chircop, ‘Managing Adjacency: Some Legal Aspects of the Relationship between the 
Extended Continental Shelf and the International Seabed Area,’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development 
and International Law 307 at 312–313; Chatham House Report, n 4, 59–63.
8   For the current state of the deep water industry and forecasts, see: Douglas-Westwood, World 
Deepwater Market Forecast 2016–2020 (Kent UK 2016).
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putting bidders on notice that a contingent Law of the Sea Royalty would apply 
in the event that the United States became a Party to the LOSC.9 The position 
taken by the United States is that bidders require notice of the existence and 
contingent application of the Article 82 royalty at the stage of tendering.10
Of more substantial note at this time is Canada’s practice. Canada stands 
out as a pioneer State because it is the first LOSC Party to issue discovery 
licences, which it has done with respect to developments in the deep waters 
off the coast of Newfoundland in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. If economic 
and technical feasibility are confirmed, the licence holders will be expected to 
apply for production licences. The prospective issuance of the first production 
license will most likely occur before Canada will have defined the outer limits 
of its continental shelf in the Northwest Atlantic. Canada ratified the LOSC on 
6 November 2003 and on 6 December 2013 made a partial submission to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in accordance with 
Article 76 to define the outer limits of the extended continental shelf in the 
Northwest Atlantic.11 Under the LOSC, the Commission reviews such submis-
sions and issues recommendations concerning the definition of the outer limit 
of the shelf. If Canada receives a positive recommendation, the submission 
will add 1.2 million square kilometres of seabed areas to national jurisdiction. 
Canada issued the first significant discovery licence to Norwegian company 
Equinor (formerly Statoil until 2018) for the Mizzen field on the Flemish Cap, 
9    For example Stipulation No. 3: Law of the Sea Convention Royalty Payment in 
Lease Stipulations, Western Planning Area, Oil and Gas Lease Sale 233, Proposed 
Notice of Sale (NOS), BOEM, August 2013, available at <http://www.boem.gov/
Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/
Lease-Sales/233/pstips233.aspx>.
10   ‘If the United States becomes a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Convention) 
prior to or during the life of a lease issued by the United States on a block or portion of a 
block located beyond the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and subject to such condi-
tions that the Senate may impose through its constitutional role of advice and consent, 
then the following royalty payment lease provisions will apply to the lease so issued, con-
sistent with Article 82 of the Convention …’ Ibid. The United States’ position on the LOSC 
is that the bulk of it represents customary international law. However, the characteriza-
tion of Article 82 as having a contingent application, i.e., if and when the US becomes a 
party, suggests that this particular provision might not be considered a customary rule.
11   Government of Canada, Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf regarding its Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean: Executive 
Summary (Government of Canada, 2013), available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_can_en.pdf>. The Convention entered into force 
for Canada on 6 December 2013, 30 days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
in accordance with LOSC, n 1, Art 308(2). With this partial submission Canada managed 
to meet the ten-year deadline for extended continental shelf submissions in accordance 
with Annex II, Art (4) on the last day.
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located well beyond 200 nautical miles off Newfoundland.12 In the meantime, 
offshore operators have been notified that the boundaries and outer limits of 
licences may be reviewed after Canada establishes the outer limits of the con-
tinental shelf following recommendations from the CLCS.13
This chapter discusses the issues of implementation of Article 82 for coastal 
States with a special focus on Canada against the backdrop of initiatives of 
the Authority aimed at clarifying its role and being of assistance to LOSC State 
Parties. The chapter starts by discussing the Authority’s initial steps to date 
in facilitating the implementation of Article 82 (Section 2), followed by brief 
analysis of textual ambiguities and uncertainties and possible interpreta-
tions in the first two paragraphs of the provision, as these constitute the core 
legal obligation to be implemented by Canada (Section 3). The chapter does 
not discuss exemptions for developing States in the third paragraph and the 
Authority’s tasks in the fourth paragraph of Article 82. The chapter also con-
siders issues that might arise in a hypothetical situation of production from a 
non-living resource straddling the shelf and the Area (Section 4). Thereafter 
the discussion moves to the domestic issues confronting the legal, political and 
economic mechanics of implementation of the provision in Canada (Section 
12   ‘Statoil confirms up to 200M barrels at Mizzen prospect’, CBC News, 20 June 2012, avail-
able at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/statoil-confirms-up 
-to-200m–barrels-at-mizzen-prospect-1.1251285>. In addition to the Mizzen discovery, first 
made in 2009, Equinor has four other discoveries in the Flemish Pass off Newfoundland: 
Harpoon, A light hydrocarbon discovery in 2013; Bay du Nord, a 2013 discovery estimated 
to hold around 300 million barrels of light high-quality oil; Bay de Verde, a light high-
quality oil discovery in 2016; and Baccalieu, a light high-quality oil discovery in 2016. 
See Equinor (Canada), available at <https://www.equinor.com/en/where-we-are/cana 
da.html>.
13   The following caveat was reproduced by the licensing authority for areas off Newfoundland 
and Labrador: ‘Any sector, parcel or licence depicted on the following map, (found on 
pages 24 and 25), beyond 200 nautical miles off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador 
is not represented by the Board to reflect the full extent of Canada’s continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles. Canada has filed a submission regarding the limits of 
the Outer Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean with the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, the review of which is pending. Any call for bids based on a sec-
tor or parcel identified in this map and any licences issued in those areas will be subject 
to approval as a Fundamental Decision under applicable legislation. The boundaries of 
sectors, parcels or licences in areas beyond 200 nautical miles may be revised to reflect 
the limits of the Outer Continental Shelf established by Canada. All interest holders of 
production licences containing areas beyond 200 nautical miles may be required, through 
legislation, regulation, licence terms and conditions, or otherwise, to make payments or 
contributions in order for Canada to satisfy obligations under Article 82 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’ C-NLOPB 2014–2015 Annual Report, 23, avail-
able at <http://www.cnlopb.ca/pdfs/ar2015e.pdf?lbisphpreq=1>.
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5). The chapter concludes with observations on the precedent-setting chal-
lenges facing Canada, as the pioneer implementing State, and the Authority in 
operationalizing Article 82 (Section 6).
2 The Road to Interpretation
The short and simple text of Article 82 belies the complexity of implemen-
tation. The Authority was the first to take initial steps encouraging States to 
consider the implementation needs of Article 82. The Authority was well-
placed to take this initiative. The Council and Assembly of the Authority are 
empowered by the LOSC to adopt
… rules, regulations and procedures on the equitable sharing of … the 
payments and contributions made pursuant to article 82, taking into par-
ticular consideration the interests and needs of the developing States and 
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing 
status …14
The regulatory power of the Council and Assembly is limited, and while the 
Authority is in a position to take steps to commence implementation of its 
own responsibilities in Article 82, it does not have express power to regulate 
the discharge of the obligation by coastal States. However, the respective obli-
gations of the coastal State to make payments or contributions in kind and 
the Authority’s responsibility to make arrangements to receive them are inter-
twined, as will be discussed below.
Using this power, in 2008 the Authority commissioned an expert study 
which was tabled for discussion in 2009 at a preliminary meeting of experts 
in Chatham House. The meeting was convened to explore and scope out legal 
issues of implementation and the role and tasks of the Authority.15 The meeting 
14   The Council is empowered to make recommendations to the Authority to adopt rules, 
regulations and procedures, LOSC, n 1, Art 162(2)(o)(i). In turn, the Assembly is empow-
ered to consider and approve them and if it does not it remands them to the Council for 
reconsideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly. Ibid, Art 160(2)(f)(i).
15   Draft Paper for Discussion at the Chatham House/International Seabed Authority 
Seminar on Issues Associated with the Implementation of Article 82 of the Law of the 
Sea Convention, Chatham House, London, 11–13 February 2009, Fourth Draft prepared by 
Aldo Chircop.
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resulted in a ground-breaking report.16 The discourse was guided by principles 
and rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,17 the con-
text and purposes of the LOSC, and the understanding on the package deal 
reached at UNCLOS III, in particular the relationship between Articles 76 and 
82, the relationship between the extended continental shelf and the Area,18 
and the powers of the Authority stemming from Articles 82, 160 and 162. The 
discourse was also informed by other provisions of the LOSC, including the 
duty of States Parties to ‘fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention’ and to ‘exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized 
in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.’19 
The meeting report identified several issues and unanswered questions that 
coastal States and the Authority would need to address, including clarification 
of terminology, the scope of the Authority’s tasks and the relationship between 
those coastal States and the Authority in the administration of Article 82. 
The report led the Assembly of the Authority to place the study of Article 82 on 
the formal programme of work.20 This led to the convening of a larger follow-
up workshop of experts in Beijing in 2012, jointly convened by the Authority 
and the China Institute for Marine Affairs of the State Oceanic Administration 
of China, and resulted in a second report.21 The workshop had a practical ori-
entation and purposed to produce draft proposals for consideration by coastal 
States and the Authority.22 Its conclusions and recommendations setting out 
16   Chatham House Report, n 4. This was accompanied by a second study Non-Living Resources 
of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Speculations on the Implementation of 
Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Technical Study no. 5 
(International Seabed Authority, 2010).
17   Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969; in force 27 January 1980), UN 
Doc. A/ Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
18   Chatham House report, n 4, 12–13, 21–24.
19   LOSC, n 1, Art 300.
20   Report of the Secretary-General in International Seabed Authority, Selected Decisions and 
Documents of the Sixteenth Session (26 April-7 May 2010), (Kingston, 2010), para 75, avail-
able at <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/publications>.
21   Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Report 
of an International Workshop convened by the International Seabed Authority in col-
laboration with the China Institute for Marine Affairs in Beijing, the People’s Republic 
of China, 26–30 November 2012, ISA Technical Study no.12, at 24, available at <http://
www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Pubs/TS12-web.pdf> [hereinafter Beijing Workshop 
Report].
22   Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc 
ISBA/19/A/2, 22 May 2013, 14–15.
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the roadmap for the next steps in implementation were submitted for consid-
eration by the Assembly.23
The Beijing workshop produced several clarifications and recommenda-
tions pertinent to the obligation of coastal States. First, coastal States that have 
issued or plan to issue offshore licenses for non-living resources on the extended 
continental shelf were encouraged to consider and anticipate the implemen-
tation needs of Article 82.24 The report suggested that coastal States had an 
obligation to notify the Authority ‘of the anticipated date of commercial pro-
duction’ which, while not an express requirement in Article 82, is a reasonable 
implied requirement.25 It should be recalled that the coastal State has a duty 
to deposit charts or lists of geographical coordinates of the outer limits of the 
extended continental shelf with the Secretary-General of the Authority.26 Also, 
the Authority needs to be in a position to receive payments and contributions 
in kind from the coastal State.
Second, the report noted that coastal States have the exclusive right to 
determine whether the obligation is to be performed through payments, i.e., 
monetary transfers, or contributions in kind, presumably through a portion 
of the resource corresponding to the required percentage. However, given 
the complexities of managing receipts of contributions in kind first, a prob-
lem first identified at the Chatham House meeting, the experts recommended 
that States be encouraged ‘to make payments in the interest of simplicity and 
efficiency of implementation.’27 It was noted that such a recommendation to 
States might have to be made by State Parties to the Convention.
Third, the uncertainly of the terminology of Article 82 led to the recommen-
dation for a more detailed study of key terms as ‘they are used in contemporary 
regulatory and industry practices across different jurisdictions.’28 This is impor-
tant because Article 82 was conceived as a royalty, a type of revenue generation 
23   Outcomes of the International Workshop on further Consideration of the Implementation 
of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc 
ISBA/19/A/4, 6 May 2013.
24   Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 24: ‘The ISA should encourage OCS States, in particu-
lar those that are issuing or plan to issue offshore licences for the exploitation of the 
non-living resources of the outer continental shelf, to consider and anticipate the imple-
mentation needs of Article 82 within their respective jurisdictions.’
25   Chatham House Report, n 4, at 51; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 22–23.
26   LOSC, n 1, Art 84(2).
27   Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 24: ‘OCS States, while enjoying the exclusive choice to 
make payments or contributions in kind, should be encouraged to opt only for payments 
in the interests of simplicity and efficiency of implementation. It is conceivable that a 
SPLOS resolution may be needed to move this recommendation forward.’
28   Ibid, 24.
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instrument applied to production from natural resources, long discarded in 
some jurisdictions, but retained by others like Canada, as will be seen below.
Fourth, given that coastal States making payments or contributions will be 
engaged in a long-term relationship with the Authority, the experts recom-
mended a voluntary memorandum of understanding to help structure the 
relationship between the two, or a guidance document to provide practical 
advice in the implementation of Article 82.29 Experts preferred an informal 
and non-binding instrument to a formal instrument, such as an agreement 
between a State and an international organization.
Fifth, it was underscored that the term ‘through the Authority’ clearly did 
not mean ‘to the Authority’, since the function performed by the Authority is 
that of a receiver rather than a collector of the royalty. Clearly, the Authority 
needs to have a mechanism for receiving royalties and for distributing them 
to beneficiaries designated by the Convention. There would be issues of costs 
of administration of the funds that would need to be considered. Further 
studies and technical reports would need to be produced by the Authority. 
Consideration of the report at the 19th Session in 2013 anticipated continued 
discussions within the Authority ‘to achieve a system for the pragmatic and 
functional implementation of article 82.’30
The development of regulations for deep seabed mining in the Area occu-
pied much of the Authority’s agenda in recent years and Article 82 was largely 
placed on a backburner. Some Member States felt that the Authority should 
give priority to its work regarding activities in the Area. However, the annual 
reports of the Secretary-General of the Authority consistently reminded 
Member States of the organization’s responsibilities in Article 82. At the 21st 
Session of the Assembly in 2015, the Beijing meeting of experts was recalled, in 
particular the recommendation that a study of terminological issues be under-
taken and that the Secretariat hoped to progress that work in 2015, but with 
‘respect to the implementation of article 82, paragraph 4, of the Convention’, 
29   Ibid, 24: ‘The ISA should explore further the concept of a Memorandum of Understanding 
between an OCS State and the ISA, or a guidance document, and take steps to prepare a 
draft for discussion, bearing in mind that such instruments will be essentially voluntary 
and aim to provide practical guidelines and advice to assist OCS States in the implemen-
tation of Article 82. The content should reflect terminological matters, functions and 
tasks, and other appropriate implementation matters discussed in this report. It could 
be undertaken in three sections, namely: (a) practical and administrative arrangements; 
(b) provisions regarding contributions in kind; and (c) considerations for OCS States to 
take into account.’
30   Press Release, Nineteenth Session Kingston, Jamaica 15–26 July 2013, SB/19/18, 26 July 
2013, 10.
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i.e., the Authority’s task in receiving and distributing benefits.31 This suggests 
that the Authority was under pressure to limit its work specifically to its own 
responsibilities in the provision and less so on those of coastal States. However, 
in 2015 the Authority proceeded with the recommendation of the Beijing 
Workshop to conduct an expert study of the terminology of Article 82 as used 
in the oil and gas industry on a comparative basis in order to help broaden 
coastal States’ understanding of the issues. The study was completed in 2016.32 
More recently, the Strategic Plan of the International Seabed Authority for 
the Period 2019–2023 adopted at the 24th Session of the Assembly includes the 
development of equitable sharing criteria for Article 82.33 The ISA’s Finance 
Committee observed that the development of the criteria should be under-
taken in parallel with the development of equitable sharing of financial and 
other economic benefits from activities in the Area to avoid duplication of 
work.34
3 Key Terminological Issues of Concern to Coastal States
The ambiguities and gaps in Article 82 posing major challenges to implemen-
tation have been studied in the literature and addressed in the Authority’s 
technical reports and therefore need not be recounted in detail. Some issues 
are purely terminological, whereas others relate to the modus operandi of 
implementation and are of potential concern for Canada.
3.1 Paragraph (1)
The paragraph (1) core rule concerning the duty of the coastal State to make 
payments or contributions in kind on the production from non-living resources 
is clear. That the choice of discharge procedure is the prerogative of the coastal 
31   Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc 
ISBA/21/A/2, 3 June 2015, 3.
32   A Study of Key Terms in Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, ISA Technical Study No. 15, authored by W Spicer/E McIsaac, (Kingston, Jamaica: 
International Seabed Authority, 2016). The study focused on the use of key terms in the 
following jurisdictions, according to whether their revenue generation systems are based 
on royalty or taxation regimes: (a) royalty regimes: Australia; Brazil; Canada (Alberta; 
Newfoundland and Labrador); Nigeria; and United States; taxation regimes: Norway; 
Russian Federation; and United Kingdom [hereinafter Key Terms Report].
33   Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority relating to the strategic 
plan of the Authority for the period 2019−2023, ISBA/24/A/10 (27 July 2018), para 21.
34   Report of the Finance Committee, ISBA/24/A/6 – ISBA/24/C/19 (13 July 2018), para 27.
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State is also clear. The term ‘contribution in kind’ could give rise to alternative 
meanings. The question that arises is whether this term is meant to refer to a 
share of the resources or potentially, and more broadly to other contributions 
of equivalent value, such as technical assistance, technology transfer, and so 
on.35 A recent paper revived an earlier idea by this author that a contribution in 
kind could be interpreted to include national official development assistance.36 
The deliberations at UNCLOS III suggest that negotiators may have had in 
mind a share of the resource, because at the time developing States wanted 
to ensure they had access to oil production. The Beijing Workshop appeared to 
lean towards an interpretation in favour of a share of the resource.37
Assuming an actual share of the natural resource is the correct legal inter-
pretation of contribution in kind, a related legal, administrative and economic 
issue would arise, namely where and when does the Authority take delivery of 
the produced resource and who is responsible for the delivery and costs (e.g., 
transportation, brokerage, insurance, etc.)? The Authority is not equipped 
with the tools and capacities necessary to handle these administrative tasks. 
It is not mandated to raise the funds needed for this purpose and nor is it 
authorised to levy an overhead charge or fee.38 The obligation of coastal States 
does not expressly extend to anything more than making the contribution in 
kind. In any case, if coastal States act on the advice of the Chatham House 
and Beijing Workshop reports that payments are easier, more efficient and less 
costly to administer, then the vagueness and complexities of in kind contribu-
tions would be avoided altogether.
3.2 Paragraph (2)
The major difficulties for coastal State implementation are mostly with 
regard to paragraph 2. The general rule in paragraph 2 is that payments 
35   Chatham House Report, n 4, 51–52.
36   W Spicer, ‘Canada, the Law of the Sea Treaty and International Payments: Where Will the 
Money Come From?’ SPP Research Papers vol 8(31) (University of Calgary, 2015), 20.
37   Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 20: ‘When negotiated at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973–1982 (UNCLOS III), the intention behind insertion 
of contributions in kind was to secure resource access to State Party beneficiaries.’ Also 
ibid at 22: ‘The difficulties to be encountered when an OCS State opts to make ‘contribu-
tions in kind’ have already been addressed in this report. In addition to those difficulties, 
an understanding of what is acceptable as a contribution in kind within the letter and 
spirit of the provision is necessary. Discussions in the Working Group proceeded on the 
assumption that this phrase refers to a share of the resource, but other possible interpre-
tations were not discussed.’
38   Chatham House Report, n 4, 37–38; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 23 in relation to 
contributions in kind, and suggesting a further study.
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and contributions are to be made annually, subject to a grace period, i.e., a 
royalty-free period during the first five years of production, to enable recov-
ery of expenses incurred in bringing the resource to production. On the sixth 
year of production, a royalty of one percent applies and will increase by one 
percent annually until seven percent is reached on the thirteenth year, and 
which will remain the royalty’s ceiling thereafter. The principles behind the 
royalty are clear.
Clarity diminishes on a closer look at the details. For example, can the 
grace period be interrupted if production is suspended and reactivated on 
resumption of production?39 Presumably yes, as a matter of fairness, but this 
is a matter of interpretation of text which is not directly on point. What is the 
meaning of ‘annually’? Financial years vary by jurisdiction.40 It could refer to 
the financial year in the jurisdiction concerned or to the anniversary date of 
first production, and if production is suspended the calculation of the year 
may have to vary accordingly.
A difficult term is ‘all production’. During negotiations this term appears to 
have meant gross production, less any portion of the resource used to enhance 
production according to Article 82(2) (e.g., use of the resource for production 
of energy for operations, re-injection of gas into a well to enhance production, 
flaring for safety purposes, etc.).41 The meaning of all production as gross pro-
duction was intentional because this approach simplified the royalty and was 
a common practice in those jurisdictions deriving royalty-based revenues in 
the oil and gas industry. The alternative interpretation of calculating the roy-
alty on the basis of net production would have engaged a complex discussion 
of accounting practices that varied significantly among jurisdictions.42 In the 
contemporary context of deep water drilling and production, where costs are 
significantly higher than offshore production elsewhere, an additional levy to 
the applicable royalty or tax regime under national law could impact on the 
feasibility of the entire operation. However, this is a domestic concern and it 
does not excuse or lessen the international legal obligation.43
39   Chatham House Report, n 4, 56–57.
40   Ibid, 32.
41   Chircop & Marchand, n 4, 297–298; International Law Association, Committee on 
the Outer Continental Shelf, ‘Report on Article 82 of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS),’ Rio De Janeiro Conference, 2008, para 2.8, available at <http://www.ila 
-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/33>.
42   MH Nordquist and C-H Park eds, Reports of the United States Delegation to the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1983), 98–99.
43   Vienna Convention, n 17, Art 27: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’
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The next set of issues in the second paragraph concern the meaning of ‘value 
or volume of production at the site.’ Is the value expected to be determined at 
the well-head or at the market location at the time the product is sold?44 There 
are significant differences between oil and gas because they are transported 
and priced differently. While oil may be priced at the well-head, gas tends to 
be priced at the point of distribution, which may be at the terminal point of a 
pipeline. The reference to ‘site’ adds another layer of ambiguity as it could be 
interpreted to mean ‘resource field, geological structure, well site, license area 
and a whole development area subject to multiple licenses’.45 Some deposits 
may be layered over each other in the same field.
Negotiated through four successive versions of early drafts of the future 
LOSC,46 Article 82 was drafted on the basis of information, assumptions and an 
understanding of the petroleum industry and government revenue generation 
practices of the 1970s. A key assumption was that the first five years constituted 
the period for the recovery of developmental costs.47 Today, deep water drill-
ing (on extended continental shelves as compared to shallow inshore waters) 
and cost models are riskier and fundamentally different, such that the period 
of cost recovery may be significantly longer than the Article 82 grace period.48 
Article 82 follows a royalty model.49 The concept of royalty meant essentially 
a share of the produced resource to reflect a rent payable to the owner of the 
resource. Today government revenue generation in this industry also includes 
a range of fiscal tools such as corporate income tax, profit taxes, resource rent 
taxes, value-added taxes, excise taxes, etc.50 Revenue generation practices have 
44   Chatham House Report, n 4; 33–34; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 20–21.
45   Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 21–22. The meaning of site was also discussed at the 
Chatham House Workshop. Chatham House Report, n 4, 61–63.
46   The earlier iterations of Article 82 were contained in the following drafts: ISNT, 1975, 
Art 69; RSNT, 1976, Art 70; ICNT, 1977, Art 82. The final text remained largely unchanged in 
the following drafts: ICNT Rev 1, 1977; ICNT Rev 2, 1980; Draft Convention (Informal Text), 
1980; and the Draft Convention, 1981, which was the last version of the text before the 
LOSC was adopted in 1982. Chatham House Report, n 4, 19–20.
47   Nordquist & Park, n 42.
48   ‘Deep water drilling and production involves long-term, multi-billion dollar projects that 
take several years to complete and are less impacted by short-term fluctuations in oil 
prices. Offshore operators often have major project budgets for years and most projects are 
completed with the anticipation of higher oil prices in the future.’ US Energy Information 
Administration, Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs, March 2016, at 23 
<https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf>.
49   Chircop & Marchand, n 4.
50   EM Sunley, T Baunsgaard and D Simard, ‘Revenue from the Oil and Gas Sector: Issues and 
Country Experience,’ (World Bank, 2002), 2, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank 
.org/INTTPA/Resources/SunleyPaper.pdf>; J Mintz and D Chen, Capturing Economic 
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made fundamental shifts, with some jurisdictions moving away from royalty-
based levies in favour of taxation-based regimes, such as major petroleum 
producing States Norway and the United Kingdom.51 Revenue is thus gener-
ated in more complex ways than, or instead of, royalties. Others, like Canada 
and the United States, have retained royalties side-by-side other fiscal tools.52 
Naturally, Article 82 is a levy on the production of the resource and not on 
the entirety of the revenue generated by the operation. This is important to 
note as the producer may significantly enhance the original product to pro-
duce by-products. Even so, for those jurisdictions where royalties are no longer 
levied, there is concern regarding how the payments to be made through the 
Authority are to be generated. Thankfully, the latter is not a Canadian problem, 
but Canada has other, perhaps more complex domestic issues to navigate.
4 Production from Resources Straddling the Outer Limits
The LOSC does not require a coastal State to refrain from activities on the 
extended continental shelf until the process of definition of the outer limits pur-
suant to Article 76 has been completed. The precise limits of the international 
seabed area will remain uncertain until outer limits of extended continental 
shelves are fully defined in accordance with the requirements of Article 76. 
The LOSC requires coastal States to give due publicity to charts or lists of geo-
graphical coordinates of the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and to 
deposit a copy of such charts or lists with the Authority’s Secretary-General.53 
At the time of writing, there appears to be a low rate of compliance by coastal 
States that have received recommendations from the Commission regarding 
their submissions on the outer limits. By 2015 only Australia, Ireland, Mexico, 
Niue and Philippines had deposited charts or lists with the Secretary-General.54 
Rents from Resources through Royalties and Taxes, SPP Research Papers vol 5 (University 
of Calgary, 2012), 5.
51   Key Terms Report, n 32.
52   Ibid.
53   LOSC, n 1, Art 84(2). This duty is in addition to the Art 76(9) duty of a State to deposit 
charts, lists and other relevant information regarding the outer limits of the continental 
shelf with the UN Secretary-General.
54   Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc 
ISBA/21/A/2, 3 June 2015, 2–3.
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The Secretary-General renewed calls for States to submit charts or lists of coor-
dinates in his most recent annual report.55
The definition of the outer limits in a final and binding manner, on the basis 
of recommendations from the Commission, has the benefit of legitimizing the 
boundary between the extended continental shelf and the Area. This is impor-
tant for the offshore oil and gas industry because it provides greater certainty 
regarding the legality of their licenses. The occurrence of single geological 
structures straddling international maritime boundaries is a realistic possibil-
ity, as demonstrated by the several instances of offshore joint development and 
unitization activities around the world.56 Where a deposit is known to straddle 
a licence area or maritime boundary, a longstanding good oilfield practice is 
for the development of the resource to be unitized, that is developed in an 
integrated manner.57 Licence holders would then come to agreement on their 
respective shares of production and a model agreement will be developed for 
this purpose.58
If such a situation were to arise, for example where a commercial hydro-
carbon find straddles areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, there 
could be three issues to consider. First, there would need to be consideration 
of whether the resource should be developed on the basis of a joint develop-
ment zone or, alternatively, by being unitized through the direct involvement 
of the licence holders. In either case, there would need to be approval by the 
Authority insofar as licence holders in the Area are concerned. The Authority 
would likely need to develop regulations for this purpose, as it has for other 
mineral resources. The Authority has an international governance structure 
for licencing activities in the Area governed by Part XI of LOSC, and is over-
seen by Member States, who are also State Parties and include the coastal State 
concerned. In turn, the coastal State could have sub-national units it would 
need to involve in negotiations. Canada, a federal State, is a good example of 
55   Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, 
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/24/A/2 
(29 May 2018), para 8.
56   J Lang Weaver and DF Asmus, ‘Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields around the World: A 
Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts,’ (2006) 28 Houston Journal 
of International Law 4. See also DM Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil 
and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?’, 93 American 
Journal of International Law 771.
57   JC Woodliffe, ‘International Unitization of an Offshore Gas Field,’ (1977) 26 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 338.
58   Lang Weaver & Asmus, n 52, 22 et seq. For the model agreement, see Association of 
International Petroleum Negotiators, available at <www.aipn.org/modelagreements/>.
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this because the regulation of the offshore is conducted by federal-provincial 
boards.59 A consequence of a joint development zone or unitization scenario 
is the need for regulators on both sides of the boundary to revisit the licences 
in the areas adjacent to the boundary and to explore whether production poli-
cies and regulatory approaches require adjustment. Moreover, environment 
protection standards may differ and would need to be reconciled for the opera-
tion in question.
Second, the payments or contributions in kind to be made by the coastal 
State would logically apply to only a portion of the produced resource. If the 
resource is unitized, the production units will be located in a manner to opti-
mize production and it is conceivable that most of these might be placed on 
one side of the boundary, rather than be evenly distributed on the shelf and 
in the Area. The consequence is that the meaning of ‘site’ might not be clear 
where most, if not all of the production units are placed in the Area, for the 
purpose of determining the Article 82 eligible production.
Third, Article 142 of LOSC safeguards the rights of the coastal State by pro-
viding that ‘[A]ctivities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the 
Area which lie across the limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted 
with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across 
whose jurisdiction such deposits lie.’60 The duty in the Convention is not recip-
rocal (and the Authority does not enjoy a counterpart right of protection), but 
this author is of the view that there might be a duty concerning transboundary 
resources at customary international law which could apply to the unilateral 
actions of the coastal State, such as the duty to inform, consult and invite to 
cooperate.61 Accordingly, although the Authority would be expected to con-
sult the coastal State with regard to activities in the Area, an analogous duty 
could be expected for the coastal State on the basis of general international 
law. From the coastal State’s perspective, the type of activity in the Area adja-
cent to the boundary that could give rise to concern is where operations pose 
a threat to the marine environment and resources of the EEZ or possibly even 
to the sedentary species of the continental shelf. From the Authority’s perspec-
tive, perhaps the major concern is where the coastal State issues licences for 
unilateral production from a transboundary resource.
59   Spicer, n 36.
60   LOSC, n 1, Art 142(1).
61   Suriname/Guyana Arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration (Award), 
17 September 2007, available at <www.pca-cpa.org/ showpage.asp?pag_id=1147>.
387Implementation of Article 82 of the UNCLOS
5 Canada: First Past the Post?
Although Canada ratified the LOSC in 2003, it was unprepared for the imple-
mentation of Article 82. This is ironic because during UNCLOS III Canada 
played an active role in the negotiation of the provision, both as a margineer 
State seeking national gain while at the same time exploring options for a 
potential compromise. In 1975, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J 
MacEachen stated Canada’s commitment to revenue-sharing.62 This position 
was pursued consistently by the Canadian Delegation led by Ambassador Alan 
Beesley, which joined ranks with the United States’ and other delegations in 
exploring options for a compromise through the establishment of a revenue-
sharing scheme primarily for the benefit of developing countries, in exchange 
for agreement on Article 76.63 Negotiations were difficult and Canada, like 
other delegations, had to compromise. In 1979 Ambassador Beesley under-
scored that revenue-sharing must be respectful of the coastal State’s sovereign 
rights over the resources of the continental shelf and must not be set at a level 
which is unreasonable, considering the high costs of deep water activities.64 In 
1980, when compromise was not yet fully reached in the late hours of UNCLOS 
III, Ambassador Beesley reiterated that position and was critical of the raising 
of the royalty ceiling from five percent to seven percent. He therefore reserved 
his delegation’s position ‘… not out of lack of generosity but because the sug-
gested rate could make it uneconomic for Canada to explore and exploit its 
continental margin in deep, cold water areas unless some safeguard provision 
was developed to ensure that any revenue-sharing we could agree upon would 
be practicable.’ The Canadian Delegation’s position was that Canada ‘… was 
prepared to explore the possibility of financial contributions related to the net 
revenues derived from the resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles 
from shore.’65 However, ‘… the question of revenue-sharing will require further 
discussion with a view to ensuring that the formula and the rate of contribution 
62   Secretary of State MacEachen stated that ‘… we are prepared to explore the possibility 
of financial contributions related to the net revenues derived from the resources of the 
continental shelf between 200 miles from the shore and the seaward edge of the con-
tinental margin. We are prepared to explore that possibility and we are prepared to 
support that principle in order to promote an accommodation.’ Statement by the 
Delegation of Canada, 2 April 1980, Doc A/CONF.62/WS/4, 10 April 1980, in Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, 9th Session, 
3 March-4 April 1980 (United Nations, 1981), 101 at 102.
63   Ibid.
64   Ibid, 102.
65   Ibid, Plenary, 125th meeting, 2 April 1980, at 8.
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will be both equitable and viable from the standpoint of both potential con-
tributors and beneficiaries …’66 On the eve of the vote on the final package of 
the LOSC in 1982, Secretary of State MacEachen stated that ‘[W]e must recog-
nize, however, that there will be funds to dispense only if these resources prove 
to be commercially exploitable.’67 This was a difficult compromise for the mar-
gineers, because other delegations were of the view that the royalty rate was 
not proportionate to the margineers’ continental margin gains.
The difficulties Canada faced in negotiating Article 82 were only the begin-
ning of a series of implementation challenges at the domestic level. According 
to the Constitution of Canada, a province’s boundaries may not be changed 
without its consent68 and that all lands, resources and royalties in provincial 
territory at the time of Union belonged to the province.69 With the growing 
interest in offshore development, the question arose as to whether the bound-
aries of coastal provinces included adjacent ocean space. Complicating this 
question was that the various provinces joined confederation at different 
dates, raising an additional issue with regard to their entitlements under inter-
national law at the time to determine what they imported into and when they 
joined the Union.70 A case by cases analysis was essential. In 1967 the Supreme 
Court of Canada determined that the territorial sea, its seabed and subsoil 
off British Columbia (Vancouver Island) belonged to Canada, not the prov-
ince.71 In 1984 the waters in Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia between 
Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland were determined to be 
66   Ibid, 9th Session, at 102.
67   Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Resumed 11th 
Session, 185th meeting, 6 December 1982 (United Nations, 1982).
68   Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 (UK), s 43: ‘An amendment to the Constitution 
of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one or more, but not all, provinces, 
including (a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, … may be made by proc-
lamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only where so 
authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative 
assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.’
69   Ibid, s 109: ‘All Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces 
of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or pay-
able for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of 
Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, 
subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the 
Province in the same.’
70   For example while Nova Scotia was a founding province of Confederation on 1 July 1867, 
British Columbia joined confederation on 20 July 1871 and Newfoundland on 31 March 1949. 
Newfoundland became Newfoundland and Labrador after a constitutional amendment 
in 2001.
71   Reference Re Ownership of Off Shore Mineral Rights [1967] SCR 792.
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encompassed within the limits of British Columbia when it joined the Union 
in 1871 and were consequently provincial.72
Newfoundland (Newfoundland and Labrador since 2001) was the last prov-
ince to join Canada, in 1949. This is significant because the province joined 
the Union shortly after the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf 
of 1945. It will be recalled that the Proclamation triggered the development 
of pertinent general international law to the effect that ‘the continental shelf 
may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and 
thus naturally appurtenant to it’ and with the consequence that ‘the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the 
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.’73 In a few years this con-
cept attained the status of customary international law so that the rights of 
the coastal State over the continental shelf belonged to that State ipso facto, 
ipso iure and ab initio, that they were exclusive to it and that its title did not 
depend on express claim, occupation or use.74 Newfoundland was of the view 
that it joined Canada while possessing the territorial and other rights at inter-
national law appertaining to a State, and that these included the territorial sea 
and continental shelf. In 1983 a Newfoundland Court of Appeal decision found 
that the province had a territorial sea of three nautical miles when it joined 
the Union.75 Continental shelf rights remained uncertain. A year later, the 
Supreme Court of Canada decided that Newfoundland had not acquired con-
tinental shelf rights prior to joining the Union in 1949.76 The reasons were that 
continental shelf rights granted by international law to a coastal State are not 
in pith and substance proprietary, but are rather ‘an extraterritorial manifesta-
tion of external sovereignty.’77 In 1949 Newfoundland did not enjoy external 
sovereignty as this power and right were enjoyed by the Crown in right of the 
United Kingdom. The Supreme Court went on to hold that if Newfoundland 
72   Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas, [1984] 1 
SCR 388.
73   Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea 
Bed of the Continental Shelf, 150 – Proclamation 2667–28 September 1945.
74   North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3 at para 19. For a commentary 
on how the continental shelf doctrine attained the status of customary international law, 
see ZJ Slouka, International Custom and the Continental Shelf: A Study in the Dynamics of 
the Customary Rules of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).
75   Reference Re Mineral and other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf (1983), 145 
DLR (3d) 9 (Nfld CA).
76   Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, 
[1984] 1 SCR 86.
77   Ibid.
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had acquired continental shelf rights prior to joining Canada, the Terms of 
Union perpetuating natural resource rights in the Province at the date of Union 
did not extend to continental shelf rights. Moreover, the Court went on to hold 
that international law did not confer continental shelf rights in 1949 and that 
such rights ‘were not indisputably recognized before the Geneva Convention 
of 1958,’ and while coastal States enjoyed these rights retroactively, they ‘do not 
have a retroactive effect capable of assisting Newfoundland.’78
The Supreme Court’s decision did not sit well with the Province. While 
the legal basis of the dispute appeared to have been resolved by the Supreme 
Court, the issue of rights to the shelf ’s resources continued as a major 
political problem. During judicial proceedings, other provinces, including 
neighbouring Nova Scotia, adjacent to which is a large extended continental 
shelf, intervened to advocate in favour of provincial rights. The differences 
between Newfoundland and Labrador and the federal government were finally 
resolved in a political settlement that was mirrored in federal and provincial 
legislation in 1987 and 1990.79 The federal government agreed that the regu-
lation of offshore activities would occur through federal-provincial boards. 
Canada agreed that the royalties from offshore production would be levied by 
the federal government and equal amounts would be paid to the provinces, as 
if production occurred in the provinces.80 The consequence of this legal fiction 
is that the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador legislated the levying of 
royalties and which it retains.81
Somehow Article 82 did not feature in the history of the federal-provincial 
disputes, with the consequence that the political and legal settlements omitted 
reference to the potential role of the LOSC provision. Several rounds of calls to 
bid were issued as a matter of course with no mention of the royalty applying 
to licence areas outside 200 nautical miles.82 The 2012 Mizzen discovery on 
78   Ibid.
79   Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, SC 1987, c 3; 
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, RSNL 1990, 
c C-2. There was a similar settlement with Nova Scotia: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore 
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, SC 1988, c 28; Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, 1987 c 3.
80   The responsible federal government department is Natural Resources Canada. See Natural 
Resources Canada, 2014–2015 Departmental Performance Report (Canada, 2015), 57, avail-
able at <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/performancereports/files/
dpr-2014-15/NRCan-DPR2014-15_e.pdf>.
81   Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSNL 1990, c P-10.
82   Early licences on the extended continental shelf are discussed by Chircop and Marchand, 
n 4, at 281.
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the extended continental shelf off Newfoundland and Labrador was on the 
basis of a licence issued by the Canada-Newfoundland & Labrador Offshore 
Petroleum Board and without including any reference to the Article 82 royalty.
The significance of Article 82 in Canada was flagged early in the scholarly 
literature.83 It was observed that Canada could face difficulties in the imple-
mentation of the provision, not only due to the uncertainty of the terminology 
in the provision, but also, and most especially, because of the political under-
standing reached between the federal and provincial governments with respect 
to the offshore royalty regime. The oil and gas industry enters into agreements 
for prospecting, exploration, development and production, in response to orig-
inal calls to tender, and production agreements would be expected to subsist 
for decades.
The first federal official notice of the potential application of Article 82 with 
regard to licenses on the extended continental shelf in the Northwest Atlantic 
was made only in 2013,84 likely as a result of the Beijing Workshop of experts 
and the recommendation to the Authority to call upon State Parties to con-
sider taking steps for implementation.85 While differences between the federal 
and Newfoundland and Labrador governments remained behind closed doors 
for much of the time until then, they are now out in the open, in dispute and 
with no solution announced, or in sight.86 The federal position is that the 
Article 82 royalty should be levied from royalties on production, which at this 
time are enjoyed exclusively by the province.87 Newfoundland and Labrador 
considers this as Canada’s obligation.88 Natural Resources Canada, the federal 
government organization primarily responsible with regard to royalty manage-
ment, has made the issue an object of focused study. Its plans and priorities 
83   A Chircop and B Marchand, ‘Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development in 
Atlantic Canada?’ (2001) 24 Dalhousie Law Journal 23 at 30–32.
84   ‘The Board [Canada-Newfoundland & Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board] informs pro-
spective bidders for these parcels, which are entirely or partially beyond Canada’s 200 
nautical mile zone, that it has been advised by the Government of Canada that, in order 
to meet obligations arising pursuant to article 82 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, additional terms and conditions may be applied through legislation, 
regulations, amendments to licences or otherwise.’ Call for Bids No. NL13–01 (Area ‘C’ – 
Flemish Pass), The Newfoundland and Labrador Gazette, vol 88(23), 7 June 2013, at 213.
85   Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 24.
86   ‘Ottawa, N.L. unsure who will pay UN tax on new oil finds’, CBC News, 28 October 





for 2015–2016 included ‘developing a domestic mechanism to implement 
Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’89 However, 
the current 2018–2019 departmental plan makes no mention of continuing 
work on Article 82.90 Deliberations on a solution appear to be on hold, pos-
sibly because production on the extended continental shelf is not imminent.
The performance of Article 82 as a treaty obligation is clearly Canada’s 
responsibility as a State in international law, and this is confirmed in the coun-
try’s constitutional law.91 As observed earlier, domestic law issues that impede 
implementation may not be invoked to avoid the international obligation.92 
Thus the onus to develop a solution lies with the federal government. The 
federal government is bound by a political accord and related legislation con-
cluded three decades ago. The domestic solution would have to be more than 
a simple amendment of pertinent federal and provincial legislation. Canada 
may well have to explore a political solution first, followed by legislative steps, 
perhaps not dissimilar to the political settlement concluded in the wake of the 
Supreme Court of Canada Reference that rendered a decision unpalatable to 
Newfoundland. In that settlement the federal government was generous and 
relinquished royalty receipts to the province, thus enabling the offshore indus-
try in the Northwest Atlantic to be launched. This renewed scenario means the 
federal government would bear the principal responsibility for Article 82. This 
route could provoke negative reactions from other provinces, in particular oil-
producing provinces, because it could be perceived as a subsidy for provincial 
production of offshore oil and gas that is not similarly enjoyed by land-based 
producers.
If the federal government insists on clawing back domestic royalties cur-
rently levied by Newfoundland and Labrador or by introducing a surcharge 
royalty or levy on current operators, it is possible additional issues could arise. 
In addition to increasing uncertainty in the Atlantic offshore industry at a time 
when revenues are low because of low oil prices, there could be the realis-
tic prospect of prolonged federal-provincial litigation. In respect to the latter, 
89   Natural Resources Canada, Reports on Plans and Priorities, 2015–2016, Strategic Outcome 
1, Sub-Program 1.1.3: Energy Market Regulation and Information, available at <http://
www.nrcan.gc.ca/plans-performance-reports/rpp/2015-16/17006>.
90   Natural Resources Canada, 2018–19 Departmental Plan, available at <https://www.nrcan 
.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/plansperformancereports/dpr/2018-19-DP-NRCan 
-EN.pdf>.
91   Constitution Act, n 68, s 132.
92   Vienna Convention, n 17, Art 27.
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operators would be faced with an additional expense that could weigh on 
the commercial viability of expensive operations in the deep waters of the 
extended continental shelf, essentially recalling Secretary of State McEachen’s 
warning about the challenges of Article 82.
It is possible that in the larger scheme, the Article 82 levy, applied over and 
above existing royalties, might not be perceived as a major issue by the first 
industry movers on the Atlantic extended continental self. In the alternative, 
i.e., if it were to become an issue, a practical way forward could be to distin-
guish between pre-2013 and post-2013 calls to bid licensees. Tenderers to the 
latter call received notice of Article 82 and can be considered as forewarned,93 
as have subsequent responders to subsequent calls for bids, most recently in 
2016.94 They would be in a position to anticipate future production cost sce-
narios against the backdrop of domestic and Article 82 royalties. Pre-2013 calls 
to bid licensees could be addressed differently because they were not put on 
notice at the time they placed their bids. The federal government would either 
absorb the cost or enter into discussions with Newfoundland and Labrador 
to explore a cost-sharing arrangement. However, the latter is not likely politi-
cally and economically realistic because the economy of Newfoundland and 
Labrador has consistently had the highest unemployment levels in the coun-
try and its heavy reliance on single resource industries, initially fisheries and 
more recently oil, makes it especially vulnerable to external market and envi-
ronmental factors.
6 Conclusion
Article 82 poses implementation challenges for both coastal States and the 
International Seabed Authority. This chapter has discussed the challenges 
faced by coastal States, with a particular focus on Canada. Although offshore 
exploration licences have been issued by a few States, Canada appears to be 
the first LOSC Party to issue significant discovery licences for areas on the 
extended continental shelf. While Canada has taken domestic steps to study 
how domestic implementation will affect the internal royalty arrangements, it 
will need to address the political and economic impacts in a fair and practical 
93   Call for Bids No. NL13–01, n 84.
94   The most recent call repeated the notice in the 2013 call almost verbatim. See ‘C-NLOPB 
Announces 2016 Calls for Bids,’ 2 April 2016, available at <http://www.cnlopb.ca/news/
nr20150331.php>.
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manner, and to do so in the near future to ensure that there will be a smooth 
transition from discovery to production licences.
Being first entails a special responsibility for Canada. It places Canada in a 
leadership role and implies a responsibility to establish a good implementa-
tion precedent. The precedent has two dimensions. First, the construction of 
key terms in the first two paragraphs of Article 82 is a matter ‘concerning the 
interpretation or application’ of LOSC, and while the coastal State may develop 
a particular interpretation, it has to be reasonable and acceptable to other 
LOSC State Parties, in other words it reflects the quid pro quo of Articles 76 and 
82. Second, the first State to implement Article 82 will need also to develop 
a good working relationship with the Authority, because that State and the 
Authority will be engaged in a long-term relationship.
part 6
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chapter 17
The Use of Sub-Seabed Transboundary Geological 
Formations for the Disposal of Carbon Dioxide
Nigel Bankes
1 Introduction
This chapter examines the legal issues associated with the use of sub-seabed 
transboundary geological structures including saline aquifers for storage or 
disposal purposes. It focuses on carbon capture and storage (CCS), specifically 
the disposal element in the CCS chain.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of CCS 
focusing on the disposal or storage part of the chain, as well as the injection of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) as part of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operations (CO2\
EOR). Section 3 deals with CCS and CO2\EOR operations in transboundary 
formations, reviewing applicable international law requirements, such as the 
general duty to cooperate as well as the more explicit rules developed under 
the auspices of the London Dumping Convention (LDC)1 and its Protocol 
(PLDC).2 It also examines the implications of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UN 
Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)3 for the situations in which one party 
may be proposing to engage in CCS operations in an area of overlapping mari-
time entitlement claims in the absence of an agreed delimitation. Section 4 
examines existing boundary delimitation agreements and joint development 
agreements in order to assess the extent to which they may apply to CCS and 
CO2\EOR operations. Section 5 recognizes that straddling hydrocarbon depos-
its are frequently developed through unitization agreements between the 
1   Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
London, 13 November 1972.
2   Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, London, 7 November 1996.
3   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 and see generally 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Report on the Obligations of States 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas, (2016) 




parties who hold the hydrocarbon exploitation rights from each state on either 
side of the maritime boundary. This section considers how this model might 
be applied to the situation where a shared formation is being used on one or 
both sides of the maritime boundary for CCS operations. Section 6 provides 
conclusions.
With its focus on the use of shared geological structures for disposal purposes, 
particularly for the disposal of CO2 the chapter does not review the general 
laws dealing with seabed disposal except to the extent that they specifically 
touch on the use of shared geological structures of the seabed. These general 
laws include provisions of UNCLOS, the LDC, the PLDC and the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)4 
and the Basel Convention.5 Both the PLDC and OSPAR have been amended to 
take account of CO2 disposal and both have developed regulatory guidance for 
CCS activities. There are a number of good accounts of how these instruments 
may apply (or not) to CCS activities in marine areas.6 Individual states have 
also adopted rules for CCS projects and, in the case of European Union (EU) 
Member States, these rules must comply with the terms of Directive 2009/21/
EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide.7 Article 24 of the Directive 
specifically addresses the issue of transboundary storage and transboundary 
transport8 and provides that ‘in such case the competent authorities of the 
4   Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 
22 September 1992, in force 25 March 1998.
5   The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and 
their Disposal, 22 March 1989, in force 1992.
6   Chiara Armeni, ‘Legal Developments for Carbon Capture and Storage under International 
Regional Marine Legislation’ in Ian Havercroft, Richard Macrory & Richard B Stewart (eds) 
Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues, (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 
145–159; Tim Dixon, Sean McCoy and Ian Havercroft, ‘Legal and Regulatory Developments on 
CCS’ (2015), 40 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 431; UNFCCC Secretariat, 
Transboundary carbon capture and storage project activities, Technical Paper, 1 November 2012 
UNFCCC/TP2012/9, (hereafter UNFCCC, Transboundary CCS Technical Paper) available at 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/tp/09.pdf>; Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, 
Technical Group, ‘Final Report from Task Force on Technical Barriers and R & D Opportunities 
for Offshore, Sub-Seabed Geologic Storage of CO2’, CSLF-T-2015–06, 20 October 2015 
(hereafter CSLF Offshore Geologic Storage) available at <http://www.cslforum.org/publica 
tions/documents/riyadh2015/tg_OffshoreSubSeabedStorageTaskForceFinalReport-Riyadh 
1115.pdf>
7   Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
geological storage pf carbon dioxide, as amended.
8   Article 2, ibid, prohibits the storage of CO2 in a storage site with a storage complex extending 
beyond the territories, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of Member States.
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Member States concerned shall jointly meet the requirements of this Directive 
and of other relevant Community legislation.’9
Neither does this chapter deal with the much-discussed question of the eli-
gibility of CCS projects for crediting under the terms of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol10 of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)11 other than to note that when the Meeting of 
the Parties ultimately decided to make CCS projects CDM eligible it did so 
subject to exceptions for project activities which involve the transport of CO2 
from one country to another and which involve geological storage sites located 
in more than one country.12
2 Carbon Capture and Storage and CO2\EOR
This Section discusses first CCS generally (2.1) and then the injection of CO2 for 
EOR purposes (2.2). It concludes with some comments on the transboundary 
implications of CCS and CO2\EOR operations (2.3).
9    The recent review of the Directive, Report on Review of Directive 2009/31/EC, COM (2015) 
576 final, Annex 2, 18 November 2015 reported (at 5) there was no practical experience 
to date with transboundary issues but (at 7) that parties should consider cooperation to 
reduce costs and that the Connecting Europe Facility might “play a role in supporting 
cross-border transport networks and regional cooperation in this area.” For discussion of 
the coordination issues that might arise see David Langlet, ‘Transboundary Dimensions 
of CCS: EU Law Problems and Prospects’ (2014) CCLR 196 at 206.
10   Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 
11 December 1997.
11   UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992.
12   Decision 10/CMP.7, paragraph 6, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a 
02.pdf . Further consideration of transboundary projects were deferred until SBSTA 45 and 
CMP 12 in Marrakech, November 2016 at which point the CMP accepted SBSTA’s recom-
mendation to the effect that since no party had applied for registration of a CCS project 
as a CDM activity that it was appropriate “to conclude the consideration of the eligibility” 
of transboundary projects: FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.19/Add.1. See generally Tim Dixon, 
Gregory Leaman, Paul Zakhour and Luke Warren, “CCS Projects as Kyoto Protocol CDM 
activities” (2013), 37 Energy Procedia 7596. A more specific article is Viviane Romeiro and 
Virginia Parente, “Carbon Capture and Storage and the UNFCCC: Recommendations to 
Address Trans-Boundary Issues” (2012), 3 Low Carbon Economy 130. Despite its title this 
paper is principally concerned with transboundary transportation of CO2 for injection 
purposes and related accounting issues.
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2.1 Carbon Capture and Storage – Generally
CCS is a recognized technology for mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, and, in particular CO2.13 CCS involves the capture of CO2 at large final 
emitters (LFEs),14 the compression and transportation of the CO2 and its 
injection under pressure into suitable geological formations.15 The main tar-
gets are depleted oil and gas reservoirs and saline aquifers; the latter are much 
more significant in terms of volume. Two important examples of this are the 
Sleipner and Snøhvit projects on the Norwegian continental shelf. Sleipner 
commenced operations in 1996 and Snøhvit in 2008.16 Both inject CO2 into 
saline formations.
Injection sites may be onshore or offshore (as above).17 There are posi-
tive and negative aspects associated with selecting an offshore disposal site. 
Positive aspects include the following: sediments of continental shelves fre-
quently contain large volumes of high quality storage; in many cases prior 
oil and gas exploration on shelves provides a good geological understanding 
of the offshore; there is typically a single owner (the state) and no severance 
of surface and mineral titles; there is minimal conflict with freshwater aqui-
fers (a major potential concern with onshore sites); the absence of resident 
populations and communities; there is frequently an existing pipeline and 
production\injection infrastructure; likely fewer wells offshore than onshore 
to serve as possible pathways to surface; it may be easier and cheaper to 
apply monitoring techniques and seismic imaging offshore.18 In addition, it 
may simply be the case that a state has no suitable onshore sites. The princi-
pal disadvantages of offshore sites are the elevated costs and risks of offshore 
13   A particularly useful policy oriented study is IEAGHG, Interaction of CO2 Storage with 
Subsurface Resources, Report 2013–08, April 2013, (hereafter IEAGHG Interaction Report). 
The report is available here http://ieaghg.org/docs/General_Docs/Reports/2013-08.pdf.
14   The LFEs at which capture may occur may include power plants (coal or natural gas) and 
a range of industrial facilities including cement operations and a variety of hydrocarbon 
processing facilities.
15   In some cases natural gas reserves (methane, CH4) may be contaminated with a signifi-
cant percentage of CO2 requiring processing in the field to produce pipeline quality gas. 
The separated CO2 may then be reinjected.
16   The Sleipner project is located 240 km west of Stavanger. Processing and injection occur 
at the production site. The Snøhvit project involves production from three separate fields 
in the Barents Sea north of Norway northern coast. The gas is piped to shore to a process-
ing and LNG facility. The CO2 is separated and piped back to the field for injection. See: 
CSLF Offshore Geologic Storage (n 6) at 8–9.
17   In one case, the Tomakomai Demonstration Project (Japan), the drill site is on land but 
the injection wells are highly deviated and the targeted formations are between 3 and 4 
km offshore. See CSLF Offshore Geologic Storage (n 6) at 11.
18   This section relies on CSLF Offshore Geologic Storage (n 6) at 2 & 5.
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operations as well as concerns for the marine environment.19 A recent report 
(2013) by the International Energy Agency concluded that CO2 storage is not 
likely to take place in the near future at onshore locations in the five countries 
surrounding the North Sea and that the North Sea is a much more promising 
option both for those countries ‘and indeed for many other nearby European 
countries.’20
Injection sites should be carefully characterized and located so as to ensure 
adequate and efficient storage capacity21 as well as geological containment 
with appropriate trapping mechanisms.22 Possible pathways to the surface 
(or sources of potable water) should be assessed, including natural fault 
lines and existing wells. While disposal into a depleted oil and gas reservoir 
involves injection into an underpressured formation (because of past produc-
tion) injection into a saline formation will occur at natural formation pressure. 
Thus, the CO2 will need to be injected ‘at pressure higher than the natural for-
mation pressures to be able to displace resident brines.’23 Upon injection the 
19   Ibid at 6.
20   IEAGHG Interaction Report, (n 13) at 37–38. There have been a number of regional scale 
European studies of offshore storage options. These studies include One North Sea, A study 
into North Sea CO2 cross-border transport and storage. Final Main report for the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 
behalf of the North Sea Basin Task Force (authors: Elements Energy Limited) 2010 available 
at <http://www.ccsassociation.org/docs/2010/OneNorthSea.pdf> Chapter 6 deals with 
legal and regulatory issues; Carbon Capture and Storage in the Skagerrak/Kattegat 
Region, Final Report, February 2102, available at <http://interreg-oks.eu/webdav/files/
gamla-projektbanken/se/Material/Files/Kattegat/Skagerrak/Dokumenter+projektbank/
CCS%20final%20report.pdf> the report contains a chapter on ‘legal issues concerning 
CCS’ authored by David Langlet; CCS in the Baltic Region – Bastor 2, Final Summary 
Report, Elforsk Report 14:50, 30 September 2014 available at <http://www.elforsk.se/
Rapporter/?rid=14_50_> This report also contains a chapter on ‘legal aspects’ also authored 
by Langlet. A more detailed report Nils Rydberg and David Langlet, Work Package 4 – 
Legal and Fiscal Aspects (nd) is available here https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/publica-
tions/ccs-baltic-sea-region-bastor-2-work-package-4-legal-and-fiscal-aspects Most of the 
legal analysis in these reports is concerned with the EU Directive and the PLDC. There is 
more limited consideration of the problems posed by transboundary storage complexes.
21   Stefan Bachu, ‘Review of CO2 storage efficiency in deep saline aquifers’ (2015), 40 
International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 188. ‘Storage efficiency’ refers to the fact 
that not all available pore space will be accessed by CO2 in the same way as not all esti-
mated hydrocarbon reserves will be producible.
22   The literature refers to six trapping mechanisms which may operate cumulatively and 
over different time scales: (1) structural and stratigraphic trapping, (2) hydrodynamic 
traps (CO2 entrained in groundwater, (3) residual gas trapping, (4) solubility trapping, (5) 
mineral trapping, (6) adsorption trapping. IEAGHG Interaction Report (n 13) at 7.
23   Jens T Birkholzer, Curtis M. Oldenberg and Quanlin Zhou, ‘CO2 migration and pressure 
evolution in deep saline aquifers’ (2015), 40 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas 
Control 203, 209.
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CO2 will migrate within the target formation as a plume of CO2. The CO2 will 
be buoyant relative to the brine in the reservoir and will thus rise and spread 
laterally when trapped under cap-rock formations.24 Injection will also elevate 
pressure conditions within the reservoir. The pressure effect of injection will 
initially be localized at the injection site but the resulting pressure front 
will extend beyond the actual CO2 plume (in some cases as far as 100 km25) 
and slowly dissipate throughout the target formation. Once injection comes 
to an end, the CO2 plume may continue to migrate within the target forma-
tion moving upwards and laterally (because of the buoyancy of the plume).26 
Migration will continue at a slow rate for centuries.
It is important to keep in mind the industrial scale of operations that will be 
required if CCS is to make a significant contribution to the mitigation of GHG 
emissions. Birkholzer et al provide a useful example noting that a 1000 MW 
power plant (enough electricity for one million people) will provide enough 
CO2 over the life of the plant to create a subsurface CO2 plume with linear 
dimensions of 10 km with pressure plume extending over 100 km.27 As a result: 
‘In a future world with CCS being a fully employed technology, sedimen-
tary basins with interconnected reservoirs might host multiple storage sites 
in which case pressure interference could be expected between individual 
projects.’28
The precise implications of the pressure changes in a formation as a result 
of injection will depend on the type of formation or ‘storage system’29 Open 
systems are likely the most desirable for large scale storage since they provide 
opportunities for pressure dissipation. Elevated pressures in a closed system 
or at the point of injection may impair cap rock integrity. It may be necessary 
24   id, 206.
25   IEAGHG Interaction Report (n 13) at 67.
26   Bachu (n 21) at 198.
27   Birkholzer et al (n 23) at 204.
28   Bachu (n 21) at 197 and 198.
29   The literature distinguishes different types of storage system: closed systems (character-
ized by a formation surrounded laterally by impervious boundaries and vertically by seal-
ing formations) and open systems where the large scale storage formation is overlain by a 
series of sealing formations but where the lateral boundaries are so far away that they will 
be unaffected by pressure changes. See Quanlin Zhou and Jens Birkholzer, ‘On scale and 
magnitude of pressure build-up induced by large-scale geologic storage of CO2’ (2011), 
11(1) Greenhous Gases Science and Technology 11, 12. The authors actually offer three 
categories – the middle category is a semi-closed system characterized by semi-pervious 
sealing units. See also Bachu (n 21) at 189 & 191.
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for projects to adopt pressure management techniques to respond to this 
problem.30
The principal environmental concerns associated with CO2 storage in 
saline aquifers, in addition to leakage to surface, include the migration of 
displaced brines causing potable groundwater contamination, not simply as 
a result of elevated salinity but also because brines may have elevated con-
centrations of heavy metals and natural radioactive materials.31 This is far less 
likely to be a concern for ocean storage sites because there will generally be no 
potable groundwater sources that are at risk of contamination.
In addition it may also be necessary to assess resource interactions i.e. the 
competing uses of available geological storage space and the implications of 
one resource use for others. These implications may be positive or negative.32
2.2 CO2 Storage and Enhanced Oil Recovery
Enhanced oil recovery using carbon dioxide (CO2\EOR)33 is a tertiary recovery 
technique for enhancing recovery of petroleum from some reservoir types.34 
Primary production (using the original pressure conditions in the reservoir) 
may result in the recovery of between 10 and 20% of the original oil in place in 
the reservoir (OOIP).35 Waterflooding operations and other secondary recov-
ery techniques may double the recovery rate. CO2\EOR operations may allow 
the recovery of an incremental 5–15% of the OOIP and in some cases as much 
as an additional 25–40%. CO2\EOR operations involve the injection of liquid 
30   Bachu (n 21) at 199 and IEAGHG Interaction Report (n 13) at 47–52 discussing the Gorgon 
Project, Western Australia, which contemplates using, in addition to nine CO2 injection 
wells, a pressure management scheme using four production wells for pressure relief and 
two injection wells for the produced water.
31   Birkholzer et al (n 23) 211.
32   The IEAGHG Interaction Report (n 13) esp at 17–69 assesses possible subsurface resource 
interactions between CCS projects and a variety of other uses.
33   This section draws on a number of sources including the Report Prepared for 
the Carbon Sequestration Leader Forum (CSLF) Technical Group by the CSLF 
Task Force on the Technical Challenges in the Transition from CO2 -EOR to CCS, 
September 2013, (CSLF, CO2 \EOR Technical Report) http://www.cslforum.org/publica 
tions/documents/CO2-EORtoCCS_FinalReport.pdf; Philip M. Marston, Patricia A. Moore 
and J. Greg Schnacke, “Carbon Dioxide Infrastructure: Pipeline Transport Issues and 
Regulatory Concerns – Past, Present and Future” (2015), 52 Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Foundation Journal 275–313 esp at 278–286, Nigel Bankes and Elizabeth Brennan, 
“Enhanced oil recovery and the geological sequestration of carbon dioxide”, 2013, a paper 
prepared for Natural Resources Canada, http://www.law.ucalgary.ca/files/law/final_june7 
_enhanced-oil-recovery-and-the-geological-sequestration-of-carbon-dioxide.pdf.
34   Not all fields are suitable for CO2 \EOR operations or even for CO2 storage in a depleted 
reservoir. For an accessible account of relevant considerations see IEAGHG Interaction 
Report (n 13) at 12.
35   Marston et al, (n 33) 279.
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or supercritical CO2 into the producing formation where the CO2 interacts 
with the oil remaining in the pores of the formation. Marston et al describe the 
process as follows:36
… the dense-phase CO2 becomes miscible with the oil (i.e. the two sub-
stances will flow together as if they were a single fluid). In the process, the oil 
droplets swell and the surface tension that held the oil droplets attached 
to the pore surfaces is reduced. This allows the oil to become mobile.
The combined fluids (oil, CO2 and brine) flow towards the low pressure point 
of the producing well. As the substances are produced any entrained CO2 
returns to the gaseous phase. The fluids and gases are separated and collected 
at the surface. Captured CO2 is dehydrated, pressurized and re-injected. The 
operator has an incentive to engage in re-capture because the costs of re-
capture are lower than the costs of acquiring supplementary sources of CO2 
with which to continue the EOR operation. Not all of the CO2 injected will be 
produced with the oil, some will remain permanently contained within the 
reservoir. Industry experience with EOR projects suggests that up to 90–95% 
of purchased CO2 will eventually become ‘incidentally trapped’ (i.e. stored) 
within the reservoir over the life of the project.37
While CO2\EOR operations may be relatively small scale, they offer some 
significant advantages when compared with CCS. The most important of 
which is that the incremental oil recovery provides a source of revenue to off-
set the expenses involved in capturing the CO2.38
There may also be other non-carbon advantages for CO2\EOR operations. 
For example, the use of CO2\EOR in the North Sea should extend the produc-
ing lives of North Sea reservoirs and the basin as a whole thereby reducing the 
need for imports and maintaining employment.39
36   Ibid 281. Emphasis in original, references omitted.
37   Ibid 283 referring to various sources including CSLF, CO2 \EOR Technical Report (n 33) 
and Global CCS Institute, “The Global Status of CCS: 2012” at 147.
38   The CSLF Technical Group report summarizes the advantages as follows:”…. 1) it enables 
CCS technology improvement and cost reduction; 2) it improves the business case for CCS 
demonstration and early movers; 3) it supports the development of CO2 transportation 
networks; 4) it may provide significant CO2 storage capacity in the short-to-medium-term, 
particularly if residual oil zones (ROZ) are produced; 5) it enables knowledge transfer, 
bridging the experience gap and building and sustaining a skilled CCS workforce; and 
6) it helps gaining public and policy-makers acceptance”. See CSLF, CO2 \EOR Technical 
Report (n 13), 1 & 58.
39   SCCS, CO2 Storage and Enhanced Oil Recovery in the North Sea: Securing a Low Carbon 
Future for the UK, (2015) at 2. Available at <http://www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/
reports/co2-eor-jip/SCCS-CO2-EOR-JIP-Report-SUMMARY.pdf>
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Despite those prospects, there are very few offshore CO2\EOR projects 
due to the limited availability of CO2 and the cost of converting existing 
infrastructure.40
2.3 Transboundary Implications of Saline Disposal and CO2\EOR 
Projects
It is apparent that the geographical implications of a saline disposal project 
will be more widespread and cover much larger areas than those associated 
with CO2\EOR projects. This is because conventional oil and gas reservoirs 
are always closed systems41 and the individual reservoirs will be much smaller 
than the regional scale, open geological formations that will likely be the target 
of saline disposal projects. A saline disposal project may raise transboundary 
concerns in one of two ways. First and most directly, the CO2 plume itself may 
migrate across the boundary. Second, and more indirectly, the pressure front 
associated with injection into a formation on one side of the boundary may 
extend across the boundary even through the plume itself may never do so. 
Increased formation pressure may make these adjacent areas less useful for 
other CCS operations since pressure conditions will affect the injectivity of the 
formation. Brine migration induced as a result of the pressurization may be of 
concern for groundwater resources if present. CCS projects may have implica-
tions for other adjacent resource activities as noted above.42
CO2\EOR projects on the other hand are unlikely to pose new transbound-
ary problems for two reasons. First, since EOR operations occur in contained 
reservoirs that are well characterized there are less likely to be regional scale 
pressure implications.43 Thus, unless the reservoir itself crosses the boundary 
there are unlikely to be transboundary effects. Second, if the reservoir does cross 
the boundary it will already be subject to some form of agreement whether a 
project specific treaty and unitization agreement or some form of framework 
or unitization agreement.44 At most the question becomes one of asking how 
those arrangements might accommodate CO2\EOR operations.
40   CSLF Sub-Seabed Geologic Storage (n 6) at 14. There is only one significant offshore 
CO2 \EOR project and that is Lula Project, Brazil, id at 11. There is also one offshore CO2 
enhanced gas recovery (EGER) project. This is the experimental K12-B project in the 
Dutch sector of the North Sea about 150 km northwest of Amsterdam. For details see 
IEAGHG, Review of Offshore Monitoring for CCS Projects, 2015/02, July 2015 at 22–23, avail-
able at <http://www.ieaghg.org/docs/General_Docs/Reports/2015-02.pdf>.
41   Non-conventional hydrocarbon reserves (e.g. shale oil and gas) however represent accu-
mulations of hydrocarbons that have not migrated into structural traps.
42   See also UNFCCC, Transboundary CCS Technical paper (n 6) at para 110.
43   There may be some exceptions if different pools are connected to a regional aquifer 
system.
44   This question is discussed further below in Section 4.
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3 The Law Governing CCS Operations and CO2\EOR Operations in 
Transboundary Formations
The present section considers the applicable law specifically with respect to 
CCS operations and CO2\EOR operations in transboundary formations. While 
some may express doubts as “to the correct ground for exercising coastal state 
jurisdiction” with respect to CCS operations45 there surely cannot be any doubt 
that a coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize CCS and CO2\EOR 
operations within its territorial sea,46 exclusive economic zone47 and the con-
tinental shelf48 including any extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm.49
The section summarizing the general rules pertaining to the duty to coop-
erate under UNCLOS as well as the more specific rules pertaining to shared 
resources including the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) in 
relation to shared groundwater resources (3.1). Section 3.2 examines the treat-
ment of sub-seabed disposal of CO2 in shared formations under the LDC and 
its Protocol. The section ends by reviewing the implications of Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3) of UNCLOS for the situations in which one party may be proposing 
to engage in CCS operations in an area of overlapping maritime entitlement 
claims in the absence of an agreed delimitation (3.3).
3.1 The General Duty to Co-operate
International law recognizes a general obligation to cooperate in relation to 
the use of shared resources.50 Shared geological structures which can be used 
for storage or disposal purposes are examples of shared resources.
45   David Langlet, ‘Transboundary Dimensions of CCS: EU Law Problems and Prospects’ 
(2014) CCLR 196 at 201 (emphasis added). As Langlet concedes all seabed CCS operations 
require drilling.
46   UNCLOS Article 2 (n 3) the sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the territorial sea.
47   UNCLOS Article 56, sovereign rights for inter alia exploring, exploiting and managing the 
natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil, subject to “due regard” obligations with 
respect to the rights and duties of other States. UNCLOS Article 60 accords the coastal 
state the exclusive right to construct and exercise jurisdiction over installations and struc-
tures for the purposes of Article 56.
48   UNCLOS Article 77 extends to the coastal state the exclusive sovereign rights to explore 
and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf which comprise the sea-bed 
and subsoil. UNCLOS Article 81 confirms that the coastal state has the exclusive right to 
authorize and regulate drilling on the shelf and Article 80 makes it clear that Article 60 
applies mutatis mutandis to installations and structures on the shelf.
49   UNCLOS Article 76.
50   David M. Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” Sate 
Practice of Customary International Law’ (1999), 93 AJIL 771 esp at 780–781. Ong refers to 
a number of sources including Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States, GARes 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 30, UN Doc. A/9030 (1974) 
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The ILC has endeavored to codify the law pertaining to a number of shared 
resources, specifically the non-navigational uses of international water-
courses51 and shared aquifers. The Commission’s Draft articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, with commentaries were adopted on second read-
ing in 2008 (hereafter Draft Articles).52 While these articles are principally 
concerned with the use of aquifers for potable drinking water a number of ref-
erences in the articles and the commentary suggest that the ILC contemplated 
that the articles should also speak to the use of aquifers for disposal purposes 
including for geological sequestration of CO2.53 However, the commentary 
to the Draft Articles also makes it clear that the Commission concluded that 
the Articles should not apply to aquifers underlying the continental shelf 
on the grounds that ‘Submarine geological formations under the continen-
tal shelf do not hold freshwater and accordingly such formations and water 
therein fall outside the scope of the draft articles.’54 While the Commission 
seems inconsistent with respect to the applicability of the articles to the use of 
and the Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance 
of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared 
by Two or More States, adopted by the United Nations Environment Programme in 1978, 
available at <http://www.unep.org/training/programmes/Instructor%20Version/Part_2/
Activities/Interest_Groups/Decision-Making/Supplemental/Enviro_Law_Guidelines_
Principles_rev2.pdf>. See also Tara Davenport, ‘The exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources in areas of overlapping claims’ in in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh 
and Robert Beckman (eds), The South China Sea Disputes and the Law of the Sea, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014, 93–113 at 107.
51   The ILC’s work on this topic resulted in the adoption of the UN Convention on the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, <http://legal.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf>
52   International Law Commission, Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 
with commentaries, adopted at the ILC 60th Session, (2008) online: <http://untreaty 
.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_5_2008.pdf> (ILC Draft Articles).
53   See e.g. the definition of ‘utilization of transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems’ 
(Article 2(e) ibid) which refers to ‘extraction of water, heat and minerals, and storage and 
disposal of any substance’; furthermore the commentary to that definition notes that 
‘Extraction of freshwater is of course the main utilization of aquifers’. Other kinds of utili-
zation, however exceptional and peripheral, should not be ignored. ‘Utilization’ is defined 
in a non-exhaustive manner to include not only extraction of water but also extraction 
of heat for thermo-energy, extraction of minerals that may be found in aquifers, as well 
as storage or disposal of waste, such a new experimental technique to utilize an aquifer 
for carbon dioxide sequestration.” There is a further reference to geological sequestration 
in the commentary to article 4 dealing with the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization: ‘an aquifer may also be used for disposal, in particular through a new 
experimental technique to utilize aquifers for carbon dioxide sequestration. This use is 
peripheral to the present draft articles.’ It is an open question whether the balance of the 
text of the articles was really drafted with CCS and other disposal operations in mind.
54   Paragraph (2) of the commentary to Article 2.
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aquifers for sequestration or disposal purposes the principles underlying these 
articles should still inform how we might think about the duty to cooperate in 
the context of shared geological formations in marine areas.55
The duties associated with the general obligation to cooperate56 include 
both procedural and substantive duties. Procedural duties include the duty to 
exchange information about the resource,57 the duty to notify as to proposed 
uses of the shared resource which may affect other parties,58 the duty to con-
duct an environmental assessment to the extent that transboundary impacts 
are anticipated,59 the duty to engage in consultations as to any concerns that 
are identified and if necessary to negotiate (or engage in other peaceful means 
of dispute resolution) to resolve any outstanding issues.60 There may also 
be a duty to monitor the use and status of the shared resource and to share 
the resulting information.61 The substantive duties include a duty of equi-
table and reasonable utilization of the shared resource,62 the duty to protect 
the environment,63 and the duty not to cause significant harm to the shared 
resource or the interests of other states in that resource.64 What amounts to 
harm, and indeed to significant harm, must be contextualized and to some 
extent may depend upon the uses that others may be making of that resource. 
Thus, disposal of CO2 into an aquifer may be a reasonable use of that aquifer 
if it is saline; it is likely not a reasonable use if the aquifer contains potable 
groundwater and certainly not if the aquifer is being used as a potable water 
source by another aquifer state.
The duty to cooperate with respect to shared resources may also result in 
the aquifer states agreeing to create appropriate institutions. Such institutions 
have proven to be particularly important in relation to international water-
courses. The draft articles on aquifers refer inter alia, to joint mechanisms of 
55   See also UNFCCC, Transboundary CCS Technical Paper (n 6) at para 63 noting that parties 
‘may wish to consider the cooperative and regulatory approaches adopted in relation to 
the management of water resources and oil and gas reserves’ and see also at para 66 a 
similar comment specifically with respect to the ILC draft articles.
56   ILC Draft Articles (n 52), Article 7, General obligation to cooperate.
57   Ibid Article 8, Regular exchange of data and information.
58   Ibid Article 15, Planned activities.
59   Ibid Article 15(2) and paragraph (4) of the commentary.
60   Ibid Article 15(3).
61   Ibid Article 15, Monitoring.
62   Ibid Articles 4 & 5.
63   Ibid Article 10, ‘Protection and preservation of ecosystems’, Article 12, ‘Prevention, reduc-
tion and control of pollution’
64   Ibid Article 5.
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cooperation, appropriate bilateral and regional agreements, joint monitoring 
activities, and a joint management mechanism.65
In addition to the general duties to cooperate with respect to shared 
resources as well as the more specific rules in relation to transboundary aqui-
fers, UNCLOS also contains a number of provisions enjoining the parties to 
cooperate including the duty to cooperate in relation to the conservation 
and management of living resources, the duty to co-operate with respect to 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas and the duty to cooperate with respect to the 
protection of the marine environment.66 There are rather more specific pro-
visions requiring the relevant parties to pursue provisional arrangements in 
areas of overlapping maritime entitlements.67 These provisions are the subject 
of more detailed examination below in section 3.3.
3.2 The Treatment of Sub-Seabed Disposal of CO2 in Shared Formations 
in the Work of Protocol to the London Dumping Convention
The one treaty forum that has addressed storage in shared geological structures 
in marine areas is the Protocol to the London Dumping Convention (PLDC).68 
It will be recalled that the parties to the PLDC agreed to amend that instrument 
to permit geological sequestration of pure streams of CO2.69 The parties also 
agreed that the injection of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery purposes does not 
engage the Protocol.70 That amendment and the understanding with respect 
to CO2 for EOR purposes did not resolve all issues relating to the potential use 
of the seabed for geological sequestration because Article 6 of the PLDC pro-
hibits the export of wastes. The Parties identified two potential implications of 
this prohibition for geological sequestration of CO2: export and migration (or 
‘migration-as-export’). ‘Export’ refers to the export of CO2 from one country 
for disposal in the jurisdiction of another country. It was agreed that this activ-
ity was subject to the prohibition of Article 6, that the problem could not be 
resolved by way of an agreed interpretation, and that it could only be resolved 
by means of an amendment. An amendment to create an exception for the 
65   Draft Articles, Articles 7, 9, 13, & 14.
66   UNCLOS (n 3) Articles 61(2), 64, 65, 66, 117, 118, 123, 194, & 197–201. Ong (n 50) at 781–785, 
Davenport (n 50) at 107.
67   UNCLOS (n 3) Articles 74 & 83.
68   PLDC (n 2).
69   LC 28/15.6 adopted November 2006 entered into force 10 February 2007; discussed in 
Dixon et al (n 12) at 433–436.




export of CO2 for geological sequestration was adopted in 2009 but is still a 
long way from entering into force.71
The migration-as-export concern is particularly relevant for this chapter 
since it concerns the scenario in which CO2 is injected into a shared geological 
structure in State A and the CO2 plume migrates (either intentionally or unin-
tentionally) from State A to State B (or to an area beyond national jurisdiction). 
The Parties concluded that such a migration does not constitute an export 
within the meaning of Article 6 (and adopted a resolution to that effect).72 It 
is therefore a form of disposal which is permitted under the newly adopted 
amendment. However, the parties considered that it required special consider-
ation under the terms of the Specific Guidelines for the Assessment of Carbon 
Dioxide for Disposal into Sub-seabed Geological Formations. The Guidelines 
were first adopted in 2007; the amended version which addresses the migra-
tion scenario was adopted in November 2012.73 The Specific Guidelines (2012) 
address geological waste disposal of CO2 generally but also contain a number 
of more specific provisions dealing with disposal into geological formations 
where there is potential for transboundary movement of injected CO2. The 
general provisions address such matters as waste prevention audits, consider-
ation of waste management options, the chemical and physical properties of 
the waste stream (i.e. proper characterization of the waste stream), an action 
list (a screening tool to determine whether a material is considered accept-
able for dumping), site selection and characterization, assessment of potential 
effects (a risk assessment and an impact hypothesis), monitoring and risk 
management, and permit and permit conditions.74
The main provision dealing with disposal into geological formations where 
there is potential for transboundary movement of injected CO2 is an over-
arching provision which precedes the general provisions outlined above and 
provides as follows:75
71   31 August 2018 only 5 parties had ratified the amendment: Norway, Netherlands, UK, Iran 
and Finland, LC 40/2, 31 August 2018.
72   Resolution LP.3(4), 30 October 2009, Recital 12.
73   Adopted 2 November 2012, LC 34/15, annex 8 (Specific Guidelines, 2012).
74   For more detailed discussion see Dixon et al (n 12) at 434. See also IEAGHG, Review of 
Project Permits under the London Protocol – An Assessment of the Proposed P18–4 CO2 
Storage Site, Report: 2016/TR4, May 2016. The project involves injection and storage into 
the P18–4 field which is a near-depleted natural gas field located approximately 20 km off 
the Dutch Coast. The report involves an analysis of the Netherlands permitting exercise to 
test compliance with the Specific Guidelines. It does not contain an assessment of poten-
tial transboundary issues presumably because the storage complex was a confined rather 
than an open complex.
75   Specific Guidelines (n 73) para 1.10 – bolded letters and numbers added.
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[A] In the case of [1] transboundary sub-seabed geological formations 
that could be used by more than one country or [2] where sub-seabed 
geological formations are located in areas where there is the potential 
for transboundary movement of CO2 streams after injection [3] the 
Contracting Party where the injection occurs should be responsible for 
the implementation of these Specific Guidelines. [B] Consent should be 
sought for the use of the sub-seabed geological formation from all coun-
tries with jurisdiction over this sub-seabed geological formation, without 
prejudice to international law including as reflected in the relevant provi-
sions of UNCLOS. [C] The Contracting Party where the injection occurs 
should cooperate with other relevant Contracting Parties, other States 
and other relevant entities, to ensure adequate sharing of information 
as needed and in accordance with international law, including by way of 
arrangement or agreement to ensure that these Specific Guidelines are 
implemented effectively.
There are a number of key ideas embedded in this paragraph.
First, sentence [A] serves to both identify the circumstances under which 
the clause shall apply but also to allocate compliance responsibility. Thus, the 
Guidelines apply where, [A1] a sub-seabed geological formation could be used 
by more than one country, or [A2] there is a formation which is located in 
an area where there is potential for transboundary migration post-injection. 
This first sentence establishes low alternative thresholds for its applicabil-
ity. The first alternative, threshold [A1], is satisfied by the mere existence of 
a geological formation that could be used by more than one country. The sec-
ond alternative, threshold [A2], is satisfied by the potential for transboundary 
migration. The allocation of compliance responsibility is dealt with in the last 
part of the first sentence [A3] which resolves that it is the State where the 
injection occurs that is responsible for the implementation of the Guidelines.
Second, sentence [B] establishes the threshold for proceeding. This requires 
that consent should be sought from all countries with jurisdiction over the 
shared sub-seabed geological formation. This requirement is said to be with-
out prejudice to international law generally and UNCLOS specifically. The 
consent requirement is broadly framed. It is not confined to seeking to obtain 
consent from states to which the plume may migrate, or states that may suffer 
a (significant) adverse effect from use of the shared formation; it extends to 
any state with whom the formation may be shared. The consent is framed in 
the passive voice. It does not specify that the consent is to be obtained by the 
Contracting Party (rather than, say, the operator of the project) but the section 
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as a whole is very state-oriented and thus it seems reasonable to think that 
consent should be obtained at the state to state level. The clause does not pre-
scribe the form that the consent must take, such as whether it might take the 
form of a treaty or an agreement between the respective regulatory authorities 
of the parties, or an exchange of diplomatic notes. It is difficult to divine the 
precise purpose of the ‘without prejudice’ clause but presumably it is intended 
to indicate that any consent that is obtained may deal with matters as between 
the parties to the consent but cannot discharge either party of obligations that 
either may owe to others, or to the international community more generally. 
Finally, the clause stipulates that ‘consent should be sought’. The clause does 
not use the mandatory ‘shall’ but the softer imperative ‘should’; nor does the 
clause stipulate the consequences of failing to obtain the consent of all forma-
tion states and certainly does not use the formulation ‘should be sought and 
obtained’.
Third, in addition to the consents that ‘should be sought’, sentence [C] calls 
upon the Contracting Party where the injection is occurring, to cooperate with: 
(1) other relevant Contracting Parties, (2) other States, and (3) other relevant 
entities. It is evident that this obligation is not confined to formation states (or 
presumably this sentence would have used the same terminology as the con-
sent clause) although one would think, given the scope of the consent clause, 
that a reservoir State would always qualify as a relevant Contracting Party or 
‘other State’. It is not clear what the term ‘other relevant entities’ is designed to 
capture but presumably it might include global and regional treaty organiza-
tions such as the Protocol secretariat and conference of the parties, OSPAR, 
and, where relevant, a body like the EU. The cooperation is designed for two 
ends: (1) to ensure adequate sharing of information, and (2) to ensure that these 
Guidelines are implemented effectively. These objectives should be the mea-
sure of the information that must be shared which must also be ‘in accordance 
with international law’. One could anticipate that an exchange that is adequate 
to ensure effective implementation of these Guidelines will need to be both 
detailed and extensive and indeed address all of the topics covered by the sub-
stantive requirements of the Guidelines. The clause provides some guidance as 
to the means of effecting cooperation insofar as it references ‘arrangement or 
agreement’ but clearly these are just possible modes of attaining the objective.
The Guidelines contain two other references to transboundary movement 
both in the section of the Guidelines dealing with the characterization of the 
sub-seabed geological formation.76 Thus, section 6.2 instructs that in select-
ing a site for geological storage of CO2 the geological assessment should take 
account of potential migration and leakage pathways over time (including 
76   Ibid, ss.6.2.5 and 6.5.
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transboundary movement) and potential effects to the marine environment 
of leakage of CO2. A second reference in the section largely follows part of the 
previously quoted and discussed section 1.10.77
While Dixon et al take the view that Guidelines under the Protocol are 
for guidance only, and not legally binding (unlike decisions adopted under 
OSPAR), these Guidelines offer the most detailed prescriptions for sub-seabed 
disposal of CO2 into shared geological formations.78 It is also possible that 
the Guidelines could attain additional normative weight through referential 
incorporation in other instruments which might, for example, require states to 
apply generally accepted standards or guidelines.79
3.3 The Law Governing Seabed Operations in Areas of Overlapping 
Maritime Claims Pending Delimitation
There are overlapping maritime claims in many areas of the world. These 
may include overlapping claims to a territorial sea, an EEZ and a continental 
shelf. Whereas Article 15 of UNCLOS establishes a default equidistance entitle-
ment in the case of overlapping claims to a full 12 nm territorial sea,80 there is 
no default entitlement rule in the case of overlapping EEZs and continental 
shelves, only a duty to negotiate a delimitation by agreement with a view to 
reaching an equitable solution, failing which the Parties shall resort to dispute 
settlement under Part XV.81 Part XV (Article 298(1)(a)) permits a state to opt out 
of binding compulsory dispute settlement with respect to Articles 15, 74 and 
77   Ibid s.6.5.
78   Dixon et al (n 12) at 436.
79   See generally Catherine Redgwell, ‘Mind the Gap in the GAIRS: The Role of Other 
Instruments in LOSC Regime Implementation in the Offshore Energy Sector’ in Nigel 
Bankes and Seline Trevisanut (eds), Energy from the Sea: An International Law Perspective 
on Ocean Energy, Brill Nijhoff (2014), and Angelica Bonfanti and Francesca Romanin 
Jacur, ‘Energy from the Sea and the Protection of the Marine Environment: Treaty-Based 
Regimes and Ocean Corporate Social Responsibility’ ibid. More specifically, UNCLOS 
(n 3) Article 208 requires coastal states to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce 
and control pollution arising from sea-bed activities. Such domestic laws shall be ‘no less 
effective than international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.’
80   UNCLOS (n 3) Article 15; absent agreement neither State is entitled to extend its territorial 
sea beyond the median line (subject to exceptions dealing with historic title or other spe-
cial circumstances. See David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, ‘Rights and obligations 
in areas of overlapping maritime claims’ in Jayakumar et al (n 50) pp. 121–228 at 196 & 197 
who observe that ‘This rule is cast in unusual terms. It amounts to a restriction on the 
entitlement of each neighbouring State’ and ‘seeks to prevent overlapping claims to sov-
ereignty by qualifying the entitlements of coastal States … Hence, whilst … the boundary 
remains disputed, and there are no special circumstances or historic titles, neither of the 
claimant States is ‘prima facie’ allowed to exercise sovereignty beyond the equidistance 
boundary line.’ (reference omitted).
81   UNCLOS Articles 74(1) and 83(1).
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83 but in return such a party must accept the possibility of compulsory, but 
non-binding, conciliation.82 This section focuses on overlapping EEZ and con-
tinental shelf claims. Where the shelf and EEZ have been delimited, the coastal 
state’s rights are exclusive. Absent an agreed delimitation ‘no such exclusivity 
can exist’.83
Articles 74 (EEZ) and 83 (continental shelf) impose procedural and sub-
stantive obligations on adjacent and opposite states pending agreement on 
delimitation.84 In particular, common paragraph three provides that:85
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States con-
cerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, 
during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching 
of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to 
the final delimitation.
This provision does not ‘limit de iure the powers of each State in a contested 
area … these powers thus remain’. Provided that the claim is a reasonable one 
powers ‘generally attributed to the coastal State by the relevant UNCLOS provi-
sions’ may be exercised but the paragraph does impose ‘a double condition on 
the exercise of those rights.’86
82   For a recent example of recent successful conciliation see Report and Recommendations 
of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission between Timor-Leste and Australia on the 
Timor Sea, 9 May 2018, Registry, Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Commission was 
able to assist the parties in negotiating the Treaty Between the Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Lese and Australia Establishing their Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea, New 
York, 6 March 2018. The treaty includes Annex B which is a joint development scheme for 
the Greater Sunrise field.
83   Anderson and van Logchem (n 80) at 198.
84   There is no similar provision in Article 15.
85   The leading decision interpreting the scope of these obligations is Guyana v Suriname, 
Arbitral Award, 17 September 2007, esp. at paras 453–486 available at <http://www.pca 
-cpa.org/showpage5751.html?pag_id=1147>. Useful assessments of both the case and the 
language of Articles 74 and 83 of LOSC include Enrico Milano and Irini Papanicolopula, 
‘State Responsibility in Disputed Areas on Land and at Sea’ (2011) 71 ZaöRV 587 esp at 
606–621, Anderson & van Logchem, (n 80) and Davenport (n 50). On the background to 
articles 73 and 84 see Rainer Lagoni, ‘Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation 
Agreements’ (1984), 78 AJIL 345. Most recently the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law (n 1), has offered a comprehensive review of state practice under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS.
86   Milano and Papanicolopulu (ibid) at 612. A reasonable claim is one that accords with the 
settled jurisprudence of the ICJ, ITLOS and Annex VII tribunals on maritime boundary 
delimitations and in particular the Black Sea Case; an unreasonable claim would be one 
that is manifestly unjustifiable when measured against that standard (id at 630).
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Rainer Lagoni has provided an authoritative account of the evolution of 
paragraph 3 of these two articles.87 Lagoni recalls that the paragraph repre-
sented a compromise and indeed a compilation of two different ideas that 
had been introduced in proposed language for this article. On the one hand, 
those states committed to the preeminence of the median or equidistance 
line favoured a formulation that prohibited a state from extending its shelf or 
EEZ (or in some proposals engaging in any exploration or exploitation activi-
ties beyond the equidistance line) absent an agreement between the states 
concerned.88 On the other hand, those states that favoured delimitation in 
accordance with equitable principles argued for a formulation that empha-
sized the importance of provisional arrangements.89 As can be observed, the 
final text incorporated elements of both of these ideas insofar as it refers to 
both the importance of making provisional arrangements as well as the com-
mitment not to do anything that would jeopardize or hamper conclusion of 
an agreement,90 a point emphasized in the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in 
Guyana v Suriname.91 That Award also emphasized that the purpose of para-
graph 3 is to permit utilization of disputed areas pending delimitation, thereby 
avoiding the suspension of economic development.92 The history of this para-
graph fully justifies Lagoni’s assertion that, at least at the time the paragraph 
was negotiated, it was ‘in no way a codification of customary international law 
but represents an example of its progressive development.’93
Paragraph 3 was subject to detailed analysis in the Award in Guyana v 
Suriname and the Tribunal helpfully distinguished the two core and comple-
mentary obligations within the paragraph, first, the duty to use every effort to 
agree on provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and second, the duty 
not to hamper or jeopardise a final agreement.94
87   Lagoni (n 85).
88   Ibid at 350–351.
89   Ibid.
90   Ibid at 349, and see also at 353 the provision ‘combines two basically different views … 
attempts either to promote certain measures or to restrict others’.
91   (n 85).
92   Ibid at para. 460.
93   Lagoni (n 85) at 354.
94   For further analysis of the decision see Milano and Papanicolopula (n 85) Anderson & van 
Logchem (n 80) Davenport (n 50) and BIICL (n 3). See also ITLOS, Dispute Concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean, Request for the prescription of provisional measures, Order 25 April 2015. For com-
ment see Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources 
in Disputed Areas: A Note on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the 
Special Chamber of ITLOS’ (2015), 46 ODIL 315. See also Judgment, 23 September 2017, 
at paras 604–634. The Chamber (at para 604) emphasized the importance of the duty to 
negotiate in good faith especially ‘where neighbouring States conduct maritime activities 
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3.3.1 Application to CCS Activities
What then is the position in relation to proposed CCS related activities in an 
area of overlapping claims to the EEZ and continental shelf at least where both 
countries are parties to UNCLOS?95 The main conclusion must be that the twin 
duties to make every good faith effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
and the duty not to take any actions that might jeopardize or hamper reaching 
a final agreement are just as applicable to CCS operations as they are to conven-
tional oil and gas operations. The first branch would require a party proposing 
to authorize CCS evaluation activities in the disputed area to notify the other 
state(s) concerned, to provide relevant information, to seek cooperation and to 
commit to share any information obtained. Both parties should be flexible in 
their efforts to negotiate provisional arrangements. Such arrangements might 
include a joint development agreement or arrangement. The second branch 
would require the proposing state not to authorize drilling activities for any 
CCS related purposes such as for taking core samples from target formations 
to assess porosity, permeability and injectivity and for assessing the character-
istics of sealing formations. Under the present state of the law, the proposing 
state cannot carry out these activities unilaterally but requires the agreement 
of the other state(s) concerned.
in close proximity.’ The same would be true with respect to efforts to negotiate a ‘provi-
sional arrangement’ but there could be breach of that duty (at para 628) absent a request 
for such an arrangement. Ultimately the Chamber found that Ghana was not in breach 
of either paragraph 3 but at least some of the Chamber’s reasoning (at para 633) seems to 
turn on the specific and limited language of Côte d’Ivoire’s request for relief.
95   As noted above, at the time of its adoption, paragraph 3 represented a progressive devel-
opment of international law rather than its codification. It is still not clear whether both 
elements of paragraph 3 could be considered to be customary international law. Milano 
and Papanicolopulu (n 86) are not completely consistent on the point. Thus at 604 and 
607 they suggest that while the duty not to hamper a final settlement might be grounded 
in the general principle to settle disputes peacefully and in good faith the same cannot 
be said of the positive duty to enter into arrangements of a practical nature. On the other 
hand, at 611, the authors suggest (without accompanying references or discussion) that 
paragraph 3 does reflect customary law. Anderson and van Logchem (n 80) at 208 seem 
content to conclude that this is ‘a difficult question’. The BIICL Report (n 3) is equally 
cautious concluding (at para 401) that it is ‘difficult to draw any general tends from the 
practice collated regarding the content of the obligations of Article 74(3) and 83(3) or any 
applicable customary international law obligations of restraint.’
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4 The Treatment of Shared Resources in Maritime Delimitation 
Agreements – Is There Space for CCS Operations?
Having examined the rules that apply where States (or at least those States that 
are party to UNCLOS) have not entered into a delimitation agreement, we can 
now examine how States might deal with storage operations in shared geo-
logical formation in their delimitation agreements. There is an extensive state 
practice and literature on this issue in the context of hydrocarbon deposits.96 
The options97 for dealing with this issue include: (1) silence, (2) the inclusion of 
a basic straddling deposit or unity of deposit clause, and variations on such a 
clause, (3) so-called framework agreements, and (4) joint development agree-
ments. The following sections examine each of these options with a view to 
determining the extent to which these arrangements address the use of shared 
geological formations for CCS operations or CO2\EOR operations.98
4.1 Silence
The parties may elect to effect a delimitation without addressing the issue 
of shared geological formations at all. This gives rise to the question as to 
what the default rules would be in such a case, either with respect to petro-
leum operations or CO2 storage and disposal operations. It is fairly clear that 
Article 74 and 83 UNCLOS and, in particular, common paragraph 3 are no lon-
ger relevant – they are spent. The subject matter of the two articles is that of 
delimitation. Once the parties have made their delimitation agreement(s), 
those agreements assume priority – at least with respect to the issue of delimi-
tation.99 Furthermore, paragraph 3 is certainly no longer applicable. After all, 
96   See, for example, Ong (n 50); Vasco Becker-Weinberg, Joint Development of Hydrocarbon 
Deposits in the Law of the Sea, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol. 30 (Springer, 
2014); William T Onorato, ‘Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum 
Deposit’ (1977) 26 ICLQ 324–337, Rainer Lagoni, ‘Oil and Gas Deposits Across National 
Frontiers’ (1979) 73 AJIL 215–243 and Peter Cameron, ‘The Rules of Engagement: 
Developing Cross-Border Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean’ (2006) 
55 ICLQ 559–586.
97   I have applied this categorization previously in Nigel Bankes, ‘Recent Framework 
Agreements for the Recognition and Development of Transboundary Hydrocarbon 
Resources’ (2014), 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 666–690 and 
Nigel Bankes, ‘The regime for transboundary hydrocarbon deposits in the maritime 
delimitation treaties and other related agreements of Arctic states” (2016) 47(2) Ocean 
Development and International Law 141–164.
98   See also UNFCCC, Transboundary CCS Technical paper (n 6) at para 110 noting that 
‘Existing agreements for the management and shared natural resources (e.g. on the use of 
the aquifer or reservoir) might apply even if they do not expressly contemplate CCS.’
99   See paragraph 4 of each Article.
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paragraph 3 commences with the words ‘Pending agreement’. The agreement 
that is referenced here is the agreement on delimitation referred to in para-
graph 1. Thus, the twin obligations of that paragraph no longer apply. One 
should recall in particular that the duty ‘not to jeopardize or hamper’ is a duty 
not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement. The delimita-
tion agreement is that final agreement. Lagoni agrees remarking at the end of 
a section headed ‘Application ratione temporis’ that ‘The obligation [to pur-
sue good faith negotiations for a provisional agreement] ceases when the final 
delimitation agreement is reached.’100
As a result, neither the two Articles, nor the interpretive case law, are directly 
applicable as treaty obligations post the conclusion of a delimitation agree-
ment. However, the general duty to cooperate with respect to shared resources 
continues as does the parallel duty to cooperate as well as the general obliga-
tions under UNCLOS, as outlined above.101 In addition, a party to the PLDC will 
need to observe the relevant provisions of the Specific Guidelines to the extent 
that it is contemplating disposal operations in a shared geological structure.102
4.2 The Basic Clause and Its Variants
Agreements delimiting the continental shelf and\or the EEZ frequently make 
provision for the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits that straddle the agreed 
delimitation line. An early and oft-cited example is the 1965 Agreement 
between the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway103 which provides that:
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any 
single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, includ-
ing sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line and the part of such 
structure or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line is 
exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, 
the Contracting Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, 
seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or field 
100   Lagoni, Interim Measures (n 85).
101   See also Eritrea v Yemen, Second Phase, December 17, 1999, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1160> esp at paras 85–86. Reference might also be had to the gen-
eral duty of good faith under both customary law and LOSC Article 300 as well as more 
general obligations of restraint based on the obligation not to take steps that would aggra-
vate or extend a dispute. See BIICL Report (n 3) at paras 65–66 and also South China Sea 
Award, 12 July 2016, Registry, Permanent Court of Arbitration, at paras 1166–1173.
102   See section 3.2 above.
103   Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the delimi-
tation of the continental shelf between the two countries, 10 March 1965, 551 UNTS 213, 
Article 3.
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shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds 
deriving therefrom shall be apportioned.
In some cases the discovery of such straddling deposits and the resulting con-
sultation has led to the conclusion of specific treaties elaborating on the rules 
for exploiting such a deposit, beginning with the Frigg Agreement in 1976.104 
These rules are typically based on the concept of unitization (which involves 
treating the entire pool as a single ownership unit)105 with apportionment of 
costs and production based on the distribution of the underlying hydrocarbon 
reserves.106 Project operations are governed by the terms of unitization and 
operating agreements concluded between the licensees on either side of the 
line, typically subject to the agreement or approval of both governments. The 
unit operator is appointed by agreement between the licensees subject again 
to the approval of the governments.107
The question for present purposes is whether a clause such as that con-
tained in the UK/Norway Agreement as well as the subsequent pool-specific 
development agreements should be read as extending to CCS operations and 
CO2\EOR operations. It is perhaps easiest to begin with CO2\EOR operations. 
These operations are strictly ancillary to the principal purpose of exploiting 
a hydrocarbon reservoir – they are designed to enhance production. It seems 
clear therefore that such operations would fall within the language of Article 3 
of the Norway/UK Agreement. Such operations would also likely fall within 
104   See Agreement relating to the exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoirs and the transmis-
sion of gas therefrom to the United Kingdom (London, 10 May 1976) 1098 UNTS 3. The Frigg 
Field was abandoned in 2004, see Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, CO2 Storage Atlas, 
Norwegian North Sea (2012) at 10, <http://www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/3-Publikasjoner/
Rapporter/PDF/CO2-ATLAS-lav.pdf>. Other reservoir-specific agreements include, 
Agreement relating to the exploitation of the Statfjord Field Reservoirs and the offtake 
of petroleum therefrom (Oslo, 16 October 1979) 1254 UNTS 379, Agreement relating to the 
exploitation of the Murchison Field Reservoir and the offtake of petroleum therefrom 
(Oslo, 16 October 1979) 1249 UNTS 173 and (between the UK and the Netherlands) the 
Agreement relating to the exploitation of the Markham Field Reservoirs and the offtake 
of petroleum therefrom (The Hague, 26 May 1992) 1731 UNTS 30235.
105   See Frigg Agreement, ibid, Article 1(1) ‘The gas in the Frigg Field Reservoir and the hydro-
carbons produced with or from the gas (excluding oil underlying the gas and gas and oil in 
other horizons), referred to in this Agreement as “Frigg Gas”, shall be exploited as a single 
unit …’.
106   Ibid, Article 2(2): ‘The two Governments shall consult with a view to agreeing a deter-
mination of the limits and estimated total reserves of the Frigg Field Reservoir and an 
apportionment of the reserves therein as between the Continental Shelf appertaining to 
the United Kingdom and the Continental Shelf appertaining to the Kingdom of Norway. 
For this purpose the licensees shall be required to submit to the Governments a proposal 
for such determinations.’
107   Ibid Article 5.
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the language of most pool-specific development agreements,108 although the 
institution of such operations would likely require the consent of the two gov-
ernments under the terms of these specific treaties.109 Plans to commence 
CO2\EOR operations may also lead to a restatement of recoverable reserves; 
however, all of these pool-specific development agreements provide for this 
eventuality and therefore would apply whether a request for a restatement is 
triggered by additional drilling which causes the licensees of the governments 
to revise their understanding of the parameters of the pool, or whether it is 
triggered by the introduction of EOR operations.110
But what is the position with respect to a shared saline formation? What is 
the position where a project in a conventional hydrocarbon reservoir moves 
from a CO2\EOR operation to a pure disposal operation? And what is the 
position where a straddling reservoir has been abandoned and is now being 
considered for CCS purposes (the Frigg Gas field is a case in point).111 The 
Norway\UK version of the straddling deposit clause addresses two subjects: 
(1) geological petroleum structures and petroleum fields; and, (2) single geolog-
ical structures or fields for any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel. 
Furthermore, the clause is concerned with the exploitation of these resources 
for commercial gain and presumably by means of extraction rather than 
exploitation by injection. There may be arguments both ways as to whether 
such clauses can be read as embracing the operations referred to above i.e. 
exploitation by injection of a saline reservoir, cross-over operations from EOR 
to pure disposal, and the use of abandoned petroleum reservoirs. Perhaps the 
arguments are strongest in relation to the use of abandoned petroleum reser-
voirs since CCS can be seen as the continued exploitation of such a reservoir. 
The arguments may be weaker with respect to a shared saline aquifer since it 
108   I say ‘most’ because the Frigg Agreement, Article 1(1) only applies to ’Frigg Gas’ and spe-
cifically does not apply to ‘oil underlying the gas’.
109   See, e.g. Frigg Agreement (n 104), Article 4(1) calling for government approval of a pro-
posed scheme for the conservation of gas; Article 11 of each of the Murchison and Statjford 
Agreements refers to the need for government approval of amendments to the exploita-
tion programme which programme should have as its objective the exploitation of the 
reservoir ‘in such a manner as to prevent the waste of petroleum and minimizes losses of 
reservoir energy’ A CO2 \EOR recovery programme would fall within this objective.
110   Frigg Agreement (n 104) Article 3.
111   See Norway’s North Sea Storage Atlas, (n 104) at 59–60 which evaluates both a pure dis-
posal operation and an enhanced gas recovery operation in the abandoned Frigg field. 
The operation would take advantage of ‘a huge [saline] aquifer that is connected to the 
field’. The Report acknowledges that a prerequisite for any injection operation would be 
integrity studies of abandoned wells that penetrate the formation.
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may be more difficult to describe such a structure as a ‘geological structure or 
field of any other [i.e. non-petroleum] mineral deposit’ (emphasis added).
The UK\Norway Agreement offers a relatively simple form of a straddling 
deposit clause. While delimitation agreements continue to be concluded with 
this type of clause, other agreements contain more sophisticated versions 
which might address such matters as the exchange of drilling information and 
perhaps dispute settlement.112 In general, it seems fair to say that the more 
detailed the clause the more likely that it can be interpreted as referring only to 
hydrocarbon reservoirs and the exploitation of hydrocarbons. However, other 
forms of the clause use more general language that does not refer to hydro-
carbon resources or petroleum reservoirs. For example, the France\Spain 
delimitation agreement of 1974 (which also creates a joint development zone 
(JDZ)) refers to the exploitation of a deposit of a natural resource.113 It does not 
seem unreasonable to think that injection of CO2 into a shared saline aquifer 
might qualify as the exploitation of that shared resource. But equally, other 
similar clauses are explicitly confined to petroleum and\or natural gas114 or to 
the exploitation of deposits of mineral resources115 and would therefore likely 
not apply to operations in saline aquifers.
112   See for example Article 2 of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Denmark together with the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland relating to the Maritime 
Delimitation in the area between the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom, Torshavn, 
18 May 1999, 4 IMB 2956. IMB refers to the series International Maritime Boundaries (vari-
ous editors, 1993 – date).
113   2 IMB 1727. See also Agreement between Italy and Spain Relating to the Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf between the Two Countries, 19 February 1974, 2 IMB 1601, Article 2 
applies to a ‘deposit of natural resources’.
114   Agreement between the Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia on the Delimitation 
of the Continental Shelves between the Two Countries, 27, October 1969, 1 IMB 1019, 
Article 4; Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Columbia and Honduras, 2 August 1986, 
1 IMB 503, Article 3, ‘hydrocarbons or natural gas deposits or fields’; Agreement between 
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland relating to the exploitation of single geo-
logical structures extending across the dividing line on the continental shelf under the 
North Sea, 6 October 1965, Cmd 3254, Article 1, ‘geological mineral oil or natural gas field 
or structure’ (this agreement is unusual since it was a stand-alone agreement dealing 
with straddling deposits and executed contemporaneously with a separate delimitation 
agreement).
115   Estonia\Russia (2005), 6 IMB 4582, Article 4; Trinidad and Tobago\Grenada (2010), 7 IMB 
4705, Article VII straddling ‘oil and gas structure or field or any other mineral deposit’; 
Venezuela\Netherlands (Antilles) (1978), 1 IMB 615, Article 6 ‘a single geological structure 
or mineral field containing oil or natural gas’;
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As for the field-specific unit operations agreements referred to above, it 
seems fairly clear that such agreements would not apply to either CO2\EOR 
operations crossing over to pure disposal or to storage and disposal operations 
in an abandoned field (the Frigg situation). While such agreements may not 
terminate automatically with the cessation of production and abandonment,116 
it seems clear that all these agreements are concerned with production of 
petroleum and not with pure CO2 disposal operations and are therefore 
inapplicable.
In sum, the general conclusion is that while delimitation agreements that 
deal with straddling deposits as well as subsequent field-specific agreements 
will likely also cover CO2\EOR operations, it is much more difficult to conclude 
that such agreements were intended to address the use of shared saline aqui-
fers for CO2 disposal purposes. More specific drafting directed at the used of 
shared geological structures for storage or disposal purposes would be more 
appropriate. A simple version of such clause might be as follows:
If any geological structure that has the potential to be used for geologi-
cal storage or disposal purposes extends across the dividing line, and the 
part of such structure or field situated on one side of the dividing line is 
exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, the 
Contracting Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek 
to reach agreement as to the exploitation of that structure for storage or 
disposal purposes.
In addition, and in light of the discussion above of the London Protocol’s 
Sub-Seabed Geological Formations Guidelines (2012), contracting parties to 
the Protocol might wish to add further text such as the following: ‘Any such 
agreement should take account of any guidelines for the assessment of geo-
logical formations for storage or disposal purposes developed by any relevant 
international organization.’ The suggested language would be broad enough 
to embrace not only the work within the London Protocol but also any future 
work within OSPAR or perhaps work by the IPCC.
4.3 Framework Agreements
Framework agreements dealing with shared hydrocarbon resources are bilat-
eral agreements which aim to provide a detailed framework for the treatment 
of straddling petroleum deposits thereby obviating the need to negotiate field 
116   The agreements provide for amendments or termination by agreement at any time: Frigg 
Agreement, (n 104) Article 31; Statfjord (n 104), Article 24, Murchison (n 104), Article 24.
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specific treaties.117 While most such agreements are free-standing agreements 
(e.g. the UK\Norway Framework Agreement), in some cases the framework 
provisions may be included in or appended to a delimitation agreement. Such 
is the case, for example, with the Norway\Russia Barents Sea Treaty. While 
specific answers to the above questions will of necessity turn on their precise 
language, these agreements generally apply only to ‘petroleum activities’ or 
some such similar term118 or to hydrocarbon deposits.119 It follows from this 
that while such agreements will therefore cover CO2\EOR operations120 they 
will not cover cross-over operations, saline aquifer disposal activities or dis-
posal activities into abandoned reservoirs, except perhaps where the CO2 is 
117   The agreements include (1) Framework Agreement between the United Kingdom and 
Norway concerning Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-operation, 4 April 2005, 7 IMB 5214, 
Report No. 9–15(6), (2) Agreement between Canada and the French Republic Relating 
to the Exploration and Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Fields, 17 May 2005, 
unpublished, on file with the author, (the agreement has been ratified by France but not 
by Canada), (3) Framework Treaty relating to the unitization of hydrocarbon reservoirs 
that extend across the delimitation line between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 20 March 2007, 7 IMB 4649, Report No. 2–13(4), 
(4) Agreement between Iceland and Norway concerning transboundary hydrocarbon 
deposits, 3 November 2008, 7 IMB 5123, Report No. 5123, (5) Treaty between Norway 
and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the 
Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, 15 September 2010, 7 IMB 5167 and its attached Annex II 
dealing with Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, Report No. 9–6(3), (6) Framework 
Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning 
the Development of Cross-Median Line Hydrocarbon Resources, 21 January 2012 avail-
able on FAOLEX here http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-110369.pdf and (7) Agreement 
between the United States and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, 20 February 2012, 7 IMB 4613, Report No. 
1–5(3). For discussion of some of these agreements see Cameron (n 96) and Bankes (n 97).
118   Article 1.1 of the UK\Norway Framework Agreement stipulates that the Agreement 
applies to cross-boundary cooperation between the two states with respect to petroleum 
activities. While the scope is arguably broader (since the substantive provisions also cover 
cross-boundary projects) other provisions make it clear that the agreement is confined to 
oil and gas activities and not disposal projects. Thus cross-boundary projects are defined 
in terms of transboundary petroleum reservoirs, pipelines and associated facilities. The 
Iceland\Norway Agreement refers only to the exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon 
deposits; similarly the Canada\France Agreement is clearly confined to transboundary 
hydrocarbon fields and activities.
119   Norway\Russia, Article 5 and Annex II; Iceland\Norway; Cyprus\Egypt, Article 1, scope.
120   The UK\Norway Framework Agreement makes this clear insofar as it defines (Article 1.2) 
‘exploitation’ as including injection, reinjection or storage of any substance used for or 
derived from the appraisal, production, treatment and processing of gas or liquids from a 
reservoir.
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derived from the processing of produced substances (as is the case for example 
with the Norwegian Sleipner and Snøhvit projects).121
In sum, such framework agreements would require comprehensive re-
drafting to include pure CCS disposal operations. Alternatively, parties could 
negotiate a parallel framework agreement expressly addressing CCS opera-
tions in the full range of shared geological structures.
4.4 Joint Development Agreements
The literature refers to two main types of joint development agreements 
( JDAs).122 The first category comprises JDAs which are put in place pending 
agreement on delimitation (provisional arrangements123) whereas the second 
category of JDA may be created as part of a delimitation agreement and is 
intended to be permanent. The distinction between these categories of agree-
ment is likely of little significance for present purposes, since, as with the above 
arrangements, the question that concerns us is whether these agreements, 
whether temporary or permanent, whether associated with an agreement on 
delimitation or not, are intended to, or can be read to apply to, CCS related 
activities as well as petroleum activities.124
121   This exception follows from the definition of exploitation quoted, id. There is no doubt 
room to argue that the reinjection activities covered by the agreement are limited to injec-
tion in to hydrocarbon formations. The One North Sea Report (n 20) does however sug-
gest (at 86) that the ideas underlying the Framework Agreement might inform a potential 
parallel agreement dealing with CCS.
122   See Masahiro Miyoshi, ‘The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ (1999), 2(5) Maritime Briefing 1–51.
123   UNCLOS (n 3) Articles 74(3) & 83(3) and see discussion above in section 3.3.
124   The JDAs examined for the purposes of this chapter are as follows: (1) Agreement between 
the Government of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 22 February 1958, 2 IMB 
1489, Report No. 7–3; (2) Convention between France and Spain Concerning on the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Bay of Biscay, 29 January 1974, IMB 1719, 
Report No. 9–2; (3) Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the 
Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to 
the Two Countries, 30 January 1974, 1 IMB 1057, Report No. 5–15; (4) Norway\Iceland (Jan 
Mayen) (1980) 2 IMB 1755; (5) Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and 
the Kingdom of Thailand on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation 
of the Resources of the Sea-Bed in a defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the 
Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 13 May 1990, 1 IMB 1099, Report No. 5–13(2); 
(6) Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam for the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the 
Continental Shelf involving the Two Countries, 5 June 1992, 3 IMB 2335, Report No. 
5–19; (7) Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Jamaica and the Republic of Colombia, 
12 January 1993, 3 IMB 2179, Report No. 2–1, (8) Agreement between the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Demarcation of the Seabed in the Northern 
Caspian Sea for the Purpose of Exercising Sovereign Rights to the Use of Subsoil 
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While some of these agreements are expressly confined to petroleum or 
mineral extraction activities125 most are broader in their application. For 
example, the JDZ established by the France\Spain agreement of 1974 refers 
more generally to the prospecting for, and exploitation of, the resources of the 
JDZ126 while the 1979 Agreement between Malaysia and Thailand refers gen-
erally to the ‘exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources 
Resources, 6 July 1998, and the Protocol, 13 May 2002, 5 IMB 4013, Report No. 11–1; (9) 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the 
Royal Thai Government regarding the Area of their Overlapping Maritime Claims to the 
Continental Shelf, 18 June 2001, 5 IMB 3735, Report No. 5–24, (an agreement to establish 
a joint development treaty); (10) Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 
Democratic Republic of Săo Tomé and Príncipe on the Joint Development of Petroleum 
and other Resources in Respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, 
21 February 2001, 5 IMB 3638, Report No. 4–10; (11) Australia\Timor-Leste (2003), 5 IMB 
3806, Report No. 6–20 (1) & (2); (12) Treaty Between the Republic of Guyana and the State 
of Barbados Concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in their Exclusive Economic Zones 
in the Area of Bilateral Overlap within each of their Outer Limits and beyond the Outer 
Limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Other States, 2 December 2003 5 IMB 3578, 
Report No. 2–27; (13) Agreement on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons in 
the Common Interest Maritime Zone between the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the Government of the Republic of Angola, 30 July 2007, 6 IMB 4270, Report 
No. 4–15, and Protocol of Agreement … Approving Offshore Unitization Prospects, 
10 September 2001, 6 IMB 4281, Report No. 4–16; (14) Mauritius\Seychelles, (2012) 6 IMB 
4391. Mention might also be made to the Denmark\Faroes and UK agreement (n 112) This 
Agreement establishes a Special Area rather than a joint development zone. The Special 
Area is principally an area of shared rights and responsibilities with respect to fisheries 
matters but the Agreement also contemplates that special provisions should also apply 
to oil and gas operators working within the Special Area. Arguably these provisions and 
restrictions would also apply to CCS related operations. Finally, the chapter does not take 
account of the most recent Timor-Leste Australia (and its annex dealing with the Great 
Sunrise project) resulting from the compulsory conciliation proceedings initiated by 
Timor-Leste (n 82).
125   The Japan\Korea agreement applies to natural resources which is defined as petroleum 
and other resources produced in association with petroleum; the Malaysia\Vietnam JDZ 
applies to the exploration and exploitation of petroleum; the Congo\Angola agreement 
creates a ’common interest maritime petroleum zone”; the Australia\Timor-Leste agree-
ment applies to the petroleum resources of the Joint Petroleum Development Area and 
the Norway\Iceland (Jan Mayen Agreement) applies to “co-operation [within the JDZ] … 
in connection with the exploration for and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources …’. 
Finally, while some of the language of the Protocol to the Kazakhstan\Russia Agreement 
refers more generally to economic activity in relation to straddling geological structures 
these provisions should likely be interpreted in light of the dominant concern of the 
agreement which is clearly the hydrocarbon resources of the Northern Caspian Sea.
126   France\Spain Agreement, Annex II. Paragraph 2 of the Annex refers to mining regula-
tions but many jurisdictions licence CCS activities through the mineral or petroleum 
legislation. Other provisions in the Annex such as paragraph 7 which refers to products 
obtained from the JDZ may suggest a narrower interpretation that does not admit of the 
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of the sea-bed and subsoil’ of the overlapping area of claims.127 The treaty 
between Barbados and Guyana similarly applies to the ‘jurisdiction, control, 
management, development, exploration and exploitation of living and non-
living resources, as well as all other rights and duties established in the [Law 
of the Sea] Convention’ within the Co-operation Zone.128 The JDZ treaty 
between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe is also far-reaching.129 This agree-
ment applies to ‘development activities’ within the zone.130 Such activities 
are defined as ‘any economic activity in or concerning the Zone, including 
petroleum activity, fishing activity, all other activities for the development 
or exploitation of other mineral or living resources of the Zone and all forms 
of exploration and research related to any of the foregoing.’ Furthermore, 
Article 32 provides that the Zone Plan (to be developed by the Joint Authority) 
may make provision for non-petroleum development activities within the 
Zone. Equally notable is the 2012 treaty between Mauritius and the Seychelles 
establishing the extended continental shelf beyond the respective EEZs of the 
two countries as a joint management area.131 Within that area, the Contracting 
Parties, through a Designated Authority, ‘shall jointly control, manage and 
facilitate the exploration of the continental shelf … and the conservation, 
development and exploitation of its natural resources’.132
It follows from the above that while all of these agreements would 
cover CO2\EOR operations many of these agreements are also broad enough 
to cover cross-over operations from CO2\EOR to pure disposal operations in 
depleted reservoirs, disposal operations in a previously abandoned reservoir133 
as well as to pure disposal operations in a saline aquifer. This would no doubt 
application of the provisions to disposal activities but the general tenor of the treaty and 
the annex does admit of a broader application.
127   Malaysia\Thailand, MOU, Annex I, Article III. Furthermore Annex III (which establishes 
the joint authority) provides that the purpose of the joint authority ’exploration and 
exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, in particular 
petroleum’ which of course makes it crystal clear that the parties were contemplating the 
exploitation of other resources within the JDZ. See also the Guinea-Bissau\Senegal JDZ 
Agreement and accompanying Protocol of Agreement establishing a joint Agency and 
other institutions. These arrangements apply to fisheries and petroleum resources but 
also refers to other resources of the Zone.
128   Barbados\Guyana, Article 1.
129   Nigeria\Sao Tome and Principe (2001).
130   Ibid, Article 3.
131   Mauritius\Seychelles.
132   Ibid, Article 3.
133   See however Congo\Angola Agreement and the accompanying Protocol (which are 
concerned solely with a ’common interest maritime petroleum zone’). Article 10 of the 
Agreement contemplates that it will expire “upon completion of abandonment work 
of the installations of the final reservoir under exploitation. Article 16 of the annexed 
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require the joint authority (where provided for) to develop specific rules in 
relation to this activity.
5 Other Possible Arrangements
The analysis above shows that while delimitation treaties between adjacent 
and opposite states will frequently deal with the possibility of shared petro-
leum deposits they do not deal expressly with the use of shared geological 
structures for the purposes of CO2 disposal or storage. While such agreements 
may certainly in some cases be read to include CO2\EOR operations, it would 
be very difficult to read them as addressing other forms of CCS operations. 
Many JDAs are framed more broadly and thus might embrace CCS saline oper-
ations but that hardly addresses the question of whether they are really fit for 
the purpose. Accordingly, this last section canvasses the limited literature dis-
cussing what a bespoke agreement for CCS operations in a shared geological 
structure might look like.
The International Energy Agency has developed a Model Regulatory 
Framework for CCS activities.134 While the principal purpose of the docu-
ment is to provide advice on the design of a domestic regulatory framework, 
the Model also acknowledges the need to take account of a number of trans-
boundary issues. These include not only export and transit issues but also the 
issues addressed in this chapter which the report lists as:135
– Unintended migration or leakage of injected CO2 in the sub-surface across 
jurisdictional borders;
– Use of storage complexes that span jurisdictional borders;
– Secondary effects from storage activities occurring across jurisdictional bor-
ders (e.g. due to a sub-surface pressure front or displacement of sub-surface 
fluids across borders).
In response to these issues, the report identifies the need for regulatory co-
ordination and harmonization and either the selection of a single competent 
authority for a CCS project or ‘joint regulatory responsibility’.136 Harmonization 
and coordination might extend to such things as coordinated bidding rounds 
for storage exploration and efforts to optimize the use of pipeline and other 
unitization protocol contemplates that it will remain in force ’as long as the production 
period in the Unitization zone lasts’.
134   International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage: model regulatory frame­
work, 2010. <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/model_frame 
work.pdf>
135   Ibid at 30.
136   Ibid at 31.
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infrastructure; application of market rules for access to storage; and agreement 
on liability and GHG accounting rules.137
In sum, the Model Framework provides some useful ideas but it is far from 
a systematic account as to the contents of either a state-to-state agreement or 
an operating agreement as between the private parties who might actually be 
charged with the responsibility for a CCS project.
Much the same can be said of the Technical paper prepared by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat in response to a request from the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technical Advice (SBSTA) in connection with qualifying CCS projects as CDM 
eligible.138 That paper also recommends drawing upon our experiences with 
water (including aquifers) and petroleum resources139 and briefly canvasses a 
broad range of relevant agreements. It notes that cooperation agreements in oil 
and gas already include common principles providing for inter alia: exchange 
of information; effective exploitation; equitable sharing of the resources; the 
protection of the environment including sometimes in joint management 
structures; appointment of contractors and operators; financial provision; 
and dispute resolution.140 The report also notes that JDAs are frequently more 
integrated and institutionally richer than other bilateral arrangements.141 The 
submissions to the Secretariat also emphasized that some guidance might be 
found in Decision 10/CMP.7 (and its Annex and Appendices), as to the topics 
that might be addressed in any bilateral agreement.142
Another source from which parties might draw are the unitization agree-
ments typically used in the oil and gas industry to deal with production from 
straddling deposits of hydrocarbons.143 Unitization will typically be achieved 
by agreement between those commercial parties who have an interest as 
a licensee (i.e. as a working interest owner) from either government to a 
137   id at 31 & 32. The starting point for developing appropriate GHG accounting rules will be the 
default rules developed by the IPCC in its 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventories, available <https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/>.
138   UNFCCC, Transboundary CCS Technical paper (n 6 and related text).
139   Ibid at para 66.
140   Ibid at para 70.
141   Ibid at para 158.
142   This is the decision of the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol accepting CCS 
project as eligible within the CDM. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.12 and Add.1 (submis-
sions from Australia and Cyprus on behalf of the EU).
143   Jacqueline Lang Weaver and David F Asmus, ‘Unitizing oil and gas fields around the 
world: a comparative analysis of national laws and private contracts’ (2006), 28 Houston 
Journal of International Law 1–190; Ana E Bastida et al, ‘Cross-Border Unitization and 
Joint Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective’ (2007) 29 Houston 
Journal of International Law 355. See also the One North Sea Report (n 20) at 86, suggest-
ing that relevant principles and ideas could be drawn from the UK\Norway Framework 
Agreement (n 117).
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geographical area that forms part of the deposit. The unitization agreement 
will provide for the apportionment of production and expenses in accordance 
with the best scientific understanding as to the distribution of reserves under-
lying either side of the boundary and each of the different licence areas (or 
tracts). Thus each tract will be assigned a tract participation factor. The agree-
ment will also make provision for future operations.144 Unitization agreements 
are only necessary where there are multiple tracts and multiple parties. If there 
is a single tract, or if there is a single owner of the different tracts that form 
the reservoir (or storage unit), then unitization is arguably unnecessary. This 
would be an unusual scenario in an oil and gas context which is an industry 
which thrives on competition145 but is perhaps a more likely scenario in a 
disposal context since operations are likely to be less competitive and more 
coordinated from the outset. Indeed, one of the goals of regulatory coordina-
tion between national authorities should likely be to try and ensure unified 
ownership of a target storage\disposal complex through coordinated offerings 
of storage acreage.
6 Conclusions
This chapter began with discussion of the storage part of the CCS chain con-
sidering CO2\EOR operations as well as storage in a saline formation. A key 
conclusion is that injection in saline formations will likely affect a larger geo-
graphical area than injection in a depleted reservoir and that the effects of 
injection will include a pressure front in addition to the physical CO2 plume.
Section 3 examined general rules pertaining to the duty to cooperate with 
respect to shared resources as well as work conducted under the auspices of 
the Protocol to the London Dumping Convention to develop a set of Guidelines 
for the Assessment of Carbon Dioxide for Disposal into Sub-seabed Geological 
Formations including one key provision dealing with cases where there is the 
potential for the transboundary movement of injected CO2. A crucial point to 
144   There may be one agreement dealing with unitization (the unitization agreement) and 
another agreement dealing with how to make decisions about subsequent operations 
(the unit operating agreement) or the two may be rolled together as a ‘Unitization and 
Unit Operating Agreement’. The agreements will typically be confidential but standard 
forms are available and see also Weaver and Asmus, ibid, especially the Appendix com-
mencing at 99 and containing sample clause from both unitization agreements and rel-
evant domestic laws. One commonly used form is AIPN’s (Association of International 
Petroleum Negotiators) 2006 Unitization and Unit Operating Agreement available on 
AIPN’s website at <http://www.aipn.org/>.
145   Terence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry, 
(Resources for the Future, 2010).
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emphasise is that the Guidelines suggest that injection should only proceed 
in such a case where consent has been sought from all countries with jurisdic-
tion over such a storage formation. Section 3 also examined the implications 
of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) UNCLOS for the situation in which one party may be 
proposing to engage in CCS operations in an area of overlapping maritime enti-
tlements and in the absence of an agreed delimitation. The analysis suggested 
that any storage operations in the area of overlapping entitlements, includ-
ing any evaluation operations that required drilling operations, could only be 
carried out with the consent of all parties with an overlapping entitlement. 
Unilateral operations would be a breach of the obligations of restraint under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3). It would also seem to follow that injection operations 
conducted outside the area of overlapping entitlement which might affect that 
area (either the physical plume or the pressure front) would also be unlawful 
insofar as such effects might prejudice the sovereign rights of the other party 
(depending on the outcome of any agreement or decision on entitlement).
Section 4 examined existing boundary delimitation agreements and joint 
development agreements to see to what extent they may be read as being appli-
cable to CCS and CO2\EOR operations. The general conclusion is that most 
delimitation agreements, even those with straddling deposit clauses likely 
do not extend to cover CCS saline operations; however most if not all would 
cover CO2\EOR operations on the basis that such operations are incidental to 
petroleum recovery. It should also be noted that such operations would likely 
only be conducted where there was already in place a treaty-based unitization 
arrangement with respect to the field and that that treaty might well address 
the introduction of EOR operations either directly or indirectly (by triggering 
a re-assessment of recoverable reserves). While some JDAs only address petro-
leum operations, others are broadly framed. Such agreements would certainly 
cover CO2\EOR operations but some may be read more broadly to cover CCS 
operations in a saline formation. Whether they are fit for purpose however is 
another question.
Section 5 considered other possible arrangements for CCS operations in 
storage complexes that cross a maritime boundary. While some work has been 
done on this topic both in the context of the PLDC and the Kyoto Protocol 
(CCS eligibility under the CDM), this work falls far short of a model bilateral (or 
broader) treaty arrangement. Finally, while there is some suggestion that oil 
and gas unitization agreements might provide a good model for such projects, 
this claim may be doubted insofar as such arrangements are designed to deal 
with the situation of multiple owners and multiple tracts. Such situations are 
common in an oil and gas context but in the case of storage operations, neigh-
bouring states should take a more coordinated approach from the outset with 
a view to avoiding the situation of multiple owners.
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chapter 18
Decommissioning of Offshore Installations: 




After decades of exploitation of offshore resources the problem of managing 
and removing platforms and installations constructed for this purpose urgently 
presents itself. The number of installations which are reaching the end of their 
life-cycle are increasing. The issue of removing outdated platforms and instal-
lations has become prominent since the 1980s. Due to technological advances 
in the oil and gas industries, the exploration of resources has extended to new 
depths and distances, increasing the number of structures in the sea and the 
impacts on the seabed. For instance, in 1950 there were only two offshore drill-
ing rigs in the world. Yet, by 1988 the number of installations rose to 750,1 and 
currently, around 7000 offshore platforms around the world are engaged in the 
exploitation of hydrocarbons.2
*   The author would like to thank Nina Mileva for her research, Nikolaos Giannopoulos for 
his comments on previous drafts of this chapter, and Vivian Aiyedogbon for her editing 
work. The research for this paper has been conducted thanks to the financial support of the 
European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innova-
tion programme (Grant Agreement No 639070 - SUSTAINABLEOCEAN).
1   Z. Gao, ‘International Law on Offshore Abandonment: Recent Developments, Current Issues 
and Future Directives’, in Z. Gao (ed.), Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas, London-The 
Hague-Boston, 1998, at 144.
2   Möller indicates that ‘[t]here are around 6.500 installations worldwide, about 4.000 of which 
are in the US Gulf of Mexico, 950 in Asia, 700 in the Middle East and 400 in Europe’; L. Möller, 
‘UN law on decommissioning offshore installations’, M. Hammerson (ed.), Oil and Gas 
Decommissioning, Global Business Publishing, London, 2013, at 33. Lyons suggests however 
that there are more than ‘7000 offshore platforms installed globally for hydrocarbon explora-
tion and production’; Y. Lyons, ‘The New Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Abandonment 
Wave and the International Rules on Removal and Dumping’, 29 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law (2014) 480–520, at 480.
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Abandoned and decommissioned installations pose two main problems: 
firstly, they can consist of a threat to the safety of navigation, and secondly, 
they can be harmful to the marine environment. Already in 1958, the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf required the complete removal 
of abandoned and decommissioned installations,3 because the exploitation of 
resources in the continental shelf should not result in any ‘unjustifiable inter-
ference’ with navigation, fishing, or the conservation of the living resources 
of the sea.4 This rule however, was designed to mainly address unjustifiable 
interferences with other legitimate uses of the sea and the seabed.5 The 
environmental aspect was not the main concern of the drafters in the early 
developments of the law of the sea, and this approach was subsequently con-
firmed with the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS).6
Nevertheless, installations of the latest generation have been designed and 
built considering the protection of the environment and the relevant legal 
framework. First generation structures, built in the period between 1950 and 
1960, were indeed designed without any consideration for the potential need 
for their removal or abandonment. The issue of dealing with old structures 
became a point of concern for states only in the late 1980s. Actually, even the 
agreements on joint management and exploitation of offshore resources con-
cluded in that period do not contain any specific provisions in this regard. The 
provisions concerning the prevention or reduction of pollution only referred 
to activities of extraction and transport of oil and gas.7
The international community however considered the issue at an earlier 
stage. The first steps towards managing the problem at the international level 
can be traced back to the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
3   Art. 5, par. 5, of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, made in Geneva on 
29 April 1958, entered into force on 10 June 1964.
4   Art. 5, par. 1, of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
5   T. Treves, Codification du droit international et pratique des Etats in le droit de la mer, in Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de droit international de la Haye, 1990-IV, at 204.
6   Signed at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, entered into force on 16 November 1994. 
Regarding the negotiations preceding the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, Treves emphasized 
that ‘le respect généralisé dont font l’objet les activités en matière pétrolière de ces temps 
de crise de l’énergie (années 1970) explique (…) le moins d’attention et de réglementation 
qu’a reçu jusqu’ici la pollution dérivant de ces activités’; cf. T. Treves, La pollution résultant de 
l’exploration et de l’exploitation des fonds marins en droit international, in Annuaire Français 
de Droit International, 1978, at 828.
7   M. Bathurst (ed.), Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, A Model Agreement for States for 
Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary, London, 1989, at 355 ff.
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the Human Environment adopted in 1972 in Stockholm.8 Principle 21 of this 
Declaration contains a reminder that ‘States have […] the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies’, spe-
cifically pointing out their ‘responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ [emphasis added]. The refer-
ence to offshore activities is quite explicit, and addresses their development 
in the 1970s. Twenty years later, in 1992, Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21, concern-
ing the ‘Protection of the Oceans’, details the obligations on states with respect 
to the prevention and fight against ‘the degradation of the marine environ-
ment due to offshore activities’, and provides in particular:
States, acting individually, bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally and 
within the framework of IMO (International Marine Organization) 
and other relevant international organizations, […] should assess the 
need for additional measures to address degradation of the marine envi-
ronment […] (c) From offshore oil and gas platforms, by assessing exist-
ing regulatory measures to address discharges, emissions and safety and 
assessing the need for additional measures. (para. 17.30).
This text, adopted prior to the entry into force of UNCLOS, highlighted a gap in 
the regime related to offshore installations and the need for a regulatory effort 
in this direction.9
More than twenty years after the adoption of Agenda 21, it may be noted 
that some grey areas persist, particularly with respect to the regime concerning 
abandoned or decommissioned platforms and installations. One can wonder 
whether there exists a general obligation to remove outdated structures, and 
if it does, what its content is. Furthermore, it can be discussed whether the 
removal of abandoned and disused structures and platforms is in the best 
interest of the marine environment. In fact, several examples in practice show 
8   Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
5–15 June 1972, available at <http://www.unep.org>.
9   The accident of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig owned by the oil company British 
Petroleum (BP) in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 and its aftermath highlighted the gray areas 
that exist in this area of activity and related regulations. See, among others, R. Abeyratne, 
‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster – Some Liability Issues,’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 
2010, at 125 ff.; C. Chatterjee, Anna Lefcovitch, The Gulf of Mexico Oil Disaster : some Legal 
Issues, in Amicus curiae : journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies, 2010, at 17 ff.
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the potential of former industrial structures to become artificial reefs offering 
habitats to certain species of fish.10
The present chapter analyses the international legal framework applicable 
to the decommissioning of offshore installations and highlights its ambigui-
ties. The chapter also stresses how states still enjoy a broad discretion on how 
to deal with the issue at hand, specifically on whether to remove (partially or 
integrally) or not disused installations. This situation coupled with the frag-
mentation of the international regulatory framework is especially detrimental 
to the protection of the marine environment.
The analysis unfolds in four steps. First, the legal regime incorporated into 
the UNCLOS is sketched. The content of the obligation of partial removal is 
discussed and particular attention is given to the rules of reference contained 
in the relevant provisions (2). Then, the chapter focuses on the global gener-
ally accepted international rules and standards (GAIRS) and the instruments 
elaborated by the IMO (3). Thereafter, the focus moves to the GAIRS elaborated 
at the regional level in order to then present (4), in the following section, some 
considerations on the interaction between the universal GAIRS and regional 
instruments (5). The concluding remarks then stress how the lack of a bind-
ing instrument at the universal level and the geographical fragmentation of 
the existing legal regime act as an obstacle to the development of clear global 
GAIRS and ergo to a more coherent (and effective) legal framework for the 
decommissioning and removal of offshore installations (6).
2 The Law of the Sea Convention Framework
2.1 The Obligation of Partial Removal
With the ‘offshore-isation’11 of the exploitation of oil and mineral resources, 
the UNCLOS entered a new cycle of expansion of the rights of coastal states.12 
Technological advances and the increasing need for energy have added value 
to offshore seabed areas rich in natural resources, and over which coastal 
10   M.J. Kaiser, Y. Yu, B. Snyder, ‘Economic feasibility of using offshore oil and gas structures 
in the Gulf of Mexico for platform-based aquaculture,’ in Marine Policy (2010) 699 ff.
11   T. DAHOU, ‘La politique des espaces maritimes en Afrique. Louvoyer entre local et global,’ 
in Politique africaine, n. 116, December 2009, at 10.
12   Idem (requests for extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles).
435Decommissioning of Offshore Installations
states exercise sovereignty.13 Therefore, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)14 
and continental shelf,15 a coastal State has the right to build or authorize the 
construction of artificial islands, installations and structures for the exercise 
of licensed activities (Article 60(1); Article 80 UNCLOS16). These activities fall 
exclusively in its jurisdiction (Article 60(2)). The question of management 
of abandoned and decommissioned structures and platforms is addressed 
directly in Article 60 para. 3, which provides:
Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, 
installations or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of 
their presence must be maintained. Any installations or structures which 
are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of naviga-
tion, taking into account any generally accepted international standards 
established in this regard by the competent international organization. 
Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the 
marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate 
publicity shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any 
installations or structures not entirely removed. [emphasis added]
From a strictly textual reading of the provision, it can be deduced that 
Article 60(3) does not impose an absolute obligation to remove offshore instal-
lations. While the general rule seems to be that of removal, the second part 
13   Article 193 UNCLOS provides: ‘States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural 
resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to 
protect and preserve the marine environment’.
14   The rights and obligations of coastal States in their exclusive economic zone are defined 
in Article 56 of UNCLOS. The exclusive economic zone is defined in Article 55 as: ‘an area 
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established 
in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and 
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention’.
15   The rights of the coastal State with respect to its continental shelf are defined in 
Article 77 of UNCLOS. The continental shelf is defined in Article 76(1) as : ‘the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or 
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend 
up to that distance’.
16   Article 80 of UNCLOS provides that Article 60 of UNCLOS ‘applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf.’ The analysis and 
considerations regarding Article 60 of UNCLOS which will be detailed later in this study 
are also valid for structures on the continental shelf.
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of the provision focuses on the safety of navigation, which weakens the abso-
lute nature of the obligation. The removal seems to be mandatory only when 
the safety of navigation is at stake; thus it could be inferred that if the safety 
of navigation is not endangered, the structures could be left in place. Other 
legitimate uses of the sea (fishing) and the protection of the environment 
should be given ‘due regard’ in the decision making process, but do not consist 
of self-standing grounds for justifying the removal of the structure. Moreover, 
what clearly emerges is that entire installations and structures cannot be aban-
doned. The last part of Article 60(3) rather explicitly provides for an obligation 
to publicize ‘the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or struc-
tures not entirely removed’. Nonetheless, Article 60(3) of UNCLOS only contains 
an obligation of partial removal, in order to ensure the safety of navigation.
This provision has raised much criticism17 particularly since the wording of 
Article 60(3) differs substantially from that of the precedent Article 5(5) of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The latter called on States to 
completely remove abandoned and disused installations.18 Nevertheless, some 
authors read Article 60(3) as imposing a general obligation of full removal 
in order to ensure the safety of navigation, and saw abandonment or partial 
removal as exceptions subject to specific justifications.19
Articles 60 and 80 UNCLOS only apply to installations in the EEZ and 
continental shelf. There is no specific provision concerning installations in 
the territorial sea except that the coastal state can condition the exercise of the 
right of innocent passage to their protection (Article 19.2(k)); and ‘shall give 
appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, 
within its territorial sea,’ as for instance to offshore installations in activity or 
disused (Article 24.2). The coastal state is then bound by a series of obligations 
17   See, among others, Z. Gao, ‘Current Issues of International Law on Offshore Abandonment, 
with Special Reference to the United Kingdom,’ in Ocean Development and International 
Law, 1997, at 59 ff. ; G.C. Kasoulides, ‘Removal of Offshore Platforms and the Development 
of International Standards,’ in Marine Policy, 1989, at 249 ff. ; AT McDade, ‘The Removal 
of Offshore Installations and Conflicting Treaty Obligations as a Result of the Emergence 
of the New Law of the Sea: A Case Study,’ in San Diego Law Review, 1987, at 645 ff.; 
A. Reglat-Boireau, ‘La désaffectation des installations en mer,’ in Annuaire français de 
droit international, 1982, at 873 ff.
18   Article 5(5) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf reads: Due notice must be given of 
the construction of any such installations, and permanent means for giving warning 
of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which are abandoned or disused 
must be entirely removed [emphasis added].
19   R. Wolfrum, N. Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, Berlin-Heidelberg-New 
York, 2003, pat 110–111.
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for the protection of the marine environment pursuant to Part XII UNCLOS, 
which also applies to the territorial sea.20
While exercising their sovereign rights pursuant to Article 193, a state shall 
comply with ‘the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment,’ 
set in Article 192; and take the necessary measures to prevent, reduce and con-
trol pollution (Article 194).21 Coastal states have a duty to ensure that pollution 
arising from activities within their jurisdiction and control does not extend 
beyond those areas (Article 194(2)).22 If there is an imminent risk of damage to 
the marine environment, the coastal state has an obligation to notify any other 
state, which might be affected by such damage (Article 198).
Article 208 UNCLOS regulates the prevention, reduction and control of the 
pollution from seabed activities subject to national jurisdiction. This is, for 
instance, the pollution generated by the offshore oil and gas industry located 
in the EEZ or continental shelf. Coastal states are required to adopt laws, 
regulations and measures that ‘shall be no less effective than international 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures’ (Article 208(3), 
emphasis added).23 Moreover, states, ‘acting especially through competent 
20   R. Beckman, ‘Global Legal Regime on the Decommissioning of Offshore Installations 
and Structures’, in M. Nordquist et al., The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development, 
Rethinking International Standards, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013, 259–280, at 279.
21   For a recent interpretation of those articles in relation to the construction of installa-
tions and artificial islands, see Permanent Court of Arbitration, The South China Sea 
Arbitration, Award of 12 July 2016, spec. paras 983 ff.
22   This UNCLOS provision re-affirms the well-established customary norm prohibit-
ing transboundary pollution. First affirmed in the Trail Smelter case (United States v. 
Canada, 11 March 1941, RIAA 1941 vol. III, 1905), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
provided that ‘The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment’ (ICJ, Advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons, 8 July 1996, para. 29). See also Y. Lyons, ‘Transboundary Pollution from Offshore 
Oil and Gas Activities in the Seas of the Southeast Asia’, in R. Warner, S. Marsden (eds.), 
Transboundary Environmental Governance. Inland, Coastland and Marine Perspective 
(Ashgate, 2012) 167.
23   UNCLOS does not define concepts such as ‘international rules’, ‘standards’ and ‘recom-
mended practices and procedures’, which remain vague also in practice. See R.R. Churchill 
and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edition (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1999) at 346; B. Oxman, ‘The duty to Respect Generally Accepted International 
Standards’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1991–92, vol. 24, 
pp. 109 ff.; S. Trevisanut, ‘La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et le 
droit de l’environnement : développement intrasystémique et renvoi intersystémique’, 
in H. Ruiz Fabri and L. Gradoni (eds.) La circulation des concepts juridiques: le droit 
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international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall establish global 
and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment referred 
to in paragraph 1’ (Article 208(5), emphasis added). This provision builds an 
important ‘bridge’ between the UNCLOS and other relevant normative sources, 
which do not necessarily generate from treaties, but derive from the work of 
relevant actors. Such includes, international organizations; diplomatic confer-
ences; and professional associations which develop recommendations and 
best practices in a specific economic sector.24
A similar rule of reference25 is also contained in Article 210 UNCLOS con-
cerning the prevention, reduction and control of pollution by dumping. 
Dumping consists of the placement for disposal at sea of wastes and other 
materials, and of ‘vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 
at sea’ (Article 1(5)). The abandonment of installations or parts of the instal-
lations can be considered dumping26 and thus falls under the relevant legal 
regime. The substantive rules on dumping and on seabed activities have been 
(or should have been developed) outside the UNCLOS, and within the frame-
work that the convention creates through reference to generally accepted rules 
and standards (GAIRS) and the duty to respect them.
2.2 The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted Rules and Standards
UNCLOS was born as a framework convention and a living instrument. In order 
to avoid becoming outdated (or even obsolete), the drafters resorted in using 
rules of reference in many of its provisions,27 in particular in those creating 
international de l’environnement entre mondialisation et fragmentation (Société de législa-
tion comparée, 2009) 416. The issue is further discussed below (see Section 2.2.)
24   C. Redgwell, ‘Mind the Gap in the GAIRS: The Role of Other Instruments in LOSC Regime 
Implementation in the Offshore Energy Sector’, in N. Bankes, S. Trevisanut (eds), Energy 
from the Sea: An International Law Perspective on Ocean Energy, Brill Nijhoff, 2015, at 40.
25   Roach highlights how the rules of reference in art. 208 is however slightly different that 
the one contained in other articles regulating pollution: ‘It should be recognized that this 
firm requirement on States (“shall adopt”) contrast sharply with the much looser stan-
dard of “shall endeavour” to establish rules in article 207 (pollution of the marine envi-
ronment from land-based sources), in article 210 (by dumping), and in article 212 (from 
and through atmosphere);’ A. Roach, ‘International Standards for Offshore Drilling’, in 
M.H. Nordquist et al. (eds), The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development, Rethinking 
International Standards (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013) 105.
26   For a discussion on whether the abandonment of installation qualifies as dumping, see 
inter alia Y. Lyons, (n2), 484–491.
27   On the drafting history of the rules of reference see Oxman, (n23), at 121 ff.
439Decommissioning of Offshore Installations
obligations in the field of environmental protection. Article 60(3) provides 
that the removal of any installations should be performed ‘taking into account 
any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the 
competent international organization’ (emphasis added). Moreover, Article 208 
provides that, states shall not only adopt laws, regulations and measures ‘no 
less effective than international rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures’ (para. 3, emphasis added), but they shall also elaborate those 
‘global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and proce-
dures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment’ 
from seabed activities (para. 5, emphasis added). Additionally Article 210(4), 
concerning pollution by dumping, encourages states, ‘acting especially 
through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, (…) 
to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.’
The IMO has taken the lead concerning both the treatment of disused 
installations and pollution by dumping. It has elaborated some guidelines 
for the removal of installations and is the depositary of the London Dumping 
Convention, both discussed below. However, its role in the development of 
the regulatory framework in relation to the offshore oil and gas industry has 
raised some criticism.28 The IMO mandate, as amended, includes ‘the general 
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning mari-
time safety (…) and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships’.29 
Notwithstanding, the IMO Legal Committee has pointed out: ‘while pollution 
directly arising from exploration/exploitation is however not of direct concern 
of IMO, the Organization may contribute to the establishment of international 
regulations’.30 The IMO Legal Committee in particular supports the develop-
ment of guidance for states in their effort to conclude arrangements at the 
bilateral and regional level on liability and compensation issues connected to 
transboundary pollution damage, resulting from offshore oil exploration and 
28   Some states and some commentators have raised several points of criticism about the 
role of the IMO in the development of rules and standards concerning offshore installa-
tions. The details of such debate are beyond the scope of the present chapter. For a critical 
voice, refer to J.A. Roach, ‘International Standards for Offshore Drilling,’ in M.H. Nordquist 
et al. (eds) The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development, Rethinking International 
Standards, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013, at 107.
29   Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Geneva, 
6 March 1948, in force 17 March 1958) 289 UNTS 3, emphasis added.
30   See ‘Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the 
International Maritime Organization’, IMO Doc. LEG/Misc.7 Annex, 19 January 2012, at 18.
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exploitation.31 Not all IMO contracting parties, however, have support for what 
they perceive as an unjustified extension of the IMO mandate.32 This under-
mines the ‘generally accepted’ character of the rules and standards which the 
organisation elaborates.
General acceptance needs to be assessed then on the basis of the subsequent 
practice of states. Consequently, the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards for the 
Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter, 1989 IMO Guidelines)33 are con-
sidered as GAIRS.34 Within the London Dumping system, Lyons for instance 
suggests that, unlike the 1972 London Convention, its 1996 Protocol does not yet 
qualify as global rule under UNCLOS because it has gained general acceptance 
only in some regions of the world.35 This also suggests that the 1996 Protocol 
may be regarded as GAIRS in some areas of the world where the majority of 
relevant states has ratified it, and hence as regional GAIRS and not global rules.
This interpretation can find further support in the joint reading of 
Articles 208 and 210 with Article 237 UNCLOS. Article 237 consists of a specific 
compatibility clause for Part XII of the UNCLOS. The provision in particular 
affirms that the provisions of Part XII are ‘without prejudice (…) to agree-
ments which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set 
forth in this Convention’ (para. 1). This provision facilitates the application 
of UNCLOS in the relevant normative context and of environmental law 
instruments in the context of marine environment protection. It enables the 
application of the 1996 Protocol, within the UNCLOS, for states that are parties 
to it, and thus recognises their practice as relevant for the interpretation and 
application of the relevant UNCLOS provisions (Articles 208 and 210).
31   See IMO doc. LEG 99/14, 24 April 2012, at para. 13.16.
32   A. Roach, ‘International Standards for Offshore Drilling’, at 105. See also see A. Chircop, 
‘The International Maritime Organisation,’ in D.R. Rothwell et al., The Oxford Handbook of 
The Law of the Sea, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, at 429.
33   IMO, Resolution A.672 (16), of 19 October 1989.
34   Y. Lyons, ‘The New Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Abandonment Wave,’ n_, at 495. 
Contra, see A. Proelss, United Convention on the Law of the Sea, A Commentary, Beck/
Hart, Oxford, 2017, at pp. 474–475.
35   Ibid., at 506, 510.
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3 Generally Accepted International (Global) Rules and Standards
3.1 IMO Guidelines
The obligation of partial removal, as affirmed in the UNCLOS, is justified by 
financial considerations surrounding the operation, and confirmed by the 1989 
IMO Guidelines.36 These Guidelines were developed by the IMO pursuant to 
its competences in the field of maritime safety37 and are thus primarily con-
cerned with the safety of navigation. They deal to a lesser degree with fisheries 
and the environment, as the mandate of the IMO does not include general 
jurisdiction over environmental matters.
The Guidelines provide that the processing of installations is performed pur-
suant to a case by case determination by the coastal State. They are therefore 
characterized by a high degree of flexibility, which contributes to their success 
with coastal states.38 Furthermore, the Guidelines provide for the removal of 
installations which are located at a depth of less than 75 meters, and weigh 
less than 4000 tons. Nonetheless, the possibility of partial removal or aban-
donment of the structures remains in cases when their removal is not feasible 
from a technical point of view (first generation structures); when the removal 
is excessively costly; or when the removal might pose an unacceptable risk 
for people or for the environment. Additionally, the Guidelines accommodate 
the possibility of re-using installation, in particular as an artificial reef for the 
development of fisheries. This is in line with the general criteria for removal 
provided by Article 60(3), namely that the removal procedure has due regard, 
36   IMO, Resolution A.672 (16), of 19 October 1989, paras 3.6, 3.8, 3.12. In this regard see 
R. Beckman, ‘Global Legal Regime on the Decommissioning of Offshore Installations 
and Structures’, in M. Nordquist et al., The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development, 
Rethinking International Standards, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013, at 266.
37   S. Rosenne, ‘The International Maritime Organization Interface with the Law of 
the Sea Convention,’ in M.H. Nordquist, J.N. Moore (eds.), Current Maritime Issues and the 
International Maritime Organization, The Hague-Boston-London, 1999, at 260. The author 
recalls that UNCLOS requires the collaboration of the IMO, as the competent interna-
tional organization in 72 sectors, 19 of which are not shared with other organization (such 
as FAO, ILO, or ICAO). The development of standards for the removal of offshore stuctures 
is featured among the 19 sectors over which the IMO has jurisdiction. On the role of the 
IMO in the development of international rules and standards, see A. Chircop, (n32), at 
429; S.N. Nandan, S. Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 
A Commentary, vol. II, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, at 587; T. Treves, (n5) at 206.
38   T. Treves, (n5), at 205: ‘The success of the IMO initiative seems to confirm that the require-
ment to introduce a measure of flexibility in the rule on the obligation to remove is 
widespread in the international community’.
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not only to the security of navigation, but also to ‘fishing, the protection of the 
marine environment and the rights and duties of other States’.39
As illustrated by the 1989 IMO Guidelines, the objective of environmental 
protection sometimes clashes with the obligation to remove an installation 
when the latter has become an artificial habitat for natural resources, mainly 
for some fish stocks.40 An abandoned or decommissioned offshore installation 
which has become an artificial habitat for certain species may still however 
be considered a form of pollution when it is an obstacle to fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea. States consequently find themselves balancing 
between environmental interests, especially the obligation to protect living 
resources, on the one hand, and the prevention and control of pollution on the 
other hand. More specifically, states find themselves stranded between, first, 
Articles 208 and 214 concerning the pollution resulting from seabed activi-
ties, and second Articles 56, 61, 117 and 118 concerning the protection of living 
resources. The Guidelines do not provide any further guidance on how to strike 
such a balance, leaving an important margin of discretion to coastal states.
3.2 London Dumping Convention and Its 1996 Protocol
As mentioned above, the remains of or disused structures can also be aban-
doned in accordance with the 1972 London Convention for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (hereinafter, 1972 
London Convention).41 Article III of the 1972 London Convention (replaced 
39   Some authors claim that paragraph 3 of Article 60 does not impose any absolute obliga-
tion as to the removal of facilities but rather suggests general criteria for determining the 
removal procedures in specific cases; see S.N. Nandan, S. Rosenne (eds.), (n37) at 585.
40   There are even mentions of a “beneficial” environmental effect of certain structures which 
develop into habitats for commercially relevant species; see K. Bangert, ‘Environment 
Protection – Offshore, Oil and Gas Production’, in U. Karpen (ed.), Maritime Safety – 
Current Problems of Use of the Baltic Sea, Baden-Baden, 2005, 88; P Macreadie. A. Fowler, 
B. Booth, ‘Rigs to Reef: will the Deep Sea Benefit from Artificial Habitats?,’ in Frontiers in 
Ecology and the Environment (2011) 455. According to Beckman, ‘[t]here are three meth-
ods by which installations and structures could be used for the creation of artificial reefs. 
First, the top part could be removed and the bottom of the structure left in-situ, with 
sufficient clearance so that it does not pose a threat to navigation. Second, the structure 
could be toppled on site with sufficient clearance so that it does not pose a threat to 
navigation. Third, the structure could be cut up and parts of it moved to specific loca-
tions to attract marine life’; R. Beckman, ‘Global Legal Regime on the Decommissioning of 
Offshore Installations and Structures’, in M. Nordquist et al., The Regulation of Continental 
Shelf Development, Rethinking International Standards, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013, at 
275.
41   Signed in London on 29 December 1972, entered into force on 30 August 1975. The 1972 
Convention was substituted by the 1996 Protocol. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, signed in London 
on 7 November 1996, entered into force on 24 March 2006.
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by the 1996 Protocol) provides that ‘dumping’ means ‘any deliberate disposal 
at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea’. The 
1972 London Convention does not contain a comprehensive ban on dumping,42 
and neither does the 1996 revised text of the Convention provide for an abso-
lute prohibition of dumping of platforms and installations.
Through its amending Protocol of 1996, the 1972 London Convention inte-
grates the precautionary principle. This reverses the logic of the previous 
system by prohibiting the dumping of seriously harmful substances43 and 
the incineration of waste at sea. The preamble of the Protocol also considers 
relevant international instruments, including in particular UNCLOS, the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21 of 1992. Article 210 (5) and (6) of UNCLOS concern-
ing pollution through dumping provides:
(5) Dumping within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone 
or onto the continental shelf shall not be carried out without the express 
prior approval of the coastal State, which has the right to permit, regu-
late and control such dumping after due consideration of the matter 
with other States which by reason of their geographical situation may be 
adversely affected thereby. (6) National laws, regulations and measures 
shall be no less effective in preventing, reducing and controlling pollu-
tion than the global rules and standards. [emphasis added]
The UNCLOS here refers to the 1972 London Convention,44 which preceded the 
UNCLOS and was taken into account in the drafting process. UNCLOS suggests 
the possibility of normative developments leading to a stricter regime. Indeed, 
42   Z. Gao, (n1) at 164.
43   Pursuant to Article IV of the 1972 Convention, before its amendment in 1996, substances 
whose dumping is completely prohibited are inserted into the ‘black list’ of Annex I 
to the Convention; then there is the ‘gray list’ of Annex II, which contains the names 
of substances whose dumping requires special permission; and finally Annex III lists the 
substances and wastes the dumping of which may be allowed in general. Art. 4 of 1996 on 
the other hand prohibits all dumping except for substances listed in Annex 1, the dump-
ing of which is subject to obtaining an authorization under the criteria set out in Annex 2.
44   C. Redgwell, ‘From Permission to Prohibition: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the Protection of the Marine Environment’, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes, D.M. Ong 
(eds.), The Law of the Sea, Progress and Prospects, Oxford, 2006, at 190 : ‘Far from being 
self-contained regimes, the [UNCLOS] and the London Convention of 1972 can be defined 
as ‘Reinforcing integrated schemes’, insofar as they contaminate each other by absorbing 
the changes that occur on one side and another, but also outside, as in the grounds of the 
IMO’; see also S. Trevisanut, ‘La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et 
le droit de l’environnement: développement intrasystémique et renvoi intersystémique’, 
in H. Ruiz Fabri, L. Gradoni (eds.), La circulation des concepts juridiques : le droit interna-
tional de l’environment entre mondialisation et fragmentation, Paris 2009, at 411.
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the regime created by the 1972 London Convention, as modified by the 1996 
Protocol, may be seen as being slightly stricter than the one created by the 
UNCLOS. The dumping of offshore platforms and installations is mentioned 
in Annex 1 of the 1996 Protocol, in reference to wastes or other matter that 
may be considered for dumping (para. 1.4, Annex 1). The text of the new agree-
ment allows states to adopt stricter national measures banning the dumping of 
wastes and other materials specified in Annex 1 of the Protocol (Article 4(2) 
of the 1996 Protocol).
Wastes and other materials may be considered for dumping provided such 
material that creates floating debris or otherwise contributes to the pollution 
of the marine environment has been removed; and only when it has been 
ascertained that the material dumped poses no serious obstacle to fishing or 
navigation (para. 2, Annex 1). Article 4(1)(2) of the 1996 Protocol indicates that 
particular attention shall be paid to opportunities to avoid dumping in favour 
of environmentally preferable alternatives. The national authority respon-
sible for granting permission for dumping must assess the existence of less 
environmentally harmful alternatives; and the owner of the structure seek-
ing permission to perform dumping must prove that there is no other more 
preferable alternative.45 The regime created by the 1972 London Convention 
as amended by the 1996 Protocol is slightly stricter than the one created by the 
UNCLOS, in the sense that full removal is general standard, and dumping is a 
possible alternative only if there is no evidence to the contrary.
The London Convention system thus creates a presumption in favour of the 
removal of an abandoned or decommissioned structure. Hypothetically, this 
preference may be reversed if the structure becomes an artificial reef, namely 
when the abandonment takes place for environmental reasons, thus for a pur-
pose other than the mere disposal of the installation. Unlike the UNCLOS, the 
London Convention does not only address coastal States, but also owners of 
structures who bear the burden of proof with respect to the inevitability of the 
dumping. These owners (private persons) thus assume an important role in 
the decision-making process concerning the treatment of disused structures. 
This might pose a problem with respect to the availability of means, as the 
two concerned entities – the national authority responsible for the granting 
of authorizations and the owner of the structure – may not have the same 
45   IMO 2000 Specific Guidelines for Assessment of Platforms or Other Man-Made Structures at 
Sea, para. 5, available at: <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/2000-specific-guidelines-for-assessment 
-of-platforms-or-other-man-made-structures-at-sea/>. See also H. Esmaeili, The Legal 
Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001, at 201.
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technical and economic means at their disposal. It is sufficient to think of 
examples of developing countries where the major oil companies are most 
active. This imbalance might be mitigated in the future by the work the London 
Convention/Protocol TC Trust Fund46 within the Technical Co-operation 
Committee (TC) of the IMO. London Convention/Protocol TC Trust Fund is 
responsible for managing donations for cooperation and technical assistance. 
The work of the fund is particularly important in regions where no specific 
instrument regulates the protection of the marine environment, generally, and 
dumping, specifically.
4 International (Regional) Rules, Standards and Recommended 
Practices and Procedures
Both Article 208.5 and 210(4) UNCLOS refer to the need to elaborate instru-
ments at the regional level in order to regulate, respectively, pollution from 
seabed activities and dumping. Four regional seas instruments have either 
specific provisions or specific instruments regulating the decommissioning of 
offshore installations and/or their dumping. The content of each regional sys-
tem is briefly described and analysed in order of strength of their provisions 
concerning the dumping of installations.
4.1 The Offshore Protocol to the Kuwait concerning Marine Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf
The 1989 Offshore Protocol to the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,47 permits partial 
removal in the interests of safety of navigation and fishing (Article XIII(1)(b)). 
Contracting states shall also have regard to any guidelines issued by the regional 
organization. The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (MEMAC)48 has how-
ever not yet elaborated such guidelines concerning the decommissioning of 
installations. It has nonetheless adopted Guidelines on Requirements for the 
46   IMO, doc. LC-LP.1/Circ.33, 19 January 2010.
47   Protocol Concerning Marine Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf, 2065 UNTS 68, available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%202065/v2065.pdf>.
48   The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (MEMAC) was created in 1982 by the Protocol 
concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful 
Substances in Case of Emergency to the Kuwait Convention. For more information about 
this regional organisation, see: <http://memac-rsa.org/en/home>.
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Conduct of Environmental Impact Survey and the Production of Environmental 
Impact System (hereinafter, Guidelines on Requirements for the Conduct of 
Environmental Impact Survey).49 Those guidelines are particularly important 
because the Protocol does not contain a clear and general obligation of envi-
ronmental impact assessment, (EIA) as it allows contracting parties not to 
require such an assessment before a new activity starts. When the contracting 
state decides not to request an EIA, it ‘shall consider’ performing a survey of 
the marine environment (Article IV.2). Contracting parties then have a wide 
margin of discretion under this instrument, which is, however, limited by the 
global legal framework analysed above.
The Guidelines on Requirements for the Conduct of Environmental Impact 
Survey mention in the terms of reference of the assessment that those terms 
require the consideration of ‘[p]lans for removal of any plant or equipment, 
and any reclamation, restoration or clearing of the site after cessation of 
operations’ (4.2(j)). The same guideline however recognises the wide margin 
of appreciation to the authority requiring the assessment as it can strike out 
any term of reference which is considered unnecessary by the objectives of 
the survey (4.2.). In respect of decommissioning of offshore installations, the 
Kuwait Convention thus does not provide for clear obligations to complement 
the general legal framework sketched above.
4.2 The Dumping and Offshore Protocols to the Barcelona Convention 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution
The 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean contains two instruments 
which are relevant for the issue at hand: the Protocol for the Prevention of 
Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (here-
inafter, Barcelona Dumping Protocol, not yet into force)50 and the Protocol 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its 
Subsoil (hereinafter, Barcelona Offshore Protocol).51
The Barcelona Dumping Protocol applies to platforms and other structures 
(Article 3.1) and follows the same rational as the London Convention system, 
49   Available here: <http://memac-rsa.org/assets/fileManager/1_GUIDELINES_Impact_Asses 
sment_1.pdf>.
50   UNEP(OCA)/MED IG.6/7; text available at < http://web.unep.org/unepmap/who-we 
-are/legal-framework>.
51   UNEP(OCA)/MED IG.4/4; text available at <https://wedocs.unep.org/rest/bitstreams/ 
2336/retrieve>.
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namely dumping is prohibited except when it is permitted. The Barcelona 
Offshore Protocol, on the other hand, consists of a quite detailed instrument 
which aims at covering the complete life-cycle of an offshore operation. In 
setting a number of mandatory requirements for the authorization proce-
dure (Articles 4–7), the protocol focuses on the role of both authorizing states 
and the industry, i.e. the operator, in assessing the environmental impact of 
a planned activity, in monitoring it and in reacting to possible emergencies.52 
Article 5 in particular requires that the project submitted by the candidate 
operator also includes ‘(g) The plans for removal of installations as specified in 
Article 20.’ Article 20 extensively reaffirms Article 60.3 UNCLOS and adds ele-
ments concerning the role of private actors. The article provides that:
The operator shall be required by the competent authority to remove any 
installation which is abandoned or disused, in order to ensure safety of 
navigation, taking into account the guidelines and standards adopted by 
the competent international organization. Such removal shall also have 
due regard to other legitimate uses of the sea, in particular fishing, the 
protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of other 
Contracting Parties. Prior to such removal, the operator under its respon-
sibility shall take all necessary measures to prevent spillage or leakage from 
the site of the activities (Article 20(1), emphasis added).
Moreover, Article 20 also creates an obligation upon coastal state to act in the 
event in which the operator ‘fails to comply with the provisions of this Article.’ 
‘[T]he competent authority shall undertake, at the operator’s expense’ any 
necessary action, including the actual removal of the installation.
The Mediterranean Action Plan,53 adopted in the framework of the Offshore 
Protocol, aims in particular at encouraging the adoption of further safety mea-
sures at the regional level, in the time frame of 2016–2024. These measures 
should include: ‘[s]etting-up a governance framework to support the imple-
mentation of the Action Plan and the adoption, enforcement and monitoring 
of regional standards, procedures and rules;’ [d]efining commonly agreed 
regional offshore standards and guidelines’; and develop and adopt ‘[c]ommon 
52   S. Trevisanut, ‘The Role of Private Actors in the Offshore Energy Industry,’ 29 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2014) 645.
53   Mediterranean Offshore Action Plan in the framework of the Protocol for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation 
of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, UNEP(DEPI)/MED IG.22/28, 
available at: <https://wedocs.unep.org/rest/bitstreams/8381/retrieve>.
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criteria, rules and procedures for the removal of installations and the related 
financial aspects adopted’.54 The Action Plan also provides the creation of 
two sub-groups within the Barcelona Convention Offshore Oil and Gas Group 
(BARCO OFOG) which will be in charge of the removal of installation, namely 
the OFOG Sub-Group on environmental impact and the OFOG Sub-Group on 
health and safety.55
In relation to the development of regional standards and guidelines, the doc-
ument emphasizes the need of Regional Guidelines on removal of installations 
and the related financial aspects,56 highlighting in this way the shortcomings 
of the global and regional existing legal framework and the crucial importance 
of clarification and harmonization.
4.3 The Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area
The Helsinki Convention for the protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area57 contains Annex VI on the prevention of pollution from off-
shore activities. Pursuant to Regulation 8 of Annex VI, concerning disused 
offshore units, the ‘Contracting Parties shall ensure that abandoned, dis-
used, and accidentally wrecked offshore units are entirely removed and brought 
ashore under the responsibility of the owner’ (emphasis added). This regulation 
restates Article 5(5) of the 1958 Geneva Convention58 in stricter terms, and 
lays the primary responsibility of removal on the private operator (the owner). 
Differently to the Barcelona Offshore Protocol, the Helsinki Convention does 
not specify what actions the State should take if the owner of the structure 
refuses to comply with his responsibilities.
Annex VI applies to all offshore units defined in Regulation 1 which includes: 
‘any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas or oil 
exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or unloading of 
oil’. This definition thus limits the scope of application to structures engaged in 
activities related to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. Hence, 
the structures engaged in the production of renewable energy are not included.
54   Ibid, at 214, 220.
55   Ibid, at 215–216.
56   Ibid, at 220.
57   Adopted in Helsinki on 24 September 1992, entered into force on 17 January 2000. The 
text replaces the previous 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the Baltic Sea for 1974. The agreed text of 1992 was amended four times (2000, 2002, 
2004, 2007). The articles which are referred to in this study correspond to the text as 
amended by the entry into force in 2008 of the last amendments, available at <http://
www.helcom.fi>.
58   K. Bangert, (n40) at 88.
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The Helsinki Convention then prohibits pollution by dumping. This 
includes ‘any deliberate disposal at sea or into the seabed of wastes or other 
matter from ships, other man-made structures at sea or aircraft’ (Article 2(4)
(a)(ii)). Offshore installations, including those which are not engaged in oil 
and gas sector, should not be dumped; thus, we can assume that there exists 
a presumption in favour of the removal of such installations. The prohibition 
of dumping is however not absolute. Contracting parties can issue a permit 
for the dumping of certain dredged material, provided that the criteria set out 
in Annex V are respected (Article 11(2)). Moreover, Article 11(3) provides that:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply (…) in any case which con-
stitutes a danger to human life, if dumping appears to be the only way of 
averting the threat and if there is every probability that the damage con-
sequent upon such dumping will be less than would otherwise occur. Such 
dumping shall be so conducted as to minimize the likelihood of damage 
to human or marine life. [emphasis added]
It may be observed that this provision contains the same criteria as the 1996 
London Dumping Protocol. Namely, dumping should take place only when 
no other alternative solution provides comparable guarantees. However, the 
Helsinki Convention does not provide detailed guidelines on the burden of 
proof regarding the inevitability of dumping as the London Convention. Given 
the role assigned to the owner of the offshore installation by Annex VI it may, 
however, be assumed that the owner is also called to play a role in the deter-
mination of the burden of proof for dumping, at least with respect to facilities 
used by the oil and gas industries.
4.4 The OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic
The North-East Atlantic is filled with offshore structures involved in the explo-
ration and exploitation of non-living resources. Already in the 1970s, coastal 
states59 established a system for the protection of the environment by adopting 
the 1972 Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping. 
59   The OSPAR system has 14 States Parties and the European Commission, representing 
the European Community, now the European Union. The States Parties are: Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Not all Contracting Parties are 
coastal states. An example of this is Finland, whose participation is justified by the fact 
that part of its rivers flow into the Barents Sea; Luxembourg and Switzerland are contract-
ing parties as they are located in the Rhine catchment area. For further information see 
<http://www.ospar.org>.
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In 1974, the Oslo Convention was joined with the Paris Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, thus becoming 
the OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic in 1992.60
Annex III of the OSPAR Convention concerning the prevention and elimi-
nation of pollution arising from offshore activities contains an absolute 
prohibition on dumping of wastes and other material (Article 3(1) Annex III) 
derived from offshore installations. The definition of dumping includes ‘any 
deliberate disposal in the maritime area of wastes or other matter from offshore 
installations’ (Article 1(f)(i)(2) OSPAR Convention) but excludes the full or par-
tial maintenance of the facilities in place, provided that this is compatible with 
the Convention (Article 1(g)(iii) OSPAR Convent). Article 5(1) of Annex III then 
specifies that no disused offshore installation shall be left wholly or partly in 
place in the maritime area without a permit issued by the competent authority 
on a case-by-case basis. If the disused offshore installation contains substances 
which may result in hazards for ‘human health, harm to living resources and 
marine ecosystems, (…) or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea’, 
no such permit should be issued (Article 5(2) Annex III). Any such permit 
should contain the relevant justifications and, since 1st January 1998, need to 
be communicated to the other OSPAR Contracting Parties through the OSPAR 
Commission, in order to make consultation possible (Article 5(3) Annex III).
This kind of obligation already existed in the Oslo conventional system. 
Such is why in February of 1995 the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
informed the Oslo Commission (the predecessor of the OSPAR Commission) of 
its intention to grant permission to Shell UK, to dump the remains of the Brent 
Spar Shell platform which was decommissioned in 1991. In April of the same 
year, multiple protests against the project were organized by environmental 
groups, and particularly by the non-governmental organisation Greenpeace. 
Without going into too much detail concerning the events,61 these protests 
led to a debate during the Meeting of Ministers of the Oslo commission in 
60   Concluded in Paris on 22 September, 1992, and entered into force on 25 March, 1998.
61   Many authors have dealt with this subject. See for example: L. de La Fayette, ‘New 
Developments in the Disposal of Offshore Installations,’ in International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, 1999, at 523 ff. ; Z. Gao, (n1), at 59 ff. ; E.A. Kirk, ‘The 1996 Protocol to the 
London Dumping Convention and the Brent Spar,’ in International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 1997, at 957 ff.; S. Mankabady, ‘Decommissioning of Offshore Installations,’ in 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1997, at 603 ff. ; J. Woodliffe, ‘Decommissioning of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Installations in Europe Waters: The End of a Decade of Indecision?,’ 
in International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1999) at 101 ff.
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June 1995, which adopted a moratorium on the dumping of offshore installa-
tions. In January of 1998, Shell UK announced a new project for the disposal 
on-shore of the structure.
The immediate consequence of this episode was the adoption of the Decision 
OSPAR 98/3 for the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installation by the OSPAR 
Commission in July of 1998.62 Pursuant to this text, which entered into force in 
February of 1999, ‘[t]he dumping, and the leaving wholly or partly in place, of 
disused offshore installations within the maritime area is prohibited’. However, 
the text states that where ‘there are significant reasons why an alternative dis-
posal mentioned below is preferable to reuse or recycling or final disposal on 
land’ the competent authority may issue a permit for exemption to the prohi-
bition. Thus, it may authorise the dumping or abandonment of parts of or the 
entire structure.
The OSPAR Commission has had a central role in the development of a 
procedure for the decommissioning and removal of offshore installations. 
Decision 98/3 with its ban on dumping establishes a presumption in favour 
of an obligation to remove a disused structure. Moreover, the mandatory sys-
tem of consultation in case of derogation, provided in Annex 3 of Decision 
98/3, guarantees the existence of control, international monitoring, and thus 
better protection of common interests, such as the protection of the marine 
environment.
5 Interaction between Regional and Global Rules: Complementarity 
and Fragmentation
The regulation of offshore oil and gas operations has developed following a 
liberal model of regionalism.63 There is no attempt in the UNCLOS ‘either to 
impose a uniform global standard comparable to that for ships, or even a mini-
mum standard comparable to that for dumping at sea.’64 The UNCLOS has thus 
only partially contributed to the coherent development of the legal framework 
in this field, mainly through the general obligations for the protection of the 
marine environment and for partial removal.
62   Available at < https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/oic/installations>.
63   A. Boyle, ‘Globalism and Regionalism in the Protection of the Marine Environment,’ in 
D. Vidas, Protecting the Polar Marine Environment, Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, at 24.
64   Ibid.
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The existence of specialized regional instruments is a welcome phenom-
enon which, on the one hand, implements the obligation set in Article 208 
UNCLOS and, on the other hand, develops state practice in this field. However, 
as highlighted in the analysis on the existing instruments, regional approaches 
seem to diverge on certain key issues, such as, absolute or relative prohibition 
of dumping and criteria for issuing dumping permits. Moreover, the level of 
regional integration varies significantly from one regional sea to the other. 
The OSPAR and Helsinki systems rely on a developed institutional framework 
which includes supervisory and monitoring bodies, the OSPAR Commission 
and the Helsinki Commission, respectively. Under the Barcelona Convention, 
compliance control lies with the Meeting of the Parties and is conducted 
through the revision of periodical reports submitted by the contracting parties 
(Articles 18.2 and 27 of the Barcelona Convention; Article 30 of the Barcelona 
Offshore Protocol). A similar system exists under the Kuwait Convention where 
the Council of the Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment receives and evaluates the reports sent by the contracting parties 
(Article XVII). These institutional differences impact the level of implementa-
tion of the existing obligations and the progressive development of rules and 
standards at the regional level.
Boyle insightfully remarks that: ‘[R]egional cooperation may fragment the 
possibilities for, and the effectiveness of international supervision of com-
pliance with environmental standards. (…) Without an overarching global 
scheme comparable to the London [Dumping] Convention, there is (…) no 
alternative supervisory mechanism and no accountability.’65 This is not a call 
against regionalism. It is more a reminder that regionalism by itself, and in 
particular weak regionalism, without an international/global framework, does 
not solve all problems. The global framework is not enough developed at the 
normative and institutional level in order to guarantee the effectiveness of 
regional cooperation systems or to offer safeguards against their failures.
6 Concluding Remarks
Partial or complete removal of offshore installations from the seabed is the 
generally accepted rule under both global and regional instruments. The con-
ditions under which the removal is supposed to be performed and the criteria 
for the exceptions however highly diverge from one treaty system to another. 
65   Ibid., at 33.
453Decommissioning of Offshore Installations
This remains highly problematic in light of the considerable number of instal-
lations reaching the end of their life-cycle, and of the potential environmental 
harm they represent.
The lack of an agreed institutional framework should not necessarily con-
sist of an obstacle to the development of a more coherent and comprehensive 
legal framework. As pointed out by Beckman, ‘[i]f the IMO is not considered to 
be the competent international organization for this purpose, then interested 
States should draft a global convention and convene a global diplomatic con-
ference to consider its adoption.’66 A specialized framework treaty could be 
an important step for the offshore industry in general and for the treatment of 
decommissioned or disused installations in particular. However, Scovazzi aptly 
highlights that, ‘there is little appetite for a global regime,’67 notwithstanding, 
the strict regional model68 has poignantly shown its limits.
66   R. Beckman, ‘Global Legal Regime on the Decommissioning of Offshore Installations 
and Structures’, in M. Nordquist et al., The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development, 
Rethinking International Standards, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013, at 280.
67   T. Scovazzi, ‘Maritime Accidents with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage from the Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Seabed, in A. De Guttry 
et al (eds), International Disaster Response Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2012, 
at 457.
68   Tanaka distinguished four models on interaction between global and regional legal 
frameworks. Under the first model, the regional model, ‘the role of the global treaty is very 
limited and marine pollution it to be regulated promarily by regional treaties.’ The other 
three models are: the global-single regional model; the global-multiple regional model; 
and the global model. See Y. Tanaka, ‘Four Models on Interaction between Global and 
Regional Legal Frameworks on Environmental Protection against Marine Pollution: The 
Case of the Marine Arctic,’ Ocean Yearbook (2016) at 346.
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chapter 19
Re-using (Nearly) Depleted Oil and Gas Fields in 




Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) involves the capture of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), the transport and injection and subsequent permanent storage into 
suitable geological formations.1 According to the European Commission, CCS 
is a major instrument in view of the transition to a full low-carbon economy, 
as CO2 storage can balance conflicting interests of increasing energy demands 
and thus continued reliance on fossil fuels on the hand and the need to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere on the other hand.2
*   This chapter has been written as part of the CATO CCUS programme. The main part of the 
research was conducted by Daniëlle M. Hanema who was a junior researcher at the Groningen 
Centre of Energy Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands until 1 November 2015. 
The main part of the research was concluded in 2015 but updates have been made where 
necessary.
1   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture 
and Storage. Prepared by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[B. Metz and others eds] (Cambridge University Press 2005) 54 <www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special 
-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf>.
2   European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions on the Future of Carbon Capture and Storage in Europe’, Brussels, 27.03.2013, 
COM (2013) 180 final, 3; European Commission, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and others, ‘A Clean Planet for all A European strategic long-
term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy’, Brussels, 
28.11.2018 COM(2018) 773 final, 15; L. Helman, G. Parchomovsky and E. Stavang, ‘Dynamic 
Regulation and Technological Competition: A New Legal Approach to Carbon Capture and 
Storage’ in D.N. Zillman and others (eds), The Law of Energy Underground: Understanding 
New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 296.
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CO2 can be stored in different kinds of reservoirs such as aquifers and 
depleted oil and gas fields.3 This chapter looks into the re-use of depleted oil 
and gas fields for the purpose of CO2 storage.4 Since CO2 storage onshore is 
met by fierce public opposition,5 offshore storage is currently considered as 
the main option in Europe. Below the focus will therefore be on CO2 storage 
in (nearly) depleted reservoirs offshore. We will in particular concentrate on 
the North Sea as this area has the largest storage capacity in Europe and a 
suitable geology for the purpose of CO2 storage.6 Because this offshore area is 
characterized by large scale oil and gas exploitation,7 it also has the potential 
for reusing these fields for CO2 storage. Depending on the size and location 
of these reservoirs, it may even be necessary to decide that CO2 storage will 
require a coordinated approach and turn several depleted reservoirs into CO2 
storage facilities at the same time.8 CO2 storage on the Dutch continental shelf 
may, for example, rely on clustering several reservoirs given their relatively 
small size.9 In order to form an adequate cluster, these reservoirs have to be 
3   See: IPCC (n 1) 94. Depleted offshore oil and gas fields are important for CO2 storage due to 
their geophysical features, the years of experience in exploiting them and the presence of 
suitable infrastructure that could be reused: IPCC (n 1) 215.
4   This reuse involves the transition of an exploitation permit to a storage permit and scaling up 
in terms of infrastructure: EBN & Gasunie, ‘CO2 transport- en opslagstrategie’ (EBN/Gasunie 
Advies 2010) 11 <www.ebn.nl/ebn-publicaties/overige-publicaties> accessed 17 October 2015 
(Dutch only).
Storage sites can only be operated provided there is a storage permit: Directive 2009/31/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage 
of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and 
Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC (CCS 
Directive) [2009] OJ L140/114, art 6(1).
5   See for example: COM (2013) 180 final (n 2) 18. Also: M. Pragnell, ‘Communications for 
Carbon Capture and Storage: Identifying the benefits, managing risks and maintain-
ing the trust of stakeholders’ (supported by Global CCS Institute 2013) 12–13 <http://hub 
.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/92266/communications-carbon 
-capture-storage.pdf>.
6   Scottish Carbon Capture & Storage (SCCS), SCCS Recommendations and Conference 2013 
Report. Unlocking North Sea CO2 Storage for Europe: Practical actions for the next five years 
(SCCS 2013) 10–11 < www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/reports/unlocking/downloads/
SCCSConference2013Report.pdf >.
According to the European Commission, storage capacity in the North Sea has been esti-
mated at over 200 gigatonnes of CO2: COM (2013) 180 final (n 2) 18.
7  <http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63>.
8   See also chapter 17 of this book, N. Bankes, ‘The use of sub-seabed transboundary geological 
formations for the disposal of carbon dioxide’
9   DHV and TNO (commissioned by NOGEPA and Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs), 
‘Potential for CO2 storage in depleted gas fields on the Dutch Continental Shelf. Phase 1: 
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situated in close proximity to each other.10 Even if these reservoirs are located 
in close proximity to each other it does not necessarily mean that they will 
reach a state of near depletion at the same time. This raises issues with regard 
to existing abandonment and removal obligations. Is it possible to keep off-
shore installations in place instead or removing them with the aim of re -using 
the reservoirs and installations for CO2 storage on a later stage?
In order to answer the question whether infrastructure can be kept in place 
with the aim of reusing it at a later stage for CO2 storage, it needs to be assessed 
whether States can allow for offshore installations not being removed after 
production has ceased. For this purpose, we will first consider in Section 2 the 
position of coastal States under international law and in particular the Law of 
the Sea as the latter provides for the legal basis for developing energy activi-
ties offshore. In Section 3, we will then examine how some coastal States have 
implemented these principles of international law in their national jurisdic-
tions. We will particularly examine the regimes in the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Norway. Subsequently Section 4 will discuss some specific 
challenges and possible solutions with regard to the reuse of depleted and 
abandoned fields and infrastructure. Finally, Section 5 will provide some con-
cluding remarks.
2 The Exercise of State Jurisdiction Offshore
2.1 Introduction
Historically, the use of the sea was unrestricted and open to all mankind.11 The 
jurisdiction of States and the rights to issue and enforce legislation was in 
principle limited to the territory of States. This situation changed when due 
to technical developments it became possible to produce oil offshore.12 In 
order to deal with offshore claims the 1958 United Nations Convention on the 
Continental Shelf provided for the concept of a continental shelf (CS) and 
the subsequent right of coastal states’ functional jurisdiction with regard to 
the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas on the continental shelf.13 The 
   technical assessment’ (June 2008) 31, 44 <www.nlog.nl/resources/StorageCO2/DHV_
TNO_CCS_offshore_%20final_30_06_08.pdf>.
10   DHV and TNO (n 9) 44.
11   See the concept of ‘Mare Librum’ as issued by Hugo de Groot in 1609.
12   See Truman Proclamation.
13   United Nations, Convention on the Continental Shelf. Done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958, 
no. 7302. United Nations –Treaty Series 1964 Vol. 499, 311–354 <https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20499/volume-499-I-7302-English.pdf>.
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1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)14 provided 
coastal States with the possibility to claim an additional maritime zone – an 
exclusive economic zone or EEZ – and thus additional rights as regards the 
production of energy from other sources like waves and other economic 
activities.15
Whereas States have sovereignty and thus full jurisdiction on their territory 
(including the territorial sea),16 their jurisdiction is limited on the CS and in 
the EEZ to economic activities such as the exploration for and the production 
of oil and gas. Coastal States may thus issue legislation governing these activi-
ties offshore. Although UNCLOS does not specifically refer to carbon storage it 
is generally assumed that this activity also is part of a coastal State’s functional 
jurisdiction, either on the basis of the regime governing the continental shelf 
or the regime governing the EEZ.17
2.2 Jurisdiction under UNCLOS
It follows from the above that coastal States have sovereign rights in the EEZ18 
and on the CS19 and thus a functional jurisdiction for the purpose of the explo-
ration and exploitation of natural resources.20 To be able to exercise these 
rights, coastal States have the right to make use of the seabed and to establish 
14   United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea. Concluded at Montego Bay on 
10 December 1982, no. 31363. United Nations – Treaty Series 1994 Vol. 1833, 396–581. 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A 
-31363-English.pdf>.
15   The 1958 UN Convention on the Continental Shelf and UNCLOS have been signed and 
ratified by the North Sea States. Currently UNCLOS is the main legal basis for develop-
ing activities offshore. See also M. Brus, ‘Challenging Complexities of CCS in Public 
International Law’ in M.M. Roggenkamp and E. Woerdman (eds), Legal Design of Carbon 
Capture and Storage. Developments in the Netherlands from an International and EU 
Perspective (Intersentia 2009) 29.
16   UNCLOS (n 13), art 2(1), (2) and art 3.
17   Brus (n 15) 29.
18   The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which shall not extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured: UNCLOS (n 14), arts 55, 57. An EEZ has to be declared by a coastal State.
19   UNCLOS (n 14), art 76(1): The CS of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is mea-
sured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
20   UNCLOS (n 14), art 56(1)(a) (EEZ) and art 77(1) (CS). Natural resources include the min-
eral and other non-living resources of the seabed and the subsoil: UNCLOS (n 14), art 56(1)
(a) (EEZ) and art 77(4) (CS).
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as well as use offshore installations.21 It entails that coastal States have the 
exclusive right to construct, authorize and regulate the construction, opera-
tion and use of all installations necessary for the exploration and production of 
energy offshore.22 The functional jurisdiction is extended to those cables and 
pipelines constructed or used in connection with exploitation of resources.23
The functional jurisdiction24 needs to be balanced with another main prin-
ciple of UNCLOS: the freedom of fishing, navigation as well as the laying of 
cables and pipelines. The freedom to use the high sea cannot be restricted more 
than really necessary. Consequently, when an oil or gas production ceases, 
installations necessary for its production need to be removed. The extent to 
which these installations have to be removed has been a matter of discussion 
since the 1980s. Below we will examine the removal obligations applying to off-
shore installations – e.g. reservoirs, wells, platforms and subsea facilities – and 
offshore pipelines as these obligations are crucial when assessing a possible 
reuse for the purpose of CO2 storage.25
2.3 Removal of Offshore Installations
2.3.1 International Legal Framework
Under the regime of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf abandoned 
or disused offshore installations located on the CS had to be removed entire-
ly.26 The introduction of UNCLOS in 1982 has limited this obligation as it now 
generally provides for the removal of abandoned or disused installations with-
out requiring complete removal.27 It therefore facilitates a partial removal of 
installations, and ‘appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth, position 
and dimensions of any installations not entirely removed’.28 UNCLOS does 
21   UNCLOS (n 14), art 56(1)(b)(i), 60(2) (EEZ).
22   UNCLOS (n 14), arts 60(1)(b), 56(1)(a) (EEZ) and arts 80, 60(1)(b), 56(1)(a) (CS).
23   UNCLOS (n 14), arts 56(3), 79(4) (EEZ) and art 79(4) (CS).
24   H.K. Müller and M.M. Roggenkamp, ‘Regulating Offshore Energy Sources in the North 
Sea- Reinventing the Wheel or a Need for More Coordination?’ [2014] The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 716, 718.
25   See further IEAGHG, ‘Re-use of Oil & Gas Facilities for CO2 Transport and Storage’, 
2018/06, July 2018.
26   United Nations, Convention on the Continental Shelf. Done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958, 
no. 7302. United Nations –Treaty Series 1964 Vol. 499, 311–354, art 5(5) <https://treaties 
.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20499/volume-499-I-7302-English.pdf >.
27   UNCLOS (n 14), arts 80, 60(3) (CS).
28   Also: R. Beckman, ‘Global Legal Regime on the Decommissioning of Offshore Installations 
and Structures’ in M.H. Nordquist (ed), The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development. 
Rethinking International Standards (Nijhoff 2013) 263; C. Redgwell, ‘International 
Regulation of Energy Activities’ in M.M. Roggenkamp and others (eds), Energy Law in 
Europe. National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University Press 2007) 65.
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not provide any detailed rules as to when and how these installations have 
to be removed. It merely states that coastal States have to take into account 
‘any generally accepted international standards established by the competent 
international organization’,29 which in this case is the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).30 In 1989, the Assembly of the IMO adopted Guidelines 
and Standards for the removal of offshore installations on the CS and in the 
EEZ (IMO Guidelines).31
Starting-point of the IMO Guidelines is the obligation to remove aban-
doned and/or disused installations.32 Entire removal is explicitly required if 
the offshore installations are located in shallow waters.33 However, the IMO 
Guidelines also provide possibilities to allow for non- or partial removal of 
installations,34 in which case the IMO has to be notified of the decision.35 An 
exemption from the removal obligation would, for example, be possible if the 
existing installation (or part thereof) will serve a new purpose.36 At first glance, 
this possibility could be relevant for reusing installations for the purpose of 
CO2 storage. However, the IMO Guidelines are not legally binding37 and a 
decision not to remove or partially remove abandoned or unused installations 
needs to be balanced against the duties stemming from UNCLOS, most particu-
larly the freedom of navigation and fishery. Although coastal States basically 
are bound by a duty to remove unused offshore installations and thus need to 
29   UNCLOS (n 14), art 60(3) (EEZ) and arts 80, 60(3) (CS).
30   ‘Competent or relevant international organizations under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea’ Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 31, 82. <www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_
publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletinE31.pdf>. On the relationship between 
UNCLOS and the IMO: International Maritime Organization, ‘Implications of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization’ 
(LEG./MISC.7), IMO 19 January 2012). <www.imo.org/OurWork/Legal/Documents/
Implications%20of%20UNCLOS%20for%20IMO.pdf>.
31   IMO, Resolution A. 672(16), adopted on 19 October 1989 (Annex: Guidelines and Standards 
for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone). <www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1026>.
32   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 1.1.
33   This concerns offshore installations which stand in less than 75 meters of water (100 
meters if it has been emplaced on the sea-bed on or after 1 January 1998) and weighs less 
than 4,000 tonnes in air (IMO Guidelines (n 31), paras 3.1 and 3.2).
34   The non- (or partial) removal has to be consistent with the IMO Guidelines: IMO 
Guidelines (n 31), para 1.1.
35   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 1.3.
36   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 3.4(1).
37   IMO, Resolution A. 672(16) (n 29), point 2. At the same time, the IMO Guidelines need 
to be taken into consideration by Member Governments: UNCLOS (n 14), art 60(3). Also: 
Redgwell (n 28) 66.
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ensure that removal actually takes place,38 UNCLOS and the IMO Guidelines 
also provide some flexibility and as decisions with regard to (partial) removal 
and the timing of removal are based on a case-by-case evaluation.39
2.3.2 What Is an Installation?
According to UNCLOS the removal obligation applies to abandoned and 
disused installations and structures in order to ensure safety of navigation 
and will take into account international standards (e.g. IMO Guidelines) and 
have due regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the 
rights and duties of other states.40 It is generally accepted that this obligation 
applies to all exploration and production platforms. It is not clear whether the 
removal obligation also applies to abandoned or unused pipelines on the CS 
or in the EEZ.41 The wording of UNCLOS indicates that the removal obliga-
tion could apply if a pipeline qualifies as an installation or other structure.42 
In the absence of a clear definition in UNCLOS of the terms ‘installation’ and 
‘structure’, it is generally accepted that a pipeline is not considered as an instal-
lation because most provisions of UNCLOS regarding installations do not apply 
to submarine pipelines. This is, for example, the case with the requirement 
that coastal states have to establish a safety zone around installations. Such a 
requirement does not apply to pipelines (and would be difficult to establish). 
Moreover, UNCLOS explicitly links the need for removal to safety of navigation. 
Unused pipelines will usually not affect safety of navigation.
Although generally speaking pipelines are not considered as an installation 
in its own right, it is still possible that some pipelines (and cables) are con-
sidered as being part of a (production) installation. In such case the removal 
obligation applying to installations may extend to some subsea pipelines. 
We therefore conclude that by virtue of the absence of a directly applicable 
international legal norm, it is within the competence of the coastal State to 
determine the legal regime governing the removal of offshore pipelines and 
38   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 1.2.
39   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 2.1. For the specific conditions: see inter alia IMO Guidelines 
(n 31), para 2.4. The coastal State also has obligations with regard to the installation, as it 
should ensure that the legal title to the installation is unambiguous and that responsibil-
ity for maintenance and the financial ability to assume liability for future damage are 
clearly established: IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 3.11.
40   UNCLOS (n 14), art 60(3).
41   M.M. Roggenkamp, Het juridisch kader van pijpleidingen in de olie- en gasindustrie 
(Intersentia 1999) 409.
42   UNCLOS (n 14), art 60(3).
461Re-using (Nearly) Depleted Oil and Gas Fields in the North Sea
that a distinction needs to be made between different types of pipelines, i.e. 
pipelines being part of the installation and field-to-shore pipelines.
2.3.3 The Timing of Removal
The next question relevant for our research is when exactly offshore instal-
lations have to be removed. The removal obligation applies if an installation 
is abandoned or disused. UNCLOS does not provide a clear guidance for this 
purpose. Generally speaking an installation is disused if production has ceased 
or if a licence to produce has lapsed. However, not any termination of the pro-
duction activities implies that the installation is disused. Although the IMO 
Guidelines merely are recommendations,43 they provide some further guid-
ance in this respect as they refer to ‘permanent disuse’. In other words, they 
seem to indicate that a distinction needs to be made between disuse and per-
manent disuse.
UNCLOS does neither provide for a specific time frame for any removal of 
unused installations. Again the IMO Guidelines seem to provide some guid-
ance as they state that the removal should be performed ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable after abandonment or permanent disuse’.44 In practice these norms 
may still prove to be rather vague as different opinions may be held about the 
term ‘reasonable practicable’. When is something reasonable practicable and 
who decides whether it is reasonable?
This phrasing of UNCLOS therefore seems to leave the possibility for leaving 
an installation in place after production has ceased with the aim of reusing it 
on a later stage for carbon storage as in such scenario the permanent disuse of 
the installation will be postponed after the injection of CO2 into the reservoir 
has been completed. Last but not least, disuse of an installation does not mean 
that the installation is abandoned. As long as an installation is being main-
tained and an operator is in charge there is no abandonment taking place.
More problematic is the situation when an installation is kept in place for 
future use (and thus not permanently disused) but at the same time is aban-
doned as the operator in charge of the production activities is no longer in 
charge. What is the status of the installation in the period of (temporary 
disuse) and reuse? To what extent should this situation be considered as con-
stituting illicit disposal under international law, especially in view of the duty 
of coastal States to adopt laws to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
43   IMO, Resolution A. 672(16) (n 31), point 2.
44   IMO Guidelines (n 31), para 1.2.
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marine environment caused by any source,45 including dumping.46 The term 
‘dumping’ refers to any deliberate disposal of offshore installations47 but does 
not include ‘the leaving wholly or partly in place of a disused offshore instal-
lation, provided that any such operation takes place in accordance with any 
relevant provision of the Convention and with other relevant international 
law’.48 A situation where an unused installation is kept in place for future use 
would therefore not constitute a form of dumping. The dumping conventions 
applying to the North Sea area do subsequently not apply and will not be dis-
cussed in this chapter.
2.4 The Reuse of Installations
The above has shown that UNCLOS requires that abandoned or disused instal-
lations or structures shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into 
account international standards and having due regard to fishing, the protec-
tion of the marine environment and the rights and duties of other states. This 
obligation applies to offshore (production) installations and to those pipelines 
that are considered part of the installation. As regards the field-to-shore pipe-
lines UNCLOS does not require any removal. Coastal States may thus decide to 
leave those offshore pipelines that are not part of an installation in situ.
Neither UNCLOS nor the IMO Guidelines impose a clear time frame on the 
coastal State with regard to the removal of installations. Moreover, the IMO 
Guidelines seem to imply that coastal States have some discretion as to the 
timing of the removal and to the possibility of temporarily leaving the installa-
tions in situ for purposes of CO2 storage. Another matter is how coastal States 
have interpreted these norms. This issue will be discussed below.
3 Functional Jurisdiction and Abandonment Approaches in the 
North Sea
3.1 Introduction
It follows from the above that coastal States have a functional jurisdiction with 
regard to the exploration for and exploitation of natural resources on the CS 
and are thus entitled to regulate oil and gas production and subsequently also 
45   UNCLOS (n 14), arts 194(1), 194(3).
46   UNCLOS (n 14), arts 194(1), 194(3) and 210(1).
47   Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic. 
Done at Paris, on 22 September 1992, art 1(f)(ii)(i). <http://www.ospar.org/convention/
text> accessed 28 October 2015.
48   OSPAR Convention (n 47), art 1(g)(iii)(i).
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the construction and removal of all necessary installations. Similarly, we noted 
that coastal States have generally assumed that their functional jurisdiction on 
the CS and/or in the EEZ also applies to carbon storage. In this section we will 
discuss how these principles of jurisdiction have been applied in the North Sea 
area. Whilst doing so it has to be noted that international law addresses States 
and States usually are not directly involved in energy production – and carbon 
storage – but rather transfer those rights to individual companies.
Most coastal States surrounding the North Sea are members of the 
European Union (EU). Norway is not a member of the EU but party to 
the European Economic Area (EEA). Based on the EEA Agreement, Norway 
may be required to implement all relevant EU directives and regulations.49 
Consequently, Norway has implemented both the Hydrocarbons Licensing 
Directive (Directive 94/22/EC) and the CO2 Storage Directive (2009/31/EC). 
These directives provide general rules on EU level for governing explora-
tion and production of hydrocarbons and the possibility of carbon storage. 
Whereas the Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive does not explicitly refer to the 
continental shelf and thus assumes that EU Member States have functional 
jurisdiction, the European legislator apparently wanted to avoid any doubt 
about the extent of coastal States’ jurisdiction as it has included in Directive 
2009/31/EC an express provision allowing for CO2 storage on the continental 
shelf and in the exclusive economic zone within the meaning of UNCLOS.50
The Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive and the CO2 Storage Directive are 
both based on an authorization regime. EU Member States may have the right 
to issue exclusive authorizations for the exploration and production of oil and 
gas51 but may also issue exploration permits for selecting suitable storage sites 
and permits for storing carbon dioxide.52 It should be noted, however, that the 
Hydrocarbon Licensing Directive does not include any provisions regarding 
the closure of reservoirs, the removal of installations and pipelines, nor regard-
ing the possibility of reusing depleted oil and gas fields for storage of carbon 
dioxide.53 Neither of these directives nor any other EU legislation specifically 
applies to the abandonment and removal of offshore oil and gas installations 
49   Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ L 1/3, art 7(b). <www.efta.int/
legal-texts/eea>.
50   CCS Directive (n 4), art 2(1) and preamble, recital 18.
51   Directive 94/22/EC, arts 1(3), 3.
52   CCS Directive (n 4), art 1 and 2(1).
53   Also: M.M. Roggenkamp and D.M. Hanema, ‘New Uses of the Underground in 
the Netherlands: How to Manage a Crowded Subsoil?’ in D.N. Zillman and others 
(eds), The Law of Energy Underground: Understanding New Developments in Subsurface 
Production, Transmission, and Storage (Oxford University Press 2014) 375.
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and the possible re-use of subsoil areas and installations. In the absence of 
any guidance at EU level we will therefore focus on the way in which coastal 
States have dealt with these issues. Below we will thus discuss the national 
regimes in three North Sea States – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Norway. These States have been mainly selected on account of their sig-
nificance in offshore oil/gas production54 and their potential for CO2 storage.55 
Moreover, all three coastal states also are faced with the need to decommis-
sion offshore installations. Despite these similarities there are also some major 
differences. One of these differences relates to the size of the fields and thus 
the extent to which it may be necessary to cluster depleted fields in order to 
develop economically viable CO2 storage.
Below we will briefly discuss the rules applying to the exploration and pro-
duction of oil and gas and the storage of carbon dioxide. The main focus will, 
however, be on the rules governing abandonment and removal of installa-
tions and the possibility for re-using these installations for storing CO2. We 
will in particular examine the Dutch Mining Act of 2003 (MA 2003)56 and its 
54   In 2013, the primary production of natural gas in the EU amounted to 131.755 kilotonne 
of oil equivalent (ktoe) and the primary production of crude oil and other hydrocarbons 
(together) amounted to 72.041 ktoe. In the same year, the Dutch primary production 
accounted for 61.767 ktoe (natural gas) and 2.192 ktoe (crude oil and other hydrocarbons), 
whereas the UK primary production was 32.870 ktoe (natural gas) and 41.921 ktoe (crude 
oil and other hydrocarbons). In Norway, the primary production in 2013 accounted for 
95.602 ktoe (natural gas) and 84 932 (crude oil and other hydrocarbons). Eurostat, Energy 
balance sheets 2013 data (Eurostat 2015) 9 (EU), 49 (Netherlands), 67 (UK), Norway (69) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-EN-15-001>. General 
information on offshore oil and gas production in the European Union/North Sea is avail-
able through: <http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63>.
55   The Netherlands: see DHV and TNO (n 9). The UK: see UK Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC), ‘CCS Roadmap. Storage strategy’ (URN 12D/016d, DECC 
April 2012) <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
48320/4904-ccs-roadmap–storage-strategy.pdf>. Norway has extensive experience with 
regard to CO2 storage: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘CO2 Storage Atlas Norwegian 
North Sea’ (2011) 6 <www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/3-Publikasjoner/Rapporter/PDF/CO2-AT 
LAS-lav.pdf>.
56   Mining Act 2003. Dutch: Wet van 31 oktober 2002, houdende regels met betrekking tot het 
onderzoek naar en het winnen van delfstoffen en met betrekking tot met de mijnbouw ver-
wante activiteiten (Act of 31 October 2002, regarding regulations concerning the explo-
ration for and the production of minerals and concerning mining related activities), 
Staatsblad 14 November 2002, number 542 (Dutch). A (non-authoritative) translation of 
this Act in English: <http://nlog.nl/en/legal/legislation.html>.
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accompanying Mining Decree57 and Mining Regulation,58 the UK Petroleum 
Act 1998 (PA 1998)59 and the Guidance Notes60 as well as the Norwegian 
Petroleum Act 1996 (PA 1996) and the accompanying Petroleum Regulations 
1997 (PR 1997).61
3.2 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate (MEA) is 
entitled to award oil and gas exploration and/or production licences as well 
as CO2 storage licences on a competitive basis.62 Exploration and production 
licences are usually applied for by and awarded to joint ventures for a specific 
period of time. The joint venture parties appoint an operator that needs to 
be approved by the MEA.63 The State participant – EBN – will usually partici-
pate financially via an agreement of cooperation.64 When awarding a licence 
the MEA may require the licensee for a financial security in order to ensure 
that abandonment and removal costs can be paid for.65 So far the MEA has not 
made use of this possibility.
57   Mining Decree. Dutch: Besluit van 6 december 2002, houdende regels ter uitvoering van 
de Mijnbouwwet (Decree of 6 December 2002, regarding regulations to implement the 
Mining Act), Staatsblad 2002, number 604 (Dutch). A (non-authoritative) translation of 
the Mining Decree in English: <http://nlog.nl/en/legal/legislation.html>.
58   Mining Regulation. Dutch: Mijnbouwregeling, Staatscourant 16 December 2002, number 
245 (Dutch). A (non-authoritative) translation of this Regulation in English: <http://nlog.
nl/en/legal/legislation.html>.
59   Petroleum Act 1998, c 17. An Act to consolidate certain enactments about petroleum, 
offshore installations and submarine pipelines <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/17/
contents>.
60   Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘Guidance Notes. Decommissioning of Offshore 
Oil and Gas Installations and Pipelines under the Petroleum Act 1998’ (DECC Guidance Notes), 
<www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-decommissioning-of-offshore-installations-and-pipelines>.
61   Petroleum Act 1996. Norwegian: Lov om petroleumsvirksomhet (Petroleum Act), 
<https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72>. A non-authoritative transla-
tion of the Act in English can be consulted at: <www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Acts/
Petroleum-activities-act/>. Petroleum Regulations 1997. Norwegian: Norwegian: Forskrift 
til lov om petroleumsvirksomhet (Petroleum Regulations). Sections 10 till 18 NO PA 1996 
provide the legal bases of these Regulations. <https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/for-
skrift/1997-06-27-653>. A non-authoritative translation of the Regulations in English can 
be consulted at: <www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Regulations/Petroleum-activities/>.
62   MA 2003 (n 56), arts 6 and 31b–32. So far, the Ministry has awarded one CO2 storage 
permit.
63   M.M. Roggenkamp ‘Energy Law in the Netherlands’ in M.M. Roggenkamp and others 
(eds), Energy Law in Europe. National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming in 2016).
64   M.M. Roggenkamp ‘Energy Law in the Netherlands’ (n 63).
65   MA 2003 (n 56), art 47.
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The MA 2003 explicitly provides that ‘a mining installation that is no lon-
ger in use has to be removed’.66 As the Dutch CS has shallow waters with an 
average water depth of 35 meters, rising to well over 60 meters in the north-
ern parts,67 these installations will in accordance with the IMO Guidelines be 
removed entirely.68 So far, approximately 2,000 wells (both onshore and off-
shore) have been abandoned, 23 platforms removed – with some 150 platforms 
remaining – and some 200 km pipelines decommissioned.69
The closure, abandonment and removal of offshore installations are subject 
to an abandonment and removal plan, which is issued by the operator.70 This 
plan needs at least to describe the way in which the installation, debris and 
other matter will be removed71 as well as their final destination,72 and the tim-
ing of the involved activities.73 The removal plan has to be send to the MEA for 
approval.74 The MEA can only refuse his consent in case of risk of potential 
damages.75 Although neither the MA nor the Mining Decree provides for a 
time limit for actual removal, the Minister has the right to set such a time limit.76 
This provision allows the MEA to force the (former) licensee77 to remove the 
installation.78 By doing so the State passes on to the (former) licensees 
the obligation to remove unused offshore installations.
66   MA 2003 (n 56), art 44(1). MA 2003 (n 56), art 1(o) refers to the term mining installations 
being ‘a mining work anchored in or present above the soil of surface water’.
67   ‘Ontwerp- Beleidsnota Noordzee 2016–2021’, 5 (Dutch). This policy document is an appen-
dix to the ‘Ontwerp Nationaal Waterplan 2016–2021’ and was presented to Dutch parlia-
ment in December 2014, see: Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 31 710, number 35 (Dutch).
68   Section 2.3. (this article). M.M. Roggenkamp ‘Energy Law in the Netherlands’ (n 61).
69   EBN c.s., ‘Netherlands masterplan for decommissioning and re-use’, 2017. See https://ken 
nisbank.ebn.nl/masterplan-decommissioning-and-re-use/.
70   Mining Decree (n 57), art 60(1).
71   Mining Decree (n 57), art 61(1)(a), (1)(c).
72   Mining Decree (n 57), art 61(1)(d).
73   Mining Decree (n 57), art 61(2).
74   Mining Decree (n 57), art 60(2).
75   Mining Decree (n 57), art 60(3).
76   MA 2003 (n 56), art 44(4).
77   MA 2003 (n 56), arts 47(2) in combination with art 41(4). If there is more than one party to 
the licence, the operator will be responsible instead: TK 1998–1999, 26 219, number 3, 27.
78   TK 1998–1999, 26 219, number 3, 27. According to the MEA, the same provision could 
create an opportunity for postponement of removal if the platform is not used anymore 
for production processes, but is still a link in the transportation system. This appears to 
be relevant if multiple fields share their infrastructure and there is/are still some produc-
ing field(s).
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Following the main principles of international law, offshore pipelines will 
usually remain in place unless the MEA prescribes such removal.79 A deci-
sion to remove unused pipelines will be made on the basis of comparing the 
costs and benefits for society with the environmental consequences and safety 
issues.80 If a pipeline remains in situ, the MEA may require that the pipeline 
meets certain requirements as regards its condition81 and that the operator 
will regularly inspect the abandoned pipeline.82 This provision seems rather 
contradictory as it can be assumed that the company operating a pipeline will 
terminate its activities when the pipeline is being disused. It is therefore not 
surprising that this provision will be reassessed.83
It follows from the above that by contrast to submarine pipelines, unused 
installations have to be completely removed on the basis of an abandonment 
and removal plan that has to be approved by the MEA. Such approval can 
only be rejected if the plan would result in dangerous situations. If not being 
rejected on those grounds, the Minister has to grant its approval and is not 
entitled to deviate from the plan submitted by the operator. Hence, the MEA 
is not in the position to facilitate that an unused and abandoned installations 
remains in place if a licensee/operators submits a removal plan and initiates a 
removal of an unused installation within a specific time frame, the MEA is nei-
ther entitled to reject the plan in order to facilitate future CO2 storage. Hence, 
the legal framework does not really facilitate re-use of installations.
However, the approach towards re-use of installations is gradually chang-
ing since EBN jointly with the organisations representing the oil and gas 
operators (NOGEPA) and service industry (IRO) presented in November 2016 
a Masterplan for Decommissioning & Re-use in the Netherlands. This led 
to the establishment of a National Platform for Re-use & Decommissioning 
(Nexstep). In response to the discussions on potential re-use options, the MEA 
is proposing an amendment of the MA to enable the re-use of offshore assets.84
79   MA 2003 (n 56), arts 49(1),(5) with reference to Mining Decree (n 57), art 103. In case 
the MEA has commanded removal of an offshore pipeline, the same regime as regards the 
removal of offshore installations will apply: MA 2003 (n 56), art 45(1).
80   ‘Ontwerp- Beleidsnota Noordzee 2016–2021’ (n 65), 35.
81   MA 2003 (n 56), arts 49(1),(5) with reference to Mining Decree (n 57), art 104(2).
82   MA 2003 (n 56), arts 49(1),(5) with reference to Mining Decree (n 57), art 104(3). If neces-
sary, the MEA may stipulate remedial action.
83   An investigation will be carried out between 2016 and 2021 in order to establish whether 
it would be possible to leave the pipelines in situ without inspection, whether the duty 
of inspection should be transferred to the government or to consider the possibility of 
removing the pipeline. See ‘Ontwerp- Beleidsnota Noordzee 2016–2021’ (n 67), 35.
84   TK 2017–2018 (Duurzame ontwikkeling en beleid), 30196, nr. G, 2.
468 Roggenkamp
3.3 The United Kingdom
Whereas exploration for and production of oil and gas are based on licensing 
pursuant to the Petroleum Act 1998 (PA 1998) as amended, permits to store 
carbon dioxide are governed by the 2008 Energy Act.85 By contrast to the oil 
and gas exploration and production licensing regime on the UK continental 
shelf, section 18(3) of the 2008 Energy Act also requires a lease from the Crown 
Estate for storing CO2 offshore.86 An offshore hydrocarbons licence covers all 
phases of the development, i.e. exploratory drilling, appraisal and production, 
but is split into three terms and may last for approximately 25 to 30 years. The 
licence may be awarded upon condition that the licensee provides for finan-
cial security87 by way of a trust or other arrangements.88 The licence is usually 
awarded to an unincorporated joint venture who appoint amongst themselves 
an operator.89 By contrast to the Netherlands (and Norway) the State does not 
participate.
The CS of the United Kingdom (UKCS) comprises (mostly) of deep waters 
and although it is presumed that unused installations have to be entirely 
removed, the PA 1998, consistent with OSPAR Decision 98/3, allows for the pos-
sibility of partial removal.90 Rules regarding abandonment and removal can 
be found in the PA 1998, which provides that the Secretary of State (SoS) may 
require the submission of an abandonment programme for the abandonment 
of an offshore installation91 or a submarine pipeline.92 The power in the hands 
85   Energy Act 2008, c 32. ‘An Act to make provision relating to gas importation and storage’ 
(…….) <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/32/contents> accessed 13 October 2015. See: 
A. McHarg and M. Poustie, ‘Risk, Regulation, and Carbon Capture and Storage: The United 
Kingdom Experience’ in D.N. Zillman and others (eds), The Law of Energy Underground: 
Understanding New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 250.
86   See also EnA2008, Explanatory Notes, para 55.
87   PA 1998 (n 59), ss 38A, 38B.
88   PA 1998 (n 59), s 38A(1).
89   G. Gordon, A. McHarg and J. Paterson ‘Energy Law in the United Kingdom’ in 
M.M. Roggenkamp and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe. National, EU and International 
Regulation (Oxford University Press forthcoming 2016).
90   PA 1998 (n 59), s 29(4)(c).
91   Offshore installation means any installation which is or has been maintained, or is 
intended to be established, for the carrying on of – inter alia – the exploitation of min-
eral resources in or under the shore or bed of relevant waters. (PA 1998 (n 59), ss 45, 
44(1)- 44(4)). Relevant waters include the Continental Shelf of the UK (PA 1998 (n 59), 
s 44(4)(b) PA 1998 (n 59), Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 1(7) and the Continental Shelf 
(Designation of Areas) Order 2013).
92   Submarine pipeline means a pipeline, i.e. a pipe or system of pipes (excluding a drain or 
sewer) for the conveyance of anything, together with all apparatus, works and services 
associated with its operation, which is (or is intended to be established) in, under or over 
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of the Secretary of State to make regulations for decommissioning93 have not 
been used, but Guidance Notes have been issued and regularly updated by the 
relevant Department94 and it is by means of these that the UK specifies in 
detail how it will go about implementing its obligations under international 
law with regard to decommissioning.95 Usually the abandonment programme 
will be submitted to the SoS by the operator, but the SoS may serve a notice 
requiring submission of such a programme might to a wide range of parties.96 
In case of any unused pipelines, a notice can only be served upon the owner 
of the pipeline, any person who owns a significant interest in the pipeline or 
associated companies with this person.97 An abandonment programme will be 
subjected to a stakeholder consultation process98 and shall in any case contain 
an estimate of the costs of the measures proposed in it and shall either specify 
the times at/within the proposed measures are to be taken or shall make provi-
sion as to determine these times.99
The SoS may reject the programme or approve it conditionally or uncon-
ditionally. If an abandonment programme has been approved by the SoS, the 
person who has submitted the programme has to secure that it will be car-
ried out and that any abandonment and/or removal conditions are complied 
with.100 This implies that the operator – who will in most cases be the desig-
nated person101 – will be responsible for the monitoring and the maintenance 
waters in the territorial sea and the CS. (PA 1998, ss 45 and 26(1), Continental Shelf Act 
1964, s 1(7), and the Continental Shelf (Designation of Areas) Order 2013).
PA 1998 (n 59), s 29(1).
Even though the Act refers to an abandonment programme, the preferred and 
generally accepted term is decommissioning programme: DECC Guidance Notes (n 58), 
para 2.1.
93   PA 1998 (n 59), s39.
94   Currently the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (commonly 
referred to by the abbreviation BEIS).
95   The most recent Guidance Notes were issued in November 2018 and are available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach 
ment_data/file/760560/Decom_Guidance_Notes_November_2018.pdf.
96   PA 1998 (n 59), ss 29,30. Also: G. Gordon, A. McHarg and J. Paterson ‘Energy Law in the 
United Kingdom’ in M.M. Roggenkamp and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe. National, 
EU and International Regulation, 3d edition, Oxford University Press, 2016.
97   PA 1998 (n 59), ss 29, 30.
98   See G. Gordon, A. McHarg and J. Paterson ‘Energy Law in the United Kingdom’ in 
M.M. Roggenkamp and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe. National, EU and International 
Regulation. 3d. edition, Oxford University Press, 2016.
99   PA 1998 (n 59) 9.
100   PA 1998 (n 59), s 36.
101   PA 1998 (n 59), ss 29, 30.
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activities that are being part of the programme. Consequently, the operator 
will also bear the costs associated with these activities.
In the event of non-compliance, the SoS may serve a default notice. Failure 
to comply may give rise to criminal penalties and will permit the SoS to under-
take any remedial action necessary, at the defaulting party’s expense.102 In case 
the designated person is no longer able to carry out the approved abandon-
ment programme, the SoS may decide to instruct another company to carry 
out the work instead.103 However, only companies that were previously in 
receipt of a notice or persons on whom notices could have been served are 
eligible to take over responsibilities.104 One has to note that this competence 
should only be used as a measure of last resort.105 Moreover, the SoS may in 
some few instances have the power to prepare an abandonment plan itself, for 
example if an abandonment plan is rejected or a notice to submit an abandon-
ment programme has not been complied with.106 In such a case, the SoS shall 
inform the persons to whom notice was given in the first place of the terms of 
the abandonment programme.107
About 500 installations and 3000 pipelines are placed on the UKCS. In 2017 
just 7% of this infrastructure has been decommissioned. However, the rate of 
decommissioning is expected to accelerate rapidly in the years ahead.108 When 
considering the possible re-use of installations, it is important to note that the 
UK government recognizes that disused facilities – including pipelines – may 
represent important infrastructure for its CS and therefore should provide the 
means for new developments such as geological storage of carbon dioxide.109 
If a specific opportunity for re-use has been identified, a deferral of the duty 
of abandonment might be considered.110 In that case the proposed abandon-
ment programme should include detailed provisions as to any continuing use 
and maintenance of the installation.111 Moreover, the operator is required to 
102   PA 1998 (n 59), s 37.
103   PA 1998 (n 59), s 34(1)(b). DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 16.1.
104   PA 1998 (n 59), s 34(2). DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 16.1.
105   DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 16.1.
106   PA 1998 (n 59), s 33(1).
107   PA 1998 (n 59), s 33(7). In that case, the provisions of PA 1998 (n 59), part IV shall have 
effect as if the abandonment programme had been submitted by the notified persons and 
approved by the SoS.
108   Bureau Veritas, Decommissioning on the UK Continental Shelf – an overview of regula-
tions, May 2017.
109   DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 5.18.
110   DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 5.18.
111   PA 1998 (n 59), s 29(4)(c).
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implement arrangements for monitoring, maintenance and management of the 
decommissioned site and any remaining parts of the offshore infrastructure.112
The question of reuse is now more acute since the arrival of the Oil and Gas 
Authority (OGA) in 2015.113 Tasked with implementing the UK’s Maximising 
Economic Recovery Strategy,114 which includes a concern to avoid stranded 
reserves in the event that infrastructure is decommissioned prematurely, the 
OGA is the body to whom an operator must apply in relation to cessation of 
production prior to decommissioning. The OGA advises the Secretary of State 
on “alternatives to abandoning or decommissioning the installation or pipe-
line, such as reusing or preserving it” and on “how to ensure (whether by 
means of the timing of the measures proposed, the inclusion of provision for 
collaboration with other persons, or otherwise) that the cost of carrying out 
the (decommissioning) programme is kept to the minimum that is reasonably 
practicable in the circumstances”.115 It is noteworthy also that in the exercise 
of its functions, the OGA must have regard, inter alia, to the “The development 
and use of facilities for the storage of carbon dioxide, and of anything else 
(including, in particular, pipelines) needed in connection with the develop-
ment and use of such facilities”.116
3.4 Norway
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is entitled to issue an explora-
tion, production and pipeline licence on the basis of the 1996 Petroleum Act 
and a CO2 storage license on the basis of a Regulation governing the storage of 
carbon dioxide on the Norwegian CS.117
112   DECC Guidance Notes (n 60), para 5.17, also 86.
113   The OGA is established as an independent Government Company by the Energy Act 
2016, s1.
114   Available at: https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3229/mer-uk-strategy.pdf.
115   BEIS Guidance Notes, para. 2.7.
116   Energy Act 2016, s8.
117   CO2 Storage Regulation 2014 (Forskrift om utnyttelse av undersjøiske reservoarer på kon-
tinentalsokkelen til lagring av CO2 og om transport av CO2 på kontinentalsokkelen) imple-
ments Directive 2009/31/EC and entered into force on 20 January 2015. The Regulation is 
based on Act no. 12 of 21 June 1963 governing the exploitation of other offshore natural 
resources (Lov om vitenskapelig utforskning og undersøkelse etter og utnyttelse av andre 
undersjøiske natureforekomster enn petroleumsforekomster) The Act and the Regulation 
can be found at <https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2014-12-05-1517>. A non-
authoritative translation of the Act in English can be consulted at: www.npd.no/en/
Regulations/Acts/Scientific-research-act/.
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Exploration and production licenses are awarded on the basis of licens-
ing rounds and are usually awarded to joint ventures established by the MPE. 
Licences are awarded for a specific period of time and the State participates via 
the State company Petoro in all licences.118 The State can provide for financial 
security ensuring that unused installations will be removed.119
The Norwegian CS comprises of deep (and very deep) waters, which means 
that installations can be partially removed. The holder of a production licence120 
and/or a pipeline licence121 has the duty to submit a decommissioning plan to 
the MPE.122 The obligation to submit a decommissioning plan depends upon 
two main events: the permanent disuse of the installations or the expiration of 
the licence, whichever event occurs first.123 The decommissioning plan has to 
either include a proposal for continued production or a proposal for shutdown 
of production and disposal of facilities. Disposal may, inter alia, constitute 
other uses or partial (or complete) removal.124 As a general rule, pipelines may 
be left in place when they do not obstruct, or present a safety risk for fishing.125
More detailed provisions are provided in the PR 1997, which state that the 
decommissioning plan shall consist of two parts: a disposal plan describing 
the disposal alternatives and an impact assessment.126 The disposal plan has to 
present all disposal alternatives relevant to the specific case, which may range 
from complete or partial removal to continued use for other purposes. The lat-
ter also includes the mere abandonment of an installation in combination with 
continued maintenance and inspections.127 The licensee has to describe the 
technical, safety, environmental and economic aspects and the relationship to 
other users of the sea for each alternative and has to recommend one of them.128 
The MPE will select one of the alternatives presented by the licensee – which is 
118   F. Arnesen and others, ‘Energy Law in Norway’ in M.M. Roggenkamp and others (eds), 
Energy Law in Europe. National, EU and International Regulation, 3rd edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2016.
119   PA 1996 (n 61), ss 1–4, 1–6(l).
120   PA 1996 (n 61), s 3–3.
121   PA 1996 (n 61), s 4–3. Also: Arnesen and others (n 107).
122   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–1. The MPE may waive the requirement to submit a decommissioning 
plan.
123   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–1.
124   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–1.
125   Arnesen and others (n 118).
126   PR 1997 (n 61), s 43.
127   Arnesen and others (n 118).
128   PR 1997 (n 61), s 44.
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not necessarily the recommended one – and decides accordingly.129 About 500 
installations are placed on the Norwegian CS. In 2018, around 20 decommis-
sioning plans have been processed and approved by the authorities. In most 
instances the final decision has been to partially remove disused facilities and 
transport them to shore.130
In case the MPE agrees that an unused installation should be abandoned 
but not removed, the licensee or owner will be liable for any damages or incon-
veniences caused wilfully or inadvertently in connection with the abandoned 
facility, unless the MPE decides otherwise.131 The PA 1996 also provides for 
a situation that the licensees/owners and the State conclude an agreement as a 
result of which the maintenance, responsibility and liability will be taken over 
by the State on the basis of an agreed financial compensation.132 The State may 
also take over a fixed facility when its use has been terminated permanently 
or when a licence is expired, surrendered or revoked.133 This possibility has 
to be regarded in view of the Norwegian government’s aim to continue the 
use of reservoirs and the installations, which are considered beneficial for 
the government.134
3.5 Approaches in the North Sea Area
It follows from the above that the approach taken in Norway and the UK dif-
fers from the approach in the Netherlands. This is partly due to the fact that 
the installations on the Dutch continental shelf are situated in shallow waters 
and thus subject to a requirement of complete removal. In Norway and the 
UK decisions regarding the removal of unused installations are based on a 
case-by-case approach and will usually result in a decision to partially remove 
the installation. More important, however, is the fact that currently the Dutch 
MEA has no discretionary powers when assessing an abandonment plan. This 
contradicts with the Norwegian and UK approaches that facilitate future uses 
of offshore infrastructure. However, all three countries have identified re-use 
129   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–3. According to Arnesen and others, this provision leaves a very wide 
margin of discretion to the MPE: Arnesen and others (n 118).
130   Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
<http://npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/>.
131   PA 1996 (61), s 5–4. Civil liability will exist as long as the installation is physically 
able to cause damage, there is no preclusion in this respect: H.J. Bull and K. Kaasen, 
‘Abandonment and Reclamation of Energy Sites and Facilities: Norway’ [1992] Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources 37, 45.
132   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–4.
133   PA 1996 (n 61), s 5–6.
134   Roggenkamp ‘Juridisch kader’ (n 41) 504–505.
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as an important issue that may affect abandonment and decommissioning 
policies.
4 Challenges and Possible Solutions with regard to the Re-use of 
Installations
4.1 Introduction
In the above we have examined how international law and national laws reg-
ulate the abandonment and removal of installations that have been used to 
produce oil and/or gas from fields situated on the CS. Now we will discuss in 
more detail the possible re-use of depleted oil and gas fields for permanently 
storing CO2 and how this may have an impact on the abandonment and 
removal obligations. Given our focus on the re-use of reservoirs and related 
infrastructure, we will not discuss CO2 storage in offshore aquifers despite its 
potential for large-scale storage.
When examining the re-use of depleted offshore oil/gas fields for the pur-
pose of CO2 storage we distinguish between several scenarios. First, we will 
discuss the option that the holder of a hydrocarbons production licence 
wishes to re-use the reservoir for CO2 storage. Thereafter we will discuss the 
possibility that the holder of the production licence is not interested in such 
a development and wants to terminate its activities and abandon the installa-
tions. To which extent can the national authorities intervene and decide that 
the installations will not be removed? Who will in such a scenario be respon-
sible for the installation, its maintenance and future removal?
4.2 Re-use by an Existing Licensee
Re-use by an existing holder of a production license is the most straightforward 
option. In such a scenario the competent authority will probably not require an 
exploration permit as sufficient information is available following the hydro-
carbons production activities. It is therefore most likely that the licensee can 
apply directly for a CO2 storage permit. However, following the CO2 Storage 
Directive sus a permit has to be awarded in competition. This means that the 
application will be assessed on the basis of its technical and financial mer-
its. If the applicant is financially sound the assessment will mainly focus on 
the technical capability of the applicant. Given the knowledge of the reservoir 
following the prior production activities it can be assumed that this particu-
lar applicant will be awarded the storage permit. This will become even more 
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likely if the holder of the production license has made use of the possibility to 
inject CO2 for the purpose of enhanced hydrocarbons recovery.
Another issue involves the abandonment and removal plan. What is the 
status of this plan if the holder of the production licence will be awarded 
the storage licence? As the UK and the Norwegian authorities are aiming at 
facilitating future uses of existing infrastructure, the holder of a production 
license under UK and Norwegian law may submit an abandonment plan that 
takes future use into account. Although not explicitly stated under Dutch law, 
it seems that such an approach would be possible as well. The abandonment 
and removal plan should then clearly explain the situation and how removal 
will be dealt with in the future. Although the MEA still has the right to set a 
time limit for removal it is not very likely that he will do so if a storage permit 
has been awarded or is pending. Moreover, under current Dutch law there is 
no time frame within which an abandonment and removal plan has to be sub-
mitted. As a consequence the licensee and the MEA may agree to postpone 
submission of such a plan.
Turning a production into a storage facility will also have some financial 
consequences. A joint venture holding a production licence will usually have 
made some arrangements in the Joint Operating Agreement with regard to 
abandonment costs. The government will be keen to ensure that any financial 
arrangements involving removal costs will be transferred to the new licensee. 
In case not all companies of the joint venture will be part of the storage ven-
ture, it may be necessary to rely on provisions that normally are included in 
farm-in and farm-out agreements. Similarly account has to be taken of the 
State participant. If a State participates in the production of hydrocarbons 
it will also be responsible of paying a share of all costs, including abandon-
ment costs. However, if the State is not participating in the storage activities 
arrangements have to be made with regard to the postponed payment of any 
removal costs. Given the more stringent abandonment provisions in the CO2 
Storage Directive it is likely that the costs of abandonment and removal will be 
higher in the future. In order to avoid disputes about the payment of removal 
costs in the future, it seems necessary that all parties involved ensure that 
there is a clear understanding of future obligations.
4.3 Re-use by Another Party
It is possible that the holder of a production license is not interested in re-using 
the reservoir and the existing installations for storing CO2 in the depleted res-
ervoir. It is, nevertheless, possible that the government is of the opinion that 
the reservoir is suitable as a storage site. After the area has been returned to the 
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government, all interested parties can apply for a storage permit. Depending 
on the national regimes, such a permit can be awarded on the basis of a per-
mitting round or via an open door approach, i.e. inviting others to submit a 
competitive application after an application has been made.
As in the above scenario, it will be necessary to consider the procedures 
regarding the requirement to submit an abandonment and removal plan. What 
happens if the government wishes to re-use the field and related installations 
but the holder of a production plans submits an abandonment and removal 
plan aiming at a complete or partial removal of the installations and closure of 
the field? In case an abandonment and removal plan has been submitted, the 
Dutch MEA cannot intervene and can only refuse to give his consent in case 
of risks of potential damages. As the MA does not provide for a clear time line 
for submitting abandonment and removal plans, the only solution seems to be 
that the MEA and holder of the production license enter into a prior agreement 
on the approach towards the abandonment and removal and the payment of 
costs involved. The UK and Norway seem to have a different approach. If in 
the UK a specific opportunity has been identified, the SoS may consider a 
deferral of the duty of abandonment and removal.135 Norwegian law opens up 
for the possibility that the State will take-over the installation if a licence has 
been expired.136
4.4 Future Re-use of Depleted Fields
A third scenario involves the situation that depleted fields are suitable for CO2 
storage but no parties can be found to apply for a storage permit or the use 
of one or more depleted fields for storage purposes only will materialise on 
the longer term, for example, due to the need to cluster several fields in order 
to develop transport facilities and/or to make it economically viable. Such a 
scenario requires that the State will be actively involved in order to avoid that 
fields are closed down and installations removed but also that the State will be 
able to ensure that the period between the cessation of the production activi-
ties and/or the termination of the production licence and the commencement 
of CO2 storage on the longer term will be bridged in terms of monitoring and 
maintenance of the fields and the existing infrastructure.137
135   See above section 3.3.
136   See above section 3.4.
137   Also: M.M. Roggenkamp ‘Regulating Underground Storage of CO2’ in M.M. Roggenkamp 
and E. Woerdman (eds), Legal Design of Carbon Capture and Storage. Developments in the 
Netherlands from an International and EU Perspective (Intersentia 2009) 225.
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As discussed above, international law requires States to ensure that unused 
installations are removed but does not provide for clear guidance as to the 
timing of removal. Consequently, States have to ensure that no installations 
become ‘orphans’ as a result of which there are no funds available for aban-
donment and removal in the future. In the absence of a licensee to maintain 
unused infrastructure, it is easy to point to the State as the party responsible 
for keeping the infrastructure in place. This follows from international law and 
is also the approach taken by Norway. However, who or what is the State? The 
State itself is not conducting such activities and will have to appoint a person 
or entity that will be able to take care of the abandoned infrastructure on its 
behalf. This could be a State oil and gas company but in the North Sea area the 
previous State oil and gas companies have been mostly privatised and any State 
participation is currently restricted to a financial participation. It is therefore 
not very likely that State participants like EBN and Petoro will be charged with 
the task to keep installations in place for future re-use. Apart from a financial 
participation the State is also involved as an independent health and safety 
authority. However, being able to supervise exploration and production activi-
ties and check whether or not installations are maintained and safe does not 
put these authorities into a position as a temporary operator. It therefore is 
most likely that the State has to appoint an oil and gas producing company to 
maintain these installations on its behalf as a temporary operator since these 
companies have the necessary expertise and technical skills.
Which company can be appointed or act as a temporary operator and how 
could this be arranged? In the absence of a State oil and gas company, a possi-
ble solution would be to appoint an ‘operator of last resort’ in order to take care 
of the abandoned installations on behalf of the State until a storage permit has 
been awarded. This ‘operator of last resort’ would be somewhat comparable 
to the ‘supplier of last resort’ in the downstream energy sector, i.e. a situation 
where an energy company is taking over the supply of energy to household 
consumers in a case where another supplier fails to deliver due to a bank-
ruptcy or withdrawal of a licence.138 The appointment of an ‘operator of last 
resort’ should be based on a competitive regime or based on a prior selection 
of companies active on the CS of the coastal States involved. Such a temporary 
operator or an ‘operator of last resort’ will be responsible for maintaining the 
138   Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L211/94, art 3(3).
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infrastructure and transfer the operations and responsibility to the holder of 
the CO2 storage permit as soon as it has been awarded.139
The appointment of an ‘operator of last resort’ has several consequences. 
As regards the abandonment obligations it can be assumed that the operator 
as a temporary operator will not be interested to take the full abandonment 
obligation without further arrangements. Hence, either the abandonment and 
removal obligations resting on the holder of the (previous) production licence 
will be transferred temporarily to the State or to the ‘operator of last resort’ 
until a CO2 storage permit has been granted. Such transfer needs to be accom-
panied with all financial consequences as apply in any transfer of a licence. 
The holder of the (previous) production license will thus not be relieved from 
paying abandonment and removal costs and the ‘operator of last resort’ will 
not be charged with abandonment and removal costs, which is fair as this tem-
porary operator of the installation will not have any income or profits from the 
position it has achieved. In order to act as a temporary operator and depend-
ing on the applicable tax regimes it may be necessary to consider some tax 
exemptions for ‘operators of last resort’. Moreover, it may also be necessary 
to consider some financial incentives to compensate the ‘operators of last 
resort’ for their efforts. The easiest and most straightforward solution would 
be to require the State to pay the operator of last resort a fair compensation. 
Such financial compensation could potentially be considered as a State aid. 
However, such compensation could escape classification as a State aid if the 
undertaking (‘operator of last resort’) is selected on the basis of a tendering 
procedure and if it involves a service in the general interest (public service 
obligation), the compensation is established in a transparent way and does not 
exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred and neither gives the recip-
ient undertaking an advantage over competing undertakings.140 These criteria 
seem to apply to the ‘operator of last resort’ if the undertaking is selected via 
a transparent tendering procedure and the compensation is limited to actual 
costs made for maintenance. Moreover, the re-use of installations would be 
in the general interest as it is the State who is subject to international and EU 
obligations regarding CO2 greenhouse gas emissions reduction and as such has 
an interest keeping these installations in place for re-use on the long(er) term.
139   M.M. Roggenkamp ‘Regulating Underground Storage of CO2’ (n 137) 225.
140   Cf. the criteria developed in the Altmark Trans case (C-280/00).
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5 Concluding Remarks
CCS is being perceived as a possibility for governments to mitigate climate 
change and to be able to fulfil the still increasing demands for fossil fuels at 
the same time, by way of storing CO2. The purpose of this chapter was to 
investigate – from a legal perspective – how to enhance the deployment of 
CO2 storage in (nearly) depleted oil and gas fields in the North Sea area. The 
chapter focuses in particular on legal aspects governing the reuse of existing 
but redundant infrastructure on the seabed of the continental shelf.
Any re-use of depleted oil and/or gas fields requires that installations are 
kept in place when production ceases and the reservoir is not shut down. 
As offshore installations potentially may obstruct other uses of the sea such 
as navigation and fishing, UNCLOS provides a clear obligation that unused 
installations have to be removed. The IMO Guidelines limit this obligation 
to a situation where installations are permanently disused. Moreover, nei-
ther UNCLOS nor the IMO Guidelines contain a strict time frame for removal. 
Coastal States may thus have more room to manoeuvre than expected at first 
sight. This is illustrated by the abandonment and removal plans, which are 
applied in the Netherlands, the UK and Norway. The regimes in the UK and 
Norway are rather similar as they facilitate partial removal of installations 
and for the possibility to keep existing infrastructure in place if relevant for 
future uses. In such case, the abandonment plan should contain provisions 
regarding continuing inspection and maintenance, for which the licensee/
operator would be responsible. In Norway, the State may even decide to step 
in and take over responsibilities and assets. The situation in the Netherlands 
differs as the MA requires a complete removal after production has ceased and 
does not provide the MEA with any powers to amend and intervene in aban-
donment and removal plan after it has been submitted. The current MA does 
not provide any strict time frame for submitting an abandonment and removal 
plan and in practice a solution can be found by postponing the submission of 
such a plan. However, this situation may change in the near future if the pro-
posal to amend the MA in order to facilitate re-use is accepted.
The interest in re-using unused offshore facilities is increasing in the North 
Sea area. However, when considering the options for re-using depleted oil and 
gas fields and all relevant installations for carbon storage, we note that some 
uncertainties exist for the transitional period between production ceases and a 
CO2 storage permit is awarded. Is there a guarantee that the holder of a produc-
tion license will be awarded a storage permit? If so, what kind of arrangements 
will be made for transferring abandonment and removal obligations to the 
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holder of the storage permit and how does this impact future removal? How 
can we ensure that fields are not abandoned and installations not removed 
without a storage permit has been awarded? Is it possible to provide for a 
temporary solution by appointing an ‘operator of last resort’? These questions 
have been discussed in this chapter and an attempt is made to provide some 
answers. However, regulatory certainty can only be provided by the legisla-
tors. We therefore conclude that from a legal perspective, storage of CO2 in 
depleted oil and gas fields is surrounded by some obstacles that need to be 
resolved. Solutions can feature on the level of international, EU and national 
law and may range from amending the IMO Guidelines, the CO2 Storage 
Directive and national legislation. As the exploitation of oil and gas fields in 
the North Sea area is ageing and maturing and although first steps have been 
made to facilitate re-use of installations, it is time for legislators and policy 
makers to act and seize this window of opportunity.
© James Harrison, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004391567_022
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License.
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Modern technology has increased the possibilities for greater parts of the 
oceans and ocean floor to be opened up for exploitation. Oil and gas extraction 
is still one of the most prevalent seabed activities, with almost a third of oil 
consumed in the world coming from seabed drilling1 and new fields continue 
to be discovered in ever deeper waters. Innovations in marine technology 
also mean that many other uses of the seabed are now anticipated. One of 
the fastest growing offshore activities is renewable energy generation, which 
involves the attachment of structures, platforms or devices to the seabed in 
order to capture energy from wind, wave, or tidal power.2 Many companies 
are also turning to the deep seabed as a source of valuable minerals, such as 
manganese, cobalt, copper and others. Significant deposits of these metals 
are thought to be located on many parts of the ocean floor, both within and 
beyond national jurisdiction.3 These examples illustrate the diversity and fast-
growing volume of the types of ‘seabed investments’ that will be addressed in 
this chapter.
Many of the seabed activities with which we are concerned in this chapter 
are undertaken by private actors, operating under a licence or concession from 
the coastal state. Coastal states have a significant degree of control over what 
seabed activities may take place in the waters adjacent to their territory. The 
*   The author would like to thank participants in the workshop held in Oslo for their feedback, 
as well as Filippo Fontanelli for his comments on a previous draft of this chapter.
1   J. Rochette, Towards an International Regulation of Offshore Oil Exploitation, IDDRI Working 
Paper No. 15, July 2012, 5. See also Global Oceans Commission, From Decline to Recovery – A 
Rescue Package for the Global Ocean, Summary Report 2014, 35.
2   For an overview of the relevant technology, see D. Leary and M. Esteban, ‘Climate Change and 
Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides’ (2009) 24 I.J.M.C.L. 617–651. The world’s first 
full-scale floating windfarm was announced off the coast of Scotland in 2017 and new proj-
ects are emerging. See BBC, ‘World’s first floating wind farm emerges off coast of Scotland,’ 
23 July 2017 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-40699979>.
3   See P.A. Rona, ‘The Changing Vision of Marine Minerals’ (2008) 33 Ore Geology Rev. 618.
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1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) confers ‘sov-
ereign rights’ on the coastal state over almost all seabed activities taking place 
in waters up to 200 nautical miles from their coast,4 as well as on the seabed 
up to the edge of the continental margin.5 The rights of the coastal state are 
inherent and they do not depend upon proclamation or occupation.6 They are 
also exclusive, so that ‘if the coastal state does not explore the continental shelf 
or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without 
the express consent of the coastal state.’7 Operators will therefore have to com-
ply with the laws and regulations established by the coastal state in relation to 
the exploitation of the seabed.
Most states will want to encourage broad participation in offshore activities, 
whilst also ensuring that companies exploiting seabed resources respect the 
marine environment and make some contribution to the national economy, 
through taxes, royalties, or other benefit-sharing arrangements. At the same 
time, the discretion of the coastal state to design its domestic legal framework 
will also be constrained by international law. Many states have entered into 
treaties, which seek to protect the interests of foreign investors, by imposing 
minimum standards of treatment. These instruments also allow companies to 
bring claims directly against states, without having to rely upon diplomatic 
protection from their own state. This is a burgeoning field of international law, 
with an increasing number of disputes being initiated.8 There have been only a 
handful of disputes concerning seabed activities to date, but it is worth noting 
that land-based energy and mineral extraction projects are currently the big-
gest users of investor-state arbitration.9
This chapter explores the extent to which the investment treaty framework 
can be applied to seabed investments and, if so, the scope of protection that 
may be expected by investors. It focuses on seabed investments made within 
the jurisdiction of coastal states. The chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, 
there will be a brief introduction to the international investment treaty regime 
4   This includes sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural 
resources of the seabed, as well as jurisdiction over the placement of installations and 
structures for the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; see 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 56–57, 60.
5   UNCLOS, Articles 76–77.
6   UNCLOS, Article 77(3).
7   UNCLOS, Article 77(2).
8   2017 saw at least 65 investment claims being initiated, bringing the total number of known 
claims to 855; see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018, 91.
9   The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) reports that 
oil gas and mining projects are the subject of 26% of claims, whilst electric power & other 
energy are the subject of 17% of claims; The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2016–1, 12.
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as it has evolved since its inception in the late 1950s. Secondly, the chapter 
addresses the geographical scope of international investment treaties, consid-
ering the extent to which they can be applied to offshore investments. This 
seemingly simple question has received very little attention in the literature to 
date and the discussion in this part will reveal a number of complexities that 
arise both from the ambiguous nature of the relevant treaty provisions, and 
also from the various scenarios in which seabed investments can take place. 
Thirdly, the chapter considers the substantive protections that are available if 
a seabed investment is found to fall within the scope of an investment treaty. 
This is an issue that raises complex questions about the balance between the 
rights of states to regulate activity falling under their jurisdiction and the limits 
that are imposed on those rights for the benefit of economic actors. The analy-
sis demands an understanding of how international investment law interacts 
with relevant rules in the international law of the sea or international envi-
ronmental law. Given the intensification in seabed activity around the world, 
this analysis will provide an important contribution to clarifying key issues 
that arise in the interpretation and application of investment standards in this 
context. Ultimately, the chapter aims to propose a framework of principles to 
reconcile these two areas of law.
2 The International Investment Law Framework
International investment law can trace its origins to the rules of customary inter-
national law relating to the protection of aliens, but international investment 
law emerged in its current form at the end of the 1950s, when states started 
to negotiate treaties for the protection of their nationals investing overseas.10 
These treaties aimed to both encourage the expansion of foreign investment 
between the parties and to create ‘favourable conditions for nationals and 
companies of either State in the territory of the other State.’11 This objective 
was achieved through the elaboration of substantive standards of protection. 
Another important feature of most investment treaties is that they confer a 
direct right on investors to bring a claim against a host state through arbitral 
proceedings. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘the availability of arbitration 
10   The first modern Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was concluded between Germany and 
Pakistan on 25 November 1959.
11   Germany-Pakistan BIT, preamble. Similar language is used in the preamble of many other 
BITs.
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is probably the most important part of the “treatment” the foreign investor is 
looking for.’12
Over time, the number of investment treaties has increased incrementally 
to the point where there are 3,322 agreements in existence today.13 Coverage 
of investment treaties is still far from universal, although most states in the 
world are party to at least one investment agreement.14 Most of these treaties 
are bilateral in nature,15 although there is a recent trend towards the conclu-
sion of so-called mega-regional economic agreements that bring together 
larger groupings of states within a region into a closer economic relationship. 
Examples include the Convention on Protection of the Rights of the Investor,16 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),17 the China/Korea/Japan 
Trilateral Investment Agreement,18 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).19
Another important agreement in the current context is the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT),20 which contains a chapter dedicated to investment protection 
in the energy sector.21 Its scope includes all ‘economic activity concerning the 
exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, land transport, transmis-
sion, distribution, trade, marketing or sale of energy materials or products.’22 
This includes prospecting and exploration for oil and gas, as well as construc-
tion and operation of power generation facilities, including those powered 
12   Impregillo v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, Dissenting 
Opinion of Bridgette Stern, para. 32.
13   UNCTAD (n8) 88. The Report notes that the total fell for the first time in 2017, due to 
several IIAs being terminated, but that an increasing number of IIAs take the form of 
regional agreements which create many treaty relationships between the contracting 
parties. The text of most BITs and other investment agreements cited in this paper can be 
found on the UNCTAD website: <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>.
14   See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>.
15   At the last count, there were 2946 BITs; UNCTAD (n8) 101.
16   1997 Convention on Protection of the Rights of the Investor, concluded by Armenia, 
Belarus, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Russia withdrew 
from the Convention in 2007.
17   The NAFTA was concluded in 1992 between the United States, Canada and Mexico. It 
entered into force in 1994. At the time of writing, major reforms of NAFTA were expected 
to be finalized in the near future, which would include renaming the instrument as the 
United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement.
18   The Trilateral Investment Agreement was concluded in 2012 and entered into force in 
2014.
19   The TPP was negotiated between the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan. The US pulled out 
of the TPP in January 2017.
20   The ECT was concluded in 1994. It entered into force on 1998. It has 52 parties.
21   ECT, Articles 10–17.
22   ECT, Article 1(5).
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by wind and other renewable resources.23 This instrument is also important 
because it has become the most frequently invoked investment agreement in 
terms of investor-state arbitration.24
What is important to remember is that all of these instruments have been 
individually negotiated and therefore no two treaties are identical. With that 
in mind, the following analysis will attempt to identify major trends in invest-
ment treaty drafting and interpretation in order to discover the extent to which 
investment treaties can be applied to seabed activities and what types of pro-
tection may be afforded to seabed investments. At the same time, it must be 
borne in mind that individual treaties may differ in their precise terms, which 
may influence the outcome in a particular dispute.
3 The Application of Investment Treaties to Seabed Activities
3.1 The Application of Investment Treaties to Maritime Zones
To identify the geographical scope of investment treaties, we must look 
firstly to the terms of the treaties themselves.25 Most early investment treaties 
simply apply to investments ‘in [the] territory’26 or ‘situated in the territory of ’ 
a contracting party.27 For example, such language is found in the first invest-
ment treaty concluded between the United Kingdom and Egypt, which refers 
to the protection of investments within the territory of the two countries, 
without any explanation of what is meant by territory.28 The first French BITs 
evidence a similar level of ambiguity, simply referring to ‘investissements … 
situé sur le territoire de l’autre Etat …’29 Even the 1992 NAFTA, seen by many 
as a watershed for a new style of investment agreement,30 simply provides 
that the investment protection chapter applies to ‘investments of investors of 
23   See Understanding with respect to Article I(5) of the ECT.
24   UNCTAD (n8) 93, which attributes 113 cases as being initiated under the ECT.
25   Note that there may be other provisions which define the scope of the treaty, poten-
tially excluding some seabed investments from protection; see e.g. the discussion of 
sectoral exclusions in S. Trevisanut and N. Giannopoulos, ‘Investment Protection in 
Offshore Energy Production: Bright Sides of Regime Interaction’ (2018) 19 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade 789, 794–795.
26   E.g. 1991 Austria – Korea BIT, Article 3(2); 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT, Article 3.
27   E.g. 1970 Belgium – Indonesia BIT, Article 5.
28   1975 UK-Egypt BIT.
29   See e.g. 1975 France-Congo BIT, Article 2.
30   N.W. Ranieri, ‘NAFTA: An Overview’, in L. Trakman and N.W. Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in 
International Investment Law (OUP, 2013) 90.
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another Party in the territory of the Party.’31 Such ambiguities are still found 
today. The TPP is a case in point, as it simply defines a covered investment as 
‘an investment in its territory’ without defining territory.32
The language of these treaties creates some ambiguity about their precise 
geographical scope. Their application to seabed activities will depend upon 
the interpretation of the phrase ‘territory.’ This is in fact a question that has 
received little attention in either the jurisprudence or the literature. Whilst 
it clearly applies to investments made within the land territory of a state, does it 
also extend to the maritime zones of a coastal state? If so, does it include both 
the ‘territorial sea’ over which the coastal state exercises sovereignty33 and 
other maritime zones in which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources?34
The inclusion of territorial sea within the scope of territory is a relatively 
unproblematic proposition. It is a general principle of treaty law that the appli-
cation of treaties extends to ‘the entire territory of each party’35 and when 
drafting the rules on this subject, the International Law Commission noted 
that the reference to the ‘entire territory’ is ‘a comprehensive term designed 
to embrace all the land and appurtenant territorial waters and air space that 
constitute the territory of the State.’36 This phrase is understood as the internal 
waters and territorial sea of a state.37 At the same time, the Commission did not 
explicitly mention the continental shelf as being part of the territory of a state, 
despite the fact that the Commission had shortly beforehand been involved in 
codifying rules on coastal state jurisdiction over the seabed.38 Not too much 
significance should be attributed to this omission, however, as the question 
does not appear to have been considered in detail by the Commission.39
Indeed, there are other reasons to believe that the term ‘territory’ should 
be interpreted to extend to seabed activities on the continental shelf. It must be 
remembered that the very notion of the continental shelf is premised upon 
31   NAFTA, Article 1101(1)(b).
32   TPP, Article 9.1.
33   UNCLOS, Article 2.
34   UNCLOS, Articles 56 and 77.
35   1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 29.
36   International Law Commission, ‘Commentary to Article 25 of the Draft Articles on the 
Law of Treaties’ (1966 - II) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 213.
37   See O. Doerr and K. Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (Springer, 2012) 497.
38   The Commission initiated discussion on the continental shelf in 1950 and it produced 
draft articles, which were used as the basis for the subsequent 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf.
39   Doerr and Schmalenbach (n37) 496.
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the natural prolongation of a coastal state’s land territory into the seabed. 
In the words of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in one of its seminal 
judgments on the continental shelf, ‘the submarine areas concerned may be 
deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the coastal State already 
has dominion – in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a pro-
longation or continuation of the territory, an extension of it under the sea.’40 
Whilst the Court was speaking in general terms and it was not concerned with 
providing a legal interpretation of the term ‘territory’, its dicta in this respect 
nevertheless would support a broad understanding of the concept of territory 
for the purpose of international investment law.41
A teleological interpretation may also support a broad understanding of 
‘territory’ for the purposes of international investment law.42 One of the prin-
cipal objectives of investment treaties is the protection of investment and it 
has thus been argued that an interpretation that offers more protection to 
investors should be preferred in cases of doubt.43 From this perspective, an 
interpretation of a treaty that excludes investments that undoubtedly fall 
within a coastal state’s jurisdiction as a matter of general international law 
could be considered as an unreasonable result that undermines the objectives 
of the treaty. There are obviously limits to this approach and the object and 
purpose cannot be used as a factor to override other more compelling argu-
ments that suggest a different interpretation, for example an explicit exclusion 
of continental shelf investments by the contracting parties.44 Nevertheless, 
it would support an assumption in favour of extending protection to seabed 
investments under the jurisdiction of the coastal state.
40   North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Reports 3, para. 43.
41   See also the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, although the question in this case was 
not whether the continental shelf was a form of territorial right, but rather whether the 
dispute relating to the continental shelf boundary between Greece and Turkey was one 
which ‘relates to the territorial status’ of Greece; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (1977) 
ICJ Reports 3, para. 81.
42   A similar argument has been made in the context of extending the protection of invest-
ment treaties to occupied territories; see R. Happ and S. Wuschka, ‘Horror Vacui: Or 
why investment treaties should apply to illegally annexed territories’ (2016) 33 Journal of 
International Arbitration 245, 261.
43   SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 
para. 116; Sanum v Laos, PCA Case No. 2013–13, Award of Jurisdiction, 13 December 2013, 
para. 240.
44   Indeed, as Happ and Wuschka point out, the award in Sanum v Laos was ultimately 
annulled because it was contradicted by diplomatic exchanges by the parties to the 
treaty; Happ and Wuschka (n42) 261.
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In practice, it would appear that this issue is not controversial. Mobil and 
Murphy Oil v Canada involved a claim by two oil companies in relation to their 
investments on the continental shelf of Canada.45 In this case, the geographi-
cal scope of the NAFTA was not even raised by the parties and it appears to 
have been assumed by the tribunal that the concept of ‘territory’ in the agree-
ment extended to this type of investment.
More recent developments in treaty drafting also confirm a broader geo-
graphical application of international investment law to maritime zones 
beyond the territorial sea. Practice on this issue appears to have taken a turn in 
the mid-1990s, when we see the question of the application of investment trea-
ties to maritime zones being addressed in more explicit terms. For example, 
the Portugal-Korea BIT, concluded in May 1995, explicitly defines the term ter-
ritory as ‘the territory of either of the Contracting Parties, as defined by their 
respective laws, including the territorial sea, and any other zone over which 
the Contracting Party concerned exercises, in accordance with international 
law, sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.’46 This is also the practice that 
has been adopted by the European Union (EU) in its negotiation of invest-
ment provisions in its recent Free Trade Agreements47 and it is a practice that 
is adopted in many modern model BITs.48 This widespread practice supports 
the inclusion of maritime zones within the concept of ‘territory’ for the pur-
poses of international investment law.49
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that investment treaties generally cannot 
be interpreted to apply to seabed investments in areas beyond national juris-
diction. Such areas are clearly not within the territory or maritime zones of a 
coastal state50 and therefore investors in these areas would have to rely upon 
the sui generis provisions of Part XI of UNCLOS if they were to seek protection 
of their investments.51
45   Mobil and Murphy Oil v Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability 
and Principles of Quantum, 22 May 2012.
46   Portugal-Korea BIT, Article 1(4). See also Paraguay-Switzerland BIT, Article 1(4).
47   EU – Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement, Article 801.
48   UK Model BIT, Article 1(e); Italy Model BIT, Article I(6); India Model BIT, Article 1(f); 
Canada Model BIT, Article 1; Germany Model BIT, Article 1(4); US Model BIT, Article 1.
49   Not all treaties necessarily include maritime zones within the concept of ‘territory.’ Some 
treaties explicitly distinguish territory and maritime areas, but nevertheless include the 
latter within their scope of application. See e.g. 2007 France-Seychelles BIT, Article 1(4); 
ECT, Article 10(1).
50   UNCLOS, Article 137(1).
51   See particularly UNCLOS, Article 152(1), Annex III, Articles 17–19. See also Part XI 
Agreement, Annex, Section 1, para. 13.
489International Investment Law and the Regulation of the Seabed
3.2 The Application of Investment Treaties to Joint Exploitation Zones 
and Disputed Maritime Areas
The previous discussion was based on the assumption that an investment 
was made within the established maritime boundaries of a coastal state. Yet, 
in some parts of the ocean, states have been unable to agree upon maritime 
boundaries. Two scenarios may present themselves in this context.
3.2.1 Application to Joint Exploitation Zones
In the first scenario, coastal states may have chosen to pursue joint devel-
opment of seabed resources in an area in which they cannot agree on the 
appropriate maritime boundary. Such arrangements are explicitly encour-
aged by UNCLOS.52 There are various types of arrangement that have been 
entered into for this purpose.53 One common mechanism is the establishment 
of joint commission, which is granted powers to authorize and regulate sea-
bed activities within a joint development area. An example is provided by the 
Thailand-Malaysia Memorandum of Understanding, which identifies an area 
of overlapping claims and establishes a Joint Authority composed of represen-
tatives of both countries.54 This body has legal personality55 and it assumes 
‘all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both parties for the exploration 
and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the seabed and subsoil 
in the overlapping area … and also for the development, control and admin-
istration of [said] area.’56 The Joint Authority is empowered to enter into 
contracts with oil and gas companies wishing to carry out operations in the 
52   UNCLOS, Articles 74(3) and 83(3). See also chapter 8 of this book, E. Røsæg, ‘Framework 
legislation for commercial activities in the Area’; J. Dingwall, ‘International Investment 
Protection in Deep Seabed Mining Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2018) 19 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade 890–929.
53   For a useful overview of arrangements, see M. Miyoshi, ‘The Joint Development of 
Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, Maritime Briefing, 
Volume 2, Number 5, 1999. See also P. Tzeng, ‘Investment Protection in Disputed Maritime 
Areas’ (2018) 19 Journal of World Trade and Investment 828, 855–858.
54   1979 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and Thailand on the 
Establishment of the Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources of the Seabed in 
a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand (1979 
MOU). For another example, see the 2001 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and the Democratic Republic of São Tomé e Príncipe on the Joint Development of 
Petroleum and other Resources.
55   1990 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of 
Thailand on the Constitution and other Matters relating to the Establishment of the 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (1990 Agreement), Article 1.
56   1979 MOU, Article III(2).
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Joint Development Area.57 It is also the Joint Authority that is responsible for 
formulating policies for seabed activities in the Joint Development Area.58
For present purposes, the question is how such arrangements would be 
addressed from the perspective of international investment law. Would such 
a Joint Development Area be classified as being within ‘the territory’ of a 
coastal state for the purposes of international investment law? This is a dif-
ficult question given that the whole purpose of such arrangements is to avoid 
the determination of which state has sovereignty or sovereign rights over a 
contested area. Thus, it may be better to consider a Joint Development Area as 
a tertium genus.59
Another problem that arises for investors in such a scenario is that the 
arrangement may confer the power to regulate seabed activities on an auton-
omous international organization with distinct legal personality. If so, any 
regulatory measures adopted by the organization arguably could not be attrib-
uted to the state that is party to the investment treaty.60 Instead, it raises issues 
of the responsibility of the organization itself.61 It follows that the investor will 
not be able to claim protection under the treaty and its remedies will be lim-
ited to those that are available on the basis of its contractual relationship with 
the organization. Thus, it is important that the investor ensures that a con-
tract contains relevant provisions to safeguard its interests against interference 
from the organization, such as the inclusion of minimum standards of treat-
ment or a stabilization clause,62 as well as an appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanism.63
3.2.2 Application to Disputed Maritime Areas
In the second scenario, states may not be able to reach agreement on provi-
sional arrangements to apply to a disputed area, but they will both continue 
57   1990 Agreement, Article 7(2)(e).
58   1990 Agreement, Article 7(1).
59   For other uses of this concept in the law of the sea, see Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1974) ICJ 
Reports 3, para. 54.
60   See discussion in the International Law Commission, ‘Commentary to Chapter IV of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ (2001 - II) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 64.
61   By way of example, albeit in the context of international human rights law, see Behrami 
and Behrami v France, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 2 May 2007.
62   See e.g. L Cotula, ‘Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable 
Development’, paper presented at the OECD Global Forum on International Investment, 
27–28 March 2008. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122 
.pdf.
63   For discussion of contractual claims in this context, see Tzeng (n53) 850–852.
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to claim authority therein. There are many maritime boundaries around the 
world that remain un-delimited64 and several areas in which more than one 
coastal state claims rights.
It is generally accepted that international law does not prevent states from 
carrying out unilateral prospecting of seabed resources in a disputed area, 
although they may be obliged to refrain from activities that might affect the 
rights of other states.65 The fact that investments may be made in disputed 
areas is demonstrated by the maritime boundary case between Cote d’Ivoire 
and Ghana, in which Cote d’Ivoire alleged that Ghana had proceeded to autho-
rize seabed activities in an area that Cote d’Ivoire argued belongs to it.66
The question that arises for present purposes is if the investor would have 
a claim against the state that had authorized it to proceed, if the investor is 
later forced to stop its activity because the area is found to be under the sover-
eignty of another state.67 Strictly speaking, in this situation, the investment is 
not within the maritime zone of the authorizing state and therefore an invest-
ment treaty would not prima facie be applicable. Yet, it seems unfair to allow 
a state to evade responsibility when it had itself led an investor to believe that 
it did have jurisdiction over the disputed area. This situation may thus call for 
the application of the principle of ex factis jus oritur, so that the exercise of de 
facto sovereign rights in a contested area could be sufficient to establish that 
an investment was in the maritime zone of the state.68 An alternative approach 
64   See C. Schofield and C. Carleton, ‘Key Technical Issues in the Law of the Sea Dispute 
Resolution and the Role of the Technical Expert’, in A.G. Oude Elferink and D. Rothwell 
(eds), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 254.
65   See Miyoshi (n53) 4. See also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Provisional Measures) 
(1976) ICJ Reports 3, paras 28–33; BIICL, Report on the Obligations of States under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas (2016).
66   Ghana raised the impacts on investors in its pleadings concerning the imposition of 
provisional measures pending the settlement of the dispute; see Dispute concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean, ITLOS Case No. 23, Provisional Measures Order, 25 April 2015, para. 85. Ultimately, 
the Special Chamber ordered Ghana to ‘take all the necessary steps to ensure that no new 
drilling either by Ghana or under its control takes place in the disputed area’ (para. 102), 
although the order did not apply to ‘ongoing activities … in respect of which drilling has 
already taken place.’ (para. 99) A final judgment was delivered by the Special Chamber 
on 23 September 2017 in which it absolved Ghana from any responsibility for carrying out 
unlawful activities in the disputed area.
67   A more complicated set of legal questions arise if an investment claim is made whilst a 
sovereignty dispute is ongoing; see Tzeng (n53) 839–848.
68   Similar arguments have been made in relation to unlawfully annexed territories; Happ & 
Wuschka (n42) 264.
492 Harrison
would be to apply the doctrine of estoppel to prevent a state from pleading a 
lack of jurisdiction in circumstances in which it had previously asserted its 
jurisdiction to the detriment of the investor.69 Whichever approach is pre-
ferred, the result is to extend the application of investment treaties to disputed 
maritime zones.
4 Standards of Investment Protection under Investment Treaties and 
Implications for the Regulation of Seabed Investments
4.1 Investment Protection Standards
Having considered the geographical scope of investment treaties, it is now nec-
essary to examine what type of protection may be granted to an investment 
thereunder. In the following section, particular attention is given to the man-
ner in which investment agreements may constrain coastal states in exercising 
their regulatory powers in relation to seabed activities.
4.1.1 Pre-investment Protection
Generally speaking, states have a broad degree of discretion as to which invest-
ments they allow to take place within their territory and most investment 
treaties leave this discretion unfettered, as protection only kicks in once the 
investment has been made. However, a number of more modern investment 
treaties do impose some obligations on states at this initial decision-making 
stage. In particular, it is increasingly common to find a requirement that states 
grant most-favoured nation treatment and national treatment to investors 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition or expansion of their invest-
ments.70 Such requirements would not restrict the content of any decision, but 
they would demand that decisions are made in a non-discriminatory manner.
69   For a discussion of estoppel in international law, see I.C. MacGibbon, ‘Estoppel in 
International Law’ (1958) 7 I.C.L.Q. 468–513; C. Brown, ‘A Comparative and Critical 
Assessment of Estoppel in International Law’ (1996) U. Miami L. Rev. 369. However, see 
Tzeng (n53) 847 who argues that this approach ‘is arguably at odds with the tribunal’s 
arguably inherent duty to examine proprio motu its own jurisdiction.’
70   See e.g. TPP, Articles 9.4 and 9.5 applying MFN treatment and National Treatment to the 
establishment of investments. ECT, Article 10(1) requires states to ‘create stable, equitable, 
favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make 
Investments in its Area.’ Article 10(2) of the ECT, however, only requires states to ‘endeav-
our’ to accord MFN and National Treatment to investors. Often, such pre-establishment 
rights are also subject to exceptions, particularly when it comes to ‘subsidies’ or ‘pro-
curement’ decisions; see e.g. Mesa Power Group v Canada, PCA Case No. 2012–17, Award, 
24 March 2016, paras 378–507.
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Some investment treaties go even further in limiting the discretion of 
host states to impose so-called performance requirements on investors. 
Performance requirements involve the imposition of conditions on companies 
relating to various aspects of their operations and they are often used by host 
states to ‘help materialize expected spill-over effects from foreign investment.’71 
Investments treaties do not prohibit all forms of performance requirements, 
rather they tend to target those that create significant economic inequalities, 
such as conditions requiring the purchase of local goods or services, conditions 
relating to the achievement of certain levels of exports or foreign exchange 
earnings, or conditions mandating the transfer of technology.72 Investment 
treaties usually address performance requirements relating to both the autho-
rization or continuing operation of an investment, as well as similar conditions 
attached to advantages, such as loans, grants or subsidies.
The interpretation of the performance requirements provision in the NAFTA 
was raised in the case of Mobil and Murphy Oil v Canada, in which the two 
oil companies challenged the revision of certain requirements concerning 
expenditure on research and training activities. Both companies had accepted 
certain expenditure requirements at the time when they made the investment. 
However, the Canadian authorities introduced revised guidelines in 2004, 
which the investors claimed significantly increased the burden imposed upon 
them to carry out these sorts of activities. In particular, the new guidelines 
required that expenditure should meet a certain level during specified peri-
ods. The companies argued that the revisions constituted a breach of, inter 
alia, the NAFTA provisions on performance requirements. The principal issue 
in dispute was whether the changes could be considered as falling within the 
prohibition on performance requirements ‘to purchase, use or accord a pref-
erence to … services provided in its territory’ under Article 1106(1)(c) of the 
NAFTA. Research and training were both held to be services for the purposes 
of the NAFTA.73 Yet, Canada argued that the 2004 guidelines did not expressly 
compel the investors to use particular local services in order to meet their com-
mitments. In rejecting the Canadian defence, the Tribunal looked beyond the 
actual text of the guidelines to determine their de facto effect, concluding that 
‘[they] are designed to ensure that expenditures for [research and training] 
services occur in the Province, and thereby implying a legal requirement for 
71   See 2015 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, ‘Policy Options 
for International Investment Agreements,’ example of Standards of treatment and pro-
tection. Available at: <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ipfsd/section/3/toc-item 
-details/277>.
72   See e.g. TPP, Article 9.10; NAFTA, Article 1106.
73   Mobil (n45) para. 221.
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the purposes of Article 1106.’74 The majority of the tribunal also took a restric-
tive interpretation of the reservations to this obligation.75 This case serves as 
a reminder of the important constraints that may be imposed by investment 
agreements.
4.1.2 Post-investment Protection
Once an investment has been made, one of the greatest risks that can face 
an investor is having their property or assets taken by the host state without 
justification. To counter such threats, most investment agreements contain 
provisions prohibiting a state from nationalizing or expropriating an invest-
ment without due process and without payment of compensation.76 Many 
agreements also prohibit a host state from restricting or delaying the transfer 
of profits or proceeds of an investment.77 Claims based upon such provisions 
are rare, as states do not often have recourse to such heavy-handed tactics. 
In contrast, it is much more common for international investment law to be 
used to challenge more subtle changes to the legal framework applicable to 
investors.
One of the most difficult issues in investment arbitration is the extent 
to which investment protection standards restrict the ability of host states to 
increase taxes or strengthen regulations after an investment has been made.
Early case law suggested that standards of protection could operate in such 
a way to significantly constrain states in their exercise of regulatory powers and 
there was a fear that investment law may have a ‘chilling effect’ on regulation.78 
This is particularly the case when tribunals emphasized the need for stability 
when interpreting investment protection standards in light of the legitimate 
expectations of investors.79
74   Ibid, para. 242. See also para. 238.
75   This decision was subject to a dissenting opinion by Professor Philippe Sands QC.
76   E.g. ECT, Article 13; NAFTA, Article 1110.
77   E.g. ECT, Article 14.
78   See e.g. J. Bonnitcha, ‘Outline of Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretation of 
Investment Treaty Protections, in C. Brown and K. Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP, 2011) 133–140; see also K. Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill 
and the Threat of Arbitration’, in C. Brown and K. Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP, 2011) 606–627.
79   Legitimate expectations has featured in the interpretation of both the indirect expropria-
tion standard (Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, 
para. 122) and the fair and equitable treatment standard (Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, para. 602). See discussion in Y. Levashova, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment and the Protection of the Environment: Recent Trends in 
Investment Treaties and Investment Cases’, in Y. Levashova, T. Lambooy and I. Dekker 
(eds), Bridging the Gap between International Investment Law and the Environment (Eleven 
International Publishing, 2016) 64.
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Yet, more recent developments in investment case law would seem to sug-
gest that the standards should not be interpreted in a restrictive manner and 
states possess a degree of flexibility when deciding how to regulate invest-
ments, particularly when ‘defining the issues that affect its public policy or the 
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions that will be implemented 
to protect such values.’80 On the basis of this case law, it is clear that inter-
national investment law cannot be relied upon to shield investors from any 
changes to the legal framework. This was made explicit in Mobil and Murphy 
Oil v Canada when the Tribunal held that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard ‘was never intended to amount to a guarantee against regulatory 
change, or to reflect a requirement that an investor is entitled to expect no 
material changes to the regulatory framework within which an investment is 
made.’81 In another recent case involving the modification of the regulatory 
framework for the renewable energy sector, the Tribunal similarly held that ‘in 
the absence of a specific commitment toward stability, an investor cannot have 
a legitimate expectation that a regulatory framework … is not to be modified 
at any time to adapt to the needs of the market and to the public interest.’82 
Moreover, it is also now generally accepted that ‘non-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances.’83
Similar considerations apply to the taxation framework that is applied to 
investors. For example, in Paushok v Mongolia, the Tribunal held that ‘signifi-
cant modification of taxation levels represents a serious risk, especially when 
investing in a country at an early stage of economic and institutional develop-
ment’ and the imposition of a windfall tax imposed by Mongolia could not by 
itself constitute a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard.84 The 
Tribunal went on to note that an investor could seek to protect itself by nego-
tiating a stability agreement with the government, but ‘[i]n the absence of 
such a stability agreement, Claimants have not succeeded in establishing that 
they had legitimate expectations that they would not be exposed to significant 
80   Tecmed (n79) para. 122.
81   Ibid, para. 153. See also Saluka Investments v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, 
Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 306; Perenco v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, 
Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, 12 September 2014, para. 560.
82   Charanne Construction Investments v Spain, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration No. 062/2012, Award, 21 January 2016, para. 510 (unofficial translation by Mena 
Chambers). The majority of the Tribunal also rejected the proposition that the regulatory 
framework in that case involved an implicit stabilization clause. See however the dissent-
ing opinion of Prof. Guido Santiago Tawil.
83   TPP, Annex 9B, para. 3(b).
84   Paushok v Mongolia, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award, 28 April 2011, para. 302.
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tax increases in the future.’85 Even a 99% windfall tax applied to oil industry 
profits was held not to violate the expropriation standard in Perenco v Ecuador 
because the tax did not affect the operation and management of the company, 
nor did it come close to extinguishing the business.86
4.2 Balancing Investment Protection and Environmental Concerns in the 
Context of Seabed Investments
4.2.1 Need for Flexibility in Interpreting Investment Standards
The preceding analysis suggests that the requirements of investment protec-
tion must be balanced against the interests of the host state to protect certain 
public interests. The protection of the environment clearly counts as an inter-
est that can be promoted by the host state in exercising its regulatory powers. 
Indeed, it must be appreciated that international law places obligations on the 
coastal state to ‘adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pol-
lution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed 
activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations 
and structures under their jurisdiction.’87 The precise content of these laws and 
regulations will be determined in the first instance by the coastal state, albeit 
subject to an overarching obligation to exercise due diligence to minimize the 
risk of significant harm to the marine environment.88 It has also been argued 
that, in light of the uncertainties concerning the impact of new technologies 
on the marine environment, emerging seabed industries require a precaution-
ary approach to regulation,89 meaning that states should adopt measures to 
prevent serious and irreversible harm, even if there is not yet proof that harm 
may occur.90 Meeting the due diligence obligation imposed by international 
law may also require the rules and standards to be adapted over time as per-
ceptions of risks change in response to developments in our understanding of 
the oceans.91
85   Ibid., para. 302.
86   Perenco (n81) paras 680–687.
87   UNCLOS, Article 208(1). This provision must also be read in light of Article 194(3)(c).
88   On the due diligence standard, see South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case No 2013–19, 
Merits Award, 12 July 2016, para. 944. See also J. Harrison, Saving the Oceans through Law: 
The International Legal Framework for the Protection of the Marine Environment (OUP, 
2017) 209–225.
89   See e.g. The World Bank, Precautionary Management of Deep Sea Mining Potential in 
Pacific Island Countries (2016).
90   See 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, Principle 15.
91   See Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of Sponsoring States with Respect 
to Activities in the Area (2011) ITLOS Reports 10, para. 117. On the importance of adaptive 
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There is little doubt that these international obligations relating to the pro-
tection of the marine environment provide relevant context for informing the 
scope and content of international investment law. As noted by in one recent 
investment award, ‘consideration of a host state’s international obligations 
may well be relevant in the application of [an investment treaty standard] to 
particular circumstances.’92 Yet, it is not to say that these environmental obli-
gations will automatically take priority. Rather, one should pursue ‘mutual 
supportiveness’93 of economic and environmental objectives and, if possible, 
it is for the Tribunal to identify an interpretation that reconciles both sets 
of rules.
The need for flexibility in the interpretation of investment rules has been 
expressly recognised in relation to industries where there are known envi-
ronmental concerns.94 This is an area in which states possess a ‘high level of 
deference … [and] it is not for an investor-state tribunal to second-guess the 
substantive correctness of the reasons which an administration were to put 
forward in its decisions, or to question the importance assigned by the admin-
istration to certain policy objectives over others.’95 However, there are certain 
principles that host states must nevertheless respect when developing envi-
ronmental regulations, as discussed in the following section.
4.2.2 Guiding Principles When Developing National Environmental 
Regulations in Order to Satisfy International Investment Law
Firstly, tribunals have stressed the need for states to take a cooperative 
approach when introducing changes to the legal framework,96 particularly 
where procedures for consultation or negotiation are themselves recognized 
in the applicable laws.97 At a minimum, states should avoid conduct that dem-
onstrates ‘a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in 
management as a regulatory approach to environmental protection, see Addis Ababa 
Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, Practical Principle 4.
92   Peter Allard v Barbados, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award, 27 June 2016, para. 244. In this 
case, the Tribunal was talking about the full protection and security standard.
93   See e.g. R. Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making’ 
(2010) 21 E.J.I.L. 649–679.
94   Methanex v United States of America, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, 8 March 2005, 
Part IV, Chapter D, para. 9.
95   Crystallex International Corporation v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 
4 April 2016, para. 583. See also Mesa Power (n70) para. 505.
96   Suez and others v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, 
para. 223.
97   Ibid, para. 237.
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judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an 
administrative process.’98 The threshold for a breach of relevant investment 
standards is, however, a high one, which requires something more than a ‘per-
ceived unfairness.’99
Secondly, international investment law would prevent states from reneging 
on clear and explicit representations that were made by the state in order to 
induce the investment and relied upon by the investor.100 Even in this scenario, 
the investor may not be successful in their claim unless they can show that 
they have relied upon the representation to their detriment and the breach 
of the representation was in some way arbitrary or unreasonable.101
Thirdly, states must take the least restrictive option that is available to them 
to achieve their environmental objectives. In other words, ‘where a state can 
achieve its chosen level of environmental protection through a variety of 
equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative 
that is most consistent with open trade.’102 This is an important consideration 
in the field of marine environmental protection, where the due diligence obli-
gations under UNCLOS would appear to leave a degree of discretion to states 
as to how they comply.
Fourthly, there may be a potential breach of relevant investment standards 
if the state can offer no reasonable explanation for a proposed change in the 
regulatory framework. In other words, there must be some evidential basis for 
a measure, if it is not to be considered as ‘arbitrary’103 or ‘disproportionate.’104 
Thus, the denial of a permit was found to be a violation of international invest-
ment law in Crystallex v Venezuela because it was based upon reasons that 
had not been raised in the exchanges between the company and the state, 
whilst ignoring the scientific evidence that had been submitted as part of the 
application.105
That is not to say that there must always be clear proof of environmental 
harm before a host state may take action. Article 201 of UNCLOS encourages 
98   Waste Management v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004, para. 
98. See also Glamis Gold v United States of America, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award of 
8 June 2009, para. 627; Mobil (n45) para. 152.
99   Perenco (n81) para. 559. See also Bilcon v Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award, 
17 March 2015, para. 444.
100   Mobil (n45) para 156. See also Glamis Gold (n98) para. 621; Suez (n96) para. 226.
101   See e.g. Mesa Power (n70) para. 502. See also Allard (n92) paras 200–204.
102   SD Myers v Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 221.
103   Waste Management (n94) para. 98. See also Glamis Gold (n94) para. 627; Mobil (n43) 
para. 152.
104   See Tecmed (n75) para. 122.
105   Crystallex (n95) paras 591–597.
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‘appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation and elaboration of rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment,’106 but it 
does not specify how much scientific evidence is necessary and it has been 
suggested that ‘the [precautionary approach] will have a role to play in the 
operation of Article 201 as the establishment of appropriate scientific crite-
ria will need to acknowledge potential risks even if they are not fully known.’107 
The precautionary approach is also accepted as being implicit in the obligation 
of due diligence.108 It follows that the precautionary approach may be invoked 
to justify action for the protection of the environment, even when there is no 
conclusive proof that environmental harm will occur.109 At the same time, 
there are limits inherent in the precautionary approach itself, which is appar-
ent from recent case law on the subject.
Windstream Energy v Canada is one of the few investment cases in which the 
precautionary approach has been raised in proceedings. The case involved an 
American investor challenging a moratorium on offshore wind farms in Lake 
Ontario in Canada. The company claimed that it had invested in a project for 
offshore wind development based upon encouragement from the Government 
of Ontario, which later changed its mind and decided to halt any further devel-
opment until further scientific studies had been carried out. Canada justified 
its decision to take ‘a cautious approach and develop a comprehensive regula-
tory framework before allowing any offshore wind energy facilities to be built’ 
as a reasonable use of its regulatory powers.110 This position was supported by 
the Tribunal, which accepted that Ontario’s policy was ‘at least in part driven 
by a genuine policy concern that there was not sufficient scientific support for 
establishing an appropriate … exclusion zone for offshore wind projects.’111 The 
reference to a ‘genuine’ policy concern is important because it emphasizes that 
there is a minimum threshold of evidence that must be met in order to invoke 
106   UNCLOS, Article 201.
107   T Stephens, ‘Article 201’, in A Proelß (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
A Commentary (Beck 2017) 1345.
108   Sponsoring States Advisory Opinion (n91) para. 131.
109   On the relationship between the precautionary approach and the standard of proof 
and sources of evidence, see J. Harrison, ‘Addressing the Procedural Challenges of 
Environmental Litigation in the context of Investor-State Arbitration, in Y. Levashova 
et al (eds), Bridging the Gap between International Investment Law and the Environment 
(Eleven International Publishing, 2016) 99–104.
110   See e.g. Windstream Energy v Canada, Government of Canada’s amended Response to the 
Notice of Arbitration, 5 December 2013.
111   Windstream Energy v Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award, 27 September 2016, 
para. 376.
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the precautionary approach. Thus, as explained by another international 
tribunal, even a precautionary approach requires that ‘there are plausible 
indications of potential risks.’112 Such an understanding ensures that environ-
mentalism is not used as a pretext for measures that substantially interfere 
with investment activity.
Indeed, another restriction is that the precautionary approach only justifies 
‘cost-effective’ measures.113 In other words, a tribunal could still evaluate the 
effects of a measure on an investor, even if it accepts that some sort of pre-
cautionary measure would be appropriate. In some cases, complete restriction 
may be justified, but this outcome should not be assumed without some sort of 
assessment of alternative measures. Furthermore, the Tribunal in Windstream 
Energy explained that, even if a moratorium would be appropriate, the pre-
cautionary approach does not give a state freedom to postpone a project for 
as long as it wants – the Tribunal ultimately held that Canada had violated the 
fair and equitable treatment standard because it had done ‘relatively little to 
address the scientific uncertainty surrounding offshore wind that it had relied 
upon as the main publicly cited reason for the moratorium.’114 This would seem 
to suggest that the precautionary approach may justify provisional restrictions 
on an investment, but a state should take further steps to gather the scientific 
evidence that may be necessary to make a full assessment of the environmen-
tal effects of an activity. This interpretation of the precautionary approach 
follows the rules agreed in other economic treaty regimes, where states are 
permitted to provisionally adopt restrictive measures where there is scientific 
uncertainty, but states must ‘seek to obtain the additional information nec-
essary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the [provisional] 
measures accordingly within a reasonable period of time.’115
Ultimately, it is important to acknowledge that there may be situations in 
which investment rules will require protection to be afforded to an investor, 
despite the environmental concerns of a state. This may be particularly true in 
the case of regulatory measures which ‘[render] the value to be derived from 
their activities so marginal or unprofitable as to effectively deprive them of 
112   Sponsoring States Advisory Opinion (n91) para. 131.
113   See 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: ‘Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a rea-
son for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ The 
requirement of cost-effectiveness was emphasized in Sponsoring States Advisory Opinion 
(n91) para. 128.
114   Windstream Energy (n111) para. 378.
115   WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 5(7).
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their character as an investment.’116 This is a very high threshold, but it might 
be met, for example, in the case of a declaration of a marine protected area 
(MPA), in which all activity is prohibited. Such findings have been made in 
cases concerning the establishment of terrestrial protected areas, for exam-
ple in Metalclad v Mexico, where the Tribunal held that an Ecological Decree 
designating a cacti reserve in the area of the investment constituted an act 
tantamount to expropriation because it severely restricted the carrying out of 
any activity within the area.117 The fact that the international community has 
repeatedly endorsed the development of MPA networks would not prevent 
such a finding.118 After all, states have a large amount of discretion as to which 
areas they designate as MPAs, as well as what activities they restrict therein. 
Moreover, it must be understood that international investment law would not 
prevent the establishment of a MPA, but the state would be required to pay 
compensation to investors that are prevented from continuing activities that 
they had been previously authorized to conduct in that area. In this respect, 
it has been noted that ‘[w]hile an expropriation or taking for environmen-
tal reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may 
be legitimate, the fact that the [p]roperty was taken for this reason does not 
affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the 
taking.’119 This is a reminder that coastal states will have to take into account 
international investment law when carrying out their regulatory mandate in 
relation to seabed activities and the establishment of MPAs. It also suggests 
that, in order to avoid conflicts, coastal states should, as far as possible, try to 
identify ecosystems that require protection prior to authorizing investments in 
the relevant areas.120
5 Conclusion
It is likely that uses of the seabed will continue to increase in the coming years, 
both in terms of an expansion of existing activities and the emergence of new 
ones. In the exercise of their sovereignty and sovereign rights over the seabed, 
116   EnCana Corporation v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, Award, 3 February 2006, para. 174.
117   See Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, paras 
109–112.
118   See e.g. Sustainable Development Goal 14.5.
119   Santa Elena Development Company v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award, 
17 February 2000, para. 71.
120   To this effect, see UK House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, The 
Future of Marine Renewables in the United Kingdom (2012) para. 92.
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coastal states have a broad degree of power to ensure that these activities are 
carried out in such a way that both provide benefits to local communities and 
do not cause serious or irreparable harm to the marine environment. This 
paper has explored the extent to which international investment law applies 
to the measures adopted by coastal states in relation to seabed activities and 
what constraints may be imposed on coastal states thereby.
It has been shown that there are clear arguments that investment treaties 
can be interpreted to apply to investments in all maritime zones of coastal 
states, even if they are not explicit in this respect.
The chapter also identified some situations in which the application of inter-
national investment law becomes more complex, notably seabed activities in 
joint development areas or disputed areas. Investors should be more cautious 
in these situations, as they may not necessarily benefit from the protections 
of international investment law. Thus, they may need to enter into special 
arrangements in order to receive the assurances that they may want before 
they invest.121 It is also important to remember that international investment 
law also does not extend to investments in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
When it comes to the substantive protection that may be enjoyed by an 
investor, it was argued that international investment law must be interpreted 
and applied in light of state’s international commitments in relation to the 
protection of the marine environment, with a view to achieving mutual sup-
portiveness between these two areas of law. The paper proposed a framework 
of principles to guide states in the exercise of their regulatory powers, in order 
to minimize any conflict with investment protection standards. In doing so, 
the paper identified the opportunities for applying a precautionary approach 
to seabed regulation, whilst also pointing out the limits of this principle as a 
defence to investment claims.
Ultimately, international investment law offers a large degree of discre-
tion to states in exercising regulatory powers, although the precise limitations 
will depend upon the nature of the obligations they have undertaken in their 
investment treaties and the restrictiveness of measures that are adopted.
121   In this context, see the discussion in Tzeng (n53) of contractual measures and political 
risk insurance.
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chapter 21
Navigating Legal Barriers to Mortgaging Energy 




Annual investments in the global energy sector exceed $1.5 trillion.1 Tens of 
billions per year thereof are invested in oil, gas and electricity infrastructure 
situated above, on or under the seabed of the North Sea. In the second half 
of the 20th century, the investments in the North Sea energy sector predomi-
nantly concerned the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas fields. Since 
the turn of the century, the number of wind farms constructed on the North 
Sea seabed has increased drastically. The energy sector can be characterized as 
highly capital intensive. This is particularly true for the offshore energy sector. 
Hundreds of millions or billions of euros are invested in individual offshore oil 
and gas and offshore wind projects.2 It is common business practice that debt 
is attracted to finance such operations.3 The companies active in the oil and 
gas sector in the last century had no issues attracting the required capital, in 
particular when oil and gas prices were high, as they could use their extensive 
assets and oil and gas reserves as collateral.4 This is different in the current 
sector as oil and gas prices are relatively low, the discovered fields are smaller 
and many fields are nearing depletion. New companies with fewer assets have 
1   ‘World Energy Investment 2018’ (OECD/International Energy Agency 2018). In 2017, total 
investments in the energy sector, including electricity generation and supply, oil and gas sup-
ply, energy efficiency and coal supply, amounted to 1.8 trillion USD. In 2015 and 2016 global 
investments in the energy sector were higher.
2   Construction and operation of individual wind farms often exceeds €1 billion, ‘Offshore 
Wind in Europe – Key Trends and Statistics 2018’ (WindEurope, 2019) 21 <windeurope.org/
about-wind/statistics/offshore>.
3   The following explanation receives more attention in C.G. Verburg & J.J.A. Waverijn, ‘Liberal-
izing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy Technology: The Role of International 
Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ (2019) Brill 
Open Law and my forthcoming PhD thesis.
4   ‘Economic Report 2016’ (Oil and Gas UK, 2017) 34 <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/Economic-Report-2016-Oil-Gas-UK.pdf>.
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entered the market, for example specializing in the offshore wind sector, ocean 
energy, the production of mature oil and gas fields or the re-use of oil and gas 
infrastructure. These companies require different types of collateral since 
reserves are not present.
In order to hedge their risks, lenders require the establishment of a compre-
hensive security package to cover the hundreds of millions of euros provided.5 
The current possibilities to offer financial security could be improved in many 
jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, where mortgaging installations on the 
seabed beyond the territorial sea (22.2km) is impossible.6 Strengthening the 
security package with such a mortgage could decrease the cost of capital in 
certain jurisdictions. Moreover, if the result is that a less complex security 
package can be established and legal opinions have to be provided, transac-
tion costs would decrease.
In the civil law jurisdictions bordering the North Sea, the regulations gov-
erning security rights are arranged for by law. This chapter discusses a rule of 
private international law which legislators could adopt and which other laws 
they should take into account to allow for the establishment of mortgage 
against installations at sea. Relevant rules of the law of the sea, private interna-
tional law and national property law will be discussed. At the level of national 
law, the Netherlands will be used as the example as it is currently impossible to 
establish such a mortgage under Dutch law and the legal questions and discus-
sions concerning current and possible future Dutch legislation may be exem-
plary for other states.
This chapter starts by setting out the extent to which coastal states can reg-
ulate the construction and operation of oil, gas, electricity and other energy 
infrastructure above, on or below the seabed according to the Law of the Sea 
(Section 2). This discussion includes the question whether coastal states enjoy 
the right to adopt property laws concerning installations constructed on the 
seabed. Subsequently, the practical potential for mortgage to be established 
against offshore installations will be illustrated by discussing investments in 
the production of oil, gas and electricity in the North Sea area and in how far 
costs are carried by private actors and states (Section 3). The North Sea area 
will be used as an example in this part, as some countries bordering the North 
Sea have a long history regulating oil and gas production and increasing expe-
rience with the regulation of electricity production at sea. Subsequently, the 
5   See, for example, Philip Benger and Patrick Holmes, ‘Ancillary Finance Documentation’ in 
John Dewar (ed), International Project Finance Law and Practice (2nd ed, OUP 2015) 463.
6   There is a range of legal questions and uncertainties connected to different security rights 
established concerning main assets of projects, such as the license and subsidies. Questions 
pertaining in particular to the Netherlands are discussed in my PhD on this topic and further 
publications thereon are forthcoming.
505Legal Barriers to Mortgaging Energy Installations
focus lies on the legal questions which the legislator in the Netherlands faces 
to introduce the possibility to mortgage installations on the seabed beyond the 
territorial sea (Section 4).
2 Legal Basis in International Law
The limits of coastal state jurisdiction over oil, gas and electricity production 
at sea are determined by the law of the sea. In light of the focus on the mort-
gaging of installations at sea, particular attention will be given to whether the 
right to adopt property laws falls within coastal state jurisdiction.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out coastal states’ 
rights and duties in the different maritime zones.7 To begin with, a distinction 
has to be made between the territorial sea on the one hand and the continental 
shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on the other.8 The reason therefore 
is that the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state extends to its territorial 
sea.9 As a result, legislation applicable to the territory of a coastal state applies 
to its territorial sea as well, unless it contains a provision explicitly provid-
ing otherwise.10 The property laws of the coastal state thus govern, inter alia, 
installations in its territorial sea, unless the laws explicitly exclude application 
within the territorial sea.
Beyond their territorial sea, coastal states enjoy sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources on their continental 
shelf11 and can claim sovereign rights for these purposes and for the produc-
tion of energy from the water, currents and winds in the EEZ.12 This includes 
7    The parties to UNCLOS 1982 currently include 167 states and the European Union. 
Important provisions of the treaty became customary international law, especially those 
granting states rights rather than obligations, as they were applied by both parties and 
non-parties, Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edition, Man-
chester University Press 1998) 19.
8    Following UNCLOS 1982, arts 3, 57 and 76; the maximum breath of the territorial sea is 
12nm, of the EEZ is 200nm and the breath of the continental shelf can exceed 200nm 
under certain circumstances.
9    UNCLOS 1982, arts 2, 56 and 77. See, for example, Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s modern 
introduction to international law, (Routledge 1997) 76; Bernard H. Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction 
of States’ (2007) MPEPIL, para 13 <opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>; Ian Brownlie, Princi-
ples of International Law (7th ed, OUP 2008) 105.
10   See, for example, Malcolm Evans, ‘Law of the Sea’ in Malcolm Evans, International Law 
(4th ed, OUP 2014) 657; Brownlie (n 9) 105.
11   1958 Continental Shelf Convention, art 3; UNCLOS 1982, art 77. The ICJ ruled that custom-
ary law provides that coastal states have a continental shelf ab inito and ipso jure, North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3.
12   UNCLOS 1982, art 56(1)(a).
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sovereign rights concerning the cables and pipelines used for the aforemen-
tioned purposes. The entire seabed and subsoil of the North Sea falls under 
the continental shelf regime of UNCLOS. In the 1960s, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Norway have entered into 
agreements dividing the vast majority of the seabed and subsoil of the North 
Sea between them.13 The states bordering the North Sea have all claimed an EEZ 
and the associated sovereign rights, which allows them to regulate the produc-
tion of oil and gas as well as electricity from the wind, waves and tides at sea.14
In the areas where a coastal state enjoys sovereign rights, its jurisdiction is 
not full but limited to the rights and area defined in UNCLOS. UNCLOS does not 
explicitly mention that these sovereign rights allow the coastal states to adopt 
property laws in this area. Instead, Article 60(1) UNCLOS provides that on their 
continental shelf and in their EEZ, coastal states have the exclusive right to 
regulate the construction, operation and use of installations and structures for 
the purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural resources and the produc-
tion of electricity from the water, currents and winds. Article 60(2) UNCLOS 
provides that coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial 
islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to cus-
toms, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.15 There are 
convincing arguments supporting that Article 60 UNCLOS also grants coastal 
states the right to adopt property laws governing these installations.16 These 
include that with the adoption of Article 60 UNCLOS a clear choice was made 
for coastal state jurisdiction, rejecting the suggestion made during the UNCLOS 
negotiations to grant jurisdiction to the state constructing or operating the 
installation.17 Also as a result of this choice, the interpretation that coastal 
13   Most of these bilateral treaties were signed between 1964 and 1966. However, in some 
cases reaching agreement on the exact delimitation of the continental shelf proved to 
be more difficult. Most famously, the International Court of Justice delivered judgment 
on continental shelf delimitation in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases concerning the 
borders of the German, Dutch and Danish continental shelves; North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3.
14   Act of 22 April 1999 relating to Belgian’s exclusive economic zone in the North Sea, Belgian 
Official Journal of 10 July 1999; The UK Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013, SI 2013/3161; 
Exclusive Economic Zone (Establishment) Act (1999) Netherlands Official Journal 281; 
Act No. 91 of 17 December 1976 relating to the Economic Zone of Norway; Danish Act No. 
411 of 22 May 1996 on Exclusive Economic Zones.
15   Pursuant to UNCLOS 1982, art 80, art 60 also applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, 
installations and constructions on the continental shelf.
16   In agreement: Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 11; Christopher Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), Inter-
national Law (OUP 2014) 316.
17   Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 112.
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states can adopt property laws for these installations does not conflict with the 
rights of other states and is in line with the rest of the treaty: the treaty grants 
coastal states exclusive jurisdiction concerning these installations.18
3 Energy Activities in the North Sea and Their Financing
The states bordering the North Sea have adopted laws and regulations to gov-
ern the construction, use and removal of installations, cables and pipelines 
on the seabed of their territorial sea and EEZ. In some respects distinctly dif-
ferent approaches were used, while in others the approaches are similar, at 
times because of EU regulation. In the following, I will firstly provide some 
background on the development and regulation of the production of oil and 
gas, wind and ocean energy and transmission infrastructure present on 
and above the seabed of different countries bordering the North Sea. This 
includes discussion of investments in these sectors and by whom these invest-
ments are carried, the private sector or the state, be it through state-owned 
companies or direct state participation. Finally, paragraph 3.3 will reflect on 
different forms of finance.
3.1 Production
3.1.1 Offshore Oil and Gas
In the continental shelves of Denmark and the Netherlands and in particular 
Norway and the United Kingdom, significant oil and gas deposits were found. 
The total oil and gas expenditures on the Norwegian19 and UK20 continen-
tal shelves are, since 2011, annually between €15 and €23 billion. In addition, 
expenses must be made for the removal of infrastructure at the end of the life-
time of oil and gas fields, or alternatively for the re-use of production platforms 
and pipelines, as there, for example, is ample potential for CO2 storage in res-
ervoirs beneath the North Sea seabed.21
Companies investing in the offshore oil and gas sector are confronted 
with high costs for the exploration of the seabed and its subsoil in search of 
18   The argumentation supporting coastal state jurisdiction to adopt property laws regard-
ing these installations and structures is discussed in more detail in the fourth chapter of 
my PhD.
19   ‘Investments in oil and gas, manufacturing, mining and electricity supply’, (Statistics Nor-
way, 21 February 2019) <ssb.no/en/energi-og-industri/statistikker/kis>.
20   Oil and Gas UK (n 4), 33–34.
21   See chapter 19 of this book, M. Roggenkamp,’ Re-using (nearly) depleted Oil and Gas 
Fields in the North Sea for CO2 Storage: Seizing or Missing a Window of Opportunity?’, 
discussing the re-use of depleted oil and gas fields in the North Sea for CO2 storage.
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hydrocarbon deposits. The cost of drilling a single exploration well ranges from 
millions of euros in shallow waters to more than 100 million euros for a single 
deep-water well. Over the life-time from exploration until decommissioning, 
capital expenditures form more than half of the costs for installations on the 
seabed of the continental shelf in Norway and the United Kingdom.22 Operat-
ing costs form almost forty percent of the total costs made in the United King-
dom, but a significantly smaller part in Norway.23
The governments of the countries bordering the North Sea provide licenses 
to private companies who wish to undertake exploration or exploitation activi-
ties. In accordance with the Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive, these licenses 
are provided on a competitive basis.24 As regards state participation, the United 
Kingdom does not, while the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway do know a 
system in which the state, through a state-owned company, participates in 
all or certain oil and gas exploration and exploitation licenses.25 The Danish 
state-owned company Nordsøfonden becomes a licensee, while the Dutch EBN 
does not. In Norway, the State’s Direct Financial Interest is managed by Petoro, 
which is a licensee in the vast majority of licenses, but in a few instances its 
participation is limited to a right to a share of possible profit.
The state-owned companies in these countries have not always been, and 
in other countries still are not always, responsible for their share of the invest-
ments and costs. For example, until 1988 the Norwegian state participant did 
not financially contribute to costs incurred for exploration, but contributed 
only to production.26 Following developments such as low oil and gas prices 
and the discovery of fewer large fields, the Norwegian, Dutch and Danish state 
participants currently do financially contribute to exploration activities in 
order to stimulate investments. The share the state-owned company obtains 
is in the Netherlands by law set at forty percent, is in Denmark usually twenty 
22   See, for example, figures provided by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, www.nor 
skpetroleum.no/en/economy/investments-operating-costs and graphics.wsj.com/oil-bar 
rel-breakdown.
23   Ibid.
24   Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on 
the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons [1994] OJ L164/3.
25   See, inter alia, section 3–6 and Chapter 11 Norwegian Petroleum Act 1996; articles 81 to 97 
Dutch Mining Act; section 8 Act on the Danish Subsoil and the Act on the Danish North 
Sea Fund; the United Kingdom used to know a system of state participation, but this was 
abolished in the 1980s.
26   Ernst Nordtveit, ‘Regulation of the Norwegian upstream petroleum sector’, in Tina Hunter 
(ed), Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative Study of Licensing and 
Concession Systems (Edward Elgar 2015) 145.
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percent and is for current projects in Norway between five and 63 percent.27 
Finally, state-participants are expected to provide their part of the required 
investments in decommissioning.28 The private companies holding the oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation licenses are thus not responsible to carry all 
investments and costs in a number of jurisdictions. In case the state does not 
participate, the private companies are fully responsible for capital costs, but 
they can still rely on existing laws decreasing their tax burden.
3.1.2 Offshore Wind
Whereas wind farms in the North Sea were scarce in number in the early 
2000s, during the past decade the installed capacity has increased exponen-
tially.29 The driving forces behind this increase are the commitments states 
have made regarding the consumption of electricity from renewable energy 
sources.30 For several states, reaching these targets by constructing onshore 
capacity proved to be difficult, inter alia, because of public opposition against 
onshore wind and spatial constraints.31 Therefore, within the boundaries of 
the Electricity Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive,32 states border-
ing the North Sea have decided to introduce varying legislation on licensing 
and support schemes which allow for the realization of offshore wind projects, 
27   Articles 88 and 94 Dutch Mining Act. EBN has a fifty percent share in production activities 
for which the exploration license was granted under a previous regime. In two licenses, 
the Danish state-owned company Nordsøfonden has a 36.36 percent rather than a twenty 
percent share, see <nordsoefonden.dk>.
28   See, for example, J.J.A. Waverijn & L. Baljon, ‘Verslag van European Energy Law Seminar 
2018’ (2018) 4 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Energierecht 133–147.
29   Offshore Wind in Europe (n 2) 12. The Norwegian offshore wind sector is currently limited 
to one, floating, wind mill both because the already installed hydroelectric capacity in 
Norway limits the need for offshore wind farms and because the water depths off the 
Norwegian coast provide technical and thereby financial challenges which other North 
Sea states do not face.
30   The states bordering the North Sea have committed themselves to national renewable 
electricity production targets and to targets at EU level through Directive 2009/28/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16 and Directive 2018/2001/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources [2018] OJ L 328/82 (the RES Directive).
31   See, for example, Anita Rønne, ‘Opposition to Wind Farms and the Possible Responses 
of the Legal System’, in Lila Barrera-Hernández and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and 
Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on Communities (OUP 
2016) 176.
32   Currently, Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ 
L 211/55 and the RES Directive (n 30).
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giving the sector an opportunity to mature and try to reduce costs.33 Further-
more, the states bordering the North Sea have signed various agreements and 
understandings to further the development of offshore wind in the North Sea 
and identified the North Sea as a ‘power house’ which may deliver as much as 
8 percent of the energy supply of Europe by 2030.34 As will be elaborated on in 
the following paragraph, these agreements also concern increased electricity 
transport through cables laid on the seabed of the North Sea.
The developers of offshore wind farms in the North Sea are private compa-
nies. These include (partially) state owned power companies such as Ørsted, 
Equinor and Vattenfall, which jointly represent around thirty percent of the 
current market.35 As the subsidy schemes currently in place for offshore wind 
can only be relied upon once production starts, developers have to fully pro-
vide the capital required to construct the wind farms.36 For large scale off-
shore wind farms in the North Sea, this usually concerns €1–2 billion, while 
operational expenditures are relatively low.37 As regards the European offshore 
wind sector, yearly investments grew from €8 billion in 2010 to €18 billion in 
2016.38 Between 2017 and 2021, the annual capacity of permitted and planned 
projects is comparable to or greater than the capacity installed during the year 
2015.39 On the longer term, both national governments and the EU are aiming 
for ambitious targets regarding the consumption of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources by 2030 and 2050 and offshore wind is expected to 
play an important role in reaching these targets.40
33   For an overview in the development of and support schemes used for offshore wind in 
the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark see Hannah Katharina Müller, A Legal 
Framework for a Transnational Offshore Grid in the North Sea (Intersentia 2015) 145, 163, 
174, 190.
34   See, in particular, Council of the EU, ‘Political declaration on energy cooperation between 
the North Seas Countries’ 8673/16 of 13 May 2016, which echoes the 2016 Manifesto North-
ern Seas as the Power House of North Western Europe which was signed by twenty Mem-
bers of the European Parliament from countries neighbouring the North Seas.
35   Offshore Wind in Europe (n 2) 27–28.
36   Previously and currently used support schemes include renewable obligation certificates, 
contracts for difference, feed-in premiums and feed-in tariffs. See also, n 33.
37   Offshore Wind in Europe (n 2) 21.
38   ‘The European Offshore Wind Industry – Key Trends and Statistics 2016’ (WindEurope, 
2017) 33 <windeurope.org/about-wind/statistics/offshore>.
39   Ibid, 24–25.
40   See, for example, Commission, ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ (Communication) COM (2011) 885 
final.
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3.1.3 Ocean Energy
Electricity can be produced from an array of ocean sources, of which the tides 
and waves are currently regarded to be most promising.41 The majority of the 
installed capacity is situated within territorial seas. The expectation is that pro-
duction will extend to the EEZ where facilities, such as network connections, 
may be shared with offshore wind farms.42
The main arguments in favour of developing ocean energy technologies 
are that the sources are renewable, add diversity to national generation, and – 
unlike electricity production from wind and sun – the output is predictable. 
Thus, electricity production from these sources is favourable in terms of bal-
ancing and the achievement of renewable electricity goals. For these reasons, 
the European Commission is active in stimulating the development of ocean 
energy technologies within the EU and have provided around €150 million in 
support in the last ten years.43 The potential worldwide market for electric-
ity production from ocean energy sources has been estimated at €535 billion 
between 2010 and 2050.44 A significant part thereof may develop in the North 
Sea, as the EU hosts around half of the world’s tidal energy developers, sixty 
percent of all wave energy developers and seventy percent of the ocean energy 
research and testing infrastructure.45 Between 2007 and 2015, €2.6 billion was 
invested in ocean energy in the EU of which 75 percent by the private sector.46 
Until 2030, a further €2.8 to €9.4 billion will be invested in the sector.
3.2 Transport Infrastructure
To transport electricity, oil and gas from either the production site to shore 
or from one country to another, a large number of electricity cables and oil 
and gas pipelines have been laid down on or under the seabed of the North 
Sea. Producers constructed oil and mainly gas pipelines connecting the pro-
duction platforms to shore and were responsible for these investments. As a 
41   Commission, ‘Renewable Energy: a Major Player in the European Energy Market’ (Staff 
Working Document) SWD (2012) 0164 final.
42   See, for example, Eric D. Stoutenburg, ‘Integrating Wind and Wave Power in California’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Stanford 2012); Sharay Astariz and Gregorio Iglesias, ‘Enhanc-
ing Wave Energy Competitiveness through Co-Located Wind and Wave Energy Farms. A 
Review on the Shadow Effect’ (2015) 8 Energies 7344.
43   See, for example, Davide Magagna and Andreas Uihlein, ‘2014 JRC Ocean Energy Sta-
tus Report’ (Scientific and Technical Research Reports) EUR (2015) 26983; The 2018 
Annual Economic Report on EU Blue Economy (European Union, Joint Research Centre 
2018) 73.
44   Commission, ‘Blue Energy – Action needed to deliver on the potential of ocean energy in 
European seas and oceans by 2020 and beyond’ (Communication) COM (2014) 08 final.
45   The 2018 Annual Economic Report on EU Blue Economy (n 43) 70.
46   Ibid, 73.
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result of efficiency considerations, offshore pipeline systems have been con-
structed which connect multiple production platforms to each other and to 
shore, of which the most elaborate network lies on the Norwegian continen-
tal shelf. Initially, the companies in control of these upstream pipelines were 
owned by the producers and the state participated. For example, almost all of 
the Norwegian upstream gas pipeline network is owned by Gassled. Gassled is 
a joint venture of which the state indirectly holds 51 percent of the shares.47 In 
the Netherlands, the Dutch state participant EBN has a share in five offshore 
upstream gas pipelines, among which a 45 percent stake in NOGAT.
The majority of electricity cables on the seabed in the North Sea are radial 
connections.48 The national regimes concerning offshore wind farm connec-
tion to shore differ. For example, in the United Kingdom, the wind farm opera-
tors are responsible for financing the construction but choose whether they or 
an offshore transmission system operator (OFTO) construct the connection.49 
Until 2016, developers in the Netherlands were obliged to fund and construct 
and owned the connection. However, the Dutch national TSO TenneT has been 
appointed to construct joint connections from multiple wind farms, funded 
through government support, with the aim to reduce costs.50 This brings the 
Netherlands in line with Denmark and Germany where, respectively, Energi-
net and TenneT are responsible for both construction and funding.
The other main category of offshore pipelines and electricity cables are 
those which cross borders, i.e. interconnectors. These pipelines and electricity 
cables cross the North Sea, connecting for example the Netherlands to Norway 
or the United Kingdom to Germany. The construction costs of a number of 
interconnectors exceeded €500 million.51 The vast majority of interconnectors 
are owned, operated and funded by state-owned TSOs.52
47   The 51 percent of the state involvement consists of 46,6 percent of Gassled shares held by 
Petero and 5 percent by Equinor. The state has a controlling interest in Equinor as it holds 
67 percent of the shares.
48   A radial connection directly connects electricity production facilities to shore.
49   Electricity (Competitive Tenders for Offshore Transmission Licences) Regulations 2013, SI 
2013/175.
50   The Minister of Economic Affairs has appointed TenneT as offshore TSO in September 2016 
by means of a decision taken on the basis of the Act of 23 March 2016 Amending Electric-
ity Act 1998 (tijdig realiseren doelstellingen Energieakkoord), article III.
51   The NorNed electricity cable between the Netherlands and Norway cost at least €600 
million, Commission, ‘The European Investment Bank finances NorNed (Press Release) 
BEI (2007)118. The BBL Pipeline – natural gas – between the Netherlands and the UK cost 
€500 million, see <bblcompany.com>.
52   See, for example, Electricity Interconnectors (Ofgem) <ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/
transmission-networks/electricity-interconnectors> and Commission, ‘Exemption Deci-
sions and Pending Notifications of National Exemption Decisions for Gas and Electric-
ity’ <ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/exemption_decisions2017.pdf>. In 
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The aforementioned cooperation agreements also concern the potential 
construction of a cross-border offshore grid, connecting offshore wind farms 
and the electricity networks of coastal states bordering the North Sea.53 The 
envisaged benefits of an offshore grid would include further interconnection 
of European energy markets, which should reduce electricity prices, construc-
tion costs and should contribute to decarbonisation and the share of con-
sumed renewable energy. Realization of such infrastructures is estimated to 
cost between €59 and €107 billion.54 Before such a grid can be built, technical, 
legal and financial hurdles will have to be overcome.55
3.3 Finance
The developers of these energy exploration, production and transmission 
activities at sea use different methods to raise the required debt or equity to 
finance their activities. This section touches upon corporate finance and proj-
ect finance and a few significant differences between the two. Regardless of the 
method used, it is common that the assets and liabilities connected to a sin-
gle activity are housed in a separate legal entity. This is always the case when 
project finance is used.56 The assets and liabilities held by this special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) include the permits, the off-take agreement and construction 
contracts.57 In case of project finance, equity and debt are used to fund the 
SPV. The defining feature of project finance is that lenders of the debt only 
have recourse against the assets of the SPV and not against any other assets 
of the shareholders of the SPV.58 Conversely, financial constructions wherein 
the recourse of the lenders is broader, for example when the parent company 
Norway, until recently, only the fully state owned national TSO could own and operate 
interconnectors. This has been changed, but the authorities are now considering revers-
ing the decision.
53   See, for example, Commission, ‘Second Strategic Energy Review: an EU energy security 
and solidarity action plan’ (Communication) SEC (2008) 2870, 2871, 2872; Memorandum 
of Understanding on the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI) of 
3 December 2010; Council of the EU (n 34).
54   Commission, ‘Study of the benefits of a meshed offshore grid in northern seas region’ 
(2014).
55   See, for example, Müller (n 33); Ceciel Nieuwenhout, ‘Offshore Hybrid Grid Infrastruc-
tures: The Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution’, in Martha M. Roggenkamp & Catherine 
Banet (eds), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2019) 95–112.
56   In the upstream petroleum sector, unincorporated joint ventures are most commonly 
used. When attracting debt, lenders often require incorporating the company, Aled 
Davies and James Orme, ‘International Projects – Sector Focus Section A – Oil and Gas’ in 
John Dewar (ed), International Project Finance (2nd ed, OUP 2015) 152.
57   Stefano Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice (Elsevier Academic Press 2013) 271.
58   Robert Clews, Project Finance for the International Petroleum Industry (Elsevier Academic 
Press 2016) 7.
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provides a guarantee to lenders, fall outside the scope of project finance and 
are referred to as corporate finance.59
Around ten percent of oil and gas funding is provided through project 
finance.60 In the European offshore wind sector, the share of project finance 
in total investments is significantly higher with 40 percent in 2015 and 2016, 
out of total investments of €31.5bn.61 In 2018, €8 out of €10.3 billion invested in 
new projects was raised using project finance.62 On top of that, another €8.5 
billion of debt was refinanced in 2018.63
The average debt raised for individual North Sea project finance deals is 
around one billion euro. This debt is provided by commercial banks, insur-
ance companies, pension funds and public and semi-public financial institu-
tions.64 The public and semi-public financial institutions are instrumental to 
the success of these deals and include development banks and export credit 
agencies, such as the European Investment Bank, the German development 
bank KfW and the Denmark’s export credit agency EKF, which inter alia can 
provide debt, guarantees and insurance.65 As commercial banks rarely offer 
risk commitments exceeding €200mln to individual projects, a consortium of 
commercial banks is involved in these deals.66 In addition, a growing number 
of institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are 
involved in financing offshore wind. This can be by providing debt, but also 
equity as, for example, some utilities sell off minority stakes in their wind farm 
to free up capital to invest in other projects. In this model, the utility remains 
in control over the wind farm while an institutional investor such as a pension 
fund, seeking equity returns, becomes a shareholder.67
Debt is attracted for almost all energy activities carried out by private par-
ties, regardless of whether this is done through corporate finance or project 
finance. Further distinctions include that the cost of capital for debt attracted 
through corporate finance is often higher: The lenders only have recourse 
against the assets of the SPV and therefore may face higher risks which translate 
59   Definitions along these lines are broadly, but not exclusively, used. Referring to sources 
used in this contribution in particular: ‘Funding challenges in the oil and gas sector’ (EY 
2014) 2 <ey.com/oilandgas>; The European Offshore Wind Industry (n 38) 20.
60   Funding challenges in the oil and gas sector (n 59) 2.
61   The European Offshore Wind Industry (n 38) 33–34.
62   Offshore Wind in Europe (n 2) 35.
63   Offshore Wind in Europe (n 2) 36.
64   Cathy Marsh and Andrew Pendleton, ‘Project Participants and Structures’ in John Dewar 
(ed), International Project Finance (OUP 2011) 35–36.
65   Davies and Orme (n 56) 155; The European Offshore Wind Industry (n 38) 32.
66   Mark Plenderleith, ‘Sources of Funding’ in John Dewar (ed), International Project Finance 
(OUP 2011) 61.
67   Marsh and Pendleton (n 64) 34–35.
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to higher interest rates. In case of project finance, it is thus of greater impor-
tance that the security which can be provided in light of the individual project 
is as extensive as it can be, as this decreases risks and thus may lead to lower 
interest rates and thus a lower cost of capital.68 The cost of capital can be a 
major part of the life-time expenses of a project, as they can for example total 
a billion euros over the lifetime of a two-billion-euro loan. The cost of capital 
can thus be prohibitive and result in projects not being developed. This is cur-
rently an issue in the ocean energy sector. Developers of ocean energy have 
particular trouble attracting sufficient funds to scale up to commercial levels 
as the projects are too capital intensive to attract venture capitalists, too risky 
to attract private equity and borrowing from banks is too expensive because 
of the risks and subsequent cost of capital.69 Governments will thus have to 
provide financial support and legislative support. One manner in which gov-
ernments can provide legislative support is by ensuring that the law does not 
contain unnecessary barriers, for example by allowing for mortgage of installa-
tions on the seabed as will be discussed in the following paragraph.
4 Mortgaging Property on the Seabed
4.1 Introduction
We have established that the investments required for the construction 
and operation of offshore installations, cables and pipelines are significant and 
that a large part of the costs involved are carried by private companies. In order 
to hedge their risks, lenders ensure to be granted a security rights. In case of 
project finance this concerns a comprehensive security package usually con-
cerning all assets of the SPV including the shares of the SPV itself, even if a cer-
tain security or a security regarding certain assets is doubtful or limited in effi-
cacy.70 This includes the license, the income streams from the power purchase 
agreement, a possible subsidy agreement, the bank accounts of the SPV or the 
physical installations. Developers not using project finance also mortgage and 
pledge their assets. Practice in the Norwegian offshore oil and gas sector is an 
excellent example thereof. The Norwegian Petroleum Act contains a chapter 
dedicated to the mortgage of licenses.71 The Ministry regularly allows licensees 
68   Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, ‘Relationship between Risk and the Cost of Capital’, in 
Shannon Pratt & Roger J. Grabowski (eds.), Cost of Capital (5th ed, Wiley 2014) 70–87.
69   Commission, ‘Market Study on Ocean Energy’ (Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2018) 45.
70   Joanne Robertson and Patrick Holmes, ‘Ancillary Finance Documentation’ in John Dewar 
(ed), International Project Finance (OUP 2011) 319.
71   Norwegian Petroleum Act 1996, ch 6.
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to mortgage an offshore license to finance activities carried out under another 
licence than the one which has been mortgaged, which means this mortgage 
does not concern project finance as that would be limited to the licensed 
activity.72 In the context of specific laws addressing security rights of offshore 
energy activities, Denmark knows laws specifically allowing for mortgaging 
physical wind farms at sea.73
In the Netherlands, such specific legislation has not been adopted. The 
possibility to mortgage energy installations on the seabed beyond the territo-
rial sea would provide lenders with additional security, however, which could 
result in a reduction in the cost of capital. The benefits of mortgaging offshore 
energy installations were recognized by the Netherlands State Commission for 
Private International Law (the State Commission), but the Dutch government 
did not follow their initial recommendations.74 The following paragraphs dis-
cuss the advice issued by the State Commission and a subsequent publication 
by the chairman of the State Commission. Through this discussion, a number 
of legal issues are identified which have to be resolved in order to allow for 
mortgaging of offshore installations in conformity with Dutch law. The discus-
sion of the Dutch regime illustrates the questions of property law which other 
governments could also be confronted with.
4.2 Property Law and Installations on the Seabed of the Continental 
Shelf
Upon request of the Dutch government, in 1990 the State Commission issued 
an advice concerning national legislative jurisdiction on the Dutch continen-
tal shelf beyond the territorial sea.75 The main area of attention identified 
by the State Commission related to property laws and installations. Private 
international law dictates which national laws apply to installations on the 
continental shelf beyond the territorial sea.76 Problems arise as the lex rei 
sitae – the place where the property is situated – determines which prop-
erty laws apply.77 As the continental shelf has no internal civil law, the State 
72   Pursuant to Section 6–2 Norwegian Petroleum Act 1996; Olav Nordli, ‘Pantsettelse av 
utvinningstillatelser’ (2011) 3 Tidsskrift for Forretningsjus 131.
73   Danish Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, s 25(4).
74   The State Commission, whose members include judges, academics and practicing law-
yers, provides the Dutch government with requested and unrequested advice concerning 
international private law.
75   Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht, ‘Advies van 12 december 1990’ in 
E.N. Frohn, E. Hennis (eds), Geselecteerde adviezen – naar een afgewogen IPR (T.M.C. 
Asser Instituut 1995). Even though it is not included in the main text, the Dutch EEZ over-
laps with the Dutch continental shelf beyond the territorial sea.
76   Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht (n 75) 247.
77   Ibid; DCC, art 10:127(1).
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Commission concluded that the lex rei sitae refers to a locus sine lege – a place 
without law – and that a legal vacuum concerning property laws exists.78
In order to increase legal certainty for both investors and developers, the 
State Commission advised the Dutch government to propose a new rule of pri-
vate international law, along the following lines:
Installations on the continental shelf of the coastal state are treated 
as installations within that coastal state.79
The Minister of Internal Affairs decided against pursuing the introduction of 
this rule. The reasons provided were that financial practice in the offshore oil 
and gas sector would not require such a rule and that according to the State 
Commission there may already be an unwritten rule of referral to Dutch prop-
erty law concerning the Dutch continental shelf, which would allegedly resolve 
the issue when encountered in practice.80 In an advice issued in 1996, the State 
Commission itself advised against the adoption of a comparable rule.81 The 
State Commission argued that the rule would lead to confusion as regards 
which laws should and which should not be applied. It also used the argument 
put forward by the Minister, that the legal structures used in the practice of 
financing petroleum installations on the continental shelf did not require a 
change in law.82
Even though the State Commission may have been correct in asserting that 
the financial structures used in the past half century in the petroleum industry 
do not seem to have hampered investments in the Netherlands, the landscape 
has changed radically after the advice was issued and the need for legal cer-
tainty and financial security has increased, as previously mentioned. Allowing 
for the mortgaging of installations at sea would in fact strengthen the security 
package and thereby increase legal certainty for investors in offshore energy 
activities.83
While the appetite for investments in offshore wind in the North Sea area 
is currently high, this increase in legal certainty could prove vital for investors 
78   Ibid.
79   Ibid 247–248. This is a translation and interpretation of the much more elaborate rule 
drafted by the State Commission in Dutch.
80   Netherlands Parliamentary Papers II (1990–91) 22 390, nr 1.
81   Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht, Rapport aan de Minister van 
Justitie – Internationaal Goederenrecht (1 November 1998) 8.
82   Ibid.
83   In agreement: Frank M.J. Verstijlen, ‘Eigendom van Delfstoffen en in de ondergrond 
opgeslagen stoffen’ in: Preadvies Nederlandse Vereniging voor Energierecht: Energie en 
Eigendom (Intersentia 2011) 19; X.E. Kramer & H.L.E. Verhagen, Asser 10-II Internationaal 
Vermogensrecht (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 413.
518 Waverijn
in the development of ocean energy, storage potential or other activities in the 
North Sea in the future, which may involve new technologies and thus greater 
risks and therefore costs. Moreover, considering that the lex rei sitae is used to 
identify which property laws apply in the vast majority of countries,84 com-
parable issues as those concerning the Dutch continental shelf are expected 
to exist in a significant number of other coastal states, many of which have 
a comparatively high cost of capital. In the coastal states with potential for 
offshore production of electricity from renewable energy sources and storage, 
cost reductions will be determinant in realizing projects.
4.3 National Law
The adoption of a rule prescribing that installations on the continental shelf 
are regarded to be situated within the territory of the coastal state would 
resolve certain but not all barriers to mortgaging installations on the seabed 
of the Netherlands continental shelf. To illustrate this, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss mortgage (hypotheekrecht) under Dutch law.
A mortgage is established by a notarial instrument drawn up between 
the parties in which the grantor grants a mortgage to the mortgagee over 
registered property, followed by the entry of the instrument, in the appro-
priate public registers provided for that purpose.85
The following questions must be answered to ascertain whether installations 
at sea can be mortgaged or pledged: What is the definition of registered prop-
erty? Can installations at sea, inside and outside the territorial sea, be defined 
as such? The definition of registered property is enshrined in Article 3:10 of the 
Dutch Civil Code (DCC):
Registered property is property the transfer or creation of which requires 
entry in the appropriate public registers.86
The most common category of property the transfer of which requires registra-
tion in the public register is immovable property.87 Immovable are the land, 
not yet mined minerals, plants connected to the land, and buildings and 
84   Malanczuk (n 9) 73.
85   DCC, art 3:260. Hans Warendorf, Richard Thomas and Ian Curry-Summer, The Civil Code of 
the Netherlands (1st ed, Wolters Kluwer 2009) 498.
86   Hans Warendorf (n 85) 434.
87   DCC, art 3:89. Warendorf (n 85) has been used for this and the following references to the 
DCC.
519Legal Barriers to Mortgaging Energy Installations
constructions permanently attached to the land, either directly or through con-
nection with other buildings or constructions.88 All tangible property which 
is not immovable is movable property.89 Immovable property is not the only 
category of property requiring registration to transfer or establish. The most 
prominent other example is ships. While a ship is movable property, Dutch law 
provides that ships are registered property.90
The result is that both movable property for which law provides that trans-
fer or creation requires registration and immovable property can be mort-
gaged. The mortgage has to be established by notarial mortgage deed which 
must be entered into the public registers. Against movable property outside 
this category, inter alia, a non-possessory security right comparable to pledge 
can be established (pandrecht).91 The qualification of property as immovable 
or movable therefore has an important influence on which type of security 
right can be established.
4.4 Installations at Sea, Immovable or Movable Property?
As Dutch law does not contain a rule that transfer of installations in the EEZ 
requires registration in a public register, the question is whether installations 
at sea are movable or immovable property. This is discussed assuming that 
Dutch property law applies pursuant to a comparable rule as proposed by the 
State Commission.
The response of the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs to questions from 
members of the Lower House provides an example of how unclear the legal 
qualification of offshore installations currently is. The minister stated that 
windmills in the EEZ are immovable property because they qualify as such pur-
suant to the Valuation of Immovable Property Act (VIPA).92 This act concerns 
municipal taxes, while the limits of jurisdiction of Dutch municipalities is one 
kilometer offshore.93 Without providing further supporting arguments, the 
minister added that the fact that this law does not apply within the EEZ did not 
affect his conclusion.94 Solely supporting this argumentation with a law which 
88   DCC, art 3:3(1).
89   DCC, art 3:3 (2).
90   DCC, art 8:199(1).
91   DCC, art 3:237(1).
92   Letter of the Minister of Economic Affairs to the Lower House as regards questions and 
amendments for the bill ‘Electricity- and Gas law (32 199), 2 October 2015, DGETM-EI / 
15138937.
93   Act of 2 November 1990, concerning provincial and municipality borders along the North 
Sea coast 1984 (1990) Netherlands Official Journal 553.
94   Letter of the Minister of Economic Affairs (n 92).
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does not apply is clearly insufficient. Considering the aforementioned conclu-
sion that Dutch property laws do not apply in the Dutch EEZ in particular, there 
is no reason to assume that the VIPA would influence the property law status of 
installations in the Dutch EEZ.
The then chair of the State Commission and Advocate-General to the Neth-
erlands Supreme Court Roelvink, addressed the question whether installa-
tions beyond territorial waters are movable or immovable in a publication 
following the advice discussed above.95 In this publication, Roelvink argued 
for the adoption of a rule of private international law. Coastal state property 
law should apply to installations within the continental shelf and EEZ in so far 
the installations are used for the purpose of the exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources.96 This rule would create an unfortunate situation where 
the material property laws of the coastal state provide both that these instal-
lations are immovable and that for the transfer and mortgaging of immovable 
property registration in the public registers is required, but where the public 
registers do not extend to the relevant part of the sea.97 Roelvink added that 
Dutch public registers do not extend beyond territorial borders. He further 
observed that other commentators have argued that matters would become 
worse if the seabed beyond the territorial sea is to be considered a res nullius 
and if national law is considered to provide that through accession the wind-
mills legally accede to, and thus are part of, the seabed and therefore also are 
res nullius.98 Roelvink concluded as follows:
I have a different point of view, at least as regards Dutch property law. I 
defend the position that an installation, connected to the ownerless con-
tinental shelf, can qualify as and can be treated as movable property. I 
do not see good grounds to assume that ownership of property is lost 
because of connection to a res nullius, nor to assume that the absence of 
public registers makes transfer impossible.99
Roelvink takes a very pragmatic approach. His conclusion that these instal-
lations qualify as movable property is not based on the legal requirements 
95   H.L.J. Roelvink, ‘Het Continentaal plat als IPR-aanknopingspunt’, in S.C.J.J. Kortmann and 
others (eds), Op recht (lib. am. Struycken) (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1996).
96   National property law should not apply to anchored beacons for shipping, telephone 
cables, transmission islands or tunnels, according to Roelvink (n 95) 280.
97   Roelvink made note of that the Dutch public registers do not extend beyond the territo-
rial sea, Roelvink (n 95) 820.
98   Roelvink (n 95) 280.
99   Translated from Roelvink (n 95) 280. Moving on to another part of his publication, Roel-
vink does not provide further insight on the legal reasoning supporting his views.
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included in Dutch property law, specified in extensive case law. Instead, he 
attaches decisive significance to avoiding the legal issues created by the treat-
ment of these installations as immovable property. While the issues caused by 
qualification as immovable property are undesirable, the present author is of 
the opinion that this cannot be considered a valid justification for deviation 
from Dutch property law, which is the law Roelvink explicitly refers to.
The applicability of Dutch property law to installations in the territorial sea 
is without doubt. The adoption of a rule in line with the proposal by the State 
Commission would ensure the same for installations on the continental shelf 
and EEZ. In the following, it will be assessed whether these installations qualify 
as movable or immovable property pursuant to contemporary Dutch law, and 
whether problems such as those mentioned by Roelvink arise.
Pursuant to Dutch law, immovable property includes constructions and 
buildings which are permanently attached to the land.100 The travaux prépara-
toires reveal that the land should be interpreted as the outer layer of the earth’s 
crust and the solid layers beneath the crust.101 Considering that the seabed is 
the outer layer of the earth’s crust, albeit covered by water, it qualifies as the land 
in the sense of this provision. Permanently attached is interpreted as requiring 
that a construction is designed and inherently intended to stay in place for a 
prolonged period of time.102 This relies on the intention of the constructing 
party; insofar this intention is clear to third parties through the nature and 
design of the construction.103 The question whether constructions at sea, such 
as wind farms and oil or gas production platforms are immovable thus requires 
a case-by-case assessment. Arguments supporting classification of installa-
tions such as wind mills and oil and gas production platforms as immovable 
property are their size,104 and – where applicable – their concrete foundations, 
which are designed and constructed with the sole purpose of supporting the 
100   DCC, art 3:3(1).
101   C.J. van Zeben, M.M. Olthof in cooperation with J.W. Du Pon (eds), Parlementaire Geschie-
denis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek. Boek 3. Vermogensrecht in het algemeen (Kluwer 
1981) 69. No different opinions have been supported since, according to Groene Serie Ver-
mogensrecht, DCC, art 3:3, comment 16 (1–1-2017).
102   Netherlands Supreme Court, 13 June 1975, ECLI:NL:HR:1975:AC3080 (Amercentrale); 
Van Zeben, Olthof and Du Pon (n 101) 69.
103   Netherlands Supreme Court, 23 February 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC5591 (Inzake Onroer-
ende Windmolens); Netherlands Supreme Court 13 May 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT5469; 
Netherlands Supreme Court, 31 October 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2478 (Portacabin) 
para 3.3.
104   Netherlands Supreme Court, 8 July 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:AA2223 (Rijdende 
Haven kranen I); Netherlands Supreme Court 24 December 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010: 
BO3644 (Rijdende Havenkranen II); H.D. Ploeger, ‘Een mobiele onroerende zaak?’ (1998) 
6321 WPNR 472.
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installations.105 Further arguments include that these installations have the 
sole purpose to produce electricity, oil or gas and that they are not constructed 
for temporary use. Indeed, many of these installations have been in place for a 
long period time which has been brought forward as evidence of the intention 
by Advocate-General to the Dutch Supreme Court Mok.106 This sufficiently 
supports that offshore production platforms and wind farms are permanently 
attached to the land, as was also concluded in a case regarding onshore wind 
mills by Advocate-General Moltmaker.107 As a result, both requirements are 
satisfied, and installations in the territorial sea, on the continental shelf and 
in the EEZ would qualify as immovable property and thereby also as registered 
property.
4.5 Ownership and Registration
As a consequence of the conclusion that production platforms and wind farms 
in the EEZ and continental shelf would be immovable property if Dutch law 
applied, questions of ownership and registration should be taken into consid-
eration when discussing mortgage.
Firstly, ownership of the seabed should be considered. Pursuant to UNCLOS 
1982, the seabed beneath the territorial sea is subject to national sovereignty, 
while the seabed beyond the territorial sea is not owned by the coastal state. 
Dutch law provides that the state is the owner of the seabed beneath the terri-
torial sea.108 It further provides that the state owns immovable property which 
has no other owner.109 This would include the seabed beyond the territorial 
sea after adoption of a rule as proposed by the State Commission. The DCC also 
provides that the ownership of the land comprises buildings and construc-
tions permanently attached to the soil.110 The Dutch state thus is the owner of 
105   Conclusion Advocate-General A.J. Moltmaker in Inzake Onroerende Windmolens (n 103).
106   Conclusion Advocate-General Mok, ECLI:NL:PHR:1980:AC1719, who interprets per-
manent as at least several years. Also referred to by Advocate-General Moltmaker in his 
conclusion in Inzake Onroerende Windmolens (n 103).
107   Conclusion Advocate-General A.J. Moltmaker in Inzake Onroerende Windmolens (n 103).
108   DCC, art 5:25.
109   DCC, art 5:24.
110   DCC, art 5:20. Many scholars support the view that pursuant to DCC, art 3:4 buildings and 
installations such as wind mills, in line with Roman law, accede to the land, Th.F. de Jong, 
De structuur van het goederenrecht (PhD thesis, University of Groningen 2006) 115 fn 196. 
The owner would thus also be the owner of the seabed. This rule of law also formed the 
basis of the argument mentioned by Roelvink that installations on the continental shelf 
beyond the territorial sea become res nullius through accession to the seabed. However, as 
the alternative is that no law applies (locus sine lege), this conclusion implies that Dutch 
property law applies which also contains the aforementioned DCC, art 5:24, which pro-
vides that the state would be the owner of the seabed rather than it being a res nullius.
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the wind turbines, transformer stations and transmission cables in the territo-
rial sea and would also be the owner of those on the Dutch continental shelf 
beyond the territorial sea were the suggested rule adopted. To avoid this, the 
state has to grant developers a right of ‘long leasehold’ (erfpacht bears some 
similarities to leasehold) for the relevant seabed area and rights of superficies 
(opstalrecht) regarding the installations and cables. This is already done for 
wind farms constructed on the seabed of the Dutch territorial sea.111
Secondly, the requirements of Dutch law regarding the registration of notar-
ial deeds cause practical problems. Comparable to other jurisdictions, Dutch 
law requires the entry of deeds for the establishment and transfer of immov-
able property and property rights therein into the appropriate public registers. 
This includes the aforementioned rights of long leasehold and right of superfi-
cies. To allow for registration, the public registers should extend to the Dutch 
continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, which is currently not the case.
5 Conclusions
Capital expenditures in the offshore energy sector are high. The investments 
in offshore wind and electricity and gas transport infrastructure in particular 
are increasing. The investments in ocean energy and the re-use of installations, 
for example for storage purposes or power-to-gas, may also greatly increase in 
the coming decades motivated by targets for carbon emissions reduction and 
electricity consumption from renewable energy sources.
It is common practice that debt is raised to finance large energy and infra-
structure projects. The greater the risks, the higher the cost of capital. The debt 
providers require a comprehensive security package to hedge their risks. Mort-
gage is commonly used and the strongest onshore security right in the Neth-
erlands, but currently cannot be used in the EEZ. The first question is which 
laws regulate such a transaction. Analysis of public international law results 
in the conclusion that the coastal state can exercise full civil jurisdiction over 
artificial islands, installations and structures within its jurisdiction in the EEZ 
and on its continental shelf. Subsequently, the legal situation depends on 
whether the coastal state has exercised its jurisdiction. In jurisdictions where 
such laws are not in place and the lex rei sitae is used to determine which 
property laws apply, a locus sine lege or legal vacuum exist as regards property 
111   Johan Dekkers, ‘Rapportage Proces Vergunningverlening Offshore Windpark Egmond aan 
Zee’ (Noordzeewind, August 2007) <www.noordzeewind.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/
OWEZ_R_192_20070820_vergunningen.pdf>.
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laws. This vacuum may be resolved by the judiciary, but this does not provide 
investors with certainty.
Considering that most states worldwide use the lex rei sitae to determine 
which property laws apply and that practice in the countries bordering the 
North Sea shows that the adoption of property laws governing installations 
on the continental shelf and in the EEZ is not commonplace, it is expected 
that a property law vacuum exists in a significant number of coastal states. 
The impossibility to mortgage installations on the seabed could be resolved 
with the adoption of a rule of private international law stating that installa-
tions connected to the continental shelf should be treated as if they were situ-
ated within the territory of the coastal state. The public registers would have 
to be extended to the continental shelf and EEZ. Further rights may have to 
be granted by the state, depending on the applicable laws on accession and 
ownership. In line with Dutch law, the state may have to grant rights of long 
leasehold and superficies to transfer ownership of the installations.
The adoption of legislation allowing for the mortgaging of offshore installa-
tions can increase legal certainty and strengthen the security package offered 
by parties using debt to finance their business. In coastal states where the cost 
of capital is comparatively high, consequences can include a reduction in the 
cost of capital, increased investor appetite and the realization of additional 
projects at sea.
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chapter 22
Crossing the Sectoral Divide: Modern 
Environmental Law Tools for Addressing 
Conflicting Uses on the Seabed
Rosemary Rayfuse
1 Introduction
The oceans are becoming increasingly crowded. They are the venue for a 
vast range of human activities including merchant shipping, fishing, seabed 
mining, construction of artificial islands, undersea cables and pipelines, pro-
duction of renewable energy, marine scientific research, and military uses. 
However, this complex, multidimensional and multi-faceted environment 
also provides a whole range of ecosystem services for humans, ranging from 
climate modulation and CO2 absorption to provision of food stuffs and min-
eral resources. Because of the fluid nature of the ocean medium, activities on 
and under the seabed, such as seabed mining or cable laying, interact with 
the water column, while activities on or in the water column, such as bottom-
trawling, may also interact with the seabed. In other words, all ocean uses 
interact with the marine environment. Thus, existing and emerging ocean 
uses can pose serious threats to the marine environment from, among other 
things, over-exploitation and pollution.
Seabed activities, in particular, pose complex threats due to the perturbation 
of marine biodiversity and the water column caused by construction, explora-
tion or exploitation activities. Even apart from pollution emergencies such as 
that caused by the Deep-Water Horizon incident, seabed mining may destroy 
critical fish habitat or interfere with submarine cables. Bottom-trawling may 
interfere with submarine cables or destroy critical habitat for a range of sed-
entary species and other marine genetic resources. Exploitation of marine 
genetic resources may destroy critical marine biodiversity or interfere with 
ocean energy development and production. Increasingly, the varying demands 
on ocean space and resources are leading to conflict between both existing 
sectors such as shipping and fishing and between existing and emerging sec-
tors including seabed mining, ecotourism and marine renewable energy. This 
increasing competition is also leading to increasing pressures on the marine 
environment.
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Despite the overarching regime established by the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC),1 regulation of ocean activities is essentially a sectoral matter. In areas 
under national jurisdiction, where coastal states enjoy jurisdictional compe-
tence in respect of seabed uses, marine governance regimes have traditionally 
been largely characterised by high levels of sector-specific, uncoordinated 
institutional fragmentation.2 The situation is even more fraught in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) where sectoral fragmentation has been 
compounded by substantive inadequacy and regulatory ineffectiveness.3 
While a complex array of treaty regimes exists, governance, regulatory and 
substantive gaps hinder the ability of these regimes to adequately address both 
existing and emerging threats to the marine environment.4 The potential for 
inter-sectoral conflict such as between shipping, fisheries, mineral exploration 
and exploitation, cable and pipeline operations and mining operations, only 
exacerbates the problem.
In recent years, consensus has emerged on the need to promote cross-
sectoral cooperation and coordination in order to avoid inter-sectoral conflicts 
and to achieve sustainable environmental outcomes for the oceans. A num-
ber of general principles have emerged which provide the foundation for the 
development of normative frameworks and management approaches. These, 
in turn, provide the framework for the development of new management 
approaches and tools, designed to address conflicting uses on the seabed and 
conserve and protect the marine environment, that better reflect the holistic, 
fluid nature of the ocean and its uses. This chapter begins with a discussion of 
these principles (Section 2) and the broad normative frameworks (Section 3) 
and management approaches (Section 4) that have emerged. It then turns to 
a discussion of the key tools that have been developed to assist environmen-
tal management of marine and seabed uses (Section 5) and an examination 
of emerging frameworks for cross-sectoral management aimed specifically 
at avoiding, minimising or resolving conflicting uses on the seabed, particu-
larly in ABNJ (Sections 6 and 7). It ends with some brief concluding remarks 
(Section 8).
1   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3.
2   RK Craig, ‘Marine Biodiversity, Climate Change and Governance of the Oceans’ (2012) 4 
Diversity 224, 231.
3   R Rayfuse, ‘Climate Change, Marine Biodiversity and International Law’ in M Bowman, P 
Davies and E Goodwin (eds) Handbook on Biodiversity and Law 123, 125 (Edward Elgar, 2016).
4   K Gjerde, H Dottinga, S Hart, E Molenaar, R Rayfuse, R Warner, Regulatory and Governance 
Gaps in the International Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, IUCN Marine Law and Policy Paper No 1 
(IUCN Gland, 2008).
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2 Basic Principles Applicable to Uses of the Oceans and Seabed
A glance at any law of the sea textbook reveals a plethora of principles, some 
contested, some well accepted, that are applicable to ocean and seabed uses. 
In the context of addressing conflicting uses of the seabed for the purposes 
of protecting the marine environment, the basic principles articulated in the 
preamble of the LOSC include those of due regard for the sovereignty of all 
states, facilitation of international communication, promotion of peaceful 
uses, equitable and efficient utilization of marine resources, conservation of 
living marine resources, and protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment. These principles play a valuable role in helping to understand and 
assess the operation and efficacy of the management approaches and tools 
that are examined in the following sections. They are therefore worthy of brief 
elaboration.
The principle of due regard reflects the notion of equality of states and 
the requirement that states refrain from any acts which might adversely 
affect the rights and duties of other states. This requirement evokes two prin-
ciples relevant to determining issues of compatibility of uses: protection of 
life at sea, and the necessity to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, 
activities co-exist rather than trump one another. It is envisaged that some 
accommodation or adjustments may be needed to the manner in which activi-
ties are carried out in order to ensure these principles are met. For example, 
navigation may be restricted temporarily in areas surrounding weapons tests 
or oil and gas installations, or permanently by the construction of deep-water 
ports. Where accommodation is not possible then states must refrain from 
activities that interfere with the exercise by other states of their rights under 
the law of the sea.5
The principle of facilitation of international communication is essentially 
a manifestation of the principle of the freedom of the seas and its corollary of 
exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction according to which no state may appropri-
ate unto itself sovereignty over the high seas or interfere in any way with the 
vessels of another state. Of course, the LOSC itself allocates sovereignty and sov-
ereign rights over ocean spaces to coastal states. However, while coastal states 
may exercise sovereignty over their territorial seas, this sovereignty is subject 
to the obligation to allow innocent passage to the vessels of other states.6 Even 
less interference with foreign shipping is permitted in the exclusive economic 
5   M Nordquist, (ed) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, vol III, 
86 (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1995).
6   LOSC Article 17.
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zone (EEZ) where the coastal state is required to permit freedom of navigation 
and other states have the right to lay cables and pipelines, albeit subject to the 
coastal state’s rights in respect of the continental shelf, exploitation of natural 
resources and prevention, reduction and control of pollution, and subject to 
the consent of the coastal state to the delineation of the course for the laying 
of such cables and pipelines.7
The principle of peaceful purposes is generally taken to refer to military 
activities and includes the general international law prohibition, articulated 
in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, on the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states.8 
Military activities, per se, are not prohibited, but are rather governed by other 
rules of international law outside the LOSC regime.9 However, articulation of 
the peaceful purposes principle in the LOSC reflects the desire of the nego-
tiators to ensure that activities such as marine scientific research and other 
seabed activities would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.10
Equitable and efficient utilization of resources entitles all states to an 
equitable share of marine resources which are to be utilised in such a way 
as to avoid wastage. This does not mean that all states receive an equal share 
in any particular resource. This is clear for example, in the context of fish-
eries where the coastal state enjoys the sovereign right to exploit11 and can 
exclude other states from fishing in its waters. Where the principle has its 
true effect is in areas beyond national jurisdiction. In the high seas, the free-
dom of fishing applies equally to all states, although not all states will share 
equally in either the physical practise of, or the economic benefit from, the 
catch. An even more important manifestation of this principle is reflected in 
the designation in Part XI of the LOSC of the non-living resources of the deep 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind and 
the establishment of a supranational management regime administered by the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA).12
The principle of conservation of marine living resources embodies the need 
to sustainably manage marine living resources, which include fish, marine 
mammals and all living marine genetic resources, for both current and future 
7    LOSC Article 79.
8    LOSC Article 301.
9    RWG de Muralt, ‘The Military Aspects of the UN Law of the Sea Convention’ (1985) 32(1) 
Netherlands International Law Review 79.
10   LOSC Articles 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d) and 155(2).
11   LOSC Articles 61 and 62.
12   LOSC Articles 136 and 137(2).
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generations.13 The principle is reflected in the duty on all states to take mea-
sures, both unilaterally and collectively, for the conservation of marine living 
resources. Importantly, the principle also encompasses effects not only on 
target species but on dependent and associated species as well.14 Thus it 
anticipates, at least in part, an ecosystem approach to the protection and pres-
ervation of the living elements of the world’s oceans.
The principle of protection and preservation of the marine environment 
reflects the realisation of the importance of the oceans and their resources 
to human existence. This fundamental principle, embodied in Article 194 of 
the LOSC, imposes on all states the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment from all sources of pollution, whether land, ship or air 
based, including the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, pollution 
from vessels, pollution from installations, intentional dumping, accidental dis-
charges, and the introduction of alien species. Also required is the protection 
and preservation of rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, 
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life. This principle 
of environmental protection applies in respect of all ocean related activities, 
irrespective of where they are carried out. Thus, the principles above must also 
be read in light of this principle. The question is, however, how to operation-
alise the principle of protection and preservation of the marine environment, 
particularly in light of the multiplicity and variety of ocean uses.
3 The Normative Frameworks for Environmental Approaches 
to Oceans Management
Management of the oceans in a manner capable of protecting and preserving 
the marine environment is a complicated matter due to their dynamic spatial 
and temporal nature. In the context of environmental protection, two over-
arching approaches to the management of ocean activities have emerged: the 
precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach.
3.1 The Precautionary Approach
The precautionary approach – also referred to as the precautionary principle – 
is of relatively recent vintage. Post-dating the LOSC, the essential core of the 
13   R Rayfuse, ‘Article 119 – Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas’ in A. Proelss 
(ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Commentary 830–850 
(Verlag CH Beck, 2017).
14   LOSC Article 119.
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precautionary principle as articulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration15 
is that in cases of possible serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation. In such cases states are to apply the 
precautionary approach.16 The approach thus aims to guide decision making 
while recognising the existence of sometimes radical uncertainty and ambigu-
ous and contestable scientific knowledge.
Neither the application nor the effect of the precautionary approach is free 
from controversy. For some, the approach provides the basis for early action 
to address threatening environmental issues. For others, the application of a 
precautionary approach is said to result in over-regulation and unwarranted 
limitations on human activity. Conflicting interpretations of the approach 
range from the requirement merely to act carefully when taking decisions 
that may have an adverse impact on the environment, to the requirement to 
regulate and possibly even prohibit activities and substances which may be 
environmentally harmful even in the absence of conclusive proof of such 
likely harm, to the requirement that the person wishing to carry out a par-
ticular activity must affirmatively prove it will not cause environmental harm.17 
This latter interpretation, in particular, requires polluters to establish that their 
activities will not adversely affect the environment before they can be autho-
rized to undertake the proposed activity, thus raising the connection between 
precaution and the requirements of environmental impact assessment (see 
section 5.1 below).
The precautionary approach is now required in an increasing number of 
environmental treaties, particularly treaties relating to the protection of the 
marine environment and the conservation and management of marine liv-
ing resources. It is a key requirement in the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement (FSA),18 and is now widely adopted in fisheries management 
regimes at both the national and the international level. In the seabed mining 
context, the precautionary approach lies at the heart of the development by 
15   Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/26; (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 874.
16   For comprehensive examinations of the precautionary principle in international law see, 
e.g., D Freestone, The Precautionary Principle: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer 
Law International, 1996) and A Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary 
Principle in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 2002).
17   P Sands and J Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd), (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 220.
18   Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 2167 UNTS 3.
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the International Seabed Authority (ISA) of the its Mining Code19 and it has 
been recognised as a necessary element of the due diligence of states in regu-
lating and conducting deep seabed mining.20
Given its wide acceptance in international and national law, it is generally 
accepted that the precautionary approach is trending towards becoming part 
of customary international law.21 While opinion may still be divided as to its 
precise scope, meaning and effect, there can be no doubt as to its central impor-
tance to the law of the sea and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. The question is simply how to operationalise it. In this respect, it 
is important to note that the precautionary approach does not prevent activi-
ties with unknown effects from proceeding. Rather, it merely requires that if 
they do proceed they must do so with caution, with awareness of unknown 
potential impacts, and with appropriate checks and risk-minimizing controls 
in place. Precaution also involves seeking out and evaluating alternatives to the 
proposed action, including the possibility of taking no action. Thus, decisions 
as to the measures to be taken cannot appeal solely to scientific or technical 
justifications but must also align with social and cultural values about what 
harm may – or may not – be considered acceptable.22 In other words, the con-
crete operationalisation of precaution is ultimately a task not only for law but 
also for the political realm. This is particularly relevant in the context of man-
aging potentially conflicting seabed uses.
3.2 The Ecosystem Approach
Like the precautionary approach, the ecosystem approach is of relatively 
recent origin, having developed in response to recognition of a crisis in biodi-
versity conservation and the realisation of the inadequacies of single species 
19   A Jaeckel, The International Seabed Authority and the Precautionary Principle, Brill 2017. 
See, as well, Chapter 8 in this book, H. Jessen, ‘Advancing the Deep Seabed “Mining 
Code”: Key Environmental Elements of the Regulatory Framework for the Commercial 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources’. The ‘Mining Code’ refers collectively to the rules, regu-
lations and procedures adopted by the ISA regulations to regulate prospecting, explora-
tion and exploitation of marine minerals in the international seabed area.
20   ITLOS, Seabed Disputes Chamber, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring 
Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory 
Opinion of 1 February 2011, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/
case_no_17/17_adv_op_010211_en.pdf.
21   Ibid, para. 135.
22   Rayfuse, ‘Precaution and Climate Change: What Role for the Precautionary Principle 
in Addressing Global Warming’ in T Hebeler, E Hoffmenn, A Proelss and P Reiff (eds) 
Protecting the Environment for Future Generations 61–78, 65 (Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2017).
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management.23 A seemingly intuitive approach, it recognises that the man-
agement and regulation of human activities that affect species, ecosystems 
and natural processes must be based on scientific knowledge of the wider 
systems in which such species, ecosystems or processes are situated, and that 
management measures must be designed and continuously adapted with con-
sideration to the scales and dynamics (including the lack of full understanding) 
of ecosystem characteristics.
The scientific ideas on which the ecosystem approach is premised can be 
traced to the first half of the 20th century and elements of it can be discerned 
in the LOSC provisions requiring protection of species dependent on and 
related to targeted fish stocks,24 protection and preservation of rare or fragile 
ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and 
other forms of marine life in the pollution context.25 The ideas underlying the 
approach can also be traced to the requirements to regulate for the prevention 
of interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment and of 
damage to its flora and fauna in the deep seabed mining context.26
While the ecosystem approach famously forms the core objective of the 
1982 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,27 
it only gained general recognition in 1995 when the parties to the Convention 
of Biological Diversity (CBD)28 adopted a ‘common understanding’ of the 
approach and called on all governments and international organisations to 
apply it.29 According to the ‘common understanding’ the ecosystem approach 
‘is a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources 
that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way …’. It 
‘requires adaptive management to deal with the complex and dynamic nature 
23   RE Grumbine, ‘What is ecosystem management’ (1994) 8(1) Conservation Biology 27–38; 
KK Arkema, SC Abramson, BM Dewsbury, ‘Marine ecosystem-based management: from 
characterisation to implementation’ (2006) 4(10) Frontiers in Ecological Environment 
525–532.
24   LOSC Articles 61(4) and 119(1)(b).
25   LOSC Article 194(5).
26   LOSC Article 145.
27   9 ATS 1982.
28   1760 UNTS 79.
29   On earlier expressions of the ecosystem approach or ‘ecosystems thinking’ in interna-
tional law and policy, see A Trouwborst, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem 
Approach in International Law: Differences, Similarities and Linkages’ 18: 1 RECIEL (2009) 
26–37, at pp. 27–30.
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of ecosystems and the absence of complete knowledge or understanding of 
their functioning’.30
The ecosystem approach has come to feature particularly strongly in the 
context of ocean management, having been endorsed, inter alia, by the par-
ties to the Helsinki and OSPAR Conventions relating to the protection of the 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea and North East Atlantic, respectively31 
and, at the global level, in the FSA32 and in the emerging requirements of the 
ISA’s Mining Code. An ecosystem-based approach is also increasingly found 
in national law and policy relating to environmental and natural resource 
use and conservation. Nevertheless, despite its acceptance, in principle, there 
exist a wide variety of definitions of the ecosystem approach and an even 
larger number of opinions as to the way in which it can be implemented or 
operationalized.
Given the various, and varying, features and complexities of both ecosystems 
and the legal/administrative systems governing them, effective implemen-
tation of the ecosystem approach can be highly challenging and requires 
consideration of a vast number of interconnected – and inter-disciplinary – 
issues. This makes it difficult to articulate universally applicable rules for its 
effective operationalisation. Despite these challenges, however, the approach 
is now well established as a guiding principle (even if not necessarily a legal 
principle) in many contexts and its application is often seen as a prerequisite 
for the successful management of ecological systems (or rather the human 
activities affecting such systems). As with the precautionary approach, the 
question remains how to implement it.
4 Management Approaches for Operationalizing Precaution 
and Ecosystem Management
Implementing the precautionary and ecosystem approaches requires the devel-
opment of management approaches capable of dealing with the ever-growing 
pressures on the marine environment from resource use and commercial 
activities. Increasingly, new approaches are being trialled. In the context of 
30   UNEP/CBD, Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (15–26 May 2000) Dec. V/6: Ecosystem Approach, U.N. Doc UNEP/
CBD/COP/DEC/V/6 (16 May 2000).
31   Record of the First Joint Ministerial Meeting of the Helsinki and OSPAR Commissions 
(Bremen, 26 June 2003) (OSPAR/HELCOM statement), Annex 5 (‘Towards an Ecosystem 
Approach to the Management of Human Activities’).
32   FSA Preamble and Article 5.
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resource management, these include approaches such as co-management, 
adaptive management, adaptive co-management, active adaptive manage-
ment and, most notably, ecosystem-based management.
Co-management refers to a collaborative approach whereby responsibility 
for resource management is shared between government and user groups.33 
It is generally seen as an effective way of improving the legitimacy and effi-
ciency of governance processes and management functions by decentralising 
resource management decisions, encouraging stakeholder participation and 
fostering dispute and conflict resolution. Inclusiveness in decision-making 
processes can both empower stakeholders and make them more accountable. 
It can also provide flexibility and the ability to adapt management regimes to 
new learned experiences.34 However, co-management can also lead to unrea-
sonable and unfulfilled expectations regarding process and result, exacerbate 
existing power imbalances, and provide room for the hijacking of environ-
mental protection concerns and non-use values by extractive interests or the 
vested interests of other user groups.35 In the absence of strong institutional 
structures it is generally considered that co-management arrangements 
can crumble under the weight of excessive and/or excessively diverse par-
ticipation.36 Nevertheless, it does provide a platform for the resolution of 
disputes and the negotiation of trade-offs.37
Adaptive management refers to management by feedback loop whereby 
lessons learned from management decisions are fed back into the following 
rounds of decision-making.38 It ensures refinement and further development 
33   S Sen, JR Nielsen, ‘Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis’ (1996) 20 Marine 
Policy 405–418; S Singleton, ‘Co-operation or capture? The paradox of co-management 
and community participation in natural resources management and environmental 
policy-making’ (2000) 9(2) Environmental Policy 1–21.
34   E Pinkerton (ed) Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for 
Improved Management and Community Development (UBC Press, 1989); JR Nielsen, 
P Degnbol, KK Viswanathan, M Ahmed, M Hara, NMR Abdullah, ‘Fisheries co-
management and institutional innovation? Lessons from South East Asia and Southern 
Africa’ (2000) 28(2) Marine Policy 151–160.
35   S Singleton, ‘Co-operation or capture? The paradox of co-management and community 
participation in natural resource management and environmental policy-making’ (2000) 
9(2) Environmental Politics 1–21.
36   M Haward, ‘Outstanding issues with regimes for ocean governance’ in D Wilson and 
R. Sherwood (eds) Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy 121–128 (Allen and Unwin, 
2000).
37   L Carlsson and F Berkes, ‘Co-management: concepts and methodological implications’ 
(2005) 75 Journal of Environmental Management 65–76.
38   CR Allen, JJ Fontaine, J Pope, AS Garmestani, ‘Adaptive management for a turbulent 
future’ (2011) 92 Journal of Environmental Management 1339–1345.
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as experience and knowledge increase. Adaptive management is said to 
address the challenge of operating with either impartial or incomplete knowl-
edge thereby allowing progress in the absence of complete information.39 In 
this respect, it can be seen as a manifestation of the precautionary approach. 
Importantly, it attempts to account for complexity by considering multiple sec-
tors and policies,40 thereby embracing complexity, variability and uncertainty. 
However, while theoretically an iterative process that can reduce uncertainty 
and deal with change through management of short and long-term impacts, 
the danger exists for passivity to replace learning and adaptation thereby 
pushing the system to a threshold at which abrupt, and unwelcome, change 
occurs.41
Active adaptive management and adaptive co-management are more 
responsive or highly developed versions of their namesakes. Active adaptive 
management is an iterative process of experimentation and re-experimentation 
designed to test hypotheses through the use of ecosystem scale holistic man-
agement experiments. However, this continued hypothesis-generation and 
testing can significantly impact the security and stability of the operating 
environment for both commercial operators and management authorities.42 
Nevertheless, this approach to management embraces ecosystem scale and 
system complexity in both human and ecological terms.43 Adaptive co-
management, for its part, links adaptive management with co-management 
and ecosystem dynamics. Seen as a means of studying or structuring increas-
ingly coupled social and ecological systems it is considered more suited to 
developing adaptive capacity, social-ecological resilience, sustainable resource 
use and enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of management.44 Its success 
39   E Ogier, J Davidson, P Fidelman, M Haward, AJ Hobday, NJ Holbrook, E Hoshino and GT 
Peci, ‘Fisheries management approaches as platforms for climate change adaptation: 
Comparing theory and practice in Australian fisheries’ (2016) 71 Marine Policy 82–93, 86.
40   F Berkes, Implementing ecosystem-based management: evolution or revolution? (2012) 13 
Fish and Fisheries 465–476.
41   J McDonald, MC Styles ‘Legal strategies for adaptive management under climate change’ 
(2014) 26(10) Journal of Environmental Law 25–53.
42   C Allen and A Curtis, ‘Nipped in the bud: why regional scale adaptive management is not 
blooming’ (2005) 36(3) Environmental Management 414–425.
43   Ogier et al, n 39.
44   P Olsen, C Folke and F Berkes, ‘Adaptive co-management for building resilience in social-
ecological systems’ (2004) 34(1) Environmental Management 75–90.
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is, however, highly dependent on the quality of decision-making and com-
munication processes and on high levels of engagement by industry or other 
relevant stakeholders.45
The final management approach to be mentioned is that of ecosystem-
based management which, as its names implies, is generally considered to be 
the most effective way of implementing the ecosystem approach because of 
its explicit consideration of all aspects of the main extrinsic forcers on eco-
system dynamics and their impacts on both human and non-human species 
and the environments in which they live.46 Ecosystem-based management 
recognises the needs of an ecosystem as a whole, as opposed to those pertain-
ing only to the particular target of management. In doing so it incorporates 
consideration of non-target dependent and related species as well as habitats 
and ecological communities and aims to sustain a broader range of ecosystem 
services. It also aims to integrate decision-making relating to all human activi-
ties that affect a particular ecosystem. In theory, by maximising ecosystem 
resources and services, it makes for their more efficient and sustainable use. As 
Warner puts it, ecosystem-based management has added ‘a new dimension to 
marine environmental protection which has previously focused on prevention 
and control of marine pollution and the protection of single species’.47 However, 
implementing ecosystem-based management is notoriously difficult, not least 
because of its complex data requirements, potentially prohibitive monitoring 
costs, and a general lack of scientific knowledge of ecosystem dynamics and/or 
their responses to human interventions. Robust precautionary environmental 
management tools are therefore required to support its implementation.
5 Modern Environmental Management Tools That Support 
Precautionary Ecosystem-Based Management
Key tools that have been developed to support precautionary ecosystem-based 
management include environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and area-
based management tools, such as marine protected areas (MPAs).
45   F Berkes, ‘Evolution of co-management: the role of knowledge generation, bridging 
organisational and social learning (2009) 90(5) Journal of Environmental Management 
1692–1702; GP Kofinas, ‘Adaptive co-management in Social-Ecological Governance, in FS 
Chapin III, GP Kofinas, C Folke (eds) Principles of Ecosystem Stewardship: Resilience Based 
Natural Resources Management in a Changing World, (Springer New York, 2009) 77–101.
46   Ogier et al, n 39.
47   R Warner, ‘Conserving marine biodiversity in the global marine commons: co-evolution 
and interaction with the Law of the Sea’ (2014) 1(6) Frontiers in Marine Science 1–23, 5.
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5.1 Environmental Impact Assessment
EIA is generally defined as ‘a process of evaluating the likely environmental 
impacts of a proposed project or development taking into account inter-
related socio-economic, cultural and human health impacts, both beneficial 
and adverse’.48 EIAs are particularly useful for determining and analysing 
the likely environmental impacts of human activities, developing mitigation 
measures, and identifying activities that should not be authorised to proceed 
because the impacts will either be too severe or too uncertain. Acknowledged 
in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration49 as a key element in the suite of tools for 
environmental protection, EIAs are a well-established practice in the domestic 
realm. The obligation to undertake EIAs in the transboundary context is also 
well recognised in international law.50
In ABNJ, however, the requirement to carry out EIAs is less well defined. 
Article 206 of the LOSC requires states to carry out environmental assessments 
‘when States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities 
under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution or signifi-
cant and harmful changes to the marine environment’. This includes activities 
in ABNJ. However, the obligation itself is neither well-defined nor universally 
implemented.51 While the general obligation has been made more specific in 
some other global agreements and in some sector specific and regional agree-
ments, there remain significant gaps with respect to a number of activities that 
have the potential to cause significant impacts to the marine environment, 
including seabed activities other than seabed mining.52
With respect to seabed activities in ABNJ, no specific EIA requirements exist 
in relation to the laying of cables and pipelines, construction and operation of 
seabed installations, the conduct of marine scientific research, bioprospecting 
and sea-based tourism. Only in the contexts of deep seabed mining and bottom-
fishing have detailed EIA requirements begun to emerge. With respect to the 
former, assessments of the environmental impacts of activities in the Area are 
48   Voluntary Guidelines on biodiversity-inclusive impact assessment. CBD COP 8 Decision 
VIII/28 on Impact Assessment, Annex, sec. 5.
49   1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, 
(1992) 31 ILM 874.
50   See, e.g., Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
25 February 1991 (Espoo Convention); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v 
Uruguay) Judgement, ICJ Reports 2010, para 204.
51   R Warner, ‘Environmental assessment in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction’ in 
R Rayfuse (ed), Research Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2015) 291–312, 292.
52   E Druel, Environmental impact assessments in areas beyond national jurisdiction’ Studies 
No 01/13 (IDDRI, Paris France, 2013).
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mandated by the provisions of Part XI of the LOSC and its 1994 Implementing 
Agreement and have now been recognised as an obligation under customary 
international law.53 Detailed regulations for the conduct of such assessments 
have been incorporated into the regulations relating to prospecting and explo-
ration for deep seabed minerals adopted by the ISA as part of its Mining Code54 
and are the subject of intense discussion in the ongoing discussions on the 
development, by the ISA, of its exploitation regulations.55 With respect to 
the latter, assessment of the adverse impacts of bottom fishing activities on 
vulnerable marine ecosystems is required by UN Resolution56 and detailed EIA 
requirements have been developed in the FAO International Guidelines for the 
Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas and adopted by a number 
of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).
Even where detailed requirements have been adopted, considerable incon-
sistency exists between regions and across sectors. In addition, not all sectors 
have developed legally binding requirements on EIAs in ABNJ. Moreover, no 
requirement exists to assess the cumulative impacts of human activities in 
ABNJ or to conduct cross- or inter-sectoral assessments.57 The current nego-
tiations on the possible development of an implementing agreement to the 
LOSC on marine biodiversity in ABNJ may result in the establishment of a 
default mechanism for the assessment and regulation of new and emerging 
activities as well as those not currently covered by EIA requirements and/or a 
standardised model for EIA requirements. As currently conceived, this would 
complement, rather than negate, the need for existing sectoral and regional 
EIA processes.58
5.2 Area-Based Management Tools
Area-based management tools have long been accepted in both the national 
and the international sphere. While there is no universally accepted defini-
tion of ‘area-based management’, it clearly refers to management on the basis 
of an area in which the regulation of human activity is more stringent than 
in the immediately surrounding area. A traditional single sector management 
approach, area-based measures include everything from areas closed to fishing 
53   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion, n 20, para 145.
54   Nodules Regulations, reg 31(6), Sulphides and Crusts Regulations, reg 33(6).
55   A Jaeckel, The International Seabed Authority and the Precautionary Principle: Balancing 
Deep Seabed Mining and Marine Environmental Protection (Brill, Nijhoff, 2017) 230–251.
56   UNGA Resolution 61/105 of 8 December 2006.
57   Druel, n 52.
58   Warner, n 51, 307.
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during spawning season to marine areas in which shipping or other human 
activities are regulated or restricted in some manner.
In ABNJ, traditional area-based management tools are often used by RFMOs 
to close fisheries either to specified gear types, or for seasonal purposes, or 
once quotas have been reached.59 They are also manifest in the IMO’s designa-
tions of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs). In the seabed mining context 
in ABNJ, area-based measures are explicitly included in the ISA’s Exploration 
Regulations which provide for the establishment of both preservation refer-
ence zones (PRZs) and impact reference zones (IRZs); the former consisting 
of pristine areas in which mining is not allowed, the latter consisting of areas 
in which mining takes place.60 The purpose of these zones is to facilitate 
assessment of the effects of mining on the marine environment.61 A more com-
prehensive area-based approach is taken in the Environmental Management 
Plan for the Clarion Clipperton Zone (EMP-CCZ), adopted by the ISA in 
2012,62 which sets out a spatial management plan for an area of deep seabed 
in the eastern central Pacific which is roughly equivalent in size to Europe.63 
A central feature of the plan is the designation of nine Areas of Particular 
Environmental Interest (APEIs) in which mining activities are prohibited. The 
purpose of these areas is both to protect representative habitat and to facilitate 
marine scientific research, although questions have been raised as to their util-
ity given the adjustments to size and location that were made prior to adoption 
of the EMP-CCZ to accommodate pre-existing mining leases.64 Nevertheless, 
the EMP-CCZ is generally considered a good example of both precautionary 
and ecosystem-based management.65
The tool that has received the most attention in recent years is that of 
marine protected areas (MPAs). Although similarly lacking a singular defini-
tion, MPAs include such things as marine sanctuaries, marine parks, wildlife 
refuges, fisheries closures, no-take MPAs, multiple use MPAs, marine reserves 
59   R Rayfuse, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’ in D Rothwell, A Oude 
Elferink, K Scott and T Stephens, Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea 439–462 (Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
60   Nodules Regulations reg 31(6) and Sulphides and Crusts Regulations reg 33(6).
61   Jaeckel, n 55, 211–212.
62   ISA, ISBA/17/LTC/7 (13 July 2011), para 21.
63   M Lodge, et al, ‘Seabed Mining: International Seabed Authority Environmental 
Management Plan for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. A Partnership Approach’ (2014) 
49 Marne Policy 66–72, 72.
64   LM Wedding et al, ‘Managing Mining of the Deep Seabed’ (2105) 349 Science 144–145 and 
Jaeckel, n 55, 206.
65   M Lodge, ‘Protecting the environment of the deep seabed’ in R Rayfuse (ed), Research 
Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2015), 151–169, 167.
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and ecological reserves. Clearly, the ISA’s PRZs and APEIs can also be seen as 
a form of protected area or MPA. However, it must be remembered that the 
ISA can only regulate activities relating to deep seabed mining and not other 
activities in these areas. They are thus not multi-sector MPAs.
The use of multi-sector MPAs as a management tool is increasingly seen 
as a central element of ecosystem-based management. In 2002 the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development called for the use of diverse approaches 
and tools to protect marine biodiversity including though the establishment 
of representative networks of MPAs by 2012.66 The Aichi Biodiversity Targets, 
adopted by the parties to the CBD in 2010, call for 10 percent of coastal and 
marine areas to be conserved through MPAs by 2020,67 although it must be 
admitted that, at this stage, achievement of that goal seems unlikely. Recent 
assessments show only 5.1 percent of areas under national jurisdiction and 0.17 
percent of the high seas as being protected by MPAs.68 While this latter num-
ber has increased with the adoption by the Commission on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources of the Ross Sea MPA in 2016,69 the pros-
pects of meeting the global 2020 target seem slim. This is in large part due to 
lingering uncertainties as to the rationale for and efficacy of these measures, 
many of which are designated in remote areas,70 lack management plans, 
allow many types of extractive activities,71 and are not enforced or monitored,72 
66   Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, para 32(c).
67   This was originally to have been achieved by 2012 however it became clear that target 
would not be achieved so the deadline was extended to 2020. CBD 2010 Decision X/2 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27.
68   BH e Costa, J Claudet, G Franco, K Erzini, A Caro, EJ Gonçalvez, ‘A regulation-based clas-
sification system for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)’ (2016) 72 Marine Policy 192–198, 192.
69   CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 91–05 (2016) ‘Ross Sea region marine protected area’, 
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-91-05-2016.
70   PJS Jones and EM De Santo, ‘Viewpoint – is the race for remote, very large marine pro-
tected areas (VLMPAs) taking us down the wrong track?’ (2016) 73 Marine Policy 231–234.
71   MD Spalding, I Meliane, NJ Bennett, P Dearden, PG Patie and RD Brumbaugh, ‘Building 
towards the marine conservation end-game: consolidating the role of MPAs in a future 
ocean’ (2016) 26 (Suppl. 2) Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 
185–199.
72   R Devillers, RI Pressey, A Greech, JN Kittinger, GJ Edgar, T Ward, R Watson, ‘Reinventing 
residual reserves in the sea: are we favouring ease of establishment over need for pro-
tection?’ (2015) 25(4) Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 48–504; 
P Leenhardt, B Cazalet, B Salvat, J Claudet, F. Feral, ‘The rise of large-scale marine pro-
tected areas: conservation or geopolitics?’ (2013) 85 Oceans and Coastal Management 
112–118; J Lubochenko, K Grorud-Colvert ‘Making waves; the science and politics of 
ocean protection (2015) 350(6259) Science 382–383; AN Rife, B Erisman, A Sanchez, O 
Aburto-Oropeza, ‘When good intentions are not enough … Insights on networks of ‘paper 
parks’ marine protected areas’ (2013) 6(3) Conservation Letters 200–212.
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as well as to their potential knock-on effects of excluding stakeholders either 
from their livelihoods entirely or from participation in the development and/
or implementation of management measures.73
An additional complicating factor in the acceptability and efficacy of MPAs 
as a management tool arises where these are established on a sectoral basis 
thereby creating the potential for inter-sectoral conflict. This is relevant in 
the case of seabed uses where implementation and enforcement of an MPA 
designed to protect the water column (i.e. fisheries) may interfere with seabed 
uses (i.e., resource extraction, wind farms, shipping) and vice versa; or where 
a seabed MPA is adopted to protect from the adverse effects of seabed mining 
but not from other seabed uses such as cable laying, oil and gas extraction, 
wind farm construction or marine scientific research. Still greater levels of 
complication arise in the case of MPAs in ABNJ where no overarching manage-
ment authority exists and individual treaty regimes are fragmented sectorally, 
substantively, geographically and in terms of participation.74 Questions thus 
persist as to how MPAs (and other area-based measures) can be brought under 
an integrated protection scheme both within a particular sector and beyond 
and, more importantly, how cooperation and coherence, or harmonisation, 
between competent management authorities can be shaped in order to cross 
the sectoral divide.75
6 Crossing the Sectoral Divide: Marine Spatial Planning
When it comes to managing ocean uses, as noted above, traditional manage-
ment structures have revolved around single sector or even, in the case of living 
resources, single species management. However, the dynamic nature of new 
and emerging ocean uses, particularly when coupled with the realisation of 
existing and emerging threats to the oceans from pollution, over-exploitation, 
habitat destruction, climate change and ocean acidification, call into ques-
tion the effectiveness and flexibility of traditional, sectoral management 
approaches. In areas under national jurisdiction this has led to the develop-
ment of new management approaches that cross the sectoral divide in order 
73   SC Gall and LD Rodwell, ‘Evaluating the social acceptability of Marine Protected Areas’ 
(2016) 65 Marine Policy 30–38, 30.
74   K Gjerde, ‘Marine protected areas beyond national jurisdiction: Some practical perspec-
tives for moving ahead’ (2012) 27(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
351–373.
75   P Drankier, ‘Marine Protected Areas in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2012) 27 (2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 291–350.
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to ensure the more orderly and sustainable use of ocean resources and to avoid 
or minimise conflict between sectors. Most notable amongst these is marine 
spatial planning (MSP).
The concept of spatial planning is nothing new; it is a commonly adopted 
approach to land-use planning. However, its application in the marine con-
text is of relatively recent origin.76 Although no agreed definition exists, MSP 
can generally be said to refer to ‘a process of analysing and allocating parts 
of the three-dimensional marine spaces to specific uses to achieve ecologi-
cal, economic and social objectives that are usually specified through the 
political process’.77 In general, MSP is seen as a ‘complicated but necessary 
process, to establish a more rational organisation of using marine space and 
the user interactions in order to protect the biological diversity of the marine 
environment, while taking into account social and economic values’.78 It is a 
forward-looking, proactive planning process intended to result in a compre-
hensive plan or vision for a marine region that both allocates and reconciles 
the use of marine space on an integrated, cross-sectoral basis.79 It is widely 
considered to be a useful tool for ensuring the equitable and efficient utilisa-
tion of resources and for avoiding, or at least managing, conflict both between 
various sectors and between human uses and the marine environment. Thus, 
MSP can also be utilised to resolve conflicts over uses of and activities on the 
seabed and to promote ecosystem-based management.80
MSP builds on the concept of integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) 
and other non-spatial integrated approaches to deliver a more spatial approach 
76   T Potts, ‘Marine spatial planning and various uses and interest relating to the marine envi-
ronment’ in N Soininen and D Hassan (eds) Transboundary Marine Spatial Planning and 
International Law (Routledge, 2015) 42–59. For reviews of recent MSP practice see S Jay, 
W Flannery, J Vince, W Liu, JG Xue, M Matczak, J Zaucha, H Janssen, J van Tatenhove, 
H Toonen, A Morf, E Olsen, JL Suarez de Vivero, JCR Mateos, H Calado, J Duff and H Dean, 
‘International Progress in Marine Spatial Planning’ (2013) Ocean Yearbook 171–212 and 
K Scott, ‘The Evolution of Marine Spatial Planning in New Zealand: Past, Present 
and Possible Future’ (2016) 31(54) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 652–689.
77   C Ehler and F Douvere, ‘Marine Spatial Planning: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward 
Ecosystem-Based management’, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and 
Man and the Biosphere Programme, IOC Manual and Guides No 53, IOCAM Dossier No 6 
(UNESCO Paris 2009), 18.
78   F Maes, ‘The international legal framework for marine spatial planning’ (2008) 32 Marine 
Policy 797–810, 798.
79   N Soininen and D Hassan, ‘Marine spatial planning as an instrument of sustainable ocean 
governance’ in N Soininen and D Hassan (eds) Transboundary Marine Spatial Planning 
and International Law (Routledge, 2015) 3–12, 4; CN Ehler and F Douvere, ‘An interna-
tional perspective on marine spatial planning initiatives’ (2010) 37(3) Environments 9–20.
80   Ehler and F Douvere, n 77; Maes, n 78 808.
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which includes the zoning of marine spaces.81 Similarly, it builds on the con-
cept of other area-based measures, in particular MPAs, which are, in effect, 
small-scale models of ecosystem-based marine spatial plans.82 However, it is 
important to distinguish between MSP and MPAs. MPAs are aimed at ensuring 
the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems. MSP is aimed at ensuring the 
orderly and sustainable use of ocean spaces. Thus, MPAs are only one tool in 
the MSP tool-kit which is used to achieve more than mere area protection.83 
Of course MSP is not intended to exhaustively plan every inch of ocean space. 
Rather, it provides a process by which areas of strategic importance can be 
identified, cumulative impacts can be addressed, and conservation of ecosys-
tem services can be maximised in an integrated, cross-sectoral management 
framework. The processes by which these ends are to be achieved are generally 
considered to include transparent and meaningful engagement and stake-
holder participation, data collection, mapping and analysis of existing uses, 
identification of alternative use patterns, monitoring and enforcement.84 To 
these can be added the need to identify and/or establish the authority respon-
sible for the planning process and the requirement of adequate financing and 
resources.85
At its heart, MSP seeks to ensure integration of oceans management on 
sectoral, spatial and temporal scales. MSP is thus a response to the traditional 
fragmented, incoherent and uncertain approach to oceans management. 
Sectoral overlaps can be identified and resolved. International, regional, 
national and local regulatory scales can be identified, and their application 
assessed and coordinated. Social, economic and ecological interests can be 
identified and accounted for, although competition between these various 
interests may be fierce and strong political mechanisms will be needed to 
resolve them. In this respect, it is important to remember that MSP does not do 
away with the need for effective (and enforceable) sectoral ecosystem-based 
management. The ‘mere act of delineating spaces’ can never be ‘sufficient to 
achieve management objectives’.86 Rather, the idea of MSP is that it comple-
ments and coordinates sectoral approaches, taking a particular area or region 
81   Potts, n 76, 43.
82   PJS Jones, LM Lieberknecht and W Qiu, ‘Marine Spatial planning in reality: Introduction 
to case studies and discussion of findings’ (2016) Marine Policy 256–264, 262.
83   Scott, n 76, 656.
84   Ehrle and Douvere, n 77.
85   Potts, n 76, 44.
86   J Duff, ‘Trends on Ocean Zoning – Layers of Confusion and Approaches to Clarity’ in 
AChircop, T McDorman and S Rolston (eds) The Future of Ocean Regime Building: Essays 
in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Nijhoff Brill, 2009) 159–174, 162.
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as a whole and integrating policies and objectives across different sectors in 
order to achieve holistic, integrated, coherent, rational and ecologically sus-
tainable use of marine spaces and resources.87 In this respect, MSP is said 
to provide the strategic context for sustainable development in the marine 
realm.88
In theory, MSP appeals as a process that recognises and integrates envi-
ronmental and ecological interests with socio-economic ones.89 In practice, 
reviews of MSP implementation in the national domain suggest that it is not 
necessarily delivering ecosystem-based management.90 MSP is often focused 
on achieving specific sectoral objectives, such as the promotion of offshore 
wind energy,91 and on promoting ‘blue growth’ activities.92 Even in the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park, the quintessential ‘poster child’ for MSP, environ-
mental interests are often compromised by economic ones such as terrestrial 
farming and port construction, with the Australian government having to fend 
off attempts to have the Great Barrier Reef placed on the World Heritage in 
Danger List. Clearly, as a tool for ecosystem-based management, MSP requires 
the integration of frameworks to assess ecosystem services and the implemen-
tation of precautionary and adaptive management approaches.93 This requires 
convincing both new and existing sectors of the advantages and opportunities 
that genuine integrated, collaborative and ecosystem-based approaches can 
offer, a difficult task even at the national level.94 In ABNJ, the effective appli-
cation of MSP further requires a level of coherence and cooperation among 
and between global and regional agreements, institutions and national admin-
istrations that simply does not yet exist.95 As discussed in the next section, 
however, some developments are occurring in this regard.
87   P Gilliland and D Laffoley, ‘Key elements and steps in the process of developing ecosystem-
based marine spatial planning’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 787–796.
88   Soininen and Hassan, n 79, 9.
89   F Douvere, ‘The importance of marines spatial planning in advancing ecosystem-based 
sea use management’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 762–771.
90   E Domínguez-Tejo, G Metternicht, E Johnston and L Hedge, ‘Marine Spatial Planning 
advancing the Ecosystem-Based Approach to coastal zone management: A review’ (2016) 
72 Marine Policy 115–130.
91   Potts, n 76, 53; Jones et al, n 82.
92   Jones et al, n 82, 262–263; M Young, ‘Building the Blue Economy: The Role of Marine 
Spatial Planning in Facilitating Offshore Renewable Energy Development’ (2015) 30 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 148–173.
93   Domínguez-Tejo, n 90.
94   Potts, n 76, 57.
95   JA Ardron, K Gjerde, S Pullen and V Tilot, ‘Marine spatial planning in the high seas’ (2008) 
32 Marine Policy 832–839.
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7 Crossing the Sectoral Divide in ABNJ
Regulation of ocean activities in ABNJ is characterised by high levels of gover-
nance, regulatory and substantive fragmentation. Absent a single centralised 
regulatory authority, a comprehensive integrated approach to ABNJ manage-
ment such as that represented by MSP requires high degrees of international 
and inter-regime cooperation. While not as developed as in the domestic 
sphere, cross-sectoral initiatives are emerging which indicate possible ways for-
ward for the integration of MSP-type management of seabed uses in ABNJ. Two 
examples discussed here relate to the protection of vulnerable benthic ecosys-
tems in the North East Atlantic from the adverse effects of bottom-fishing, and 
the protection of undersea cables from deep seabed mining activities. These 
examples provide interesting studies in the possibilities, through coordinated 
management, of the implementation of the general principles articulated in 
the LOSC; the first exploring the balance between the principles of due regard, 
equitable and efficient use of resources and protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, while the second adds consideration of the principle of 
international communication to the mix.
7.1 Conservation of Seabed Ecosystems vs Bottom-Fishing in the North 
East Atlantic
Protection of vulnerable benthic ecosystems has its origins in the 1990s. 
It emerged from the recognition of the need for holistic ecosystem-based 
approaches to environmental protection coupled with the increasing realisa-
tion of the adverse effects of fishing activities on other parts of the marine 
ecosystem and on the protection of marine biodiversity.
In the North East Atlantic, two regional organisations are changed with 
protection of aspects of the marine environment: the OSPAR Commission 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic and 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). While the two com-
missions cover the same geographic area, neither their membership nor their 
areas of application are the same. OSPAR has competence within both areas 
under and areas beyond national jurisdiction, while NEAFC’s competence is 
limited to the high seas beyond national jurisdiction. In addition, their man-
dates, while complimentary, are completely distinct. NEAFC has competence 
over fisheries in ABNJ while OSPAR has competence in relation to the man-
agement of human activities (including those on the seabed) that impact the 
marine environment, including the protection and conservation of ecosystems 
and biodiversity in ABNJ. OSPAR’s competence specifically excludes fisheries, 
shipping and seabed mining, although it does have a mandate to bring any 
such issues to the attention of the relevant international organisations.
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In 2003 the OSPAR Commission formally adopted the ecosystem approach 
as the basis for its management activities and adopted a strategy to establish, 
by 2010, an ecologically coherent network of MPAs in the OSPAR Convention 
area, including in those parts of the area that constitute ABNJ.96 Given their 
respective mandates, the only way in which OPSAR could ensure the coher-
ence and protection of its MPAs was to enlist the support and cooperation of 
NEAFC. In the years that followed parallel, rather than coordinated, efforts 
were expended in both organisations leading to tensions, particularly on the 
part of NEAFC, which was concerned by what it saw as attempts by OSPAR to 
usurp its managerial competence. Initial efforts by OSPAR in 2002 to propose 
cooperation were soundly rejected by NEAFC. The prospects of a counter-
productive ‘turf war’ were further heightened in 2004 when OSPAR, making 
good on its mandate to draw to the attention of NEAFC the need to protect 
some coral areas on the high seas from bottom fishing, suggested the start of a 
dialogue. NEAFC simply responded by saying that it was working on the issue.97 
Eventually, NEAFC realized that OSPAR was going to move ahead with MPAs 
which might impinge on its regulatory area. Thus, in 2006 the NEAFC parties 
amended the NEAFC Convention to remove any doubts as to NEAFC’s ability to 
apply an ecosystem approach in order to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems 
(VMEs) on the seafloor from the adverse impacts of bottom-trawling.98 This 
allowed NEAFC to adopt the first of its precautionary bottom-trawling closures. 
These were expanded in 2008 and 2009 to closures on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge 
and the Charlie Gibbs Fracture Zone. Meanwhile, in 2007, OSPAR commenced 
consideration of its own MPAs in ABNJ, including areas on the mid-Atlantic 
Ridge. In 2010 OSPAR established six high seas MPAs, the world’s first ‘network’ 
of high seas MPAs, to which a seventh was added in 2012.99
Taken together, the OSPAR and NEAFC closures have been said to represent 
an effective network of high seas MPAs in the North East Atlantic. In truth, 
96   Bremen Joint Ministerial Statement on the Ecosystem Approach to the Management 
of Human Activities ‘Towards an Ecosystem Approach to the Management of Human 
Activities”, 26 June 2003. https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1232/jmm_annex05_eco 
system_approach_statement.pdf.
97   I Kvalvik, ‘Managing institutional overlap in the protection of marine ecosystems on the 
high seas. The case of the North east Atlantic’ (2012) 56 Ocean and Coastal Management 
35–43.
98   See ‘Status of the 1980 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries’ explaining the amendments, https://www.neafc.org/system/files/
status-of-1980_convention-03.pdf.
99   BC O’Leary, RL Brown, DE Johnson, H von Nordheim, J Ardron, T Packeiser and CM 
Roberts ‘The first network of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the high seas: The process, 
the challenges and where next’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 598–605.
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neither the ecological coherence nor the efficacy of these MPAs has yet been 
assessed,100 and upon closer examination a less sanguine picture emerges. 
Analysis of the geographical coordinates establishing the NEAFC closures and 
the OSPAR MPAs shows that the areas only partially overlap, potentially leading 
to a situation where activities undertaken under the regulation of one organ-
isation may violate the protective measures adopted by the other. Moreover, 
only two of the OSPAR MPAs cover both the water column and the seabed (the 
Milne and Charlie Gibbs South MPAs). The others pertain to areas in which 
either Portugal or Iceland have claims to extended continental shelves. Until 
these states’ submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf have been dealt with it is unclear who has jurisdictional competence over 
what. This gives rise to very difficult issues relating to the scientific validity and 
ecosystem coherence of these MPAs, not to mention complicated questions 
of co-management as between OSPAR and the coastal states. In addition, the 
possibility exists that contracts could be issued by the ISA for mineral explora-
tion and exploitation in areas currently within the OSPAR MPAs, in particular 
in the Charlie Gibbs Fracture Zone on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge thereby com-
pletely undermining (both literally and figuratively) the OSPAR MPAs. With 
the ISA considering adoption of an environmental management plan for the 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge, the further possibility exists for inconsistent environ-
mental protections along the physical continuum of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge 
ecosystem and for conflict between the OSPAR and ISA regimes.
Cooperation between OSPAR and NEAFC has now been formalized beyond 
their initial Memorandum of Understanding101 into the Collective Arrangement 
Between Competent International Organizations on Cooperation and 
Coordination Regarding Selected Area in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction 
in the North East Atlantic,102 which provides an informal framework for dia-
logue and the sharing information of mutual interest within the overall context 
of respecting each other’s mandates and legal competencies.103 However, the 
two main targets of the Collective Arrangement efforts, the ISA and the IMO, 
have, as yet, declined to join the Collective Arrangement. Admittedly, the 
ISA has made an effort to participate in the Collective Agreement meetings. 
100   See OSPAR, Summary Record of the Meeting of the Biodiversity Committee, 29 February 
to 4 March 2016, BDC 16/9/1-E.
101   Available at https://www.ospar.org/about/international-cooperation/memoranda-of-un 
derstanding.
102   Established in 2014. See https://www.ospar.org/news/collective-arrangement.
103   For a history of the development of the Collective Arrangement, see, S Ásmundsson and 
E Corcoran, The Process of Forming a Cooperative Mechanism Between NEAFC and 
OSPAR, NEAFC and OSPAR (2015), https://www.ospar.org/documents?v=35111.
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Nevertheless, a comprehensive, cooperative mechanism for coherent, coor-
dinated and holistic ecosystem-based management of multiple and possibly 
conflicting human uses of the seabed in the OSPAR MPAs is still missing.
7.2 Submarine Cables and Deep Seabed Mining
Another example of emerging cross-sectoral planning relates to submarine 
cables and deep seabed mining.104 Submarine cables are the backbone of 
the global economy carrying up to 98 percent of international telecommu-
nications. This critical international infrastructure, which is almost entirely 
privately owned, criss-crosses the world’s oceans over a total combined length 
of 1,576,481 kms. Cables are light weight, unprotected, and carefully laid to 
minimize the risk of fault or damage. Repairs to cables, particularly in ABNJ, 
are expensive, time consuming and highly technical.
Traditionally the greater water depths in ABNJ have protected cables from 
human interference, although they have always been subject to natural threats 
such as earthquakes, landslide and deep currents.105 With the advent of deep 
seabed mining operations in ABNJ, however, the potential exists for cable lay-
ing and mining operations to come into conflict with each other. Two areas of 
particular current concern are the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean 
where cables traverse areas over which the ISA has already issued exploration 
permits for polymetallic nodules.106 The fear of the cable owners is that min-
ing operations may damage the cables. The fear of the mining contractors is 
that cable laying and repair operations will interfere with or possibly cause 
damage to their mining operations. In both cases, economic losses could be 
substantial.
In contradistinction to seabed mining companies, whose operations and 
interests are the concern of the ISA, cable operators are not represented by any 
inter-governmental organisation, although their activities are carried out in 
pursuance of a number of international treaties. Rather, they are represented 
by the non-governmental International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC). 
In 2015, the ISA and the ICPC held a workshop with the purpose of identifying 
and addressing the issues involved in the potential risk of interference between 
submarine cables and deep seabed mining and finding ‘practical solutions for 
104   On the commercial aspects of submarine cables, see Chapter 26 in this book, L.O. Askheim 
‘Commercial arrangements and liability for crossing pipelines, power cables and telecom-
munication cables on the seabed’.
105   ISA, ‘Submarine Cables and Deep Seabed Mining: Advancing Common Interests and 
Addressing UNCLOS ‘Due Regard’ Obligations’ Technical Study No 14 (ISA, 2015), 17–19.
106   ISA, ‘Submarine Cables and Deep Seabed Mining: Advancing Common Interests and 
Addressing UNCLOS ‘Due Regard’ Obligations’, Briefing Paper 03/2105 (ISA, 2015), 3.
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the peaceful coexistence of both uses in’ ABNJ.107 It will be recalled that the 
LOSC expressly authorises both activities however it equally expressly stipu-
lates that these activities must be carried out with ‘due regard’ for each other 
(and for other users). In other words, both cable owners and mining contrac-
tors are required to exercise due regard for each other. Unfortunately, the LOSC 
does not define what constitutes ‘due regard’. Thus, the workshop looked at 
practical procedures to reduce risks and avoid disputes between the two con-
stituencies. Key to these was an understanding that, at the very least, ‘due 
regard’ requires first notice, either actual or constructive, and then consultation 
between the cable owners and contractors engaged in competing activities.108 
It was agreed, among other things, that the ISA and the ICPC should cooperate 
as points of contact, facilitators and information disseminators to ensure that 
their respective audiences would be able to identify solutions to cable location 
should exploitation occur in the future. It was further suggested that mapping 
of exploration areas under contract with the ISA and eventual cable locations 
would be useful, as would a joint code of conduct or the unilateral adoption by 
both organisations of appropriate recommendatory guidance on how to avoid 
conflicts with each other’s operations.109 Whether such recommendations will 
be adopted remains to be seen. Suffice it to say here that the need to reduce 
conflicts between seabed activities in ABNJ has, at least, been identified, 
and some concrete practical steps have been suggested as to how best to go 
about it.
What these two examples show is an increasing awareness of the need to 
cooperate across sectors in order to avoid, minimise or manage conflict, even 
at the international level. This is being achieved, to an as yet minor extent, 
through memoranda of understanding and other agreements or arrangements 
providing for cooperative activities such as joint workshops, work programs, 
and meetings, and participation in each other’s meetings as observers. The 
success of these ventures remains, however, dependent on some common 
understanding of their potential benefits, such as certainty, prevention of 
duplication, increase in efficiency in achieving agreed goals and targets, and 
on the further development of significantly more, more complex, and more 
constructive processes for cooperation.110
107   ISA, n 104, 5.
108   Ibid, 27.
109   Ibid, 33–34.
110   JA Ardron, R Rayfuse, K Gjerde, R Warner, ‘The sustainable use and conservation of bio-
diversity in ABNJ: What can be achieved using existing international agreements?” (2014) 
49 Marine Policy 98–108.
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8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of the key environmental approaches 
and tools that are being developed in order to reduce, minimise and avoid con-
flict between different uses and users of the seabed. It will be immediately 
apparent that a plethora of such approaches and tools exist, although not all 
are necessarily focused on precautionary and ecosystem-based management. 
In both areas under and areas beyond national jurisdiction certain key features 
of sound environmental management exist. First, it is necessary to know and 
understand what each sector is doing. Then the impacts that the activities of 
each sector can have or are likely to have on another sector must be assessed. 
Finally, cross-sectoral cooperation, aimed at ensuring each sector is interfered 
with only to the extent necessary and in a manner that does not compromise 
ecosystem integrity, is needed. This is not an easy task. However, the future 
orderly, peaceful and environmentally sustainable development and use of the 
seabed depends on it.
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chapter 23
Commercial Arrangements and Liability for 
Crossing Pipelines, Power Cables and Telecom 
Cables (Connectors) on the Seabed
Lars Olav Askheim
1 Introduction1,2
A direct consequence of the increasingly interconnected world and off-
shore energy production facilities – such as platforms producing petroleum 
and wind farms – is the growing number of crossings between subsea trans-
port assets such as oil and gas pipelines, power cables of various voltages 
and telecom cables such as fiber-optic cables and any traditional telegraph and 
telephone cables. In particular in closed-basin seas such as the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, the number of crossings has increased 
exponentially over the years.3 As a general rule, each crossing is governed by an 
agreement, almost invariably called a ‘crossing agreement’, entered into by 
the owners.
This chapter focuses on offshore crossings, i.e. crossings occurring on the 
seabed outside the territorial seas. While the issues are much the same onshore 
and with a similar need for entering into crossing agreements, offshore agree-
ments have some specificities. For example, the coastal state may have used its 
jurisdiction to affect the crossing arrangements, influencing the liability and 
compensation regime. Furthermore, there will most probably be additional 
types of pipelines, such as water and sewer pipelines on shore. The analysis 
1   My colleague Mr. Knut Gjelsten, whose experience in this field exceeds my own, has kindly 
reviewed this article and provided numerous comments. His input is greatly appreciated, but 
as always, any errors and omissions are my responsibility.
2   The views expressed in this chapter are personal ones. They have not been approved by my 
employer Statnett SF, who as the Norwegian transmission system operator for electricity has 
many existing and future subsea power cables, which are subject to a substantial number of 
crossings.
3   By way of example, the NordLink power cable between Norway and Germany currently 
under construction, will have approximately 20 subsea crossings. The North Sea Link (NSL) 
power cable project between Norway and Great Britain, also under construction, will have 
approximately 30 subsea crossings.
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in this chapter is restricted to three types of ‘connectors’4 that are mentioned 
above: oil and gas pipelines, power cables and telecom cables.
Further clarifications in terms of terminology and scope are necessary. The 
‘intruding’ installation will hereafter be referred to as the ‘Crossing Connector’, 
the ‘incumbent’ installation at the crossing point as the ‘Affected Connector’, 
and the owners as the ‘Crossing Party’ and the ‘Affected Party’ respectively. 
While the Affected Connector might be buried in the seabed, thereby not nec-
essarily entailing any physical contact between it and the Crossing Connector, 
the situation will still be deemed a crossing. In a situation where the two con-
nectors are adjacent to one other but without any actual crossing, the owners 
often enter into a ‘proximity agreement’ governing their relationship. This 
type of agreement will not be covered in this chapter. This chapter is based on 
experience from crossing agreements in the North Sea, most of which involve 
pipelines and power cables. There might be some regional specificities, includ-
ing legal traditions, but the issues covered are universal and therefore relevant 
for other parts of the world. Finally, the chapter takes a practising-lawyer 
approach, focusing primarily on practical issues.
Project specificities constitute important starting points. The physical 
aspects of crossings are fascinating, particularly as work will be carried out on 
the seabed, possibly at a depth of hundreds of metres. The dark environment 
and substantial water pressure require the use of very specialized equipment, 
largely operated remotely from vessels on the surface. While telecom cables 
usually merely rest on the ocean floor, power cables are generally buried (below 
the seabed). For oil and gas pipelines, both approaches are adopted. Thus, the 
design of crossings will vary, depending on the types of connectors involved, 
their vulnerability and other factors. For each type of crossing scenario, 
fairly standardized solution concepts have been developed. If the Affected 
Connector has a free span (i.e. hanging unsupported in the sea) at the crossing 
point, the parties need to agree on a specific solution addressing the particular 
concerns free spans create.
This chapter starts by reviewing the relevant provisions under the United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Section 2). It continues by 
identifying the different interests of the parties involved (Section 3), before 
reviewing in detail the main features and provisions of crossing agreements 
4   My choice of terminology is inspired by the term ‘interconnector’ used in the European 
Union (EU) regulatory framework for cross-border exchange of gas and power, designating 
gas pipelines and power cables between Member States (the Electricity Regulation and the 
Electricity Directive, as well as the Gas Regulation and the Gas Directive).
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(Section 4). The next sections focus on the installation phase (Section 5), and 
importantly, the liability and indemnity regime applied by the crossing agree-
ments (Section 6). The occurrence of ‘new situations’ after completion of the 
installation is envisaged (Section 7). The chapter ends with some concluding 
remarks (Section 8).
2 International Law Aspects: Relevant Provisions in UNCLOS
2.1 Applicable Regime on the High Seas
On the high seas (UNCLOS, Part VII), pursuant to Articles 87 and 112(1), all states 
have the right to lay cables and pipelines. This includes the right to lay new 
pipelines and cables that cross existing cables and pipelines, without the need 
for consent. The opposite alternative, in the view of this author my view, would 
give the Affected Party more power than necessary to adequately protect his 
interests. Further, the Crossing Party usually has very few practical alternatives 
to crossing the Affected Connector, implying that the Affected Party would 
have the power to veto beneficial projects. It would also be contrary to the 
principle of freedom of the seas if the Affected Party should be regarded as an 
incumbent with quasi-property rights to the seabed.
However, the Crossing Party will have to give due consideration to 
the Affected Connector, as provided for in Article 79(5), which also applies 
to the high seas (see Art. 112(2)):
When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to 
cables or pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repair-
ing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.
Article 114 states some basic principles for liability:
Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that, 
if persons subject to its jurisdiction who are the owners of a submarine cable 
or pipeline beneath the high seas, in laying or repairing that cable or pipe-
line, cause a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall bear 
the cost of the repairs.
Several principles can be identified in this provision. The first principle is the 
one of strict liability, since there is no requirement for wilful misconduct or 
negligence. The second principle is that the provision is neutral between the 
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Crossing Party and the Affected Party, in the sense that it applies to both: if one 
of them causes damage to the other, it is liable. The third principle is that the 
provision pertains only to repair costs, which means that other losses, such as 
loss of revenue, are not protected.
2.2 Applicable Regime in the Exclusive Economic Zone
With respect to the exclusive economic zone (UNCLOS, Part V), the same rules 
for pipelines and cables apply as for the high seas (see Article 58 (1) and (2)). It 
must be noted that the interests of the coastal state have been given some pro-
tection in paragraph 3, however this does not seem very relevant in the context 
of crossing agreements:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention 
in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights 
and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regula-
tions adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.
2.3 Applicable Regime on the Continental Shelf
On the continental shelf (UNCLOS, Part VI), the liability regime established in 
Article 114 will still apply. However, there are significant changes with respect 
to the laying of pipelines and cables. First, the coastal state has broad jurisdic-
tion over pipelines and cables placed in its territorial waters or used for the 
exploitation of the continental shelf (Article 79(5)). Second, while the princi-
ple of free laying of pipelines and cables is maintained for pipelines and cables 
crossing its continental shelf (Article 79(1)), the coastal state may protect its 
interests relating to exploitation of the continental shelf and the prevention of 
petroleum pollution (Article 79(2)), but may not impede laying or installation. 
Third, the course of the pipeline or cable is subject to consent from the coastal 
state (Article 79(3)).
3 The Interests of the Parties
Before going into the content of the crossing agreements, it is beneficial to 
review the interests of the parties.
The main concern of the Affected Party with respect to crossings is that the 
Affected Connector is covered for damage or exposure to a higher risk of dam-
age resulting from the Crossing Connector or the installation work. Repair 
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costs are substantial, particularly in terms of use of vessels and other marine 
operation costs. Repairs will consume considerable time, as they require com-
prehensive planning and the mobilization of specialized equipment/vessels, 
and may be heavily dependent on weather conditions, including seasonal 
‘weather windows’.
In addition to covering the repair costs, the Affected Party will also suffer a 
financial loss due to the Affected Connector being unavailable for its intended 
use. The amount of the loss will depend on the capacity of the Affected 
Connector and the economic value of that capacity. In comparison, the value 
of capacity in telecom cables will generally be substantially lower than the 
value of capacity in the connectors transporting energy (petroleum, power). 
The impact of the Affected Connector becoming unavailable will also depend 
on the redundancy, if any, in the networks with which the Affected Connector 
is affiliated. It would then be a question of whether the ‘traffic’ could be re-
routed through other connectors. Due to the relatively high costs of subsea 
connectors, redundancy will tend to be much lower than for onshore connec-
tors, so there will be a considerable exposure for the Affected Party, through 
loss of revenues, or compensation payable to purchasers of capacity. And even 
if the Affected Party succeeds in protecting himself against this, there will be a 
socio-economic loss. Finally, there may be a significant pollution risk relating 
to oil spillage from a damaged oil pipeline.
The interests of the Crossing Party mainly relate to the Crossing 
Connector. The costs and loss related to damage to it are much the same 
for the Affected Party as for the Affected Connector, as described in the pre-
vious paragraph, but the risk of causing damage to the Crossing Connector 
is obviously much smaller. However, the fact that the Affected Connector is 
situated in international waters does not mean that fundamental legal prin-
ciples regarding the protection of property belonging to others do not apply. 
As the newcomer on the scene, the Crossing Party should respect the fact that 
the Affected Connector is already on site and will have to be given appropriate 
consideration. Furthermore, once the installation of the Crossing Connector 
has been completed, the Crossing Party will undoubtedly expect to benefit 
from the same crossing principles with respect to any subsequent newcomers 
that cross its own connector. Thus, the combination of those principles and 
obligations create a positive environment between the parties.
After the crossing has been completed, a new risk scenario emerges in 
the crossing area. For the Affected Party, access to the Affected Connector 
in the event of repair or maintenance work becomes more difficult, in par-
ticular directly underneath the Crossing Connector. For the Crossing Party, the 
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existence of the Affected Connector will impede repair and maintenance work 
to some extent.
4 Crossing Agreements in a Nutshell
The parties to the crossing agreement will be the Affected Party and the Crossing 
Party, but several other companies will also have a direct interest in the con-
tent of the agreement, and particularly those affiliated with the Crossing Party. 
These interested third parties will typically be lenders, insurance providers, 
and the company that will carry out the installation of the Crossing Connector 
under contract to the Crossing Party.
4.1 Main Features
The main features and issues in a crossing agreement can be summarized as 
follows (issues that are not always addressed are marked with an asterisk):
– Identification of the crossing point;
– The crossing angle, i.e. the angle between the Crossing Connector and the 
Affected Connector at the crossing point;
– The Affected Party approves the crossing, either based on (i) an agreed 
technical solution in an appendix, or, more rarely, on (ii) a defined design 
process, the result being subject to final consent;
– Definition of a time slot for the installation;
– Steps before installation, i.e. sharing of data on the Affected Connector, 
design criteria and process, etc., notification prior to start of installation;
– The installation work itself, including representatives, notifications, stan-
dard of work, emergency procedures;
– Follow-up work, including preparation of as-installed documentation;
– Liability and indemnity, including basis for liability, extent of liability, liabil-
ity caps;
– Insurance requirements*;
– Future repair and maintenance;
– Upgrading and reinvestment*;
– Crossing Connector projects with crossings*;
– Decommissioning*.
With respect to the contract period, this is often left open. It is assumed that 
the crossing agreement will apply as long as the crossing exists.
Naturally, there will also be ‘boiler plate’ type provisions dealing with issues 
such as confidentiality, waivers, amendments, notices, all of which are found 
in most commercial contracts.
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4.2 Model Agreements
There is no universal, fixed format for crossing agreements. However, experi-
ence shows that it is fruitful to distinguish between different crossing scenarios, 
depending on the type of connector involved. As demonstrated in the table 









Pipeline IS / CS ? ? – ad hoc?
Telecom cable ? CS ? – ad hoc?
Power cable CS / based 
on IS
CS ? – ad hoc?
IS = Industry standard
CS = Company standard – might apply for the whole company or just for a single project
? = This author is unaware of any specific standards applying to this situation or whether stan-
dard from other crossing types are adopted.
In Great Britain and Norway, the industry associations (UK Oil & Gas Industry 
Association and Norwegian Oil and Gas) have produced model agreements for 
pipeline crossings.5 Oil companies may also have established company stan-
dards. In the North Sea, the major telecom operators have produced their own 
company standard agreements; these are far from identical but are still quite 
well-aligned.
The company standards have tended to favour the interests of the Affected 
Party. They are generally drawn up by incumbents, some of whom own or 
operate a large number of connectors. However, the drafters of some of these 
standards have wanted to avoid a situation where each crossing has to be nego-
tiated extensively. Given that the draft is frequently heavily in favour of the 
Affected Party, one wishes to avoid the Crossing Party disputing every deviation 
5   For the UK, for Oil and Gas UK, see ‘Pipeline Crossing Agreement & Proximity Agreement 
Pack October 2015’ (OP115), available at: <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/pipeline 
-crossing-agreement-proximity-agreement-pack-october-2015/>. For Norway, for Norwegian 
Oil and Gas, see ‘Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended Model Agreements for use of 
Pipeline to pipeline, Tie-in, Crossing, Proximity, Confidentiality’, available at: <https://www 
.norskoljeoggass.no/drift/standardkontrakter-og-modellavtaler/modellavtaler/>.
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from the draft. Instead, they have prepared a model agreement that is not nec-
essarily totally balanced but is largely within acceptable limits for the Crossing 
Party. With such a standard, it will be easier to insist that ‘no variations are 
accepted’ – or that variations may be acceptable but will require substantial 
internal processes over a lengthy and undetermined period of time.
The understanding of this author is that the development of industry stan-
dards in the petroleum sector has been based on the awareness that today’s 
Crossing Party may become tomorrow’s Affected Party in a new crossing, else-
where at a later time. Thus, a more natural balance can be obtained in a longer 
run.
The UK standard pipeline crossing agreement is structured as follows:
– Main body of the agreement. It numbers approximately 20 pages, includes 
contractual conditions and signature pages. Interestingly, on some issues, 
the text provides alternative solutions.
– Schedule 1: Plan of the Route of the Crossing Pipeline
– Schedule 2:
 – Part (A) Scope of Work
 – Part (B) Plans, Specifications, Construction Procedures and Risk 
Assessments
 – Part (C) Specimen Composite As-built Survey Drawing
 – Part (D) Construction Operations and Location of the Representative
– Schedule 3: Facilities for the Representative Offshore
The Norwegian standard pipeline crossing agreement has a slightly different 
structure:
– Special Terms and conditions. This is a short, top-level document of 4 arti-
cles only. It contains consent to the crossing, list of the contract documents, 
a few basic definitions and signature page.
 – Article 1 – Definitions, Agreement Documents and Interpretation
 – Article 2 – Consent to Pipeline Crossing
 – Article 3 – Capacity of the Parties
 – Article 4 – Representatives and Notices
– Appendix A General Terms and Conditions for Pipeline Crossing (approx-
imately 15 pages)
– Appendix B Planned Route of the Crossing Pipeline and Crossing Point(s)
– Appendix C Laying Operation
4.3 The Parties’ Motivation for Entering into Crossing Agreements
As indicated above, the Crossing Party does not need consent from the Affected 
Party. More generally, there is no legal obligation to enter into a crossing 
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agreement with regard to crossings in international waters.6 In practice, most 
crossing situations entail the signing of a crossing agreement.
In the view of this author, the first major benefits from having a crossing 
agreement are clarity and predictability. The parties will know their legal situ-
ation, which is obviously an advantage for both. The Crossing Party can assess 
the legal risks relating to the crossing, and the Affected Party will have some 
influence over how and where the crossing shall take place. In addition, by hav-
ing an agreement with a choice of law provisions, the parties avoid potentially 
difficult choice of law issues that may arise in the absence of an agreement. 
After all, lex loci delicti, which is the general principle for tort claims in private 
international law,7 does not provide much guidance for crossings in interna-
tional waters.
Secondly, a crossing agreement may establish solutions that differ from the 
ones provided in UNCLOS. A very important example in this respect is the intro-
duction of maximum amounts of liability. There is no basis for such liability 
caps in UNCLOS, but there is a clear commercial need, not just for the Crossing 
Party, but also for his lenders and his insurance providers.8
A third advantage is that the crossing agreement can be made much more 
specific and detailed than the fairly short and general language in UNCLOS. 
The parties will still adhere to the principles found in UNCLOS, but they will 
define how these principles shall apply to the crossing at hand. The prime 
example of this is the often quite detailed body of provisions on cooperation 
before, during and after the construction work. These are much more opera-
tional and practically appropriate than the general language in Article 79(5) on 
the consideration to be given to the Affected Connector.
Closely related to this is the parties’ opportunity to address issues that are 
outside the provisions of UNCLOS. The liability provisions of Article 114 only 
cover costs of repair to the Affected Connector and the Crossing Connector. 
The parties may also find it appropriate to provide solutions for damage to 
6   There may be nationally based exceptions relating to owners of pipelines and cables which 
enter into territorial waters (and thus do not just cross the seabed outside these limits, or 
owners of pipelines and cables used for the exploitation of resources on the continental 
shelf.
7   The essence of this is that the tort claim is governed by the law of the place where the key 
elements in the tortious act occurred. There is substantial legal practice and theory here, but 
for reasons of space, I will not go further into these issues.
8   The construction of the New Connector will often be covered by project insurance (CAR = 
Construction All Risks) which will regularly include liability cover, including liability towards 
the Affected Party. For these reasons the providers of CAR insurance will attach great impor-
tance to the existence and contents of crossing agreements.
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other assets belonging to them, damage to their personnel, as well as third 
party liability. Further, no insurance requirements exist in UNCLOS either.
All these advantages can be condensed into a single observation: the nego-
tiations for a crossing agreement create an opportunity for the parties to 
find more effectual solutions than those that might have been adopted if the 
Crossing Party had simply proceeded on his own. The solutions can be based 
on the specifics of the crossing itself and the interests of the parties.
4.4 Timing for Entering into a Crossing Agreement
In projects for a new connector, it will be necessary at an early stage to clarify 
issues such as the type of crossings to be made, with appropriate details of 
the existing connectors and their owners. This will partly be a desktop exer-
cise based on available information, supplemented by information from the 
owners of known or suspected connectors. Furthermore, data from the early 
seabed surveys will confirm the existence of a crossing situation and indicate 
any additional crossings. It may be a bit surprising, but not all existing con-
nectors are properly documented, and some of them may no longer be known 
even to their owners.
At this stage, it is also beneficial to identify any ‘dead’ connectors, i.e. con-
nectors that are no longer in use and for which there is no plan to make further 
use of them. The connector project will not aim to enter into crossing agree-
ments for such connectors even if the historical owners were identified. Such 
connectors are usually disregarded for installation purposes and are regarded 
as having been abandoned by their owners, who thereby are deemed to have 
relinquished ownership.
When there is a real crossing situation, it is advantageous for a connector 
project to enter into crossing agreements at a fairly early stage, particularly if 
there are third parties with substantial interests in them. This is obviously the 
case when construction is to be financed on a project-finance basis. Under this 
approach, the crossing agreement will most likely only identify the crossing 
point, while the design of the crossing itself and the installation methods and 
procedures will be determined at a later stage.
However, in practice, many crossing agreements tend to be entered into 
fairly late. This allows for the involvement of the installation company selected 
by the Crossing Party and which will carry out much of the physical work. The 
insights and inputs from the installation company are obviously valuable for 
the successful and timely completion of the project. The detailed crossing 
design can be appended to the crossing agreement. It might also be difficult to 
convince the Affected Party to engage in quick negotiations if the laying of the 
crossing is several years in the future.
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In some instances, there is a two-stage process, with an early quasi-
agreement: once the contact has been negotiated between the parties, the 
Affected Party will issue a short ‘letter of no objection’. This letter usually refers 
to the standard technical requirements of the Affected Party and its standard 
crossing agreements, both of which are attached to the letter. In the letter, the 
Affected Party states that, on the basis of compliance with those two docu-
ments, it has no objection to the crossing. It is unlikely, and not intended, that 
this letter is legally binding. However, it still serves a useful purpose by indi-
cating the basis on which the Affected Party is ready to enter into a crossing 
agreement. It also provides some assurance to the Crossing Party and parties 
related to it, such as lenders and insurers.
5 Considerations Surrounding the Installation Phase
5.1 Pre-installation Phase and Related Provisions
The objective is here to facilitate the development of a good crossing solution, 
where the interests of the Affected Party are duly protected. Among the com-
mon topics covered are exchange of information about existing infrastructures 
and design of the crossing;
The content of the provisions concerning the pre-installation phase will 
depend on whether the parties have chosen an ‘early’ or ‘late’ crossing agree-
ment, as discussed in Section 4.4. If the ‘early’ approach has been chosen, the 
Affected Party will need to provide information about the Affected Connector, 
usually covering existing documentation and without involving any liability 
for the correctness and completeness of the information submitted. Under 
the ‘late’ approach, the crossing agreement will usually only describe the 
detailed crossing design (prepared by the Crossing Party or a subcontractor, 
approved by the Affected Party), without any reference to information, if any, 
provided by the Affected Party.
The crossing agreement places the responsibility for the design of the cross-
ing on the Crossing Party. This will also include installation methods and 
procedures. There is also almost invariably a requirement for a pre-installation 
survey to be carried out. The Crossing Party will have to produce appropri-
ate drawings and progress schedules and may also be obliged to prepare risk 
assessments and/or other quality assurance/quality control documentation. 
The anchoring patterns for the installation vessel is a particular concern. The 
crossing agreement may contain references to ‘good engineering practice’ or 
similar expressions, although such requirements will usually apply even if they 
are not explicitly mentioned.
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Following this, the Affected Party has the option of approving or disapprov-
ing the corpus of documents submitted. The Affected Party will be given a 
maximum time period for this, and it is usually stated that consent cannot be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed.
In some instances, the crossing solution entails that the Crossing Connector 
is installed underneath the Affected Connector. This usually requires cutting 
or lifting the Affected Connector so that the latter will be out of service for 
some time. The Affected Party might want to insist in the agreement that any 
work done directly on the Affected Connector be carried out by his contractor, 
or at least that there must be only one contractor commissioned to do all work, 
one who is qualified to perform work on both connectors.
To the extent approvals from public authorities are necessary, the Crossing 
Party will assume the task of obtaining them. In practice, it is usually stated 
that the party is obliged to ensure compliance with all applicable legislation.
The choice of contractor lies with the Crossing Party, but the crossing 
agreement might set some specific stipulations in terms of qualification and 
experience requirements.
5.2 The Installation Work Itself
The installation work is the obligation of the Crossing Party and is to be car-
ried out at his cost and risk. Before installation starts, the Crossing Party must 
respect a minimum notification period.
The crossing agreement will often require, in a standard clause, that the 
Crossing Party conduct all installation work in compliance with general stan-
dards of care and reason. This concept can be expressed in various ways, such 
as ‘good oil industry practice’ or ‘acting as reasonable and prudent operators’ 
to give only two examples.
The installation of the Crossing Connector will be preceded by some pre-
paratory works, including deepening the position of the Affected Connector 
in the seabed, as well as building trenches, foundations, ramps, and/or bridges 
for the Crossing Connector. When the Crossing Connector has been put in its 
proper place, the Crossing Party will have to carry out any protective measures 
agreed in advance, such as the placing of protective materials – mats, rock, 
other materials – over the Connectors.
Many crossing agreements will allow the Affected Party to have a repre-
sentative on site during installation work. This representative is usually given 
observer status – expressly stated in the crossing agreement – and shall not be 
called upon to give approvals or act as a representative of the Affected Party. 
However, the representative may have the right to stop the installation work 
under certain circumstances, such as emergencies or risk of damage to the 
Affected Connector.
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In the event the Affected Connector is damaged during installation, a situ-
ation arises for which it is difficult to make proper provisions in advance. The 
crossing agreement might specify that any repair work must be carried out by 
the Affected Connector or by a contractor chosen by him. The costs will be 
at the expense of the Crossing Party, as discussed in more detail in Section 6. 
The crossing agreement might also state that the protection and repair of 
the Affected Connector shall have priority over the installation work, if the 
Affected Party so requests. The Affected Party might be entitled to request 
assistance from the Crossing Party, for example to use the vessel and marine 
equipment the Crossing Party has on site. However, this cannot be strictly 
required. The suitability of the vessel, equipment and workmanship should 
fall under the provision stipulating appropriate tools and materials, and to a 
‘best efforts’-type of reservation.
The Crossing Party will be subject to reporting obligations on a cyclical and/
or more or less current basis during the installation period.
5.3 Follow-Up Activities
After completion of the physical installation work, crossing agreements often 
provide for some additional obligations for the Crossing Party. While the 
content of those obligations will vary, the following issues seem to be most 
pertinent:
– An as-installed survey shall be carried out by the Crossing Party and made 
available to the Affected Party at no cost. Some crossing agreements 
introduce an approval mechanism here, implying that the Crossing Party 
may have to re-do the survey in full or in part. The purpose of the survey 
is both to document the current physical situation at the crossing point 
and in the area around it, and to verify that the Crossing Party has carried 
out the installation work in compliance with the terms of the crossing 
agreement.
– The as-installed survey will be included in the as-installed documentation, 
which shall also be provided to the Affected Party.
– Rectification of any deviations, whether identified through an as-installed 
survey or not, shall be carried out by the Crossing Party.
– A ‘quarantine period’ of some months will apply, during which all defects 
identified in the Affected Connector will be deemed to have been caused 
by the Crossing Party, entailing that any related financial loss will be borne 
by the Crossing Party. Such a period should be seen in conjunction with the 
liability and indemnity provisions of the crossing agreement, which will be 
reviewed below.
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6 Liability and Indemnity
6.1 Balancing Parties’ Interests and Capabilities: General Matters
The liability and indemnity provisions are often seen as the core of the cross-
ing agreement in a legal perspective. They will address not only the direct 
tort liability of the parties between themselves, but also the extent to which a 
party can seek indemnification from the other party in the event of third-party 
claims.
Concerning liabilities between the parties, there are both the costs of repair-
ing any damage to the Affected Connector and any follow-on losses such as loss 
of revenue, exposure under contracts with users of the Affected Connector, 
and in some cases also exposure under regulatory mechanisms relating to the 
unavailability of the Affected Connector.9
The number of potentially affected companies and individuals can be 
quite large. The first set of third parties is related to one of the parties in some 
manner, and includes inter alia affiliates of the parties, contractors and sub-
contractors, as along with employees of all these entities. These will be referred 
to as the ‘Affected Group’, and the equivalent group on the other side as the 
‘Crossing Group’.
The second set of third parties is occasionally referred to as ‘true’ third par-
ties and is quite diverse. It can include owners of other facilities in the vicinity 
of the crossing point, shipowners, fishermen, users of the Affected Connector, 
etc. A special type of claims relates to pollution liability, which in practical 
terms is significant mainly for oil and gas pipelines.
The liability and indemnity provisions cannot be considered in isolation 
of the insurance arrangements. On a superficial level, the insurance arrange-
ments can be seen as designed to cover the liabilities and indemnities assumed 
by a party in the crossing agreement. However, in the view of this author, it 
is more productive to see it the other way round: to the extent that an expo-
sure is protected by insurance, it does not really matter which of the parties 
is responsible under the liability and indemnity provisions.10 Consequently, 
the financial liability exposure should be assumed by the party who has the 
best access to insurance and can obtain the most favourable premiums and 
other conditions, including deductibles. The parties should attempt to avoid 
a situation where both carry insurance for the same potential event, as this 
is not efficient in terms of premiums, i.e. the Affected Party under his general 
9    This exposure can arise for connectors that are part of an open access network with tariffs 
developed under public regulation.
10   The liability and indemnity provisions will still be relevant for any deductibles and exclu-
sions from the insurance cover.
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insurance, the Crossing Party under insurance relating to his project in general 
or to the crossing itself. ‘Double insurance’ can also create disputes as to which 
insurer shall pay.
Given UNCLOS Article 114 and the incumbent position of the Affected Party, 
it should not come as a surprise that in a crossing situation, as a general rule, 
the Crossing Party will carry the liability in the event of damage to the Affected 
Connector, howsoever caused. However, in practice this general rule is rarely 
applied to its full extent and exceptions are made. Based on the review of sev-
eral crossing agreements, the impression given is that there is considerable 
variation on that point.
6.2 Specific Liability and Indemnity Issues
The first and most fundamental issue is the extent, in time and space, of the 
special compensation regime the crossing agreements establish. Most of them 
relate this to the installation operation, either by simply looking at this as a 
period of time, or by requiring a link (with language like ‘arising out of or in 
connection with’ the work or the installation) between the installation and the 
damage.
The next issue is the damage the special compensation regime applies to. 
Damage to the Affected Connector is obviously included, but in practice the 
regime will also apply to other forms of damage to property and personnel in 
the belonging to the Affected Group, as well as claims from third parties.
Damage might not necessarily manifest itself during the installation period. 
It may also be that although the damage occurred during installation, it only 
comes to the attention of the parties at a later time. In order to give protection 
to the Affected Party in this respect, many crossing agreements establish what 
can be referred to as an ‘extended liability period’.
The effect of the extended liability period, in its purest form, is that dam-
age discovered during the period will be deemed to relate to the installation, 
and thus be covered by the special regime, regardless of actual cause. In some 
instances, this is softened into a presumption that the Crossing Party can rebut 
if he can produce adequate evidence that the damage was not caused by him. 
In practice, this will mean that he will have to substantiate that a person spe-
cifically caused the damage, or that the damage is caused by a particular type 
of activity, for example trawling. The extended liability period can be quite 
long – 6 to 24 months is not unheard of. It can start when installation work 
is completed or can be linked to the delivery or approval of the as-installed 
documentation.
The next issue is the basis for liability. In contract practice, the prevailing, 
sufficient basis for liability is that the Affected Connector is damaged. It is 
therefore not a necessary condition that the damage is caused by the Crossing 
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Party or any other individual or company for which he is responsible, such as 
contractors, affiliates or employees of such companies. However, in a few cross-
ing agreements, causation is only a presumption that the Crossing Party may 
attempt to rebut, and the burden of proof will lie with him. It seems appropri-
ate that the Crossing Party should be deemed liable in the event of inherent 
defects in the Affected Connector.
Is the principle of liability for the Crossing Party maintained also in the 
event that it can be substantiated that the damage was caused by the Affected 
Party or the Affected Group? This may be regarded as unreasonable, and many 
legal systems will not accept such a principle when there is serious miscon-
duct. There are several ways to attempt to resolve this, and the proper solution 
depends on the governing law chosen by the parties. One element here is the 
gravity of the acts of the Affected Group, where an exception will be made 
in cases of wilful misconduct, possibly also extending to gross negligence. 
The other element is the identity of the persons in question: some crossing 
agreements limit the exclusion in this context to such actions taken at a man-
agement level.
It is customary to agree on a maximum amount of financial responsibility 
for the Crossing Party. The amount will obviously depend on several factors, 
including probability of damage, an expected range of loss and insurance costs. 
In Norway, in respect of crossings involving pipelines, a global cap amount 
of USD 100 million for the crossing is prevailing and is reflected in the indus-
try standard. Still in Norway, the cap amount for crossings involving telecom 
cables tends to be significantly smaller, but here the cap often works at two 
levels: one cap for each incident, and a higher total cap.
Another important issue is whether indirect/consequential losses caused 
by damage to the Affected Pipeline are excluded. Here there is no generally 
prevailing solution. In the two oil industry standards referred to in Section 4.2, 
the Crossing Party is liable within the limits of the liability cap also for con-
sequential damage. This is contrary to normal practice in most commercial 
contracts. For crossings involving telecom cables, the crossing agreements 
made available seem in general to take the opposite approach, excluding con-
sequential loss.
Pollution liability, including both damages caused and clean-up costs, is 
particularly relevant for oil pipelines. Some crossing agreements involving oil 
pipelines exclude such liability from the special regime and will instead gen-
erally provide that financial losses due to spillage/leakage of oil from an oil 
pipeline, will be assumed by the owner of the pipeline in question. Exceptions 
might apply in the event of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
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7 Dealing with the New Situation in the Post-completion Phase
After completion of the installation, a new situation is created with two con-
nectors in the same area and various protection arrangements in place. Both 
connectors are vulnerable with respect to the performance of work on the 
other connector. For the connector located underneath, there is an obvious 
additional challenge of obtaining access.
In the normal course of business, there should be little need for physical 
work in the crossing area, as the risks of defects in the connectors themselves 
are limited. Then, only a small part of the connector is located in the crossing 
area. Meanwhile, defects can occur, and one or both connectors could be dam-
aged by outside forces. Some crossing agreements do not address this situation 
at all, which might be explained by a lack of foresight, deliberate omission 
after difficult negotiations, or just a business judgment that the risk is fairly 
small and can be assumed by the parties if it should arise. However, the con-
sequences of defects can be far-reaching. Consequently, rules are needed that 
define the rights and obligations of the parties in such situations.
Most agreements do not distinguish the solutions depending on the par-
ties, meaning that the provisions are symmetrical and that the Affected Party 
will have the same position as the Crossing Party. The Affected Party can thus 
not expect to avoid any subsequent costs deriving from the crossing merely 
due to the fact that he was the first in the area, even if his situation can be 
said to be worse than that of the Crossing Party. However, it may happen that 
the Affected Party obtains some concessions in the event of difficult access or 
temporary removal of the Crossing Connector, typically due to some particular 
circumstances.
An important element of the crossing agreements will relate to the physical 
delimitation of the area in which the post-completion provisions apply. This 
area is usually defined by a given radius around the crossing point. Outside 
that area, any obligation on the parties must be based on other legal grounds 
in the crossing agreement.
Some types of work do not involve actual physical contact with the seabed 
or the Connectors, such as surveys carried out by remotely operated vehicles 
(ROVs) (miniature, unmanned submarines controlled from the surface). The 
tendency is that each party can carry out intentional work, but potentially sub-
ject to a notification requirement.
Other types of work will involve physical presence, such as the use of 
anchors and other mooring equipment, as well as ploughs or other equipment 
affecting the seabed. For those physical works, several approaches are followed 
in practice. One approach is to make all such work conditional upon a sepa-
rate agreement being entered into. Obviously, this approach will give the other 
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party a strong negotiating position. An alternative approach is to retain the 
concept of consent but soften it by stating that consent shall not be unreason-
ably withheld. This language is not very precise, but it is hard to see that it is 
possible to improve it significantly. A third approach is to state that the parties 
shall enter into a new crossing agreement which must reflect the first crossing 
agreement. With this approach, the status of ‘intruder’ in the new crossing is 
determined independently of the status in the first crossing agreement. Thus, 
the Affected Party in the second crossing agreement could be the Crossing 
Party in the first crossing agreement. Regardless of the approach, it is conve-
nient to have an exception for emergency situations, where there is insufficient 
time to obtain agreement or consent. The costs of such work are generally to 
be assumed by the party triggering the work, even if some of them relate to the 
connector of the other party.
Some crossing agreements foresee a particular need for changing the config-
uration of the crossing. For example, the Affected Connector which originally 
lies underneath the Crossing Connector may instead cross over it at a later 
stage. The contents of such change in crossing configuration clauses will vary. 
One approach is to modify the provisions on consent requirements to facilitate 
the changes but also clarify the cost consequences, e.g. that the Affected Party 
will assume all costs.
Finally, any work in the crossing area after completion of installation will 
generate liability and indemnity issues, governed either by the existing cross-
ing agreement or in a new agreement to be entered into.
8 Concluding Remarks
Crossing agreements are commonly seen as practical arrangements, with lim-
ited interest from a commercial point of view. In companies with a significant 
portfolio of subsea connectors, crossing agreements tend to be dealt with by a 
small group of specialists who are highly experienced but with a strong prefer-
ence for their established practices and model agreements/clauses.
For the reasons stated, agreeing on a crossing agreement can be a fairly long, 
but not necessarily a very complicated process. There is little general contro-
versy and the industry shares some common practices along with the joint 
need to realise respective projects. However, if a Crossing Party faces many 
crossings in a project, this will create additional challenges in managing the 
entire process.
Crossing agreements constitute a fascinating example of the conflict 
between incumbents and intruders in relation to the use of the same seabed 
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area. The basic question remains: how to strike the balance between the 
interests of the party who first moved into an open area and the interests 
of newcomers. UNCLOS provides the main principles, but as the review of 
contract practices has shown, many additional provisions are needed and 
different solutions must be found to solve possible conflicting situations. 
Therefore, there are significant benefits to be derived by both parties agree-
ing on a crossing agreement. Not least, the potential ’reversal of roles’ in the 
post-completion phase regarding subsequent crossings/projects will make 
the parties more inclined to seek balanced solutions than if the crossing in 
question was seen as an isolated case.
© David Langlet, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004391567_026
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chapter 24
Balancing Competing Interests When Building 




The age of large-scale hydrocarbon infrastructure projects may, partly as a 
consequence of climate change policy, be nearing its end. However, significant 
projects are still being planned and executed. Natural gas is also touted as a 
‘bridge’ between more carbon intense coal-based energy production and 
carbon neutral, or almost neutral, renewable energy sources. This, together 
with new gas production technologies could further increase the need for gas 
transport infrastructure, significant parts of which are likely to be sea based.1 
Also, if carbon capture and storage (CCS) emerges as a large-scale climate 
change mitigation technology, which some see as imperative if climate change 
is to be tackled affectively,2 that is likely to result in demand for submarine 
pipelines to transport carbon dioxide to offshore injection points.3
1   Offshore is estimated to account for almost two-thirds of the world’s remaining conventional 
natural gas resources. International Energy Agency, Offshore Energy Outlook (OECD/IEA, 
2018) 16.
2    See, inter alia, European Parliament Resolution of 14 January 2014 on Implementation 
Report 2013: Developing and Applying Carbon Capture and Storage Technology in Europe 
(2013/2079(INI)); and OECD/IEA, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage (OECD/
IEA 2013) 5. However, there is no lack a critics of CCS. See e.g. E Rochon, ‘False Hope: Why Carbon 
Capture and Storage Won’t Save the Climate’ (Greenpeace International, May 2008) <http://
www.greenpeace.org/usa/research/false-hope-why-carbon-capture/> accessed 15 June 2014. 
The technology is associated with many problems, not least the lack of a viable business 
case for its employment in most jurisdictions. On the role of CCS and bioenergy with CCS 
(BECCS) in scenarios that would limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, see H de 
Coninck, A Revi, M Babiker, P Bertoldi, M Buckeridge, A Cartwright, W Dong, J Ford, S Fuss, 
J-C Hourcade, D Ley, R Mechler, P Newman, A Revokatova, S Schultz, L Steg, and T Sugiyama, 
‘Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response’, in V Masson-Delmotte et al (eds), 
Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the 
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The construction and operation of submarine pipelines engage several 
parts of the law of the sea. Such activities can also affect many potentially com-
peting interests, such as the freedom of transport, the utilization of resources 
in and on the seabed, protection of the marine environment, and access to 
secure energy supplies. With transit pipelines – i.e. those pipelines that pass 
over the continental shelf (CS) of one or more States without entering their 
territorial waters – potential conflicts between interests take on additional lev-
els of complexity since the interests pertain to different States who may be 
quite differently affected by the pipelines. The States can also be in very differ-
ent positions as to their ability to exercise control in relation to the pipelines 
and thereby influence the balancing of the interests concerned. If submarine 
energy pipelines are to be built and operated without unnecessarily interfering 
with other legitimate activities and interests, and vice versa, significant levels 
of coordination or cooperation between the affected States is often required.
The challenge of handling constructively and sustainably the many inter-
ests potentially affected by submarine pipelines is compounded by the relative 
vagueness of the applicable legal regime, not least with regard to the nature 
and extent of the jurisdiction that may be exercised by the States concerned.
This chapter aims to discuss, from an international- and partly EU law per-
spective, the challenges of managing conflicting interests associated with the 
use of the seabed for transport purposes. To do so it uses the Nord Stream pipe-
line project in the Baltic Sea, one of the most complex and contentious energy 
transport projects in Europe, as a case study. The focus is on issues pertaining 
to the physical presence and operation of the pipelines in a specific location 
and the interests that may prompt restrictions of the laying and operation of 
pipelines.
After a presentation of the Nord Stream pipeline project (Section 2), the 
chapter discusses which framework such sea based transport projects offer to 
manage competing interests, both in general terms (Section 3) and specifically 
context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty’ (2018, in press).
3   In some regions offshore storage is the only or most abundant storage option while it in 
other cases may be preferred for policy reasons. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, prepared by Working 
Group II of the IPCC (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 223, 257 and S Teir 
|J Hetland, E Lindeberg, A Torvanger, K Buhr, T Koljonen, J Gode, K Onarheim, A Tjernshaugen, 
A Arasto, M Liljeberg, A Lehtili, L Kujanpaii and M Nieminen, Potential for Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) in the Nordic Region (VTT Research Note 2556, 2010) 73.
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in the case of Nord Stream (Section 4). The chapter ends with some concluding 
remarks (Section 5).
2 The Nord Stream Project
The Nord Stream project has been highly contentious and much debated. This 
has partly been due to the environmental risks associated with a large energy 
project being carried out in a unique and fragile marine area which is already 
subject to very high human pressures, e.g. in the form of eutrophying emis-
sions and quite intense shipping activities. To a large extent, the debate has 
also been influenced by the mounting political tensions between Russia and 
several other European countries affected by the project.
The concerns raised by affected States vary from direct physical impacts 
on the environment or marine security, over economic implications of a 
sea-based gas transport route, to issues related to national security.4 While 
acknowledging that this inevitably affected the political context in which the 
relevant legal provisions where construed and applied the main emphasis is 
here on the applicable law and on issues that may be of relevance also beyond 
the specific region and project.
Before engaging with the legal framework, the Nord Stream project as such 
will be introduced.
2.1 Background, Facts and Figures
The Nord Stream project in its current form comprises two 1,224 kilometres long 
parallel gas pipelines with the combined capacity to transport 55 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) of natural gas from Russia to Germany annually. The submarine 
pipelines originate near Vyborg in Russia, then pass through the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) and over the CS of Finland and Sweden, before entering the 
EEZ but also the territorial waters of Denmark, and finally landing in Lubmin, 
near Greifswald, in Germany.5 The first of the two pipelines became opera-
tional in 2011, the second one about a year later. In 2017, the pipeline system 
4   On the various objections raised and contentions associated with the project see B Solum 
Whist, ’Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline’ FNI Report 15/2008 (2008) and D Langlet ‘Nord 
Stream, the Environment and the Law: Disentangling a Multijurisdictional Energy Project’ 
(2014) 59 ScStL 179.
5   On the notions ’exclusive economic zone’ and ’continental shelf ’, see section 3.2.
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operated at 93 per cent of its design capacity, delivering 51 billion cubic metres 
(bcm) of natural gas.6
Initial feasibility studies of different routing options were carried out in the 
late 1990s by North Transgas, a company whose major owners were the Russian 
OAO Gazprom (Gazprom) and the Finnish Fortum Oil and Gas Oy (Fortum). 
They found a submarine pipeline solution, similar to that eventually built, to 
be the most feasible option for connecting Russia’s natural gas fields with the 
central European market.7
The pipelines were eventually built and are now operated by Nord Stream 
AG, a company founded in 2005 and currently owned by Gazprom, with 51 per 
cent of the shares, Wintershall Holding GmbH (a BASF subsidiary) and PEG 
Infrastruktur AG (an E.ON Beteiligungen subsidiary) with 15.5 per cent each; 
and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and ENGIE (formerly GDF SUEZ) with 9 per 
cent each.8 Nord Stream AG is based in Zug, Switzerland, where also the con-
trol centre, from which the pipelines are monitored and operated, is situated.9 
Nord Stream AG is thus to be regarded as a national of Switzerland and subject 
to Swiss jurisdiction in accordance with the nationality principle.10
2.2 Purposes and Developments
While the purpose of the Nord Stream pipeline system is to transport gas from 
Russia to central and Western Europe the project is also very much about 
avoiding transporting gas via established land-based routes, thereby reducing 
the control of transit States, and completely avoiding certain States becom-
ing transit States. As Nord Stream AG has itself explained, the Nord Stream 
pipeline system offers a natural gas connection ‘free from non-technical risks 
6    ‘Nord Stream Reaches Average Utilisation of 93% in 2017–51 bcm delivered to the European 
Union’ (Nord Stream, press release 16 January 2018) < https://www.nord-stream.com/
press-info/press-releases/nord-stream-reaches-average-utilisation-of-93-in-2017–51-bcm 
-delivered-to-the-european-union-500/> accessed 23 June 2019.
7    T Koivurova and I Pölönen, ‘Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment in the 
Case of the Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 151, 156.
8    ‘Who We Are’ <www.nord-stream.com/about-us/> accessed 17 August 2016. The company 
was originally called ‘North European Gas Pipeline Company’ and had a slightly differ-
ent ownership. ‘Nord Stream Environmental Impact Assessment Documentation for 
Consultation under the Espoo Convention’, Nord Stream Espoo Report, February 2009, 
Volume II: Chapter 1–8, 21.
9    ‘The Nord Stream Pipeline Project’, Fact Sheet, February 2013.
10   On this matter, see further D Langlet, ‘Transboundary Transit Pipelines: Reflections on 
the Balancing of Rights and Interests in Light of the Nord Stream Project’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 
977, 980.
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and free of interference of a commercial or non-commercial nature by third 
parties’.11
As has been discussed elsewhere, Nord Stream has met with much opposi-
tion, not least from States such as Poland, which view it as a way to circumvent 
them as transit States.12 However, this dimension of the Nord stream project 
is only very indirectly linked to competing uses of the seabed and will not be 
further discussed here.13
In 2015 Gazprom, BASF, E.ON, ENGIE, OMV and Royal Dutch Shell signed 
a Shareholders’ Agreement on implementation of a ‘Nord Stream 2’ pipeline 
project to be developed by a new company.14 Like the original Nord Stream, the 
Nord Stream 2 project comprises the construction of two offshore pipelines 
with an aggregate annual capacity of 55 bcm of gas to be transported from 
Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, largely along the same route as the 
two existing pipelines. The new company is, like Nord Stream AG, established 
in Switzerland, and continues the preparatory and planning activities initiated 
by Nord Stream AG.
In August 2016 the consortium behind Nord Stream 2 crumbled after a deci-
sion by the Polish anti-trust office not to approve the notification in Poland 
of a joint venture to construct and operate the new pipelines. The approval 
for a Polish joint venture was needed despite the planned pipelines not enter-
ing Polish waters because of the EU-based partners in the consortium being 
active in Poland. The notification was declined with reference to Nord Stream 
2 restricting competition in gas supplies.15 This lead to the new company, Nord 
11   ‘Nord Stream Extension Project Information Document (PID)’, March 2013, Document 
No. N-GE-PER-REP-000-PID00000-A, 15.
12   The then Polish defence minister Sikorski even said in 2006 that the project echoed the 
1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (in which the territories of several European countries, 
among them Poland, were divided into Nazi-German and Soviet spheres of influence just 
before the outbreak of WWII), Nord Stream ‘a waste of money’ says Poland (EURACTIV, 
11 January 2010, updated 31 August 2011) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-
europe/news/nord-stream-a-waste-of-money-says-poland/> accessed 28 May 2019.
13   See instead Langlet (n 4) and Solum Whist (n 4).
14   Gazprom export, ‘Nord Stream 2’ at <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/5/> 
accessed 28 May 2019.
15   A Rettman, ‘Russia to build Nord Stream 2 despite Polish objection’ (Euroserver, 
22 August 2016) <https://euobserver.com/economic/134694> and ‘Nord Stream 2 part-
ners withdraw amid Poland pressure’ (Financial Times, 12 August 2016) <http://www 
.ft.com/fastft/2016/08/12/nord-stream-2-partners-withdraw-amid-poland-pressure/> 
both accessed 19 May 2019.
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Stream 2 AG, being wholly owned by Gazprom but financing agreements for 
the project have been signed with ENGIE, OMV, Shell, Uniper and Wintershall.16
The transit States Finland and Sweden granted permission for laying of the 
new pipelines in April and June 2018, respectively.17 As of June 2019, the third 
transit State, Denmark, had yet to make a final decision on Nord Stream 2 
AG’s permit application. The legal developments in Denmark regarding Nord 
Stream 2 are further discussed in Section 4 below.
2.3 Legal Status
As concluded above, both Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG (in the 
following referred to collectively as ‘Nord Stream’ when no distinction is 
necessary) are Swiss companies and are with respect to the application of 
international law to be regarded as nationals of Switzerland and subject 
to Swiss jurisdiction.18 As a consequence of State sovereignty and accord-
ing to the maxim pacta tertiis – the meaning of which is that no obligations 
can follow from an international agreement for non-parties to such agreement 
without the consent of the non-party in question – any obligation imposed 
on Nord Stream should be compatible with the legal position of Switzerland 
under international law.19 Switzerland became a party to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)20 in May 2009, just a few months 
before Denmark, Finland and Sweden decided on Nord Stream AG’s permit 
applications regarding routes on their respective CS. However, Switzerland 
is not a member of the European Union (EU) and hence not subject to EU 
law obligations. Customary international law and international agreements 
to which the EU is party, such as UNCLOS, have an elevated position in the 
EU legal system.21 But this does not rule out the possibility of conflicts with 
16   Nord Stream 2, ‘Shareholder and Financial Investors’ at <https://www.nord-stream2 
.com/company/shareholder-and-financial-investors/> accessed 28 May 2019.
17   ‘Nord Stream 2 Receives Full Set of Permits in Finland’ (Nord Stream 2, press release, 
12 April 2018) at < https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/nord-stream 
-2-receives-full-set-of-permits-in-finland-92/> accessed 28 May 2019; ‘Decision on applica-
tion from Nord Stream 2 AG’ (Swedish government, press release, 7 June 2018) at <https://
www.government.se/press-releases/2018/06/decision-on-application-from-nord-stream 
-2-ag/> accessed 28 May 2019.
18   See father Langlet (n 10) 980.
19   This customary principle has been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 arts 34–36.
20   UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982) (UNCLOS).
21   For a succinct account of the relationship between EU law and public international law, 
particularly in the field of environmental protection, see D Langlet and S Mahmoudi, EU 
Environmental Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2016) 124 et seq.
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respect to the application of EU standards to non-EU nationals, such as Nord 
Stream AG.22
However, the potential imposition of an obligation on Nord Stream, as a 
private legal subject, that is not consistent with international law, would 
not be a violation of any right of Nord Stream’s, but rather a transgression 
of Switzerland’s rights under international law and could justify the exercise 
by Switzerland of diplomatic protection (ius protectionis) with respect to the 
company.23
3 Framework for Managing Competing Interests
3.1 Mapping of Interests
There are two sets of interests, widely construed, that are directly linked to 
the pipelines, their routing and operation. One is the general interest of the 
concerned States to exercise authority, understood as legislative and executive 
jurisdiction, over activities on their CS and in their EEZ which may somehow 
affect them. Potential conflicts are thus a matter of competing claims of juris-
diction in relation to the pipelines and their operation.
The second set of interests covers substantive interests, such as protection 
of the environment, unimpeded access to natural resources in or on the seabed, 
and the freedom to lay and operate pipelines for economic or other purposes. 
These sets of interests are functionally linked since whoever gets to exercise 
legal authority in a certain case to some extent thereby becomes the arbiter 
between competing substantive interests. At the same time, this competence 
is contingent on the specific circumstances since the right to exercise author-
ity, understood as competence to regulate and enforce rules and decisions, 
over a certain area (i.e. maritime zone) varies depending on what substantive 
interests are at issue. Although a distinction between jurisdictional interests 
and substantive interests may have an analytical value they are, from a legal 
perspective, often indissociably linked.
22   For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between EU law and international law 
in the related field of maritime safety, see H Ringbom, The EU Maritime Safety Policy and 
International Law (Brill – Nijhoff, 2008).
23   On diplomatic protection, see further The International Law Commission, ILC’s Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection’, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first 
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10) art 1.
579the Case of the Nord Stream Pipelines
3.2 General Rules on Jurisdiction
One of the main purposes of UNCLOS is clearly to allocate competencies in 
relation to areas and activities between different actors, primarily States acting 
in different capacities such as flag State, coastal State, or port State. This chap-
ter focuses on those rules most directly relevant to the use of the seabed on the 
CS for energy purposes, particularly the laying and operation of submarine 
pipelines.24
The maritime zones of interest here are the EEZ and the CS, and to a lesser 
extent the high seas. The territorial sea is in this respect less interesting since in 
this zone the coastal State has virtually unrestricted jurisdiction with respect to 
energy infrastructure.25 There is thus little room for competing claims regard-
ing the construction and operation of, for example, pipelines in this area.
While there is no high seas – i.e. parts of the sea not included in the EEZ, 
the territorial sea, or the internal waters of a State26 – in the Baltic Sea, it is 
still relevant to note that the so-called freedom of the high seas comprises not 
only a freedom of navigation and of overflight but also, inter alia, the freedom 
to lay submarine pipelines and cables.27 And, as we shall see, the freedoms of 
the high seas apply also, although subject to additional restrictions, in the EEZ.
24   For a general presentation of the jurisdictional system set out in UNCLOS, see e.g. D R 
Rothwell, A G Oude Elferink, K N Scott, and T Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press 2015); and Y Tanaka, The International Law of 
the Sea (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2015).
25   Where geography allows, the coastal State may claim a territorial sea that stretches 
12 nm from the baseline. Here the coastal State in most respects exercises sovereignty 
in a way similar to what applies on its land territory. UNCLOS (n 20) arts 2–3. However, 
as the Danish example shows, limitations on the ability to exercise this right can follow 
from domestic law. Until 2017 Danish law lacked a provision enabling the restriction of 
the laying of pipelines within the territorial waters based on for example foreign policy 
considerations. In December that year, an executive order was issued to the effect that 
approval by the Foreign Minister is required for the granting of a permit for the laying of 
pipelines within the Danish territorial sea. Bekendtgørelse om visse rørledningsanlæg på 
søterritoriet og kontinentalsoklen, BEK nr 1520 af 15/12/2017 (Executive order on certain 
pipelines in the territorial sea and on the continental shelf). Although drafted so as to 
be of general applicability, this legislative action was clearly aimed at the ongoing Nord 
Stream 2 process.
26   UNCLOS (n 20), art 86. To be exact, the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State are 
also not part of the high seas.
27   UNCLOS (n 20) art 87(1). Additional freedoms are the freedom to construct artificial 
islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to UNCLOS 
(n 20) Part VI; the freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in 
UNCLOS Part VII, section 2; and the freedom of scientific research subject to UNCLOS 
Parts VI and XIII.
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Pipelines are normally laid on the seabed, which, at least within 200 nauti-
cal miles from the baseline,28 forms part of the CS.29 The CS does not have 
to be claimed by the coastal State but exists ipso facto.30 The Baltic Sea is not 
wide enough for there to be any seabed beyond the CS. Also beyond this region 
energy transport infrastructure is for practical reasons mostly restricted to 
the CS.
Without affecting the legal status of the superjacent waters, the coastal 
State exercises sovereign rights over the CS for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources.31 This means, inter alia, that all extraction of 
oil and gas, as well as utilization of living organisms belonging to sedentary 
species,32 are the exclusive prerogatives of the coastal State.
In the Baltic Sea there is no CS not covered by a water column constituting 
the EEZ of the pertinent coastal State. Unlike the CS, the EEZ has to be claimed 
by the coastal State but all such States affected by the laying of the Nord Stream 
pipelines have, like most coastal States, claimed an EEZ.
In many respects the legal regime for the EEZ supplements that for the CS.33 
In the EEZ the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights for the purpose of explor-
ing and exploiting, conserving and managing the living as well as non-living 
natural resources. This applies to the waters superjacent to the seabed as well 
as to the seabed and its subsoil. The coastal State also has sovereign rights with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploration and exploitation of the 
zone.34 Furthermore, the coastal State has jurisdiction, as provided for in rel-
evant provisions of UNCLOS, with regard to the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, marine scientific research, and the establishment 
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures.35 Pipelines are not, 
however, installations or structures in this regard but are subject to their own 
regulatory structure.36
28   Baselines are defined in UNCLOS (n 20), arts 5 and 7.
29   UNCLOS (n 20) art 76 (1).
30   UNCLOS (n 20) art 77(3).
31   UNCLOS (n 20) art 78.
32   Sedentary species are those organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immo-
bile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact 
with the seabed or the subsoil. UNCLOS (n 20) art 77.
33   The relationship between the two regimes is discussed in section 4.3.
34   UNCLOS (n 20) art 56(1)(a).
35   UNCLOS (n 20) art 56(1)(b).
36   R Lagoni, ‘Pipelines’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (e-resource, Oxford University Press 2008, updated April 2011) para 10.
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3.3 Jurisdiction with Respect to Pipelines
Turning now to the specific legal conditions applying to submarine pipelines 
it should first be noted that the regulation of pipelines in UNCLOS is charac-
terized by a delicate, and at times rather vague, balancing of the interests of 
different actors, primarily coastal States and those wanting to lay and operate 
pipelines, and between objectives, including protection of the marine environ-
ment and the right to lay and operate pipelines as part of the freedom of the 
seas. However, this is far from specific to pipelines. Rather, UNCLOS is replete 
with provisions that balance potentially competing interests.37
As a point of departure, all States, and indirectly their citizens,38 enjoy, 
with some exceptions, the freedom of the high seas in the EEZ. This freedom 
comprises, inter alia, freedom of navigation and overflight and of the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines, but also other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation 
of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. The activities carried 
out under this freedom must be compatible with other relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS.39 Also, with respect to the seabed and subsoil the coastal State’s sov-
ereign rights and jurisdiction are to be exercised in accordance with Part VI of 
UNCLOS concerning the rules on the CS.
According to UNCLOS Part VI, all States are entitled to lay submarine cables 
and pipelines on the CS. However, whereas the coastal State may not other-
wise impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines on the CS it 
has a right to take ‘reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction 
and control of pollution from pipelines’.40 This also means that UNCLOS does 
not allow for restrictions on the laying or operation of submarine pipelines for 
other reasons, such as security or energy policy considerations.41
37   The most explicit reference to such weighing up of interests is perhaps found in art 59 but 
it is also implicit in many other provisions or combinations of provisions.
38   The freedom pertains to States, not individuals. But in practice the activities covered by 
the freedom of the high seas are overwhelmingly exercised by private parties. W Wiese, 
Grenzüberschreitende Landrohrleitungen und Seeverlegte Rohrleitungen im Völkerrecht 
(Duncker & Humblot GmbH 1997) 210.
39   UNCLOS (n 20) art 58(1). When exercising these freedoms in the EEZ other States must 
also comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance 
with the provisions of UNCLOS and other rules of international law in so far as they are 
not incompatible with the provisions on the EEZ in UNCLOS. ibid art 58(3).
40   UNCLOS (n 20) art 79(1) and (2).
41   Koivurova and Pölönen (7) 179. However, in the Nord Stream case ‘the security of energy 
supply’ was listed in the Finnish permit decision as one of the impacts of the project 
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As regards protection of the marine environment, coastal States not only 
have a right to control the laying of pipelines on their CS. They are also, like 
other States, under a general obligation to take ‘all measures necessary to 
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as 
not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment’.42 
They are also subject to a more specific requirement to adopt laws and regu-
lations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment 
arising from or in connection with seabed activities under their jurisdiction.43 
To the extent that for example the design or routing of a pipeline is subject to 
the coastal State’s control, it thus has a corresponding obligation to take rea-
sonable measures to prevent the pipeline from causing pollution.
Whereas the requirement that measures must be ‘reasonable’ is inherently 
vague it is clear that the assessment by the coastal State of what is reasonable 
must be carried out in good faith.44 However, nothing precludes in principle 
the imposition by the coastal State of conditions that make the laying of a 
pipeline economically or technically unviable as long as those conditions are 
genuinely prompted by and needed for the protection of one of the interests 
recognized by UNCLOS. Whether these conditions are met can be a conten-
tious matter but anyone seeking to legally challenge an allegedly unjustified 
restriction imposed by the coastal State will have the burden of showing at 
least a prima facie breach of that State’s international obligations.
Although it is not for the coastal State to question the motive or need for 
a pipeline, it is wholly conceivable that the importance of the pipeline to 
other States than the coastal State could become a factor in the assessment of 
whether a measure by the coastal State is reasonable.45
that were to be weighed up in the assessment. ‘Consent to Exploit Finland’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone’ (5 November 2009) 678/601/2009 (Unofficial translation provided by 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy) 28. But from this cannot be inferred 
that the Finnish government was of the view that a negative impact in this regard would 
in itself justify a rejection of the application. In the end, no negative impact on Finnish 
security of energy supply was identified.
42   UNCLOS (n 20) art 194(2). There are also more specific obligations imposed upon coastal 
States in this regard both by UNCLOS and numerous regional conventions. See e.g., 
UNCLOS art 208 and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area, ‘Helsinki Convention’ (Helsinki, 9 April 1992) 1507 UNTS 167.
43   UNCLOS (n 20) art 208.
44   This follows generally from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 19) art 26, 
but also from UNCLOS (n 20) art 300.
45   For a more extensive analysis of the meaning of ‘reasonable’ in this context, see Langlet (n 
10) 990–3.
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Another important right also pertains to the coastal State: the delineation 
of the course for the laying of submarine pipelines on the CS is subject to its 
consent.46 It is thus not the laying as such that requires consent but the pipe-
line’s delineation. However, for practical purposes the delineation and the 
laying are indissociable since any laying entails a particular delineation. This 
consent requirement also gives the coastal State reason to put in place a permit 
procedure which can also be used to decide on reasonable measures to protect 
legally recognized interests.
Importantly, the waters above the CS remain governed solely by the 
EEZ-regime. This means that structures above the seabed, such as the main-
tenance platform initially planned for the original Nord Stream pipelines, are 
subject to additional jurisdictional rights of the coastal State. Under the regime 
for the EEZ the coastal State has, as previously noted, sovereign rights inter alia 
with regard to all activities for the economic exploration and exploitation of 
the zone and, subject to other provisions in UNCLOS, jurisdiction with regard 
to the establishment and use of installations and structures.
In sum, a coastal State has rather far-reaching authority to influence and 
restrict the laying of submarine pipelines on its CS. However, the drafters of 
UNCLOS clearly did not intend to grant the coastal State a carte blanche for 
prohibiting pipelines on its CS. But the vagueness of the restrictions imposed 
on the coastal State in this regard does invite discrepant interpretations and 
potentially conflict.
In the Nord Stream case, no affected State has legally challenged any deci-
sion regarding the laying, delineation, or operation of the pipelines on the CS 
and the Nord Stream companies have only appealed one decision by a national 
authority. This is not too surprising considering that all affected States granted 
their consent to the two existing pipelines, although with various conditions,47 
and that two out of three transit states have also consented to Nord Stream 2. 
But as will be seen in the following section this does not mean that the Nord 
Stream project was not affected by different assessments or competing views 
on the weighing up of interests, sometimes resulting in legal action being taken.
46   UNCLOS (n 20) art 79(3).
47   On some of these conditions, see section 5. For a more extensive analysis, see Langlet (n 4).
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4 The Impact and Handling of Competing Interests in the Nord 
Stream Case
The legal authority to regulate the laying and operation of submarine pipelines 
on the CS, and thereby act as arbiter between different competing interests, 
is affected by a delicate balance between on the one hand the coastal State’s 
interest to control activities on its CS, and the related obligation to take mea-
sures for the protection of the marine environment, and on the other hand 
the interest of transport and communication as manifested in the right to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines on the CS of any State.
The limited and rather vaguely defined right of the coastal State to restrict 
pipeline operations is potentially problematic for a number of reasons. One 
fairly obvious risk is that coastal States will be tempted to circumvent the 
restrictions on their right to regulate pipelines by using a legitimate objective, 
such as protection of the marine environment, as a pretext for pursuing objec-
tives not recognised by UNCLOS. The suspicion that coastal States will act in 
this manner could also make (prospective) pipeline operators, and potentially 
their home States, sceptical towards the environmental concerns raised by 
coastal States. On the other hand, legally extraneous factors, such as political 
pressure felt by small countries when big States invest heavily in the pursuance 
of a large energy project, could conceivably lead to less than diligent assess-
ment and consideration of effects to the marine environment. So, to what 
extent did these risks materialize in the Nord Stream case? And was the legal 
framework appropriate for managing conflicting interests in a constructive 
manner?
Highly relevant in terms of potential conflicts is that applications by Nord 
Stream AG to survey the seabed in preparation for a potential routing through 
Estonian waters were rejected by the Estonian government in 2007 and 2012.48 
Since surveying the seabed is an indispensable part of the planning and 
48   ‘The Government did not agree to issue a permit for the survey application’ (Government 
Communication Unit, 20 September 2007) <valitsus.ee/et/uudised/pressiteated/ keskkon-
naministeerium/13572> accessed 15 August 2013; and ‘Cabinet meeting decides to deny 
Nord Stream AG’s request to conduct marine investigations in Estonia’s exclusive eco-
nomic zone’ (Government Communication Unit, 6 December 2012) <http://valitsus.ee/
et/uudised/pressiteated/majandus-ja-kommunikatsiooniministeerium/73717> accessed 
15 August 2013. On the Estonian opposition to the Nord Stream project, see Solum Whist 
(n 4) 71; R Götz, ‘The Nord Stream Pipeline: The Energy Policy Background’ (2009) 52 
GYIL 233; and S Vinogradov, ‘Challenges of Nord Stream: Streamlining International Legal 
Frameworks and Regimes for Submarine Pipelines’ (2009) 52 GYIL 30.
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construction of a submarine pipeline this meant that the Estonian CS was 
unavailable to Nord Stream AG.49 The primary reasons cited by Estonia were 
not environmental but national interests in the EEZ and that surveys would 
give information about Estonia’s natural resources and their possible use.50 
Estonia seemed to view the intended surveys as marine scientific research 
in the terminology of UNCLOS and thereby subject to coastal State consent.51 
Although that classification, and thereby the coastal State’s right to restrict sur-
veys on this ground, could be disputed it is nonetheless clear that the surveys, 
which were to involve drilling in the seabed, did require consent by the coastal 
State.52 It is namely the exclusive prerogative of the coastal State to authorize 
drilling in the seabed and there are no circumstances in which it is explicitly 
required to give such consent.53 There would thus hardly have been any pros-
pect for successfully challenging the Estonian decision, had any affected actor 
desired to do so.
A somewhat similar development was seen with respect to the maintenance 
platform that Nord Stream initially planned to build in the Swedish EEZ. In 
this case no application was ever rejected but Nord Stream withdrew the plat-
form application in 2008 and opted instead for another technical maintenance 
solution, based on deployment of so-called intelligent pipeline inspection 
gauges, or ‘pigs’. The decision to withdraw the application, which according 
to the company was made possible by technical progress, came in response to 
a very critical debate in Sweden regarding perceived environmental, fisheries 
and security concerns relating to the platform and to some extent the pipe-
lines as such.54 Considering that the platform would have been governed by 
49   The main purpose of such surveys is to identify a suitable pipeline route, i.e. a route that 
will minimize the risk for harm to the future pipeline, and indirectly harm to the environ-
ment and human activities in the vicinity of the pipeline, and avoid conflicts with other 
uses of the seabed. R Lagoni, ‘Cable and Pipeline Surveys at Sea’, in HP Hestermeyer and 
others (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Vol. 1 (Brill 2012) 933, 933.
50   ‘The Government did not agree …’ (n 48).
51   On the legal preconditions for marine scientific research, see UNCLOS (n 20) Part XIII; 
M Gorina Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research (Brill-Nijhoff 
2004), and more specifically in relation to pipeline surveys, Langlet (n 10) 986.
52   On the role and legal status of seabed surveys in preparation for the laying of subma-
rine pipelines, see Langlet (n 10) 986; Vinogradov (n 49) 284; and S Wolf, Unterseeische 
Rohrleitungen und Meeresumweltschutz (Springer 2011) 86.
53   UNCLOS (n 20) art 81.
54   ‘Maintenance of Nord Stream Pipelines Feasible without a Service Platform’ (Press Release, 
8 April 2008) < http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/maintenance-of 
-nord-stream-pipelines-feasible-without-a-service-platform-130/> accessed 19 May 2019.
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the EEZ regime, it is fairly clear that Nord Stream could not have been success-
ful in legally challenging a potential rejection of its application by the Swedish 
authorities.
Whereas no part of the Nord Stream project has been challenged directly 
under international law, there has been some appeals to domestic courts 
and other appellate bodies, the most significant of which perhaps being an 
appeal by Nord Stream 2 AG of a decision by the Danish Energy Agency. In 
April 2017 the company behind Nord Stream 2 submitted an application for 
the laying of two pipelines through the Danish territorial sea South of the 
island of Bornholm, in parallel with the two existing Nord Stream pipelines. In 
August 2018 it submitted another application, this time for an alternative route 
North of Bornholm that would pass through the Danish EEZ outside of territo-
rial waters.55 The option of laying the pipelines beyond the territorial sea south 
of Bornholm was not available due to the relevant area being subject to a legal 
dispute between Denmark and Poland. However, in November 2018 the two 
countries reached an agreement, subject to ratification, on the delimitation 
of their respective EEZ and CS in the area south of Bornholm, thereby making 
it possible for Denmark to authorise the laying of pipelines on the CS in this 
area.56 In early 2019 Nord Stream 2 AG was informed that it would be required 
to submit an application, including an environmental impact assessment, for 
such a routing so as to enable the Danish authorities to select the routing with 
the least negative impact on the marine environment and marine safety. Once 
a formal decision to request the assessment of a new route had been made 
in March 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG appealed to the Danish Energy Board of 
Appeal, arguing inter alia that the Danish Energy Agency lacked the right to 
request the full investigation of a new routing option at such a late stage in the 
process.57 However, despite its appeal, the company submitted an application, 
with an attendant impact assessment, for a southern route through the Danish 
EEZ in April the same year.58 At the same time, it argued in its appeal that any 
55   Nord Stream 2, ’Permitting Process in Denmark’ < https://www.nord-stream2.com/
permitting-denmark/danish-permitting-process/> accessed 26 June 2019.
56   ’Polen og Danmark indgår aftale om den maritime grænse i Østersøen’ (Poland and 
Denmark reach agreement on maritime delimitation in the Baltic Sea), Ministry of for-
eign affairs of Denmark, press statement, 1 November 2018.
57   Klage over Energistyrelsens afgørelse af 26. marts 2019 om en sydlig rute på kontinental-
soklen (Appeal of the decision of 26 March 2019 by the Danish Energy Agency concerning 
a southern route on the continental shelf), 17 April 2019, Doc no 21148344.1.
58   Reportedly, the companies view was that it was ‘forced to submit this third application 
as a mitigation measure’. Reuters, ‘Nord Stream 2 says Denmark tries to delay pipeline as 
it seeks third route option’, 15 April 2019, < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gazprom 
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environmental advantage of such a route would be too marginal to justify the 
additional costs and delays suffered by the company. At the time of writing, 
the Danish Energy Board of Appeal has not decided on the matter. Depending 
on the outcome this could become a case in which environmental reasons 
have been used, and accepted by a domestic legal system, to at least partly 
further other interests, namely to delay the need for making a final decision 
on what has become a highly controversial issue in Denmark. A challenging 
circumstance for Denmark is of course that is has already found the laying of 
gas pipelines, i.e. the two existing Nord Stream pipelines, through its territorial 
sea south of Bornholm not to entail significant environmental harm.
During the process for the original Nord Stream pipelines the Danish per-
mit was appealed by an Estonian NGO claiming, inter alia, that the pipelines 
would harm the integrity of internationally protected areas, such as Natura 
2000 sites,59 and areas protected under the Ramsar Convention.60 However, 
the Energy Board of Appeal found neither evidence nor probability of such 
harm and upheld the original permit decision.61
The construction permit for the Finnish part of the original Nord Stream 
pipelines was appealed by Estonian environmental non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs). They asserted, inter alia, that the permit was based on 
insufficient and incorrect information and called for an independent expert 
assessment. They were granted standing but the permit was upheld by the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court.62
Neither of these are internationally authoritative assessments of the con-
cerned States’ application of international and EU law obligations pertaining 
to protection of the environment. They do, however, speak against the idea 
that the coastal States in question to some extent disregarded their obligations 
with respect to the marine environment as a result of the political context. 
The same can be said for the fact that the Swedish authorities rejected the 
documentation initially provided by Nord Stream AG and required a detailed 
-nordstream-2-denmark/nord-stream-2-says-denmark-tries-to-delay-pipeline-as-it 
-seeks-third-route-option-idUSKCN1RR15F> accessed 26 June 2019.
59   On the Natura 2000 network of protected natural areas and its regulation in EU law, see 
Langlet and Mahmoudi (n 21) 356.
60   Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(Ramsar, 2 February 1971) 996 UNTS 245 (Ramsar Convention).
61   Decision by the Energy Board of Appeal (Energiklagenævnet), 31 May 2010, Eksp.nr.: 
49725 (translation).
62   Decision by the Supreme Administrative Court, 22 June 2011, No 4324/1/10.
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description of alternative routes for the entire route of the pipelines as well as 
a no-action alternative.63
Environmental concerns raised by coastal States have also resulted in sig-
nificant amendments compared to the original plans. The initially proposed 
routing of the existing pipelines was changed on several occasions, including 
during the Finnish, the Swedish and the Danish assessments, as a result of 
concerns raised in consultations. Adjustments to the routing were primarily 
prompted by the prevalence of dumped munitions and mines and the prox-
imity of the planned pipeline to protected areas, notably those designated as 
Natura 2000.64
That rules on the protection of Natura 2000 sites, based as they are in EU 
law, were applied so directly to the project may give rise to some questions, 
considering that the applicant is a Swiss company. However, since ‘pollution 
of the marine environment’ is quite broadly defined in UNCLOS,65 measures for 
the protection of sites of particular natural value, or sites that are important 
for the preservation of particular species, should be consistent with the right 
to take reasonable measures to prevent pollution from pipelines. The obliga-
tion to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment has even been construed to encompass ‘measures 
focussed primarily on conservation and the preservation of ecosystems.’66 
There are hence good grounds for seeing most obligations stemming from EU 
law on Natura 2000, as well as other nature protection provisions, as consistent 
with UNCLOS, as long as they are not applied arbitrarily or without a scien-
tific basis.67 Nord Stream AG has also accepted modifications to the proposed 
63   Request for a supplement to the application for a permit for a pipeline system under the 
Continental Shelf Act (1966:314) and the application for a permit to build and use a service 
platform under the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1992:1140), 12 February 2008, 
M2007/5568/F/M.
64   See, e.g., Bundesamt für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie, Genehmigungsbescheid, 
28 December 2009, 63 et seq. For a more detailed discussion about the national permit 
procedures and the changes prompted by them, see Langlet (n 4).
65   ’Pollution of the marine environment’ is defined as ‘the introduction by man, directly 
or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources 
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fish-
ing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities.’ UNCLOS (n 20) art 1(1)(4).
66   Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), Arbitral Award 
of 18 March 2015, para 538.
67   However, considering the still disputed status of precaution in international law 
(Y Tanaka, Principles of international marine environmental law, in R Rayfuse (ed), 
Research Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 31 
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route based on considerations for Natura 2000 sites without raising any objec-
tions as to the legitimacy of these requirements. Nor has Russia, as the sending 
State and a non-EU member raised such concerns. It should also be noted that 
obligations to ‘conserve natural habitats and biological diversity and to protect 
ecological processes’ as well as to apply the precautionary principle, including 
by taking preventive measures when there is reason to assume that substances 
or energy introduced into the marine environment may harm living resources 
and marine ecosystems can be found in the Helsinki Convention to which 
both Russia and Switzerland are parties.68
Unlike the different economic and security dimensions of the projects, 
the potential environmental effects of the Nord Stream pipelines have been 
subject to formal impact assessment under both international and EU law.69 
Notably, the project was subject to an international environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) in accordance with the Espoo Convention,70 which was 
carried out more thoroughly than the States concerned were obliged to by 
the Convention’s minimum requirements.71 Also Russia, a non-party to the 
Espoo Convention, agreed to apply the Convention to the extent permitted by 
its national legislation.
The Finnish government referred to its participation in the EIA under the 
Espoo Convention as its way to dispose of the obligation to cooperate that per-
tains to States bordering a semi-enclosed sea like the Baltic Sea.72 Such States 
are expected to cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and 
in the performance of their duties under UNCLOS, for example by endeavour-
ing to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect 
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.73 However, 
that this provision would entail a binding obligation of any level of substance 
at 43) the strict version of the precautionary principle that characterises some parts of the 
Natura 2000 regime (Langlet and Mahmoudi, n 21, 359) are unlikely to be fully consistent 
with UNCLOS.
68   Helsinki Convention (n 42) arts 3 and 15.
69   See e.g. ‘Nord Stream Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Documentation for 
Consultation under the Espoo Convention’, Nord Stream Espoo Report: Non-Technical 
Summary, February 2009.
70   Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 
25 February 1991) 1989 UNTS 310 (Espoo Convention).
71   Koivurova and Pölönen (n 7) 174.
72   ‘Consent to Exploit Finland’s Exclusive Economic Zone’ (n 41) 23.
73   UNCLOS (n 20) art 122. The Baltic Sea qualifies as semi-enclosed both since it is ‘sur-
rounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
outlet’ and since it consists ‘entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive eco-
nomic zones of two or more coastal States’ ibid.
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is disputed and no conclusion to the contrary can be drawn from the Nord 
Stream case.74
As far as competition for space on the seabed between communication and 
transport installations, i.e. primarily cables and pipelines, is concerned, the 
Nord Stream case indicates that this need not be a major problem. Typically 
there are technical solutions to handle intersections between submarine 
pipelines and/or cables so that they can coexist, provided that the regulatory 
context facilitates that.75
5 Conclusions
The Nord Stream projects have affected many interests and entailed complex 
permit procedures involving five States and an even wider transboundary 
EIA. Some of the main bones of contention affecting the projects have not 
been directly linked to the physical presence of the pipelines on a particular 
stretch of the seabed, and therefore not within the primary purview of this 
analysis. We did, however, identify a risk of issues not recognised by UNCLOS 
as legitimate grounds for restricting pipeline operations nonetheless influenc-
ing decisions. This stems not least from the legal framework for the laying and 
operation of submarine pipelines on the CS being characterised by a level of 
uncertainty due to the imprecise manner in which the authority of the coastal 
State to regulate such activities is worded.
This has not result in any legal action under international law. Since all 
required permits for the existing two pipelines were eventually granted, with 
the exception of the one for surveying the seabed in the Estonian EEZ which 
was in fact not essential to the project, there was no real incentive to take issue 
with the result of the decision making processes.
The permit procedures of the transit States also appear generally to have 
been characterised by a desire to construe and apply the applicable law dili-
gently and in good faith, despite heavy criticism based on considerations not 
recognized by UNCLOS being directed against the project in some of these 
States.76 The decision by a Danish authority to request the investigation of 
74   E Franckx and M Benatar, ‘The “Duty” to Co-Operate for States Bordering Enclosed or 
Semi-Enclosed Seas’ (2013) 31 Chinese (Taiwan) YBInt’lL&Aff 66.
75   See L.O. Askheim ‘Commercial arrangements and liability for crossing pipelines, power 
cables and telecommunication cables on the seabed’, Chapter 23 of this book.
76   On this criticism, see e.g. Solum Whist (n 4) 30; and R L Larsson, ‘Nord Stream, Sweden 
and Baltic Sea Security’, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), March 2007, FOI- 
R – 2251-SE 35–7.
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a third routing option about two years after Nord Stream 2 AG’s submission 
of its first application, one that essentially corresponds to a pipeline routing 
that has previously been approved by Denmark, gives rise to the suspicion that 
environmental and maritime safety concerns may here have been used for 
aims not recognized by UNCLOS. However, the final outcome is still unclear 
and there are no indications that Denmark intends to not approve any route.
That relevant international provisions overall seem to have been applied 
in good faith may have been facilitated by the projects being subject to an 
ambitious international impact assessment in accordance with the Espoo 
Convention, involving all the States concerned. Despite proposals to that 
effect,77 the EIA did not consider broader policy considerations pertaining to 
for example energy security and climate policy, but focused on the environ-
mental impact of the pipelines as such. That may have helped to focus the 
subsequent permit procedures on the legally relevant issues, including protec-
tion of the marine environment and utilization of the resources of the seabed.
One legal issue that did come to the fore in this case was the legal signifi-
cance of the need to drill in the seabed in preparation for pipeline laying. Since 
the coastal State can reject drilling in the CS at its discretion the need for 
surveys involving drilling can de facto provide coastal States with additional 
leverage beyond the powers granted in the provisions of UNCLOS dealing with 
pipelines. This does not seem to increase the legal uncertainty or the propen-
sity to engage legal remedies. Rather, since the right exercised by the coastal 
State in this case is set out in absolute terms it has made the coastal State’s 
competence somewhat easier to define.
As regards the concerns that coastal States could feel pressured not to take 
sufficient action for the protection of the marine environment, there is in fact 
much to indicate that environmental concerns played a central role in the 
assessments made by most coastal States. They clearly had a significant impact 
on the final routing of the pipelines.
Overall, the experience so far from the Nord Stream projects indicate that 
coastal States, including those that are merely transit States, have relatively 
strong instruments for influencing how pipelines are laid. With one possible 
exception, the fear that restricting coastal State authority to the protection of 
a few legitimate interests would result in excessive interpretations of those 
interests, or otherwise in actions that would upset the balance between com-
peting interests have not materialized.
77   Koivurova and Pölönen (n 7) 176.
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Whether limiting transit State competence to reasonable measures for the 
protection of a few listed interests is the optimal way to regulate pipeline lay-
ing on the CS may of course be debated. Expanding that right to also include 
wider security or other policy considerations could, however, give such States 
a de facto veto over pipeline laying, something that was not intended by the 
drafters of UNCLOS.
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All States have a duty to prevent harm to the environment including the 
marine environment. States also have ‘… the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’1 
Similar language is found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides that ‘States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.’2 UNCLOS sets forth a governance and 
enforcement system of our global ocean where part of the ocean is under 
national jurisdiction and sovereignty, after which the remaining part of the 
ocean is located beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), in which the freedom 
of the high seas applies.3 No State has sovereignty or sovereign rights to the 
Area, and the Area’s minerals can only be extracted according to Part XI in 
the UNCLOS. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) was created to orga-
nise, control, and carry out exploration exploitation activities in the Area.4 
The ISA has thereafter developed, and continues to develop, the ‘Mining Code’, 
which is a ‘… comprehensive set of rules, regulations and procedures issued by 
the International Seabed Authority to regulate prospecting, exploration and 
exploitation of marine minerals in the international seabed Area (defined as 
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction).’5 The current 
three key regulations of the ‘Mining Code’ are ISA Regulations on Prospecting 
1   Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5–16 June 1972, 
Stockholm, Art. 21.
2   UNCLOS Art. 192.
3   See UNCLOS Part XI and Art. 87.
4   Id. at. Art. 153.
5   ISA, ‘The Mining Code’ at <https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code>.
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and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules,6 Polymetallic Sulphides,7 and 
Cobalt-Rich Crusts,8 in the Area.
The interest in exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals has 
increased. The ISA has in total entered into 15-year contracts for exploration for 
polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese 
crusts in the deep seabed with 29 contractors.9 17 of these 29 contracts are for 
exploration for polymetallic nodules: 16 contracts in the Clarion-Clipperton 
Fracture Zone, which is a geological submarine fracture zone of the Pacific 
Ocean, and one contract in the Central Indian Ocean Basin.10 There are seven 
contracts for exploration for polymetallic sulphides in the South West Indian 
Ridge, Central Indian Ridge and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge and five contracts for 
exploration for cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.11 These con-
tracts grant the contractors the exclusive right to explore an initial area of 
up to 150,000 square kilometres of specified parts of the deep oceans outside 
national jurisdiction.12
As a result of the transition of deep seabed mining in the Area from the explo-
ration phase to the exploitation phase, the Legal and Technical Commission of 
the ISA started working on drafting regulations and standard contract terms on 
exploitation for mineral resources in the Area in 2015.13 The draft exploitation 
regulations are currently under development. The first draft was published in 
July 2016 and were still under discussion at the time of the 25th Annual Session 
6    International Seabed Authority Council, Decision of the Council of the International 
Seabed Authority relating to amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and related matters, ISBA/19/C/17, 
22 July 2013, at <https://www.isa.org.jm/documents/isba19c17>.
7    International Seabed Authority Assembly, Regulations on prospecting and exploration 
for polymetallic sulphides in the Area, ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1, 7 May 2010, at <https://www 
.isa.org.jm/documents/isba16a12-rev-1>.
8    International Seabed Authority Assembly, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration 
for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area, ISBA/18/A/11, 27 July 2012, at 
<https://www.isa.org.jm/documents/isba18a11>.




12   See above n 6. Reg. 24.1 and 25.1. For a complete review of the applicable general regime, 
see J. Dingwall, Chapter 7 of this book, ‘Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: The International Legal Framework.’
13   The Legal and Technical Commission of the International Seabed Authority (2016) 
Working Draft Regulations and Standard Contract Terms on Exploitation for Mineral 
Resources in the Area at https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/DraftExpl/
Draft_ExplReg_SCT.pdf.
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of ISA in July 2019. In principle, the draft exploitation regulations should be 
finalised by 2020.
The current draft regulations contain sections on: form of applications; fee 
for applications; processing of applications; consideration of applications by 
the Commission and Council; exploitation contracts; plan of work for exploita-
tion; annual fees; royalties; returns, payments and refunds; record, inspection 
and audit; anti-avoidance measures; interests and penalties; suspension or 
termination of contract; disputes and review of payments; information gather-
ing and handling; inspections; enforcement and penalties; dispute settlement; 
and review of the Authority’s regulations. The draft regulations however do 
not construct a model for liability and compensation for damage as a result of 
these activities.
The current chapter is a contribution to the discussion on how to compen-
sate damage caused by activities in the Area. The chapter sketches the current 
parallel system of the sponsoring State’s responsibility for damage caused in 
the Area and the sponsored contractor’s liability for damage caused in the Area 
(Section 2). The chapter attempts to draw a model for an improved liability 
and compensation system for damage caused by deep-sea mining in the Area 
(Section 3). The chapter ends with some concluding remarks (Section 4).
2 The Current ‘System’ of Responsibility and Liability for Pollution 
Damage Caused in the Area
2.1 Prelude
To ensure compensation of environmental damage, UNCLOS places respon-
sibility on the sponsoring State of the company applying for exploration 
and exploitation in the Area to ensure compliance with the applicable parts 
of UNCLOS, a breach of which places liability on the supporting State.14 The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) gave an Advisory Opinion 
1 February 2011 on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring 
Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area15 based on Nauru’s 
submission of an application for approval of a work plan for exploratory sea-
bed mining activities to the ISA, ‘but had become concerned that the potential 
14   See UNCLOS Part XI and art. 139.
15   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, at <https://www 
.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/17_adv_op_010211_en.pdf>.
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liabilities or costs arising from its sponsorship of a mining entity might exceed 
its financial capacities as a developing country.’16
2.2 Sponsorship
The notion of sponsorship is a key element in the exploration and exploita-
tion system of resources in the Area.17 Enterprises and, in association with the 
Authority, States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons 
can engage in activities in the Area.18 Natural and juridical persons must how-
ever satisfy two requirements to be eligible to engage in activities in the Area: 
1) ‘they must be either nationals of a State Party or effectively controlled by 
it or its nationals’,19 and 2) ‘they must be “sponsored by such States”.’20 The 
requirement of sponsorship similarly identically applies to state enterprises.21 
States Parties themselves engaged in deep seabed mining are directly bound by 
the obligations set forth in UNCLOS and does not need sponsorship.22
The sponsorship requirement is crucial, creating the necessary nexus 
between the international legal treaty only binding on the States Parties and 
the domestic legal systems, of which the Enterprises are subjects.23 The nexus 
between States Parties and subjects of domestic law consists of the nationality 
and effective control, which requires all contractors and applicants for con-
tracts to ‘secure and maintain the sponsorship of the State or States of which 
they are nationals. If another State or its nationals exercises effective control, 
the sponsorship of that State is also necessary.’24 All sponsoring States are in 
such situations jointly and severally liable, unless otherwise provided in ISA 
regulations.25
16   Gunther Handl, ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with respect to Activities in the Area: the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea’s recent Contribution to International Environmental Law (2011) Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law, 20, pp. 208–213.
17   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 32.
18   UNCLOS Art. 153 2.




22   Id at p. 33, UNCLOS Art. 153 2(b), and Annex III Art. 4 5.
23   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 33.
24   Id at p. 33 and UNCLOS Annex III Art. 4 3.
25   Id at p. 62.
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2.3 Liability in General
In its advisory opinion, the Tribunal sets forth the system and different sources 
of liability as stated in UNCLOS:
1) rules concerning the liability of State Parties (article 139, paragraph 2, first 
sentence),26
2) rules concerning sponsoring State liability (article 139, paragraph 2, sec-
ond sentence),27 and
3) rules concerning the liability of the contractor and the Authority (referred 
to in Annex III, article 22).
Paragraph 2 of article 139 attach liability on a sponsoring State from its failure 
to carry out its own responsibilities, while not being liable for the failure of the 
sponsored contractor to meet its obligations. ‘There is, however, a link between 
the liability of the sponsoring State and the failure of the sponsored contractor 
to comply with its obligations, thereby causing damage.’28 This chapter dis-
cusses these rules more in-depth and towards the end offers some suggestions 
on improvements.
2.4 State Fault-Based Responsibility for Failure to Properly Perform Due 
Diligence – Secondary Fault-Based Liability
The State(s) sponsoring contractors or applicants for contracts for the explo-
ration and exploitation of resources in the Area have responsibilities and 
obligations under the UNCLOS. These obligations are characterised as ‘direct 
obligations’.29 The main direct obligations incumbent on the sponsoring States 
are:
the obligation to assist the Authority in the exercise of control over activi-
ties in the Area; the obligation to apply a precautionary approach; the 
obligation to apply best environmental practices; the obligation to take 
measures to ensure the provision of guarantees in the event of an emer-
gency order by the Authority for protection of the marine environment; 
26   First sentence states: ‘Without prejudice to the rules of international law and Annex III, 
article 22, damage caused by the failure of a State Party or international organization to 
carry out its responsibilities under this Part shall entail liability; States Parties or interna-
tional organizations acting together shall bear joint and several liability.’
27   Second sentence states: ‘A State Party shall not however be liable for damage caused by 
any failure to comply with this Part by a person whom it has sponsored under article 153, 
paragraph 2(b), if the State Party has taken all necessary and appropriate measures to 
secure effective compliance under article 153, paragraph 4, and Annex III, article 4, para-
graph 4.’
28   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 57.
29   Id at p. 44.
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the obligation to ensure the availability of recourse for compensation in 
respect of damage caused by pollution; and the obligation to conduct 
environmental impact assessments.30
The sponsoring State’s liability for failure to meet its direct obligations is gov-
erned exclusively by the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article 139, while a 
sponsoring State’s liability for a failure to meet its obligations in relation to 
damage caused by a sponsored contractor is covered by both the first and sec-
ond sentences of article 139.31 The nature of these obligations obviously does 
define and determine the scope of liability.
In its advisory opinion ITLOS relied on UNCLOS article 139 paragraph 1,32 
article 153 paragraph 4,33 and Annex III article 4 paragraph 4,34 when confirm-
ing that ‘the obligation (responsibility) of the sponsoring State is “to ensure” 
that the “activities in the Area” conducted by the sponsored contractor are 
“in conformity” or in “compliance” with the rules to which they refer.’35 The 
Tribunal highlighted that one of the sponsoring State’s obligations under inter-
national law expressed as a ‘responsibility to ensure’ in UNCLOS establishes 
a mechanism where UNCLOS rules concerning activities in the Area become 
30   Ibid.
31   Id at p. 58.
32   The paragraph states: ‘States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities 
in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridi-
cal persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled 
by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in conformity with this Part. The same 
responsibility applies to international organizations for activities in the Area carried out 
by such organizations.’
33   The paragraph states: ’The Authority shall exercise such control over activities in the Area 
as is necessary for the purpose of securing compliance with the relevant provisions of this 
Part and the Annexes relating thereto, and the rules, regulations and procedures of the 
Authority, and the plans of work approved in accordance with paragraph 3. States Parties 
shall assist the Authority by taking all measures necessary to ensure such compliance in 
accordance with article 139.’
34   The paragraph states: ’The sponsoring State or States shall, pursuant to article 139, have 
the responsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so sponsored 
shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms of its contract and its 
obligations under this Convention. A sponsoring State shall not, however, be liable for 
damage caused by any failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obli-
gations if that State Party has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative 
measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for 
securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.’
35   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 40.
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effective for sponsored contractors, which are bound by domestic law and not 
UNCLOS per se.36
A violation by the sponsoring state of this obligation ‘to ensure’ entails lia-
bility for the actual amount of damage.37 The sponsoring State remains liable 
for damage also after the completion of the exploration phase.38 Paragraph 
2 of article 139 requires two conditions for liability to arise: 1) the failure of 
the sponsoring State to carry out its responsibilities and 2) the occurrence 
of damage.39 Such failure may be ‘act or an omission that is contrary to that 
State’s responsibilities under the deep seabed mining regime.’40 That said, a 
sponsoring State is only liable for a failure to carry out its responsibilities when 
damage has been inflicted. Thus, no matter the situation, no damage equals 
no liability for the sponsoring State.41 Therefore, ‘in order for the sponsoring 
State’s liability to arise, there must be a causal link between the failure of that 
State and the damage caused by the sponsored contractor.’42 This causal link 
cannot be presumed and must be proven.43 Strict liability is therefore not the 
standard of liability for a sponsoring state.44
‘However, not every violation of an obligation by a sponsored contractor 
automatically gives rise to the liability of the sponsoring State. Such liability 
is limited to the State’s failure to meet its obligation to “ensure” compliance 
by the sponsored contractor.’45 As such, a private entity’s failure does not 
trigger liability for the sponsoring State, but is a mere trigger mechanism for 
36   Id at p. 41.
37   UNCLOS Art. 139, paragraph 2, first sentence and ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 
1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 62.
38   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 63.
39   Id at. p. 58.
40   Ibid.
41   This is an exception from the customary international law rule on liability where ‘a 
State may be held liable under customary international law even if no material damage 
results from its failure to meet its international obligations.’ ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 
1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 58, relying on Rainbow Warrior Arbitration at para-
graph 110 (Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the 
interpretation or application of two agreements, concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two 
States and which related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, UNRIAA, 
1990, vol. XX, p. 215) and paragraph 9 of the Commentary to article 2 of the International 
Law Commission ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Part 
Two.
42   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 59.
43   Id at p. 60.
44   Id at p. 61.
45   Id at p. 41.
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potentially giving rise to liability. Only the sponsoring State’s own failure to 
carry out its own responsibilities give rise to liability for the sponsoring State.46 
The Tribunal importantly pointed out that:
The sponsoring State’s obligation “to ensure” is not an obligation to 
achieve, in each and every case, the result that the sponsored contractor 
complies with the aforementioned obligations. Rather, it is an obliga-
tion to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do 
the utmost, to obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in 
international law, this obligation may be characterized as an obligation 
“of conduct” and not “of result”, and as an obligation of “due diligence”.47
In explaining the obligation to act with due diligence, the Tribunal quoted the 
International Court of Justice in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. 
Uruguay):
It is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate 
rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforce-
ment and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and 
private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by 
such operators …48
The International Law Commission expressed the same view.49 Thus, the 
Tribunal confirmed that sponsoring States are only liable for a failure to not 
properly perform their due diligence. The content of this due diligence obliga-
tion is not precise partly due to diligence as ‘a variable concept’.50 Sufficiently 
diligent measures can be insufficient with time as a result of for example 
‘new scientific or technological knowledge’.51 The level of due diligence also 
increases according to the level of risk. The Tribunal stated that ‘the standard of 
due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier activities.’52 The sponsoring 
46   Id at p. 60.
47   Id at p. 41.
48   Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, 
p. 14, paragraph 197.
49   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 42 quoting the Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 2001, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).
50   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 43.
51   Ibid.
52   Ibid.
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State must adopt within its legal system ‘reasonably appropriate’ measures to 
comply with the standard of due diligence appropriate to the level of risk, for 
which the measures are adopted.53 Compliance with the above-listed direct 
obligations ‘can also be seen as a relevant factor in meeting the due diligence 
“obligation to ensure” and that the said obligations are in most cases couched 
as obligations to ensure compliance with a specific rule.’54
Sponsoring States also have another direct obligation, which ‘gives sub-
stance to the sponsoring State’s obligation to adopt laws and regulations within 
the framework of its legal system.’55 Article 235, paragraph 2, states as follows:
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their 
legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in 
respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by 
natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
Article 235, paragraph 2, applies to sponsoring States as ‘the State with jurisdic-
tion over the persons that caused the damage.’56 The Tribunal also points out 
that States may also need to ‘establish substantive rules governing claims for 
damages before its domestic courts … ensuring that the sponsored contractor 
meets its obligation under Annex III, article 22, of the Convention to provide 
reparation for damages caused by wrongful acts committed in the course of 
its activities in the Area.’57 Additionally, the sponsoring State’s laws, regula-
tions, and administrative measures must be in force during the whole period 
of the contract between ISA and the contractor.58 The existence of such laws, 
regulations, and administrative measures are not a condition precedent for 
concluding a contract with ISA, but ‘it is a necessary requirement for compli-
ance with the obligation of due diligence of the sponsoring State and for its 
exemption from liability.’59 If ISA regulations are passed after already existing 
sponsoring State legislation, sponsoring States are under an obligation to make 
the necessary amendments to such legislation to keep with the provisions of 
53   Ibid.
54   Id at p. 44.
55   Id at p. 49.
56   Ibid.
57   Ibid.
58   Id at p. 68.
59   Ibid.
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the ISA regulations.60 Importantly, State laws, regulations, and administrative 
measures cannot be in perpetuity.61
Examples of domestic law rules are provisions concerning ‘financial viability 
and technical capacity of sponsored contractors, conditions for issuing a cer-
tificate of sponsorship and penalties for non-compliance by such contractors’,62 
and enforcement mechanisms of ITLOS decisions. Example of administrative 
measures are ‘the establishment of enforcement mechanisms for active super-
vision of the activities of the sponsored contractor’,63 and to coordinate better 
efficiency between the sponsored contractor and ISA to remove activities lead-
ing to duplicate work.64
If the sponsoring State has taken the ‘reasonably appropriate’ measures and 
thus complied with its due diligence standard under the UNLOS, the spon-
soring State is exempt from liability for damage inflicted by the sponsored 
contractor.65 This can result in situations, in which a sponsoring State has 
fulfilled its due diligence standard, while, at the same time, damage has been 
inflicted in the Area and has not been compensated. The question becomes on 
whom to place liability for harm inflicted beyond national jurisdiction with-
out any fault by a sponsoring State in exercising its obligation to prevent harm 
because the standard of care required is met? The Tribunal and the UNCLOS 
are clear on the fact that liability cannot be placed on the sponsoring State in 
such a situation.
2.5 Simultaneous Contractor Liability for Pollution Damage – National 
Legislation
UNCLOS requires a contractor that wants to engage in deep seabed mining to 
first secure and thereafter maintain the sponsorship of a State, as mentioned 
above. Sponsorship is the mechanism for domestic legal entities to comply 
with the international legal obligations of UNCLOS only binding on State 
Parties, and ISA’s regulations and instruments applicable to these domestic 
legal entities.66 As stated in Annex III, article 4, paragraph 4:
60   Id at p. 69.
61   Ibid.
62   Id at p. 72.
63   Id at p. 68.
64   Ibid.
65   Id at p. 43 and UNCLOS Art. 139 paragraph 2 last sentence, and UNCLOS Annex III art. 4 
paragraph 4.
66   Id at pp. 32 and 40–41.
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The sponsoring State or States shall, pursuant to article 139, have the 
responsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so 
sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the 
terms of its contract and its obligations under this Convention. A spon-
soring State shall not, however, be liable for damage caused by any failure 
of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that State 
Party has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative mea-
sures which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably 
appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.
A sponsoring State is obligated to adopt laws and regulations and to take the 
administrative measures necessary, as the contractor’s obligations cannot all 
be enforced through administrative measures and contractual arrangements.67 
This is partly because contractual obligations cannot be invoked by other enti-
ties, than the parties to the contract, against the sponsoring State, and that 
contracts generally lacks transparency as it is difficult for the public to mea-
sure the sponsoring State’s success in meeting its requirements.68 Annex III of 
UNCLOS and ISA regulations do not require a sponsorship agreement between 
the contractor and the sponsoring State, nor its submission to ISA or public 
publication if in existence.69 The sponsoring State is only required to submit a 
certificate of sponsorship to ISA stating its assumption responsibility accord-
ing to article 139, article 153, paragraph 4, and Annex III, article 4, paragraph 4, 
of UNCLOS.70
That said, the sponsored contractor is obviously obligated to conduct its 
activities in the Area according to the terms of the contract. Even though 
29 contracts have been entered into, ISA’s Legal and Technical Commission 
are now developing standard contractual terms ‘on exploitation for Mineral 
Resources in the Area for consideration by the Members of the Authority 
and all stakeholders.’71 If a sponsored contractor fails to comply with rules in 
UNCLOS, in the ISA seabed-mining regime, or in the contract, which results 
in damage the sponsoring State is not liable.72
67   Id at pp. 68–69.
68   Id at p. 69.
69   Ibid.
70   Cobalt-rich regulations, supra note 8 at reg. 11 para. 3(f); Sulphides regulations, supra note 
7 at reg. 11 para. 3(f); and Nodules regulations, supra note 6 at reg. 11 para. 3(f).
71   Working Draft Regulations and Standard Contract Terms, supra note 13 at p. 4.
72   UNCLOS Art. 139, paragraph 2, and ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 
15 at p. 60.
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UNCLOS Annex III, article 22, places liability on the contractor for inflicted 
damage in the Area for its activities:
The contractor shall have responsibility or liability for any damage aris-
ing out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations, account being 
taken of contributory acts or omissions by the Authority. Similarly, the 
Authority shall have responsibility or liability for any damage arising 
out of wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions, includ-
ing violations under article 168, paragraph 2, account being taken of 
contributory acts or omissions by the contractor. Liability in every case 
shall be for the actual amount of damage.
The contractor also remains liable for damage after the completion of the 
exploration phase.73 The contractor and the ISA are mainly liable for wrong-
ful acts conducted performing contractor’s activities and ISA’s powers and 
fictions respectfully, and not the sponsoring State.74 As previously mentioned 
the sponsoring State is liable for its own failure to carry out its responsibilities, 
while the contractor is liable for its own non-compliance.75
As previously mentioned, the sponsoring State has direct obligations to 
ensure and adopt appropriate rules and measures, and also enforce these rules 
and measures at a certain level of vigilance.76 One of these direct obligations 
require the implementation of rules and measures for prompt and adequate 
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment.
2.5.1 So What Rules and Measures Have Been Implemented by 
Sponsoring States?
In 2014, Tonga ‘became the first country in the world to put in place a law 
that manages seabed mineral activities within its national marine space and 
under its sponsorship in international waters.’77 Whether this is in fact correct 
73   Cobalt-rich regulations, supra note 8 at reg. 32; Sulphides regulations, supra note 7 at reg. 
32; and Nodules regulations, supra note 6 at reg. 30.
74   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 63.
75   Id at p. 64.
76   Id at p. 42 and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, supra 34 at paragraph 197.
77   Pacific Community – the Geoscience Devision, ‘Tonga a world leader in seabed 
minerals law’ (1 September 2014) at http://gsd.spc.int/media-releases/1-latest-news/583 
–tonga-a-world-leader-in-seabed-minerals-law.
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is debatable. The Seabed Minerals Act 201478 established the Tonga Seabed 
Minerals Authority, regulations of seabed minerals activities within Tonga’s 
national jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities of individuals, prospecting 
permits and licensing within national jurisdiction, sponsorship of activities 
in the Area, certain fiscal arrangements, marine scientific research, and some 
miscellaneous sections.79 The Deep Sea Minerals Project, a partnership 
between the EU, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and 15 Pacific Island 
countries assisted in the preparation of the Seabed Minerals Act.80 Chapter 7 
of the Act is titled ‘Sponsorship of Activities in the Area’; within it section 84 is 
titled ‘Liability of Sponsored Party’:
(1) The Sponsored Party shall be responsible for the performance of all 
Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within the Contract Area, and their 
compliance with the Rules of the ISA; and will be liable for the actual 
amount of any compensation or damage or penalties arising out of its 
failure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions and those of 
its employees, officers, subcontractors, and agents in the conduct of the 
Seabed Mineral Activities.
(2) Any obligations which are to be observed and performed by the 
Sponsored Party shall at any time at which the Sponsored Party is more 
than one person be joint and several obligations.
(3) A Sponsored Party shall at all times keep the Kingdom indemnified 
against all actions, proceedings, costs, charges, claims and demands 
which may be made or brought by any third party in relation to its Seabed 
Mineral Activities.
Other Pacific Island countries, such as Tuvalu, have implemented the 
same wording the same year.81 Nauru made some smaller amendments to 
78   The Seabed Minerals Act 2014 (the Kingdom of Tonga), at http://www.eisourcebook.org/
cms/February%202016/Tonga%20Seabed%20Minerals%20Act%202014.pdf.
79   Ibid.
80   Pacific Community, supra note 77.
81   Seabed Minerals Act 2014 (Tuvalu), s. 93.
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the same text,82 following the wording of Fiji’s 2013 enactment.83 ISA has also 
made a list of countries’ legislation/reciprocating legislation and national ini-
tiatives with respect to the activities in the Area.84 Singapore’s deep sea mining 
legislation for the Area is less specific:
(1) Where a licensee is responsible or liable for any wrongful act under 
Annex III, Article 22 of the Convention, the Court may —
 (a) order the licensee to pay to a person such compensation for the 
wrongful act as may be ordered to be paid to that person pursuant to that 
Article; and
 (b) grant to a person such other remedy for the licensee’s wrongful 
act as may be granted to that person pursuant to that Article.
(2) In this section, “licensee” includes a Singapore company which has 
ceased to hold a licence.85
It is apparent from a brief look at some national legislation that sponsored 
parties are under fault-based liability. One problem with fault-based liabil-
ity enacted on national level is the more obvious fact that the level of fault 
that is required to trigger liability will be different between sponsored par-
ties sponsored by different countries, as fault is defined differently among 
countries. Similarly, rules of evidence various between countries too, which 
will impact the “hurdle” of attaching fault-based liability to a sponsored party. 
As these enactments show, some countries have also included an indemnity 
clause. Taking into account the abovementioned State’s responsibility for due 
diligence, which lack of government oversight contributing to damage attach 
82   International Seabed Minerals Act 2015 (Nauru), s. 29: ’(1) A Sponsored Party shall be 
responsible for the performance of all Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within 
the Contract Area, and their compliance with the Rules of the ISA and shall be liable 
for the actual amount of any compensation, damage or penalties arising out of its fail-
ure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions in the conduct of the Seabed 
Mineral Activities. (2) By operation of this section, Nauru shall be indemnified against all 
actions, proceedings, costs, charges, claims and demands which may be made or brought 
by any third party in relation to a Sponsored Party’s Seabed Mineral Activities.’
83   International Seabed Mineral Management Decree 2013 (Fiji), s. 33. For more information 
on Pacific Islands’ legislation, see Blue Ocean Law and Pacific Network on Globilization, 
’Resource Roulette: How Deep Sea Mining and Inadequate Regulatory Frameworks Imperil 
the Pacific and its Peoples’ (2016) at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
Resource-Roulette-Deep-sea-Mining-and-Inadequate-Regulatory-Frameworks.pdf, Ch. 5.
84   ISA, ’Laws, regulations and administrative measures adopted by sponsoring States and 
other members of the International Seabed Authority with respect to the activities in 
the Area’ (13 June 2016), ISBA /22/C/8, at https://www.isa.org.jm/sites/default/files/files/
documents/isba-22c-8_1.pdf.
85   Deep Seabed Mining Act 2015 (Singapore), art. 17.
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liability, and situations where a State is part of a joint venture engaged in 
deep seabed mining, these indemnity clauses appear unenforceable in certain 
situations.
2.5.2 Compensable Damage
UNCLOS does specify that the amount of damages should be for ‘the actual 
amount of damages’.86 This terminology ‘actual amount of damages’ is 
repeated word for word in ISA regulation Standard Clauses for exploration 
contracts87 and abovementioned national law regulating activities in the Area. 
The Tribunal confirmed that the form of reparation depends on actual dam-
ages and the technical feasibility of restoring the pollution damage to ex ante,88 
relying on article 34 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility when determin-
ing the form of reparation, which states:
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, 
either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter.89
Neither UNCLOS nor the Regulations define or specify compensable dam-
age, or which subjects are entitled to damages.90 However, the Tribunal lists a 
couple of possible types of damage: damage to the Area, damage to the Area’s 
resources considered the common heritage of mankind, and damage to the 
marine environment.91 The lack of further clarity on what damage categories 
are compensable and how to actually calculate this ‘actual amount of damages’, 
place a large responsibility on the sponsoring States and national legislation 
to properly do this. It also opens up for forum shopping by contractors when 
choosing from with jurisdiction to conduct activities in the Area. A sense of 
such bias by the contractor could presumably initiate sponsoring States facili-
tating for more lenient national liability and compensation legislation as well 
86   UNCLOS Annex III, art. 22.
87   Cobalt-rich regulations, supra note 8 at reg. 32 in conjunction with Annex IV section 16.1; 
Sulphides regulations, supra note 7 at reg. 32 in conjunction with Annex 4, section 16.1; and 
Nodules regulations, supra note 6 at reg. 30 in conjunction with Annex IV section 16.1.
88   Id at p. 63.
89   International Law Commission ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts’ (2001) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Part Two, art. 34.
90   Cobalt-rich regulations, supra note 8 at reg. 32; Sulphides regulations, supra note 7 at reg. 
32; and Nodules regulations, supra note 6 at reg. 30.
91   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 59.
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as environmental legislation to attract the financial benefits of sponsoring a 
contractor.
3 The Need for a Proper System of Strict Liability for Pollution 
Damage Caused in the Area
3.1 The Lack of a Proper Liability and Compensation Scheme for Deep 
Seabed Mining
ISA, entities engaged in deep seabed mining, other users of the sea, and Coastal 
States are some examples the Tribunal explicitly states as subjects that may 
claim compensation for pollution damage in the Area.92 Claims against the 
contractor (sponsored party) may either be paid or not paid. If the contractor 
has paid the actual amount of damages, ‘there is no room for reparation by 
the sponsoring State.’93 This presumes that the concept of ‘actual amount of 
damages’ corresponds with compensation in full, which should be full envi-
ronmental restitution. This is hardly the case.
In certain situations, such as blameless actions of the contractor or simply 
contractor’s bankruptcy, the contractor may end up not paying for pollution 
damage in the Area. As stated above, strict liability is not the standard of liabil-
ity applicable to the sponsoring State. There is also no residual liability for the 
sponsoring State,94 and the sponsoring State and the contractor does not bear 
joint and several liability, which is a standard applicable where different enti-
ties have contributed to the same damage so that compensation in full can be 
achieved.95 As a result, certain ‘liability gaps’ may occur in situations where the 
contractor does not pay the actual amount of damage. The fault-based limita-
tion on liability for sponsoring States leaves at least three liability gaps:
– where a state takes all necessary and/or appropriate measures required by 
international law and the blameless actions of the contractor nevertheless 
cause environmental harm;
– where a state takes the requisite necessary and/or appropriate measures and 
the private operator is blameworthy, but insolvent or its assets are beyond 
the reach of the sponsoring state; and
– where the sponsoring state has failed to take the required measures but 
there is no causal link with the environmental harm.96
92   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 59.
93   Id at p. 64.
94   Ibid.
95   Id at pp. 63–64.
96   Donald K. Anton (11 November 2011) ‘The Principle of Residual Liability in the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: The Advisory 
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These liability gaps are currently not protected under international law, and 
compensable. Article 304 of UNCLOS allows further developments of interna-
tional law to be implemented into the deep seabed liability regime, and also 
further developments of the deep seabed liability regime specifically.97
3.2 An Alternative Model of Liability and Compensation
3.2.1 Sponsored Contractor’s Strict Liability for Pollution Damage  
in the Area
ITLOS states that the sponsoring States may apply more stringent standards as 
far as the protection of the marine environment is concerned to their contrac-
tors.98 Sponsoring States should implement strict liability for their contractors 
for pollution damage from activities in the Area, as such activities are hazard-
ous, to ensure prompt and adequate compensation.99 There is no good reason 
why injured parties and the environment should take the risk of contractors 
adhering to a negligence standard for pollution damage in the Area. The cost 
of such liability can be internalised and offset to some extent by insurance.100 
The Norwegian Petroleum Act101 is a good example of how strict liability on the 
licensee for pollution damage caused by petroleum does not limit the interest 
from national and international companies to explore and produce oil and gas 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
3.2.2 Pollution Damage Fund under the ISA
ITLOS suggested that ISA should consider the option of setting up a damage 
fund as a means to cover damages that are not otherwise covered by the deep 
seabed mining liability scheme, the liability gap.102 A pollution damage fund 
would be a good way of creating a second layer of safety to ensure compensation 
of pollution damage in the Area, for situations where the sponsored contractor 
become delinquent and claims are beyond the scope of its insurance.103 Such 
Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed Mining (ITLOS Case No. 
17)’ McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy, at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1957907, pp. 12–13 referring to Written Statement of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/docu 
ments/cases/case_no_17/StatementIUCN.pdf, pp. 28–29.
97   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 66.
98   Id at p. 73.
99   ILC, ‘Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising 
out of hazardous activities’ (2006) International Law Commission, 58th session, art. 4(2).
100   Working Draft Regulations and Standard Contract Terms, supra note 13 at sec. 8.
101   Lov om petroleumsvirksomhet 1996 nr. 72.
102   ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at pp. 65–66.
103   ILC, ‘Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising 
out of hazardous activities’ (2006) International Law Commission, 58th session, art. 4(4).
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a fund should be under the ISA, as the international regulatory body and col-
lector of certain deep seabed related fees. ISA has created draft regulation to 
establish a Environmental Liability Trust Fund.104
3.2.3 Residual Liability for the Sponsoring State
The sponsoring State is not residually liable for a contractor’s 
non-compliance.105 However, sponsoring States should be liable in last 
instance as deep seabed mining is a significant hazardous activity.106 The spon-
soring States set the financial requirements of the contractor and can increase 
financial security requirements of the contractor to decrease its own risk. The 
environment in the Area, the common heritage of human kind, should not be 
put at risk and suffer when this could be avoided.
4 Conclusion
The sponsoring State’s liability arises from its own failure to carry out 
its responsibilities, whereas the sponsored contractor’s liability arises from its 
own non-compliance. These two forms of liability exist simultaneously and 
in parallel. The only connection between the two is that the sponsoring 
State’s liability depends upon the sponsored contractor’s damage resulting 
from activities or omissions.107 This system facilitates for liability gaps, which 
could and should be removed by enacting on a national level strict liability for 
pollution damage in the Area on the sponsored contractor, an international 
seabed pollution damage fund, and residual liability on sponsoring States. This 
is stricter than the current international legal situation, but international law is 
constantly evolving and should evolve accordingly.
104   ISA, ‘Developing a Regulatory Framework for Mineral Exploitation in the Area: a 
Discussion Paper on the development and drafting of Regulations on Exploitation for 
Mineral Resources in the Area (Environmental Matters)’ (January 2017) at https://www 
.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/DraftExpl/DP-EnvRegsDraft25117.pdf, pp. 72–74.
105   Position put before ITLOS by amongst others R.A. Makgill et al., Written Statement of 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Commission on 
Environmental Law, Oceans, Coastal and Coral Reefs Special Group (19 August 2010) at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/StatementIUCN.pdf, 
pp. 29–32.
106   ILC, ‘Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising 
out of hazardous activities’ (2006) International Law Commission, 58th session, art. 4(5).
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